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

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A REPLY

TO THE

MISREPRESENTATIONS AND ASPERSIONS

ON

THE MILITARY REPUTATION

OF THE LATE

LIEUT.-GEN. R. B. LONG,

CONTAINED IN A WORK ENTITLED

"Further Strictures on those Parts of Col. Napier's History of the Peninsular War which relate to the Military Opinions and Conduct of General Lord Viscount Beresford, G.C.B. &c. &c. &c."

ACCOMPANIED BY

EXTRACTS FROM THE MS. JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF THAT OFFICER, AND CORROBORATED BY THE FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIVING WITNESSES.

BY CHARLES EDWARD LONG, ESQ.

Pudet hæc opprobria nobis
Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli.

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Lx.C.1

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY.

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C. ROWORTH AND SONS, BELL YARD,
TEMPLE BAR.

PREFACE.

NOTHING but the duty of vindicating the reputation of a deceased relative, would have induced the Compiler of these pages to put forth a printed Reply to the work which has recently appeared, entitled "Further Strictures on Col. Napier's Third Volume of the Peninsular War, &c. &c." It is an undertaking at once foreign to his habits and painful to his feelings. But, as the Author of the Strictures has thought proper to shelter his Commander-in-chief (Lord Beresford) from the charges brought against him by Colonel Napier, by dragging forth unnecessarily, and in somewhat offensive language, the deeds, or as he would insinuate, the misdeeds of another, and by heaping countervailing charges on the conduct of a brother officer who is not living to refute them; no

alternative is left to those by whom the memory of that officer is revered, but to meet such charges plainly and promptly with the nearest evidence at hand—the written and recorded statements of the party accused, whose own unvarnished narrative, corroborated, as it is, in nearly every important particular, by the testimony of living witnesses, may afford the best reply to the injurious aspersions of his anonymous accuser.

ERRATA.

Page 26, third line from the bottom, *for* " of the General," *read* " of General."
—— 35, ninth line from the top, *for* " squadrons A. that," *read* " squadrons that."
—— 45, twelfth line from the top, *for* " army," *read* " arm."
—— 55, fifth line from the bottom, *for* " August," *read* " March."
—— twelfth line from the top, *for* " columns," *read* " column."
—— 63, fourth line from the bottom, *for* " squadron," *read* " squadrons."
—— 64, fourth line from the bottom, *for* " at this distance," *read* " at the distance."
—— 80, twelfth line from the bottom, dele " them."
—— 91, *for* " Than their slight habits," *read* " Than thin slight habits."
—— 96, seventh line from the bottom, *for* " to the command," *read* " the command."
—— 137, thirteenth line from the top, *for* " near to the source," *read* " near the source."
—— 141, ninth line from the bottom, *for* " every," *read* " very."



REPLY, &c.



It is not the intention, neither is it within the capacity of the author of this reply, to enter upon a military *critique* of the work in question, but simply to point out a few of the various discrepancies that exist in the "Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War," as compared with the journal and correspondence of the late Lieutenant-General Long, and the living evidence that has been obtained, so far as it affects the operations with which that officer was immediately connected. It must be left to the public, and to the military reader more particularly, to form their own conclusions as to the general character of the work by a comparative estimate of the different accounts submitted to their perusal. All that the author can pretend to do is, to lay before his readers such statements as shall be deemed sufficient to vindicate the reputation of his deceased relative from the unjust and unprovoked reproaches attempted to

be cast upon it; to involve no one in the controversy excepting those by whom that relative has been assailed, and to found his defence, not on vague assertions sent forth with all the ostentation of authority, and yet coupled with all the irresponsibility of concealment, but on statements backed by living evidence, which is alike within the reach of all. For the multiplicity of details, and the continued repetition of facts, a desire to strengthen the defence by corroborative testimony is the only apology that can be offered.

That differences unfortunately existed between Marshal Beresford and General Long is well known to many officers now living. The lapse of more than twenty years, and the decease of the latter officer, had nearly buried the remembrance of those differences in oblivion. However unmerited might have been the treatment of General Long, the revolution of time had nearly obliterated from the minds of his surviving relatives all traces of that treatment, and the recollections had passed away as the events by which they had been occasioned receded from observation, or were overshadowed by others of a deeper and more durable interest. It remained for the author of the Strictures to renew those recollections, and in seeking out a victim to

appease his antagonist, and account for the errors of his chief, he has thus chosen to stab, with all the bitterness of long rankling hostility, the reputation of an officer now, unfortunately, not living to refute his charges, and whose character is thus left to the chance-medley aid of a few private letters, the evidence of some one or two brother officers, and (but which it is hoped may be confidently relied on) the impartial judgment of the readers of this publication. Neither the letters of General Long, nor his private journal, were ever intended to meet the public eye; they were written solely for the gratification of his relatives, and one or two professional friends; and most certainly, but for the censures of the writer of the Strictures, would never have been submitted to the press. An answer to an anonymous publication might, under other circumstances, be deemed an unnecessary, perhaps, an inconsiderate, undertaking. But, carrying with it, as that publication confessedly does (in its tone at least), the mark and impress of a higher hand, it cannot be regarded as the mere effusion of some obscure and casual critic of Colonel Napier's History, but as the deliberate narrative of an authorised advocate of Lord Beresford's cause, connected with his proceedings, and possibly countenanced by his appro-

bation. In the prosecution of this task, it has been the author's chief aim, to abstain from all personal allusions, and, in that respect, to avoid the example of the writer of the Strictures. He, at least, has not confined himself to the barren refutation of distinct charges, nor limited his animadversions to the historian, whose work he has professed to criticise; but, to quote his own words, he "dashes about his inconsiderate censures, without any regard for those whose honour or character he may wound; and, though a soldier himself, appears to have no sympathy in the common sentiments of all military men, that a soldier's honour is dearer than his life."

However reluctantly the author may have been forced into this painful controversy, and unexpectedly dragged to the bar of public opinion, he is still aware that that opinion is alone to be governed, as he would wish it to be governed, by the strength of the evidence adduced.

It is by the strict standard of truth that the value of this reply is to be estimated, and by that let it be tried. It might have been thought, perhaps, that there was no one who would come forward to undertake the irksome office of a posthumous defence. The writer may have triumphed in the conscious superiority,

that the weapons of the living are at hand, and have cherished the delusive expectation that, as those who are in their graves speak not, there is no arm to right them. He has yet to learn, that there is still enough of honest indignation among the surviving relatives of an injured man, to rouse them to a just sense of their duty to defend him, and still enough of evidence within their grasp, to confound, if not to silence, his accusers.

Almost immediately on his second arrival in the Peninsula, in March 1811, General Long was appointed to the command of the cavalry in the Alemtejo, under the orders of Marshal Sir William Beresford, whom he joined at Thomar on the 16th of that month, having previously been present, though not in any command, at the affair of the 13th, at Casal Nova, with Lord Wellington.

In proceeding to lay before the reader the documentary evidence on which the author is prepared to found his answer to the misrepresentations of the writer of the "Further Strictures," it is necessary to preface its introduction by a brief notice of the charges which have been adduced against General Long, and which charges, in fact, form the ground work, if not the whole, of the defence of Lord Beresford against the censures of Colonel Napier, by

whom General Long is not, as respects the affair of Campo Mayor, even nominally alluded to as the officer in command. There are other occasions in which General Long's conduct is called in question; indeed, wherever his name appears in the work it is invariably coupled either with censure or insinuation. If failures are to be accounted for, the cause of them is attributed to him; if praise might be bestowed, it is studiously and systematically withheld.

The writer first states, in opening the case of Campo Mayor, that "General Long, who then commanded the Allied cavalry, was directed to proceed to turn the enemy and to threaten his line of retreat," p. 38, which, he adds, was "done with a view of trying whether the French commander intended to abandon the place, or to remain under the protection of its guns and defend it," the enemy having, as he says, been previously observed to be "filing out of it, and forming on the glacis." "General Long," he continues, "was ordered only to make such a circuit as would be just sufficient to keep his troops clear of the guns of the works. He had not gone far before the Marshal, perceiving that he was taking far too wide a range, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge with orders for him to circle nearer the town, in obedience to the instructions that had

been given him. General Long still continued to widen his circuit; and a second time Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge was sent after him to express the Marshal's displeasure, and with directions for him to approach the enemy. The General alleged some foolish reasons for thus obstinately persisting in his most extraordinary detour, and, in the mean time, the enemy perceiving the movement that was made, began to retire to Badajos."—p. 38-9.

In Marshal Beresford's dispatch, it will be seen that Brigadier-General Long was ordered "to endeavour to turn the enemy's right, keeping out of the reach of the place." The letter of General Long, dated April 22, notices this complaint of the extended circuit as coupled with his orders, by giving a reason for not narrowing the detour, and denying that he exceeded his directions; and the answer of Major-General Sir Charles Dalbiac to the second question submitted to him, as far as relates to that portion of the cavalry he was with, corroborates the fact, that if Brigadier-General Long did disobey his orders it was in *not* "keeping out of reach of the place," and by only occasionally, if at all, moving beyond cannon range in following his directions to "turn the town," and "threaten the line of retreat." With respect to the concluding passage in these

extracts, and the "foolish reason" alleged to have been returned by Brigadier-General Long to the second message from the Marshal, urging an immediate approximation to the enemy, an application was, on reading this passage, almost immediately made to Sir Henry Hardinge, to know what was (for in the flippant generalization of his terms the author had omitted to note it down) the answer of General Long to this "second message, expressive of the Marshal's displeasure." The reply of Sir Henry Hardinge was as follows:

"I was directed by Lord Beresford to express his dissatisfaction at the wide circuit he" viz. General Long, "was taking, and to repeat his Lordship's injunctions that General Long should take a shorter line, in order to place the cavalry on or near the road leading from Campo Mayor to Badajos. General Long, in making this movement, had his *right* flank towards the town, and his *left* towards the undulating but open country by which the place is surrounded. The General, in explanation, urged the propriety of securing his *left* flank against any enemy's cavalry force which he was of opinion might be concealed under cover of the undulating ground on the left.

"I expressed to the General at the time the different view I took of the necessity of the

caution he was using, and, as General Long's subsequent explanations to Lord Beresford were to the same effect, the impression remained, that the General, on this occasion, had erred in judgment, as to the best and most prompt mode of carrying Lord Beresford's orders into execution."

That this reason for the detour differs very materially from that given in General Long's letter, dated Los Santos, April 22, is unquestionable. But on comparing this passage with the letter to General Le Marchant, it will be seen that General Long, in speaking of "an impassable ravine," apparently alludes to an earlier part of his operations; for he subsequently mentions the arrival of an aide-de-camp with orders for him to "proceed round the town, so as to turn it, but to keep at two or three gun shots from the works," and then confirms so much of the statement of Sir Henry Hardinge as relates to the "propriety of securing his left flank," in consequence of "the enemy's demonstrations on his left." If, however, no other reason was assigned for such detour than that stated from recollection by Sir Henry Hardinge, the evidence of that officer is singularly unavailable in support of the charge of the author of the Strictures, inasmuch as it equally involves him with General Long

in the same "error in judgment;" for, in page 48, that writer observes that "the heights alluded to" viz. in a passage in Napier, "were really only on the enemy's left flank as he retired; but on this plain there are *great inequalities of ground, behind which any number of troops might be concealed.*" If, therefore, General Long was, in the opinion of Sir Henry Hardinge, using unnecessary caution in "securing his left flank against any *enemy's cavalry force* that *might be concealed under cover of the undulating ground on the left,*" he was confessedly not so in the opinion of the author of the Strictures; and if he did allege "some foolish reasons for thus obstinately persisting in his most extraordinary detour," those reasons were obviously not the reasons stated by Sir Henry Hardinge, the bearer of the message.

This deduction, being abundantly evident to the merest tyro in reasoning, the author may here be permitted to observe, with reference to the difference of opinion that seems to exist respecting the direction taken by General Long to arrive at the enemy, that a movement which must have had the effect of placing that officer and his cavalry on the road between Campo Mayor and the enemy, and not on the road between Badajos and the enemy, would appear to be an extraordinary way of obeying his

injunctions to "turn the enemy" and "threaten his line of retreat"—p. 38. Even supposing that by such a narrowing of his circuit he could have obeyed the remainder of his orders to "keep his troops" all the while "clear of the guns of the works."

To proceed, "That officer," viz. Brigadier-General Long, "had been expressly ordered not to charge the enemy's infantry under any pretence whatever, while they were in column and prepared, but to exert every means to harass and delay its progress till the infantry of the Allies could come up."—p 39. "When the marshal," he continues, "first got sight of the Allied cavalry, they were already in contact with the enemy, and the first thing he could discern was a charge made by the Portuguese cavalry against a column of French infantry. As might be expected, the assailants were beaten off."

How far the author can be borne out in the assertion that Brigadier-General Long charged the column of French infantry with the Portuguese cavalry, the reader will best determine from the letter of General Long, dated March 28, and the private memorandum, as also from the notes of Lieut.-Colonel Doyle, and the answer of Major-General Sir C. Dalbiac to the fourth question submitted to him, both which officers

were present. The Portuguese *never charged the infantry at all.* The Hussars, who had not stirred from the enemy's column, advanced, whereupon the Portuguese troops fled.

"At this time," the writer goes on to say, p. 39, viz. *after* the Marshal had discerned (it being "the first thing he could discern") this "charge made by the Portuguese cavalry against the column of French infantry" (which never took place) and their "expected" discomfiture (which would seem to have taken place without the assistance of any charge whatever,) "the Marshal came up with the heavy brigade of cavalry, commanded by Colonel De Grey, at a short distance in rear of the others, and directed them to take post on a small height until" (*until!*) "he could examine what was going on in front." So that having "*first*" got sight of the allied cavalry when they were effecting their ideal charge on the column of infantry, the Marshal *afterwards* "came up with the heavy brigade," gave it its directions, (viz. to halt) and *then*, and not till then, *proceeded* to "examine *what* was going on in front," he having been previously in profound ignorance, or, what was worse than ignorance, in positive error as to "what" *had* been "going on in front." This examination having, it appears, taken place, "Colonel De Grey was then ordered up, the

nearest guns were directed to advance with all possible speed. Two guns from the German infantry brigade arrived, and a few rounds were fired into the enemy's column; but the horses were exhausted and could not be made to keep pace with the French troops, who steadily pressed on at a very quick step, notwithstanding the cavalry of the Allies were threatening to charge them at every instant."—p. 40.

The nearest guns were directed to advance with all speed. Two had arrived, and were already, be it observed, between the heavy brigade and the enemy at the time when the former were "ordered up" from the "small height" across the Badajos road. The natural question that must immediately suggest itself to the general reader is: Why, if two guns could come up, did not all six? It would appear from the statement of Colonel Doyle, that the bringing them up was deemed no very impracticable undertaking by the officer commanding them. But the "horses were exhausted,"—exhausted in the pursuit of infantry to a distance of two miles from Campo Mayor!! The mere stopping to fire might, one would suppose, have enabled these "exhausted" animals to recover their wind, and to keep pace at least with the march of a column of infantry, having several miles of open country before it, and which "the

cavalry of the Allies were threatening to charge at every instant"!

The next in the series of disasters narrated by this faithful historian, is coupled with an accusation, as respects Brigadier-General Long, at once as astounding as it is ridiculous. "The Marshal," he writes, p. 40, "now heard from General Long, whose report was confirmed by Baron Trip, that the 13th Light Dragoons* had, in the strangest manner, been taken prisoners bodily. Indeed the account which these officers delivered of the capture of the 13th was even more extraordinary than Colonel Napier's description of their engagement. "The Marshal finding it difficult to credit the account, expressed his astonishment that in a plain such as they were upon, no one man should have broken away. Still the assertion that such was the fact could not be contradicted."

The extreme absurdity of such a charge, viz. that the general officer commanding on the

With respect to Baron Trip, it is stated (p. 38,) that "some light horse were sent down to reconnoitre." With these, who were Portuguese skirmishers, Baron Trip, as the author is confidently informed, was stationed, and consequently could not have seen the charge of the 13th. Whether he was the author, or one of the authors of the report circulated, as is affirmed by the writer of the Strictures, it is not necessary to inquire.

spot, who directed the charge of his troops, and witnessed the discomfiture of the enemy should himself have reported to his chief that they had been, subsequently to their success, *actually captured en masse*, but how or where no man knew, would hardly seem to require the aid of direct evidence in refutation. The reader is however requested to observe in the letter of General Long to E. L., dated May 29, how, in a conversation with Sir William Lumley, he had first become acquainted with the fact that such a report had indeed been made *direct* to Marshal Beresford; and he is further required to notice the authorized communication from Sir W. Lumley, and the answer of Sir C. Dalbiac to the fifth question submitted to him.

But it "could not," says the writer, "be contradicted." Whether such a report required a direct contradiction, or whether credulity herself should not have been shamed into scepticism, and have only been startled (if startled at all) by the shapeless incongruity, at the mere instant of its apparition, it is not pretended to inquire. But it *was* contradicted, *viz.* by Colonel Doyle, (who had followed in the charge for some distance,) as he himself states, when he was sent by General Long to order up the heavy dragoons; and this fact sufficiently proves that

Marshal Beresford never *could* have "heard" this strange report "from General Long," (even putting the evidence of that officer's letter aside,) inasmuch as General Long was not aware by whose order the heavy dragoons had been halted, and subsequently removed to the right of the Badajos road, until Colonel Doyle had returned with his report from head quarters, and that the message to which that report was in answer, was preceded by the rumour at head-quarters of the "bodily capture" of the 13th. But the whole thing is most unaccountably strange and mysterious; for, from the answer of Major-general Sir C. Dalbiac to the sixth question, it is clear that he, at least, as one of the heavy brigade, had witnessed, if not the charge of the 13th, the evidence of the success of that charge, and this about the time head-quarters passed the heavy brigade, and "proceeded to examine what was going on in front!" In the sequel, p. 40, "the Marshal seeing that it was impossible to bring up his infantry, and that the cavalry had been brought into action in direct opposition to his orders," &c. "commanded the cavalry to desist from all further pursuit."—p. 41. With respect to the impossibility of bringing up any infantry, the reader will notice what is stated by Colonel Doyle with reference to General Stewart's division,

and also what is mentioned by General Long, in his letter dated Dec. 3, in regard to Colonel Colborne, an officer in General Stewart's division, and the identical Colonel Colborne (now Sir John Colborne) of whom the writer of the Strictures observes, that "neither Colonel Colborne nor any infantry were near the scene of action."—p. 42. He will also further notice the answers of Colonel Gabriel (General Stewart's aide-de-camp) to the questions submitted to him regarding the proximity of the infantry. With respect to the cavalry being brought into action in direct opposition to his (the Marshal's) "orders," it is sufficient to refer to the Marshal's dispatch, where he states that the "opportunity" was "favourable," and of the effect, that the enemy "were entirely routed."

The author of the Strictures, in conclusion, gives a *résumé* of the affair as follows:—"With regard to the 13th," p. 41, he observes, "the fact was this:—General Long, coming from his circuit, at less than a league from Campo Mayor, descended from the heights upon the left flank of the enemy." The construction of this passage is somewhat obscure, but it is presumed that the writer means to signify that General Long "descended from the heights upon the left flank of the enemy at less than

a league from Campo Mayor." The distance given is somewhat indefinite. It was in reality about two miles, consequently, considerably less than a league from Campo Mayor, and although General Long's movement is pronounced to have been "erroneous," p. 46, it is satisfactory to ascertain that it brought him precisely upon the left flank of the enemy so as to "threaten his retreat."

"The Marshal," p. 41, continues our informant, "some time after the halt, was the first to perceive a column of troops advancing towards them from the direction of Badajos. On looking through the glass he discovered it to be the 13th returning." The obvious question that occurs to the unprofessional inquirer is—Why, when the Marshal saw (and indeed was the "*first*" to see) that they were safe, and that their "bodily" engulphment was a chimerical delusion, did he not bring up his guns (the horses having sufficiently recovered from their exhaustion by the time that had elapsed between the halt and the first perception of the victorious captives), and try to retrieve the "mischief and folly," p. 47, of the day, by some small effort of hostility against the enemy's column (now confessedly surrounded by *all* the allied cavalry with a couple of guns, and the whole army with the other guns in the rear), or at least securing their already captured artillery?

The gradation of events is not very rigidly adhered to by the author of the Strictures, and it is necessary to follow his criticisms in the order they occur. "General Long," pp. 44, 45, he observes, "instead of charging the hussars in front, as he should have done, if he thought fit to make any attack at all, so as to drive them upon their infantry, charged them in flank, and separated them from the latter, which was thus left quite clear on every front of its square."

It is not for the author to speak in the tone of a tactician of the military merit or demerit of such a movement. It must be left to the criticism of the military reader. He may, however, be allowed to submit whether a charge of the 13th, which should have been sufficiently successful to have carried them through the enemy's cavalry (as appears to have been the case in the attack made by that regiment), would not have placed them between two bodies of the enemy in a state of disorganization, and in face of the then unbroken infantry, and consequently that it would have been indeed an instance of "folly," not unlikely to have been attended with its merited proportion of "mischief." One fact is certain, amply authenticated by the writer himself in his reprint of Sir B. D'Urban's brief notice of the affair,

and fully corroborated by the dispatch of Marshal Beresford, viz. the *success* of the charge, "made," says the Marshal, "with the most determined courage," the enemy being "entirely routed, and pursued into the town of Badajos, two leagues distant; in which flight the greater part of them were sabred, as were the conductors and the artillery-men of sixteen pieces of cannon, which were taken on the road, but afterwards abandoned." In a no less laudatory style, is the concise and correct statement of Major General Sir B. D'Urban. Not a word here about the "erroneous movement." "An occasion," says Sir Benjamin, "was found for attacking his cavalry, notwithstanding that it moved very near to, and appuied itself upon his infantry."—p. 8, Appendix. "The attack was admirably executed, and the success complete. The enemy's cavalry was routed, driven off the field, and pursued to the bridge-head of Badajos. It suffered severely, particularly the 26th Dragoons, who lost their Colonel and eight officers, and were almost entirely destroyed. The allied cavalry in pursuit of the French overtook the detachment of artillery, which had been employed in the siege of Campo Mayor, fell upon them and cut them to pieces." And this is what the writer has the temerity to quote in corroboration of

his censures upon the officer who directed this "admirably executed" attack, in which Marshal Beresford states, that that officer "manœuvred with great ability," and that "the loss of the enemy was very considerable, not less than five or six hundred men in killed, wounded, and prisoners!" But "their infantry," says the writer, in consequence of this charge in flank, "was thus left quite clear on every front of its square." This assertion, like that in pages 39 and 40, that none of the "enemy's cavalry were to be seen," is equally devoid of foundation. The hussars which headed and closed the column had never stirred from the infantry. "The Marshal," says the writer, reverting to the first scene of his drama, p. 46, "sent General Long to manœuvre under his own eye, and he remained himself at the head of the infantry, ready to put it in motion as soon as he should discern what were the intentions of the enemy." That General Long "manœuvred with great ability," we have in evidence from Marshal Beresford himself; and when the intentions of the enemy "to abandon the place," and not "to remain under the protection of its guns and defend it," were made manifest, where, it may be asked, was the Commander-in-Chief, that he was not at hand to "discern" those "intentions," and "ready to

put" his infantry "in motion" to counteract them?

"When," writes the author, the Marshal "perceived that General Long still continued his erroneous movement," p. 46, (although manœuvring "with great ability,") "even after the enemy were in motion," (one of the two objects which the Marshal was desirous of ascertaining and of being "ready" to take advantage of,) "Beresford set off at full gallop after him (who had then been lost sight of,) and though he had not reached the cavalry when the charge was made by the 13th," (going at "full gallop,") "though indeed he did not see it, though he did not arrive early enough to stop the attack made by the Portuguese brigade," (which, as we have seen, was an effort of vigour on their part that was rendered superfluous by their flight,) "yet he came up immediately after, and in time to prevent the occurrence of still greater mischief and folly."

The main and primary question is this—was the allied cavalry to attack that of the enemy, if an opportunity offered of striking a blow? That such was the understanding of Brigadier General Long, the officer in command of that cavalry, is obvious from his letters; that such was the impression of M. General Sir C. Dalbiac, then in command of one of the regiments

of that cavalry, is evident from his first answer; that such was the conviction of Colonel Doyle, an officer on the staff of the army, is clear, from his observations; that such was the idea of Major General Sir B. D'Urban is indisputable, from his account of the affair; that such was the supposition of Marshal Beresford's staff is palpable, from the suggestions of one of his aide-de-camps, as stated in the letter of General Long to General Le Marchant; and that such was the conception of the Marshal himself is manifest from his dispatch—the "opportunity" was "favourable." Was General Long accountable for the indiscreet but gallant pursuit of the 13th to the bridge-head of Badajos? The Marshal himself says that he was not. On the contrary, he affirms, that that officer "made the greatest exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the cavalry, and regulate their movements." It is submitted to the military reader, whether, if Marshal Beresford had intended to interfere with, rather than to support, the operations of his cavalry, he ought not to have been in advance, and on the spot, to have witnessed the charge of the 13th (which it is evident that neither he nor any of his staff did witness), and to have taken measures to have supported the successful efforts of his cavalry, for he could then have

seen that there was no wholesale and "bodily capture" of that regiment. If, on the other hand, he was not in advance, and knew not of their success, "*though* he had not reached the cavalry when the charge was made by the 13th; *though*, indeed, he did not see it; *though* he did not arrive early enough to stop the attack made by the Portuguese brigade;" *though*, it may be added, the "determined courage" of the one had ended in captivity, and the presumptuous gallantry of the other had evaporated in flight; *though* the "entire routing" of the enemy had but enabled them to absorb within the vortex of their fugitive squadrons the victors whose "success was complete," and by whom they were "pursued to the bridge-head of Badajos;" *though* all these miracles had been wrought, and the dirge of defeat had so simultaneously (if the Hibernicism may be permitted) succeeded to the shout of victory, ought (it is submitted) the individual, by whom the energies of an army were to be directed, thus to have paralysed (*before* the rumour of the capture had reached him), by an immediate interference, and by the withering of his presence, those proceedings which he had delegated to others, prepared to partake in the gale of their triumph, and yet condemn the head that had directed,

and the arm that had executed, "admirably executed," that attack, which was destined to crown with titular distinction one, who, at the same time, indignantly spurned the hand by which the wreath that was proffered had been woven? But the Marshal "considered" (that is, *after* the first interference of halting the heavy brigade) "one regiment as lost." It is again submitted, whether, if such had really been the case, it was not an urgent and additional reason for attempting to neutralize the triumph of his enemy, by every effort to effect a decisive blow against the retreating column of infantry, and more especially when he saw them, as he says, "in much confusion," and had artillery at hand to produce much more? In conclusion: whether Marshal Beresford's arrival on the spot with his heavy cavalry, (which he had previously halted at the moment when its support was most critically required,) and a couple of guns, was, as the author is pleased to observe, "in time to prevent the occurrence of still greater mischief and folly;" and whether the Marshal (the 13th having been, "from the report of Baron Trip," "given up as lost,") acted with judicious generalship in "hovering round" the enemy's infantry, "at the distance of a hundred yards," (p. 49,) in ordering a general halt, and finally (after having been "the first to per-

ceive" the safety of the 13th,) in leaving that enemy (now confessedly hemmed in on all sides,) to retire unmolested to Badajos, and their captured battering train to be re-captured and carried off at their earliest convenience, is no part of the province of the author of these pages to determine.

The winding up of this most extraordinary detail of facts and reckless advancement of opinions by the writer of the Strictures, where he says, p. 50, "I have reason to believe that the whole of the Marshal's censure on their temerity" (viz. the pursuit of the 13th,) "was confined to the formal reception and the brief sentence of admonition, which he addressed to Colonel Head," is in harmonious keeping with the general accuracy of his narrative. Marshal Beresford, it is well known, wrote to Lord Wellington, and caused that reprimand, which will be found in the order of the papers printed. Of its severity and of its justice the public will judge; and they will in like manner reconcile, if it be possible, the "facts" collected by the author of the Strictures, for his case of Campo Mayor, with Marshal Beresford's dispatch, the papers of General Long, the evidence of the officers who were present, and the brief narrative of the General Sir B. D'Urban. They will then determine whether the writer of the Strictures has confined himself to the legiti-

mate line of defence, or whether his is not an endeavour to enhance the military judgment of an officer now living, by a most unjust and ungenerous attack upon the military character of an officer deceased.

Dispatch from Marshal Beresford to his Excellency Lord Wellington, dated Campo Mayor, March 26, 1811.

My Lord,

I had communicated to your Excellency my arrival at Arronches with all my forces, except the division of Brigadier General Cole, to which, in consequence of the continued marches it had made, it was judged necessary to give a day's rest at Portalegre.

On the 24th, I caused the troops to move from Arronches for Quinta de Reguengo, a little more than half-way to this place, and the division of General Cole for Arronches, and having joined yesterday at ten in the morning, I put the whole in motion for this town. I could not know the intention of the enemy with respect to this place; but in case he should endeavour to maintain it, I proposed to post myself between him and Badajos, and thus cut him off from the latter.

We discovered the enemy's advanced ca-

valry on the heights of Lopo de Malto, about a league distant; but perceiving that we were manœuvring on their flank, they retreated, and some skirmishing took place at the foot of the walls of the town with the advanced cavalry. When I reached the heights of the place, I discovered the enemy's force on the outside of the town. (I did not, however, know whether or not he was master of the place.) There were four regiments of cavalry, the regiment of infantry, No. 100, of three battalions, with some horse artillery.

I ordered Brigadier General Long with the cavalry to endeavour to *turn the enemy's right, keeping out of the reach of the place.* My object was to detain the force of the enemy till some infantry could arrive. The Brigadier made a wider circuit than was intended, so that he *more effectually flanked the enemy,* and obliged him to retreat hastily, and indeed with extraordinary rapidity. The cavalry advanced upon his right flank, and Brigadier General Long, *seeing a favorable opportunity,* ordered Colonel Head, with two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons, to charge the cavalry of the enemy, which obliged the infantry to fall back to support it. This charge, followed by Colonel Otway, with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and supported by General Long, with

the remainder of that regiment, the 1st Portuguese, and the brigade of Colonel de Grey, was made with the most determined courage, and the French were *entirely routed*, and pursued into the town of Badajos, two leagues distant; in which flight the greater part of them were sabred, as were the conductors and artillerymen of 16 pieces of cannon, which were taken on the road, but afterwards abandoned.

This success, though it occasioned a great loss to the enemy, was in some manner unfortunate; because, not knowing what had been done by the cavalry that had made the charge, and continuing to pursue the infantry with the remaining cavalry and two pieces of artillery, for the space of a league, to support the detached body which had advanced, and not having received any notice from it, nor knowing what new force the enemy might send from Badajos, prudence obliged me to halt with my cavalry till the infantry could come up. The enemy's infantry, amounting to about 1,200 men, though *in much confusion*, continued to march in column without halting, notwithstanding we were not more than one hundred and sixty yards distant from them; yet not knowing any thing of the 13th Regiment of Dragoons and 7th Portuguese, I could not hazard the loss which would have necessarily

taken place, even though successful, had I ordered a charge of the heavy brigade under the command of Colonel de Grey. The attention, firmness, and order of this brigade, composed of the 3d Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons, merit my warmest approbation. *General Long manœuvred with great ability, and made the greatest exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the cavalry and regulate their movements.* The valour of all was exemplary, particularly of Colonels Head and Otway, and their squadrons; and the only thing to be remarked is, that which is customary with our troops, on their first encounter with the enemy, too great an impetuosity.

The loss of the enemy was very considerable; not less than 5 or 600 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. We likewise took a great number of horses and mules; in fact the enemy abandoned everything; but we had only means to bring away what is mentioned in the enclosed list. Some carriages, &c. were destroyed. We also suffered some loss, a return of which I have the honour to transmit to you. It was not my intention yesterday to have proceeded to this city, and I was only induced to do so from the prospects of capturing or destroying the force which the enemy incautiously left there, and which would infallibly

have taken place if our cavalry had not compelled the enemy to make a retreat so rapid that the infantry could not come up with it.

After the long marches and fatigues necessarily consequent on them, I have sent the troops into cantonments here and at Elvas for rest and refreshment, and to make the necessary preparations for the ulterior operations recommended by your Excellency. Of the corn and provisions in the place at the time of its surrender to the enemy, the latter had not time to carry anything away, and they will prove a very opportune assistance to us. The enemy left behind 8,000 rations of biscuit, not expecting so sudden a visit. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) W. C. Beresford, Marshal.

Private Memorandum of the Affair of Cavalry between Campo Mayor and Badajos, on the 25th of March, 1811.

Brigadier-General Long having received orders from Marshal Beresford to turn the town of Campo Mayor on the 25th instant, and to attack the enemy, should circumstances appear to favour it, proceeded with eight squadrons of heavy dragoons (3d Dragoon Guards and 4th

Dragoons) under Colonel de Grey, two and a half squadrons 13th Light Dragoons under Colonel Head, and five small squadrons of Portuguese under Colonel Otway. The enemy, observing the movement, evacuated the town, nor could General Long close with them till he had nearly gained their flank and rear, and to which he was obliged to advance at a trot near five miles.* He then discovered their force, apparently eight squadrons of cavalry and about two battalions of infantry. The latter were retreating in column at one quarter distance, with two troops of hussars at their head and two also closing their rear, the rest of the cavalry manœuvring so as to cover the retreat of the infantry, if possible, and, at the same time, to secure themselves the benefit of their co-operation. General Latour Maubourg commanded them in person.

As they were marching each by a flank, General Long by his left, and the enemy by their right, his first determination was to dispose of the covering force of cavalry, which, as he approached, took up a position *en potence*, and

* An officer who was present considers the ground gone over, from the point where the order was given to turn the town, to the point where they came upon the enemy, to have been about four miles.

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First Position.
Fig. 1.



A 3 Squadrons French Dragoons.
B 3 D.o D.o
C Column of French Infantry Head & Rear closed by Troops of Hussars.

№1 2 Squadrons Portuguese under Col. Otway to cover Gen.l Long's Left Flank & turn the Enemys Right
2 3 Squadrons Portuguese to dispose of Corps A.
3 2 Squadrons 15th L.t Dragoons disengaged from the Rear to dispose of Corps B.
4 8 Squadrons Heavy Dragoons to support.

Second Position.
Fig. 2.



Last Position.
Fig. 3.



formed their infantry into an oblong square, viz. fig. 1. Not knowing what their object might be, General Long was inclined to believe the corps A. destined by a rapid flank movement to turn his left, while the corps B. and the hussars attached to the infantry, attacked to the front. He therefore kept two squadrons in line, on the left of his column, under Colonel Otway, and directed Colonel Head to disengage from the rear of the column, to march in parallel line with him, and when he should have gained the flank of the corps B. to attack them while he disposed of the corps A. They proceeded accordingly, but as soon as the enemy B. saw the light dragoons advancing in column, left in front, and presenting a flank, or else anticipating the proposed movement, they changed position to the left, throwing forward their right, and immediately advanced to the charge. The 13th formed to their front, and advanced with equal determination. General Long endeavoured with the Portuguese to gain the flank of the corps A., but before this could be accomplished, the charge of the 13th Dragoons had broken the corps B., which in its flight carried away every thing behind it. General Long formed the Portuguese to the front, and followed to support the 13th as far as the spot where his route intercepted the road by which

the enemy retired; but finding it impossible to rally the 13th, he detached Colonel Otway with his two squadrons to follow them in line, and to support them to his utmost. These, however, dispersed in pursuit, so that every thing, except the three squadrons which he kept with him, were *en débandade*. He then intended to adopt some new arrangement for the disposal of the enemy's force, which was cut off in his rear, and to support his van in front. Upon turning back, however, he discovered that the heavy brigade had been withdrawn from the situation he had directed them to keep, and halted two miles off, on a slope of ground across a valley, and on the other side of the route, Fig. 2. Had they closed *towards* General Long on their *left*, all would have been well, but going away to the right was abandoning him, and putting a valley and an impassable ditch or rivulet between them; and General Long's attention being engaged in front, he did not observe this movement until it was over. He sent an order for their advance, which had scarcely been dispatched, when the enemy's column came up from their rear, upon his right flank, and he afterwards observed two squadrons rallying on a rising ground, about 200 yards on the left flank. The line was formed to the right to meet the

column, but when the enemy was observed again in the rear, he was obliged to change his position by the right, to get clear of them, and throw back his left flank. The moment the column saw this movement they began to fire, and the hussar skirmishers to advance, the Portuguese got frightened without any reason, and scampered off. The two squadrons, A. that had rallied, were French Dragoons, absolutely passed and left behind by the cavalry in pursuit, and who were thus at liberty to turn again upon them. General Long rallied the Portuguese as soon as he could, and led them back rapidly to the flank of the French column, to threaten and delay its march, and watch the movements until the heavy dragoons arrived. These had at length been put in motion, but were making a long detour upon an outward and concentric circle, and the enemy had gained considerably before they came up on their reverse flank in two lines, apparently manœuvring for the purpose, and with the intention of attacking.

Figure 3 became the last position.

E. column of French, continuing its retreat in same order.

A. 13th Dragoons and two squadrons Portuguese, returning from pursuit of the enemy.

B. three squadrons Portuguese rallied and brought back on the enemy's flank.

C. Heavy brigade in two lines, the leading regiment advancing in direct *echellon* from the right, under Marshal Beresford.

D. two guns brought up, and at liberty to fire into the French column as near as they pleased.

At this moment a general halt was ordered, and the enemy permitted to retire through an open country without molestation, retaking, on their march, all the artillery (15 pieces) which the dragoons had captured, and some of which they were actually bringing back, also carrying away with them the greater part of the prisoners taken from us, who were with the column.

Of the enemy's cavalry, nearly 600 were killed, wounded, and taken; 16 guns (only one brought off) and several ammunition waggons taken. All the men attached to the train of artillery were killed. Out of 16 officers of one of their regiments of cavalry, only 6 remained for duty. All done by two squadrons of the 13th and two squadrons of Portuguese.

General Latour Maubourg escaped, but his friend, Count Chamorin, colonel of the 26th dragoons, fell by the sword of one of the 13th

dragoons, whose comrade he had just before shot through the head.

Had the heavy dragoons taken the intended share in the action, the whole French corps must have been destroyed or taken.

The loss of the allied cavalry on this occasion was—1 cornet; 23 rank and file, and 20 horses killed; 2 lieutenants, 1 staff, 1 quartermaster, 1 serjeant, 55 rank and file, 35 horses wounded.

1 serjeant, 76 rank and file, and 108 horses* missing; some of the missing were made prisoners on the bridge of Badajos.

* The disproportionate loss of horses was occasioned by the Portuguese, who abandoned their own in order to secure those of the French, and made a return of the loss but not of the gain. Such at least is the statement of an officer who was present.

39, Mount Street,
June 11, 1832.

My dear Doyle,

I believe I told you that it was the intention of the late General Long's relations to publish a reply to the attacks made upon his military reputation (especially in the case of Campo Mayor, where you were present), in the work that has recently appeared, entitled "Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's 3rd vol. &c. &c."

I now send you General Long's MS. account of that affair, in which I observe that your name is mentioned. If you can furnish any observations, bearing either upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of that account, you will greatly oblige me by making them, and allowing me, at the same time, to avail myself of the assistance that they may afford.

Yours, very sincerely,

C. E. Long.

Lieut. Col. Doyle,
&c. &c.

George Street,
14th June, 1832.

My dear Long,

With reference to your note of the 11th instant, I now return to you the late General Long's MS. account of the cavalry affair at Campo Mayor, with a few remarks bearing upon those parts which came under my personal observation. I think it right to apprize you, that my acquaintance with your late uncle was very slight. He found me attached as an officer of the Quartermaster General's Department to the cavalry of Marshal Beresford's corps, on his joining that force, and as I was relieved from that duty very shortly after the above mentioned affair by Captain Heathcote, and ordered to join headquarters in the north of Portugal, my intercourse with him ceased. I can of course have no objection to your making use of the facts I have stated, if you think they will assist your object.

I am, my dear Long,
very truly yours,
C. J. DOYLE.

C. E. Long, Esq.

Extract of a Letter from Brig. Gen. Long, to C. B. L. with Journal of Operations, dated St. Vicente, near Elvas, March 28, 1811.

My last to you was written, I think, on the 21st or 22nd instant, from Portalegre, and it announced the probability of approaching operations against the force besieging Campo Mayor, and afterwards perhaps against Badajos. Our united force assembled at Arronches on the 24th instant, and marched, with the exception of one division, to a bivouac on the left bank of the Caya river, our right close to the ford which is passed in going from St. Olaya to Campo Mayor. The enemy was reconnoitred early the next morning, and the report made them very strong in cavalry, so much so as to induce Marshal Beresford, after having planned the march of my division in two separate columns, to unite them again in one. Having left our bivouac about 10 o'clock A. M. on the morning of the 25th, a march of about three miles brought us out of the wooded into the open country, and we came in contact with the enemy's picquets.

The arrangements for our further progress were here made, and I was directed to move circling round a considerable height, over

which the infantry marched, but from whom I was separated by a deep ravine. The heavy dragoons were again separated from me, and marched in column on my right flank. I trotted away with the light gentry, and having driven the enemy's picquets from the positions they occupied, I at length passed over a considerable plain which brought me to a small ridge, from whence I looked down on the town of Campo Mayor, distant about 1,200 yards. Here I first saw their cavalry (a part of them at least), drawn up in line of battle under the protection of the works. I immediately formed my line and waited further orders, not knowing what were the Marshal's intentions. During this time they began to move and manœuvre, and I did the same, to counteract any project they might have in contemplation. I had expressly asked the Marshal in the morning, if it was his wish that I should attack them, if practicable, wherever I might meet with them. His answer was, that they were very strong, that I must not commit myself; but, that if a favourable opportunity of striking a blow should occur, to avail myself of it.* I soon

* The orders I understood Brigadier General Long to have received were, to circle round the town of Campo Mayor, out of cannon range, and to make a dash at the enemy's cavalry, if a favourable opportunity offered. Briga-

after had orders to lead the column of light cavalry (five troops of the 13th light dragoons, and five weak squadrons of Portuguese) so as to turn and gain the rear of the town. This I did, and the enemy, alarmed at the movement, soon began to retire, and formed in the valley behind the town, on the road to Badajos, their order of march *en retraite.* As soon as I observed this, I determined to gain their flank and rear, and then to act as circumstances might prompt me. The heavy cavalry now joined me, and as the route upon which I was marching intersected, at about one mile and a half, the road upon which the enemy was retiring, the further I advanced the more of course we closed. At length I found myself, for the first time, in sight of their whole force, consisting of eight squadrons of cavalry, 10th hussars, some chasseurs, and, I believe, the 26th dragoons, and two battalions of infantry, in close column. The column of infantry had

dier General Long did at first make rather a wider detour than perhaps was absolutely requisite; that is, however, matter of opinion, but I incline to it, as the light cavalry had to bring up their left shoulders frequently, before the enemy was observed formed in the low ground behind the town on the road to Badajos. The French force consisted of about 8 squadrons of cavalry, and 1,200 infantry in one column, viz. cavalry, 26ieme dragons; 2ieme hussards; 10ieme ditto; about 100 Juramentados or Spaniards, in the service of King Joseph, and 100ieme of the line, 2 battalions.

Rough plan of the position as Sketched in B. Gen. Long's M.S. Journal



a squadron of hussars at its head, and another in its rear, and in this way they were retiring in perfect order. Six squadrons in two divisions *en potence* covered their retreat. Considering myself quite strong enough to show my adversaries the way to Campo Mayor, I determined at least to attempt it. The heavy brigade had joined me, and the force now under my immediate command consisted of

8 squadrons 3d dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons,
2½ ditto, 13th light dragoons,
5 very small squadrons of Portuguese.

in all, perhaps, about 1,200 swords. At this time the enemy's position was thus *(vide engraving)*.

To oppose which, I made the disposition as above *(vide engraving of sketch)*, and my orders and instructions were, in the first instance, to get rid of the covering force of the cavalry A and C, and then to dispose of the rest, who, deprived of their support, would no doubt fall an easy conquest. I marched the light division† by the

The rough sketch gives a tolerable idea of the general disposition. The heavy dragoons were in reserve, a fact, of which it is well to bear in mind, Colonel Head was apprized.

† The light cavalry were in column of ranks by threes, left in front, and advancing at a brisk trot. Brigadier General Long disengaged the 13th dragoons from the rear of the column, and ordered them to bring up their left shoulders.

left in column of ranks by threes, and when I had approached sufficiently near, I directed the 13th dragoons to disengage from their right from the rear of the column, and having gained the flank of the enemy's corps C, to charge them, whilst my movement with the remaining five squadrons of Portuguese was directed against the corps A, to cover at the same time the left flank of the 13th dragoons and to endeavour to cut them off completely from their point of retreat; the heavy dragoons to support this movement in the situation you see described. Two detached squadrons covered my left flank, and interposed between the enemy and the point of his retreat.

It is necessary to observe, that I led the light division over a ridge of heights and broken ground,* which overlooked the valley in which the enemy were formed, and through which ran a nasty boggy and almost impassable kind of ditch. My intention was, that the heavy cavalry should continue to move straight on, their left towards the heights I occupied, their right as low down as the ground permitted.

The heavy brigade, in two lines, were advancing in a steady slow trot, over some soft ground, rather to the right and in the rear of the 13th dragoons.

* The ground could scarcely be termed broken, it was undulating.

Every thing being thus situated and arranged, I directed the attack to be made. The moment the enemy C* saw the two columns moving on parallel lines to outflank and attack them, they changed their position to the left on their left squadron. The 13th formed immediately to their front, and both proceeded with determined gallantry to the charge, the 13th receiving a partial fire from the infantry as they passed. As the movement of the 13th dragoons was made with the rapidity characteristic of the army, and as the pace of the Portuguese ponies could not be very extended, consistent with the preservation of that order

* Part of the enemy's cavalry posted near the point C. of the sketch, but rather more off the road, changed to the left and formed line. Colonel Head observing that instantly after the formation, they advanced to charge the 13th dragoons, formed the latter rapidly to their front, and receiving, as he passed to the charge, a fire from the enemy's infantry, broke completely through the line of the French cavalry. At that moment, the officer commanding the grenadier troop, or *compagnie d'élite* of the 26ieme *dragons*, finding they covered more ground than their assailants, wheeled inwards, upon the rear of the 13th dragoons. But the impetuosity of Colonel Head's charge had so completely broken and appalled the other squadrons, that the cool steady conduct of that young officer and his *élite* was of no avail, and they were hurried away, mixed up in the mass of fugitives, the whole flying on the road leading towards Badajos. It is not impossible that this circumstance may have occasioned the silly report of the 13th having been bodily taken. The officer commanding the *compagnie d'élite* was taken prisoner.

which, with ill-formed troops, is with difficulty maintained at any pace, I found, at the moment of the attack of the 13th, that the head of the three squadrons I led was only just in a line with the attacking corps, which, having completely broken the enemy's ranks, the whole of the corps A. and C. dispersed and fled in confusion towards Badajos. I followed as rapidly as I could to support this attack,* still supposing the heavy brigade in my rear, occupying the attention of the remaining part of the enemy's force, but, to my utter astonishment, when, at the point where I first met the Badajos road, I halted, and looked round to see what was next to be done, I found they had quitted altogether the line of direction I had pointed out, and at the suggestion of one of Marshal Beresford's aides-de-camp,† had marched by their right to the other side of the valley and road, and were halted a mile and half off, on the opposite and elevated ground, quite abandoning me to myself, and completely oversetting all my plans. In

* I am not aware where Brigadier General Long was at the moment when the 13th dragoons charged, or if the ground admitted of his seeing the full effect of the attack. I believe he was on their left flank, with some Portuguese cavalry.

† The movement of the heavy brigade is correctly described, but at whose suggestion they were so moved I know not.

consequence of this unfortunate occurrence, the enemy's infantry column had kept on retreating uninterruptedly, and the whole of the 13th Dragoons having dispersed in pursuit of the flying and beaten cavalry,* and every effort of mine to stop them proving useless, I felt myself obliged to detach two squadrons of the Portuguese to support and rally them, under the orders of Colonel Otway,† formerly of the 18th Dragoons. *They*, however, instead of obeying my orders, broke also away in pursuit and continued unsupported till they reached the bridge of Badajos. The rapidity with which this ill-judged pursuit was made absolutely left as many of the enemy behind as they were driving before, so that soon after I had halted, I found two squadrons of them rallying on the road upon a small rise, within 200 yards of my left flank, and just at the same moment came up the infantry columns, headed

The 13th Dragoons did not disperse in pursuit, they followed in mass, closed in upon the French cavalry, but certainly (as I afterwards learnt) arrived with them at the foot of the bridge, and were fired at from the ramparts of Badajoz.

† I am unacquainted with the orders Colonel Otway received from Brigadier-General Long. Shortly after the charge of the 13th Dragoons, I remarked Portuguese cavalry at some distance to the left at a gallop, these I afterwards learnt were two squadrons under Colonel Otway.

and closed by two squadrons of hussars on my right flank.* I felt the critical situation I was in, and saw but one way of getting out of it, that of making a rapid change of position, throwing back my left flank. As soon as I could get the Portuguese to understand me,†

I am inclined to think Brigadier-General Long was deceived by appearances; they certainly did not leave as many of the enemy's *cavalry* behind as they were driving before them. It was the main body of their cavalry that had been defeated, and that consisted principally of the dragoons, whose brazen helmets, with crests of long horse hair, it was impossible to mistake. In riding back from the spot where the battering train was captured, to seek Brigadier-General Long, I saw very few French scattered about, and those wounded or unhorsed.

It is more than probable the two squadrons which the Brigadier-General states he saw rallying on his left flank, were skirmishers, who had been called in, and a portion of the hussars detached from those at the head of the column of infantry. The turn of the road will account for their position, and the rise of ground which intervened, concealed them from the Brigadier-General until they rose the crest of the hill from out of the low road. The French infantry had also moved from the point D. to about C., and the Brigadier-General himself must at that time have been near A.; at all events I have a distinct recollection that they were all hussars.

† I remember coming up at this moment to Brigadier-General Long, who had with him some troops of Portuguese cavalry, and explaining to the commanding officer (a Portuguese) what the Brigadier-General required.

I put their ranks by threes to the right, and was in the act of conducting them to the point I intended,* when some of the enemy's infantry and flankers firing, and a troop of their cavalry advancing and shouting, my Portuguese friends got alarmed, broke away and fled in disorder. The French hussars, encouraged by the spectacle, pursued and got among them. After great difficulty I rallied them, with the assistance of Captain Doyle, of the Quarter-Master-General's department, and led them back, posting myself on the enemy's left flank, within 200 yards, and continuing to march parallel with them, with the view of preventing them from acting against the corps of the 13th and Portuguese, that were at this time still between them and their point of retreat—Badajos. I at that time sent Captain Doyle to order the

* Brigadier-General Long never made any attack on the enemy's infantry, as the author of the Strictures asserts; a few shots were fired, and the French hussars advanced a short distance and began shouting, when the Portuguese certainly were alarmed and went about, which the enemy's hussars observing, they made a *demonstration* of pursuing them, and some few individuals rode out and fired their carbines or pistols, but they did not venture to leave the infantry. After a little difficulty the Portuguese were rallied and brought back in good order, and the Brigadier-General continued to manœuvre them on the flank of the French infantry.

immediate advance of the heavy cavalry,* determined, on its arrival, to lose not a moment in accomplishing the defeat and surrender of this column of infantry.

For the first time I learned from Captain Doyle that Marshal Beresford himself was with the brigade of heavy cavalry, and had himself halted them in the situation I have described. I had nothing further to say. Soon after I saw them in motion at a very slow pace in two lines, keeping to the right of the road on which the enemy were retreating. At length they approached the right flank of the enemy's column, indicating an apparent intention to attack, bringing up at the same time two† pieces of

* Brigadier-General Long did send me to order up the heavy brigade. On my way I passed the French infantry, then in close column, and went on to where I saw Marshal Beresford and his staff. On coming up I was asked (as well as I recollect) where the 13th Dragoons were, to which I replied that they had charged and broken the French cavalry, and were pursuing them on the Badajos road. I then learnt it had been reported that the 13th had all been cut to pieces or bodily taken, and that it was by the Marshal's order the heavy dragoons were in the position in which Brigadier-General Long then saw them. I of course returned and acquainted the Brigadier-General of what I had been told.

† These two guns were brought up from Major Hartmann's brigade of the King's German Legion Artillery. It was currently stated at the time, that Hartmann had been anxious to bring up the entire brigade, and it is presumed that as two of

artillery, which no earthly obstacle prevented firing into the French column at such a distance as they chose. I hung upon their left flank with my valiant runaways. The country was beautifully open and favourable for the movements of both artillery and cavalry. The enemy had still several miles to go to their point of retreat, and between them were interposed the four squadrons of British and Portuguese, who had pursued their adversaries to the bridge of Badajos, taking all the artillery they had with them and had employed at the siege of Campo Mayor, about twelve or fifteen pieces of cannon. In such a state of things I did not conceive it possible for the enemy to exist ten minutes longer, and I really am convinced that, had they been summoned, an immediate surrender would have taken place. After parading and escorting them in this manner, for some distance, judge my astonishment at seeing all the troops, artillery, &c. halted, and the enemy permitted to retire without molestation before us, taking with them

the guns were actually up, the rest might as readily have been brought into action. The fire from these would in all probability have obliged the French infantry either to loosen their formation and thus afford an opening for the heavy dragoons to act against them with effect, or they must have been nearly annihilated by the concentrated fire from six pieces at a distance of from 160 to 200 yards, or thereabout.

all the prisoners they had made from us, retaking all their guns,* and absolutely threatening the safety of the dragoons in advance, who were then returning from their pursuit, which, though displaying great gallantry, was a sad proof of want of order and discipline both in officers and men.† The heavy brigade, by some

* Brigadier-General Long here mistakes. The battering train was not recaptured at the time by the French infantry, the guns were left on the road, the traces had been cut and the horses were taken away, it was said, by the Portuguese cavalry, or some of the stragglers.

† Colonel Head, in making the attack he did, positively only obeyed his orders. Had he not charged, he must have received the charge of the 26ieme Dragons, who were in motion with that intention. He formed his line with rapidity and precision, and charged with the greatest impetuosity, leading his regiment in very brilliant style. He had every right to suppose he was supported by the heavy brigade, for he was told so, and shortly before the charge they were observed in the rear advancing in a beautiful soldier-like and steady manner, keeping their horses in wind by gently trotting over some deep ground across which they were moving. How their direction was changed matters not; Colonel Head was ignorant of it. The pursuit was certainly carried on beyond the line of prudence; on this point there can be but one opinion. Colonel Head, however, could never seriously apprehend danger for his retreat, when he had, as he imagined, that fine heavy brigade advancing to his support, the whole army in his rear, and an extensive plain (passable in every direction for cavalry) to manœuvre upon.

That the report of the destruction of the 13th Dragoons, (generally attributed, with what justice I know not, to Baron

improper, though perhaps well-meant interference, had left me to myself, and the subsequent retreat of my three squadrons, with the loss sustained, obliged me to leave the others almost to their fate; but the defeat of the enemy's column would have ensured safety to the whole, and would have wound up as brilliant a little field-day as fortune could have delighted my heart with.* It was only necessary to charge, and beat, and throw into confusion the cavalry at their head and rear, (and which if British dragoons could not do, they have no business here,) and the object was accomplished. But I am convinced, that had a determination to annihilate them been shown, and steps taken accordingly, they would have surrendered at the first summons.

Such is my decided opinion, and I believe (with the exception of Marshal Beresford) that of every officer present on the occasion. The

Trip,) may have occasioned the change in the disposition of the heavy brigade, is very possible; but to whatever cause that change was owing, no individual who witnessed the combat can doubt that it disconcerted the entire plan.

* The affair, I apprehend, must ever be deemed brilliant, although it did not realize *all* the results anticipated. *The fault was*, first, not effectually supporting the attack of the light cavalry; secondly, when the guns were eventually brought up, not bringing into action the *whole* instead of a *part* of Major Hartmann's brigade.

motives of his conduct were I dare say excellent, but sure I am that Lord W. himself would never have conferred such an honour on the enemy and entailed such a disgrace on his own troops, as to suffer two battalions of infantry and four squadrons of cavalry to bid defiance to and retreat in safety before eight squadrons of British and three of Portuguese cavalry, two pieces of artillery and a large column of infantry that were following the same route, and were within a couple of miles of the scene of action,* and this in a country so favourable to the operations of cavalry, and after the whole of the enemy's covering force of cavalry had been charged, broken and pursued for nearly nine miles. The thing speaks for itself, therefore I shall say no more.

* I recollect it was matter of conversation at the time, that Major-General the Honourable Sir William Stewart offered to bring up a portion of the infantry, if the men were allowed to take off their packs.

The 100ieme French infantry regiment behaved with coolness. Hartmann's guns killed a few men, but they kept firm in their formation. It is, however, more than probable, under the circumstances in which they were placed, had any force of infantry shown itself, they would have availed themselves of the fair excuse to surrender. As it was, it must have been evident to them, that there was no serious intention of risking the heavy cavalry in an attack upon their square.

39, Mount-street, May 27, 1832.

My dear Sir,

You may possibly have seen a work, recently published, entitled "Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's Third Volume of the History of the Peninsular War, &c." in which the military reputation of my late uncle, General Long, is, as his relatives have no hesitation in declaring, most unjustly and ungenerously assailed. Of their anxiety to refute the aspersions contained in that work it is hardly necessary for me to speak, still less when I am writing to the personal friend and brother officer of General Long, and in the full knowledge of the friendship that still subsists with other members of his family.

I have lately been informed that you were in command of the 4th Dragoons, one of the regiments of the heavy brigade under the immediate orders of General Long, during the spring of 1811, commencing with the operations at Campo Mayor on the 25th of August. It is under these circumstances that I venture to hope that you will not object to reply to a few questions touching the different orders and arrangements as connected with General Long's

operations, so far as the same came within your own knowledge, or under your own observation at the period in question.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, very sincerely,

C. E. LONG.

M. Gen. Sir C. Dalbiac,
&c. &c.

34, Cavendish-square, May 29, 1832.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE to acknowledge your note of the 27th instant, and have to state that I was in command of the 4th Dragoons at the cavalry affairs of Campo Mayor and Los Santos in 1811, but not at the battle of Albuera. I do not know that I can object to reply to any questions which you may wish to put to me "touching the different orders and arrangements as connected with General Long's operations (at the cavalry affairs above-mentioned), so far as the same came within my own knowledge, or under my own observation," but of the propriety of my so doing, I shall be better able to judge when those questions shall be submitted. I conclude that they will be limited to matters of fact, for having been un-

acquainted with the general instructions which Brigadier-General Long received from time to time from his superior in command, I can venture no opinion as to the correctness with which those instructions were carried into execution. Indeed it will naturally occur to you, that the offer of any opinion thereupon, coming from an inferior officer, would be presumptuous and improper.

I remain, my dear Sir,
Yours, most sincerely,
J. C. DALBIAC.

C. E. Long, Esq. &c. &c.

39, Mount-street, June 1, 1822.

MY DEAR SIR,

IN answer to your letter of the 29th, I can assure you that nothing would be further from my wishes or intentions than to bring you into a collision of opinions with other officers who may have served at the period in question. The duty of vindicating General Long's reputation has devolved upon his surviving relatives. It is one which they intend to perform to the best of their ability, but without the slightest desire to implicate others in the dispute. My questions will be limited, as you will see, to

matters of fact, and in no way, I trust, so framed as to appear to elicit an opinion from you either as to the correctness or incorrectness of the military performances of any party.

I enclose them to you, and shall hope to be favoured with the answers as soon as you can conveniently reply to them.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, very sincerely,

C. E. LONG.

M. Gen. Sir C. Dalbiac, &c. &c.

34, Cavendish-square, 16 June, 1832.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE been prevented by a variety of circumstances from taking earlier notice of your letter of the 1st of June. I now transmit replies to the questions which accompanied that letter; in which replies I have reason to believe that nothing will be found essentially different from the circumstances to which your questions refer.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours, very sincerely,

J. C. DALBIAC.

C. E. Long, Esq.

Questions submitted to Major-General Sir Charles Dalbiac, together with his Answers to the same.

I.

Q. When the allied cavalry under the command of Brigadier-General Long was ordered to advance on the morning of the 25th March, 1811, was it your impression that no attack was on any account to be made on the enemy's cavalry?

A. My impression was that the allied cavalry were to attack that of the enemy, if a favourable opportunity offered. I judged from the orders issued by Brigadier-General Long, having been present when the General informed the Hon. Colonel de Grey that the cavalry were ordered to advance, with a view to intercept the enemy between Campo Mayor and Badajos; that he (the General) should direct the advance with the light brigade, and that the heavy brigade was to support at a proper distance, and be cautious to maintain its order. The Hon. Colonel de Grey's instructions to the officer commanding the 3d Dragoon Guards and to myself corresponded with those which he had received from General Long.

II.

Q. Was Brigadier-General Long ever, according to the best of your recollection, out of

cannon range whilst making his detour round the town of Campo Mayor?

A. I think the advance of the cavalry in the first instance was made in two columns, the heavy brigade forming the right one, and before passing Campo Mayor was never at a distance beyond cannon range from the fortress, though there might have been moments when it was partially hidden therefrom by inequalities of ground.

III.

Q. How far was the spot where the British cavalry first encountered the enemy's cavalry from Campo Mayor, and what was the nature of the attack directed by Brigadier-General Long?

A. The knoll of a hill which intervened between the heavy brigade and the position where the enemy had formed when attacked, precluded me from witnessing the actual encounter between the allied cavalry and that of the enemy: but from what came under my observation immediately afterwards, I should state the distance to have been about two miles from Campo Mayor on the Badajos road.

IV.

Q. Did Brigadier-General Long, to your knowledge, charge the enemy's infantry with

the Portuguese cavalry, or did you ever understand that he had done so?

A. The situation of the heavy brigade (as stated in the preceding answer) precluded me from being an eye-witness of the attack made by the light brigade. I never understood that General Long had ordered any part of the cavalry to attack the enemy's infantry, or that an attack upon the infantry had ever been made; but the officers of the 13th Dragoons stated that in their advance to charge the enemy's cavalry, supported by that of the Portuguese, some of the squadrons had drawn down a partial fire from the columns of French infantry.

V.

Q. Did you understand that Brigadier-General Long had himself informed Marshal Beresford of the fact of the bodily capture of the 13th Dragoons (as stated by the author of "Further Strictures," p. 40), or did you understand that any such report had been made by others? If so, at what period did you hear that such report had been made?

A. It was circulated through the heavy brigade, very soon after it halted on the right of the Badajos road, (and it was rumoured as the cause of the halt of the troops,) that Baron Trip, upon being questioned by head-quarters as to the fate of the 13th Dragoons, had either made a report, or induced a belief, or admitted

the probability that the 13th Dragoons had all been taken prisoners. Indeed, being myself, at one time very near to head-quarters, on the left of the heavy brigade, I heard a conversation from some of the staff to the effect that Baron Trip had so expressed himself. I never understood that any such report or supposition had emanated from General Long.

VI.

Q. Did you see the charge of the 13th Dragoons, and at what period, with reference to that charge, did Marshal Beresford direct the heavy brigade "to take post on a small height (as stated in the "Further Strictures," p. 39), "until he could examine what was going on in front?"

A. The nature of the ground, as before observed, prevented me from actually witnessing the charge of the 13th Dragoons; but I had seen shortly before the attack the light brigade (at about 500 yards in advance, and from a direction more to the left than the heavy brigade) to carry left shoulders forward over a small ridge of heights, whence it immediately descended into the bottom on the Badajos road, where the charge against the enemy took place. Soon after which I observed, at a point of the road more distant, the French dragoons pursued by the 13th in the direction of Badajos. About this time head-quarters passed the heavy brigade, which was then ordered to halt upon some

rising ground, whence were seen soon after some Portuguese squadrons to ascend in considerable confusion, and subsequently to rally upon the slope of the same ridge of heights over which the light brigade had previously passed in order to attack the enemy.

VII.

Q. How soon after the heavy brigade was ordered to take post on the said small height was it " ordered up" (as expressed in p. 40 of " Further Strictures") nearer to the enemy, and how was it then placed, with reference to that part of the light cavalry which remained with General Long?

A. I should say the heavy brigade halted for some minutes, (not a quarter of an hour,) after which it descended from the rising ground in the direction of Badajos, and then first got sight of the column of French infantry attended by two squadrons of hussars. The heavy brigade crossed the road to Badajos, and formed line at about 250 yards short of the enemy, the left of the brigade bearing upon two of Major Hartmann's guns, placed on the Badajos road, which had just fired a few rounds, with no very considerable effect. The Portuguese squadron (with which I presume General Long then was) were formed on the left of the Badajos road, having descended a little the slope on which they had previously rallied.

VIII.

Q. How far from Campo Mayor was it where the heavy brigade came up with the enemy's infantry, and how far did it continue to follow his retreat?

A. The heavy brigade came in sight of the column of French infantry at about two miles from Campo Mayor. It followed the enemy (at this distance and in the position stated in preceding answer) for several hundred yards, or somewhat less than a mile, when it was finally halted.

The two following Questions were submitted to Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel, Aid-de-Camp to the late General Stewart.

1. How far were the infantry column (commanded by Major General the Hon. W. Stewart), and Major Hartmann's guns from the spot where the heavy brigade and the two guns in advance were halted, at the close of the affair of Campo Mayor, March 25, 1811 ?

2. Was the enemy's column then in sight ?

To these questions Colonel Gabriel returned the following answers.

1. The head of the infantry column was a few hundred yards (about 4 or 500) in rear of the heavy brigade.

2. The enemy's column was in sight.

Extract of a Letter from General Long to E. H. dated Los Santos, April 22, 1811.

"Our *début* at Campo Mayor, but for the untimely interference of others, would have been attended with perfect success and little

loss. The official representation I have seen of it in the Lisbon Gazette is very unfair. The Marshal says, the movement I made to get round the town was more circuitous than he wished; he should have added the reason, namely, that ignorant of the ground, he was not aware that a deep and impassable ravine separated me from the enemy, and prevented my getting over at any other spot but where I did; but even with this fact, I maintain that my column was never more distant from the town than he directed. Secondly, he says that his object was to get between Badajos and the enemy, and thus to cut them off completely: if this was really his intention, the operations to accomplish it were most defective; because the corps he sent to pass the Caya river, between Elvas and Campo Mayor, never arrived till the afternoon, whereas they ought to have been at their post early in the morning. Thirdly, he says, that he wished to bring up his infantry, but that my movements obliging the enemy to retreat precipitately, he could not accomplish his object. To this, I answer, that if such was his intention, he should have let me remain halted before the town till the infantry came up, instead of which, I received his positive orders to move rapidly round to the rear of the town, which move-

ment it was evident must, and would, dislodge the enemy, and of course throw his infantry further in the rear. Lastly, he says he wanted to cut off the retreat of the enemy to Badajos. To this, I answer, the business was done to his hands by the cavalry, and *they were completely cut off;* their covering force was driven into Badajos, all their artillery taken, and the rest completely surrounded in such a manner as to make their destruction inevitable. One of the French officers who was with their column on the above occasion, but since made prisoner, told me, that not a man of them thought it possible to escape, and they were utterly astonished at our forbearance. But mark the result! To cover the deeds of the General, the cavalry, though acting strictly up to his orders, have been represented rather as causing the escape of the very enemy they had gallantly beaten, and absolutely cut off from their point of retreat, and have been severely reprimanded for doing too much!"

Extract of a Letter from General Long to E. L. dated Villa Franca, May 29, 1811.

"I think I have deserved (from good-will at least) more support, and, I should dare to say, approbation, from Marshal Beresford than it has been my good fortune to receive. His own public letter convicts him of inconsistency, particularly where he attributes, to the impetuosity of the cavalry, the defeat of his intentions to surround and capture the enemy's force with his infantry at Campo Mayor. In the first place, Latour Maubourg himself reconnoitred early in the morning, a league from the town of Campo Mayor, our whole force advancing upon him, upon which he immediately ordered his corps to evacuate the town and retreat; and I see no reason for supposing, after this precaution, that three battalions of infantry and cavalry cannot march away as fast as a heavy column of infantry can follow, the former having the start of several miles. But, supposing the contrary, why did the Marshal order me to *turn* the town and flank the enemy with the cavalry, if he wished them not to be hurried away? Such a movement, on my part, could *not fail* to make them retreat, even had they been disinclined so to do, and it certainly had

the effect of accelerating it, even supposing no attack to have subsequently ensued.

Things come out by degrees, General Lumley has just told me a fact I was never before acquainted with, and which accounts for the Marshal's feelings and conduct at the time. After the charge of the 13th dragoons, an officer rode up to the Marshal and assured him that the whole of that regiment had been surrounded by the enemy and carried off † * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Marshal is wrong in describing the attack. Colonel Otway never charged the enemy, and was never directed so to do. He was on my left flank, with two squadrons to support; and after the charge of the 13th dragoons and dispersion of the enemy, I detached him, not to charge, but to support the pursuit of the 13th dragoons, and as a point for them to rally upon, and I supported him with the rest of the troops. Such being the facts, the Marshal's account is neither fair nor correct. But, however, when such credit is assumed for driving the enemy into Badajos with such loss, I leave the world to determine who are entitled to the

† Sir William Lumley, on being applied to for a confirmation of this statement, corroborates it to the extent that, "on riding up to Marshal Beresford and a group of officers on the field, he was informed that a staff officer had just reported the 13th dragoons to have been all taken prisoners."

credit, those who accomplished the business, or those who looked on, without supporting them, and afterwards abused them for it."

Extract of a Letter from Gen. Long to C. B. L., dated Cabeça de Vide, December 3, 1811.

" I have likewise since learned, that at Campo Mayor, Marshal B. himself was the cause that the infantry did not accomplish what it was within their power to have done. Colonel Colborne told me that he was detached round the town, and observing the enemy with the baggage &c. quitting it, he sent back word to beg he might be supported, and that he was in a situation to cut them all off. The answer he received, was a positive order to halt; in consequence of which, the opportunity was lost, and could not be again recovered. Compare this account and fact with the Marshal's dispatch."

General Order.

" Brigadier-General Long has it in command from his Excellency Marshal Beresford, to signify to the officers of the light cavalry portion of the division under his command, that his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, Lord Wellington, has expressed very great displeasure at the report he has received of their conduct in the affair of the 25th ultimo. His Excellency never doubted the spirit and gallantry of any part of his army, consequently required no proof to fortify his opinion in these particulars; but it is of the utmost importance, to the credit and safety of corps in particular, as well as of the army in general, that that discipline and controul over troops, which can alone give effect to their gallantry, should, under no circumstances, be ever lost sight of or abandoned; and unless this command over the men can be relied upon and maintained by officers in all situations, whether of victory or defeat, the distinguishing feature of regular troops is lost and disappears, and the body so acting or conducted resembles more an armed rabble than an organised part of a regular army.

In communicating these painful remarks to the regiments particularly engaged on the 25th ultimo, Brigadier-General Long trusts that they

will nevertheless remain deeply impressed on the mind of every officer to whom they are addressed, that they be explained by them in such a manner to the troops under their respective commands, as may secure him hereafter from the painful duty he fulfils, in being the channel of conveying to them an admonition so unpleasant to their feelings, but, at the same time, so necessary, perhaps, to their future credit and the safety of their regiments."

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*Letter from Gen. Long to Gen. Le Marchant.**

Los Santos, near Zafra, Confines of Estremadura, April 25, 1811.

"Your letter, my dear Le Marchant, of the 10th ultimo, is now before me, and this is the first scrawl I have been able to write to you since I arrived in Portugal; not perhaps for want of time to commit to paper a dozen lines to say how do you do, but from my perfect inability to undertake such a letter to you as could alone be acceptable. My mind and body indeed

* The author is indebted to the kindness of Mr. Le Marchant for this letter to his father (the late Gen. Le Marchant), and he has only to regret that a subsequent letter to the same distinguished officer, giving a detailed account of the operations at Albuera, has, by some unfortunate accident, been mislaid.

have been so occupied by the duties of my situation, that the sight of pen, ink and paper, could not be endured. An interval of rest restores me to myself, and I dedicate a leisure hour to acknowledge the receipt of your last, and to give you a short summary of our proceedings.

I landed at Lisbon on the 5th March, and proceeded early the next morning to Cartaxo to see Lord W. His Lordship had that day advanced to Santarem, in consequence of the enemy's retreat. I proceeded thither and had an interview with him the same evening. Not having a single horse with me, or other article but what I had upon my back, it was proposed that I should return to Lisbon, borrow two horses from the Prince Regent's stable, and join his Lordship again as soon as possible. I did so, and overtook his column again near Redinha, and remained with him till they passed Miranda de Corvo.

In the mean time, however, letters had been written to me which I never received, desiring me to proceed to the Alemtejo, and take the command of the cavalry south of the Tagus, and it was at the same time intimated, that operations upon an extensive scale were about to be undertaken in that quarter, and Lord W. told me himself that he proposed conducting them in person. Finding, therefore, on the 15th

March, that the enemy declined all engagement, and were decidedly retreating upon Celerico, and that Marshal Beresford was to leave Lord W. immediately for the Tagus, and that one division of infantry (General Cole's), and two regiments of cavalry (the 3d Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons), were likewise ordered to the Alemtejo, I also turned my horse's head and proceeded back to Chamusca. General Beresford overtook me at Thomar, and I continued with him till we reached Portalegre, on the 20th ultimo. The whole force at his disposal (about 20,000) was to have been assembled there on the 22d March, and so they were, but the fatigue sustained by General Cole's division, and their want of shoes, obliged the Marshal to leave them behind. The French were at this moment on the point of taking Campo Mayor, and the object was to surprise them at this work, and our whole force was considered necessary for the purpose. The consequence was, that the Governor, unable to hold out longer, surrendered the town on the very day the troops marched from Portalegre. Well! on the 24th March, three divisions of infantry, and all the cavalry, were assembled in a bivouac upon the Caya river, about two leagues from Campo Mayor. Whilst reconnoitring the position, Colonel D'Urban had been discovered and pursued by

the enemy's patrole. The next morning another *reconnoissance* was made with a squadron of dragoons, and the enemy's picquets were found placed upon a height that runs all the way from Campo Mayor, and forms the boundary, as it were, of the open country into which we were about to debouche. On Colonel D'Urban's return, an order of march was given out, and we proceeded towards Campo Mayor. This order of march was completely changed before we had proceeded half a league. However, I had a conversation on the morning with the Marshal. He told me the enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry, and that I must hug the infantry for support if necessary. I asked him peremptorily if I should attack them wherever I met them; his answer was, do not commit yourself against a very superior force, but if the opportunity to strike a blow occurs, avail yourself of it.

With these instructions, I proceeded to move, and was soon ordered to the front (as usual) with all the cavalry. On reaching the open country I saw nothing but a cavalry picquet observing our motions.

The cavalry was here divided. A deep and impassable ravine running down a bottom, separated the two heights upon which I moved with the light portion of my division, and that over which the infantry marched, supported by the

heavy brigade. I followed implicitly the instructions I received as far as the ground permitted, and when I could find a passage across the ravine, I filed my column over, drove the enemy's picquets from the opposite heights back upon Campo Mayor, towards which I proceeded across a considerable plain, and halted about a mile from the town. I here observed a part of their cavalry formed under the works, but the undulation of the ground prevented my getting a complete view of their whole force. They began, however, to manœuvre behind the heights, &c. as if intending an attack, and I employed myself in making what I thought the best disposition to counteract their intentions, waiting the Marshal's further orders. At length an aide-de-camp brought me an order to proceed round, and to the rear of the town, so as to turn it, but to keep at two or three gun-shots from the works. Though the Marshal and I differ upon this point, I do not believe I was ever more than the prescribed distance from the town, although the enemy's demonstrations on my left obliged me to extend to cover that flank. At length I got a full sight of my opponents, and the heavy brigade having joined me, I proceeded in a direction that intersected their line of march, or rather retreat, and as every step I took brought me more and more upon their

flank, and towards their rear, it was not long before we closed so much that I was enabled to distinguish their whole force and position. I should here mention that one of the Marshal's aides-de-camp having joined me about this time, whilst I was reconnoitring the position and strength of my opponents, and rather urged my attempting something against them, as likely to give the Marshal, his master, considerable satisfaction. Having fourteen squadrons under my command, and the enemy having but eight, with two battalions of infantry, I thought myself justified in considering the opportunity of attacking them as one which might enable me to strike a blow without committing myself, for the infantry columns were following though at some distance, and unless the attempt was made by the cavalry upon this retreating force, there was nothing to prevent their reaching Badajos without molestation. I therefore determined to try my luck, and began by directing, in the first instance, my efforts against their covering force of cavalry, aware that if they were properly disposed of, the remainder would be at my mercy.

The enemy had placed two squadrons in column of half squadrons at the head of their column of infantry, and another in a similar manner in the rear, and in this order they persevered in their retreat throughout the day.

The remainder of their cavalry were formed en potence waiting, apparently, my attack. I was on their left flank, marching by my left; they on my right, marching by their right. I directed Colonel Head, with two squadrons and a half of the 13th Dragoons, to attack three of their squadrons, whist I proceeded with three Portuguese against the remainder. I kept two other squadrons of Portuguese on my left flank parallel with the head of my column, to counteract any manœuvre of the enemy in that direction.

The moment they saw Colonel Head disengage from the rear to execute my orders, three of their squadrons that had been *en potence* made a change of position to the left to front him, and immediately moved on to the attack. This brought the French upon two parallel lines of three squadrons each. Colonel Head formed to his front and proceeded to the charge. I was still in column of threes, left in front, and on his left, and when I observed what was passing on my right, I pushed on as quickly as I could to gain the flank and rear of the enemy's line. The rapid advance, however, of the 13th, the *déroute* of the enemy, which threw both their lines into disorder, and the wretched kind of horse mounted by the Portuguese, frustrated my intention of cutting off completely the ene-

my's retreat. The whole of the 13th pursued, and became so broken and intermixed with the enemy, that to cover them I was obliged to detach the two squadrons on my left to their immediate support, intending to move on likewise with the remaining three squadrons of Portuguese. I also sent positive orders to them to rally and form. Colonel Otway, with the two supporting squadrons, disbanded also in pursuit and away they all raced, without further support, to the bridge of Badajos. On looking round to make fresh arrangements and dispositions, I discovered to my astonishment that the whole of the heavy brigade, which I had stationed in my rear in two lines, but outflanking to the right, to support me and observe the column of infantry, had been drawn across to the other side of the valley, and were halted on the opposite height about two miles from me. At this moment, too, I perceived two squadrons of the enemy rallying upon my left flank, and the column of infantry with two squadrons approaching my right. I immediately attempted a change of position with the Portuguese, but on the first fire of the enemy's skirmishers, they broke and ran off. I rallied them however, returned to keep the enemy's column in check, and sent off for the heavy dragoons, but the Marshal was himself with them, and it took

some time before he could be persuaded to put them in motion. He at length advanced on the other flank of the enemy's column in two lines, and brought up two guns. The country perfectly open, and every where favourable to the operations of cavalry. The artillery began firing, and with some, but not the desired, effect into the column, and all we had to do, was to continue thus to pepper them till their order was broken, and then to let loose a portion of the cavalry, which surrounded them on every side. At this critical moment for the enemy, and when I momentarily looked for their surrender, judge my surprize on seeing a general halt and cessation of attack ordered, and the enemy permitted to walk off unmolested, thus absolutely interposing themselves between us and that portion of our cavalry that had pursued them to Badajos, and were then on their return. To this fatal determination, and to the previous occurrence of the heavy brigade having separated from me, all *our* loss is to be attributed, and it is lucky that it was no worse. The enemy, however, was completely routed (that part of them at least that were attacked) and we took sixteen pieces of artillery, two of which only were brought away. Their loss, by their own acknowledgment, amounted, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to 600 men and several

officers, among whom was the Colonel of the 26th Dragoons.

"Well! instead of thanks we got nothing but abuse; and by the Marshal's official account it should appear that we had marred a well-digested plan of his to cut them all off himself from Badajos. If such a plan ever was projected, the measures adopted to accomplish it were the very reverse of what they ought to have been; and had not the cavalry made the attack they did, not a single Frenchman on that day would have fallen into our hands; whereas their loss was six times that of ours, and the impression made upon them, such as to this hour they have not forgotten, or are likely soon to do." [*continued page* 100.]

In proceeding with the narrative of events, and following the course of the work before us, the next occasion on which General Long's name occurs is at p. 77, respecting the capture of a squadron of the 13th, near Villa Real. "The Marshal," it is observed, "before sunset, communicated to the principal officers the intended attack of the enemy; and having fixed General Stewart's division in its position, he marked out that which General Cole's was to take up as it arrived. The squadron of the 13th he had ordered to be withdrawn before dark, and to be placed in the rear of General Stew-

art's division. From some mistake or other, which occurred in giving or carrying M. General Long's orders, this movement was not executed." There is an ambiguity about this latter passage, as respects the position of the words "giving" and "carrying," which might lead to an inference that some blame was to be attached to General Long. To prevent the possibility of misconception upon this point, it is sufficient to mention, that Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel, in a short interview with the author, which led to the questions submitted to him, fully confirmed the accuracy of General Long's account of the transaction, as detailed to General Le Marchant. It clearly appears that General Long had no connection with the disaster in question, further than in doing every thing that was possible to remedy it, and that the construction of the passage should, if General Long's name is intended to appear at all, be this, that "from some mistake or other, which occurred in giving or carrying the orders *to* General Long, this movement was not executed," and the consequences were, as the author has stated, the capture of this squadron. The occurrence is treated more in detail in General Long's journal, but it has been deemed unnecessarily tautological to enter further into it.

Not long after this misfortune, an opportunity

of, in some measure, counteracting its effects by retaliation occurred. "The Marshal," p. 82, says the narrator, "drove Latour Maubourg into the Morena, and defeated and cut to pieces two regiments of French cavalry, not at Usagre, as misstated by the author," viz. Colonel Napier, "but at Los Santos." Without desiring to detract from the claims of Marshal Beresford to his equitable share, as commander-in-chief, of the merit in defeating and cutting to pieces these two regiments of cavalry; by the most ordinary rules of justice, some slight notice, one should think, ought to have been taken of the officer in command of that cavalry, inasmuch, as though the order to attempt the defeat emanated from his superior officer, and the practical part of the proceeding was carried into execution by the regiments themselves, the mode of accomplishing the object, and the movements regulating it, were indisputably arranged by him. But this is only in unison with the whole tenor of the work. Where the Marshal was present, as at Campo Mayor, and where not only his ineffective co-operation, but his active interference, palpably neutralized the successes of his cavalry, the fault is fixed upon the commander of that cavalry. Where, as at Los Santos, that arm alone effected its object, and the Marshal was present, the

whole of the credit is assumed for him only, by the impartial recorder of his exploits.

We now approach the ever-memorable day of Albuera, (for not even on the prouder day of Waterloo, were the glorious deeds of a gallant army more nobly conspicuous,) and the final criminatory charges against General Long, which have been pleaded in bar of judgment on the part of Lord Beresford, by the unknown counsel chosen for conducting his defence. "Lord Beresford," says the writer, p. 116, "having left staff officers to put the troops in the positions he had assigned them, went to reconnoitre the country in the direction of Talavera, and refresh his memory with its features, though his former visit had already made him pretty well acquainted with it. He proceeded on this object for about two leagues, till he came within sight of the town, and was slowly returning towards Albuera, when one of his aides-de-camp came galloping towards him, with the account that General Long had arrived there in great confusion from Santa Martha, and that the enemy's light cavalry were close upon him." Whether General Long did so arrive from Santa Martha, "in great confusion," as stated by the writer, will best appear from the journal of that officer, and the corroborating testimony of his

aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Pitt, contained in his answer to the first question submitted to him. "The Marshal's astonishment was extreme," so at least writes the author of the "Further Strictures," p. 117. Not so, however, M. General Sir B. D'Urban, whose work that author has (apparently with a view to the more effectual confirmation of his own statements) taken the trouble to re-print and publish jointly with his own narrative. This "great confusion" of the cavalry, and "extreme astonishment" of the Marshal, are by that officer frittered away in the lukewarm phraseology, and summed up with the sententious brevity and simplicity of the eight meagre words "rather more briskly than had been looked for." Ap. p. 24. "He," viz. the Marshal, continues our author, (p. 117) "had very recently received dispatches from General Long at Santa Martha, in which not the slightest mention was made of an immediate retreat." This may be very possible, the necessity of an *immediate* retreat might not have been stated, but General Long, in the journal of his proceedings, distinctly declares that he was "hourly reporting to head quarters the advance and movements of the enemy," and adds, that he had not received "a single instruction," although repeatedly applied for; and the first of these facts is fully corroborated, as will

be seen, by the answer of Lieutenant-Colonel Pitt to the second question submitted to him. "He," the Marshal, "then hastened back," viz. to Albuera, (having been told, p. 116, that "Gen. Long *had arrived there,*") "and found the cavalry still in considerable confusion." p. 117. *Still!* That is, between the period of the aide-de-camp's departure *from* Albuera, where General Long and the cavalry *then* were, and Marshal Beresford's arrival there, they had remained in a state of confusion. "After," says our author, "forming them, and placing them in their position, he," the Marshal, "discovered that the enemy's horse had already occupied the wood, on the slope of the opposite heights beyond Albuera, and through which the road from Santa Martha slopes slantingly towards the bridge." So that *after* Marshal Beresford had returned to Albuera, and "formed" his cavalry, and "placed them in their position," though in what position, (whether on the right or left bank of the stream,) does not distinctly appear, he *then* discovered that the opposite heights were abandoned to the enemy. There must, indeed, have been *very* "considerable confusion," "confusion heaped upon confusion," to have endured thus long, and the confusion could not have been confined to the cavalry alone. The Marshal must, according to the conductor of his cause,

have participated rather largely in this general disorganization: thus, on a sudden, to have seen that the heights, where the cavalry he had just been forming ought, as is afterwards declared, p. 119, to have kept the enemy "at bay," were "already occupied" by that enemy, and not by the cavalry he had so recently formed in their position. So that the author would exhibit the Marshal to us in such a state of absolute bewilderment, as to have made the disastrous discovery, that the cavalry he had been engaged in "forming," were in point of fact not elsewhere. To rescue the Marshal from so palpable an absurdity, the more charitable, as indeed the more rational supposition is, that the Marshal discovered that no *infantry* were on the heights to keep the enemy "at bay," as he had intended; for he had heard through his aide-de-camp, as we have seen, that General Long *had* arrived *at* Albuera before he got there, and therefore he could not have expected to find *him* contending for the possession of the heights. We shall presently see whether this surmise is the correct one.

"The only error," says our author, p. 119, "that appears in Lord Beresford's plans, was his omitting to place some infantry in occupation of the wood on the great height beyond the Faria stream, through which the road from Santa Martha passed. This I understand," he

observes, "had been intended." *Had been intended!* If "intended," why was it not *done?* and if *not* done, why is this "only error" (acknowledged as such by the writer of the Strictures, and by *him* applied *solely* to Marshal Beresford) attributed in its effects to General Long, the scape-goat of every blunder, when, in fact, if "intended," it could only be so "intended" by the Commander-in-Chief, the necessary originator of all intentions. "It could not, indeed," continues the writer, "have been maintained against the French infantry for any length of time; but had their cavalry been here kept at bay, the Marshal might have compelled them to show their force on the elevated plain beyond the wood, and, as their infantry only came up during the night, he might thus have prevented their gaining possession of it for the whole of that day." The reader is particularly requested to attend to this profound pleading in mitigation, and the dexterous attempt to shift the error to other shoulders. Marshal Beresford having neglected, or some other officer to whom his intentions had been made known having neglected, to "place some infantry in occupation of the wood," as "had been intended." General Long, having no connection with the infantry, arriving there in obedience to his orders to "fall back upon

Albuera," followed by an overwhelming force of the enemy's cavalry,* against which he had been peremptorily ordered not to commit his own; and seeing (as is evident from the testimony of Colonel Pitt, that he did see,) this omission, this non-execution of intentions, should have notwithstanding kept, or endeavoured to keep, the enemy "at bay," as the expression is, with his inferior cavalry, and thus, by disobeying his positive injunctions, have enabled the Marshal to escape from the consequences caused by this "only error in his plans."

"But," continues the author, p. 119, "the unaccountable manner in which General Long abandoned this post, before Lord Beresford ever knew of his having left Santa Martha, has already been related; his fault ought to have been repaired. It was not; and whoever was to blame for it, this was certainly an omission." So then it would appear that there were two omissions and one fault. 1st. The "only error in Lord Beresford's plans," viz. "his omitting to place some infantry in occupation of the

* "The French cavalry, so infinitely superior in numbers, discipline, and composition to our own."—p. 172. Confirmed by Sir B. D'Urban, in p. 22, App.—"The advantage which the enemy possessed . . . . . aided by a superior cavalry, over an army of three different nations, inferior in the latter arm."

wood on the great height." 2dly. The "fault" of General Long in having unaccountably "abandoned this post," which the Marshal had omitted to occupy: and 3dly, the "omission" of some officer, name unknown, in not having repaired the "fault" of General Long, in not having repaired the "only error" of Marshal Beresford. In other words, the concentrated essence of error was in General Long, by reason of his having abandoned a post which the Marshal "intended" to have defended, but which he, or those to whom he had delegated that defence, had *already abandoned!* Whose, then, was the fault? and what was the proposed reparation of that fault? Was it ever even whispered that General Long ought to have defended this height against the enemy's superior cavalry, in defiance of his orders and in contempt of the consequences? What steps did Marshal Beresford take towards the reparation of this fault? Where did he find the cavalry, as stated in p. 117? Where did he "form them?" Where did he "place them?" literally, nowhere. The written evidence of General Long, the living testimony of Colonel Pitt, prove, beyond the shadow of a shade of a doubt, that the orders to General Long, to move his cavalry to the left bank of, in fact across, the Albuera stream, originated in the Commander-in-Chief, and were

communicated through the Adjutant-General to General Long; nay, more, that the Commander-in-Chief never "found" the cavalry until they *had* crossed the river, never "formed" them at all, and that they were in no confusion whatever!! The author does not insist upon these as mere random unsupported assertions,

> "Without more certain and more overt test
> Than their slight habits, and poor likelihoods,"

such as have been put forth by the anonymous writer of the Strictures; but as facts, authenticated by living evidence, and boldly challenging the equally open contradiction of living witnesses. But the testimony of Sir Benjamin D'Urban has been hurried across the Atlantic to assist in this vindication of Lord Beresford's wrongs. The defendant has declined the distinct avowal of his defence; the counsel in the cause has cautiously shrunk from the notoriety of an open court, and assumed the dark obscurity of an inquisitorial disguise; while the only living witness subpœnaed on this trial is—Major General Sir Benjamin D'Urban. Let us see then what assistance can be rendered, as regards the points at issue, by the testimony of that officer. It has already been seen of what avail it was, in the instance of Campo Mayor.

"The assembly of the army then," writes Sir

Benjamin, "having been determined at Albuera, on or before the noon of the 15th, the cavalry, which had concentrated at Zafra and Los Santos, had been directed to fall back gradually before the enemy, by Santa Martha, upon Albuera, taking care to observe the roads of Solana and Torre de Almendral."—App. p. 24.

"About three o'clock, the cavalry, which had been pushed back from Santa Martha rather more briskly than had been looked for, by that of the enemy, arrived, and upon the return of Sir William Beresford to the right, from placing the left of the line, and examining the country immediately beyond it, he found that it had already crossed the rivulet, and that the whole of the opposite bank was in possession of the enemy. Under the actual circumstances, this mistake once made, it was too late to repair it."

Marshal Beresford, from this account, appears to have done exactly what it is presumed that he did do, though not exactly what the writer of the "Strictures" would make him do. He returned to Albuera on hearing that the cavalry had "arrived," and found that they "had already crossed the rivulet," and that "the whole of the opposite bank was in possession of the enemy." It will be observed that no notice is taken by General D'Urban of the "only error in Lord Beresford's plans," respecting the placing

of the infantry as "had been intended;" while the "mistake" is enveloped in a sort of mysterious ambiguity that might attach to anybody. We are indebted to the author of the "Strictures" for explicitly assigning, in his summing up, the whole blame to General Long. "His fault," says the author, "*ought to have been repaired.*" "This mistake," says General D'Urban, on the other hand, "once made, it was *too late to repair it!*" So far "the slight discrepancies which exist between" the writer of the "Strictures" and General D'Urban. But does that writer derive any assistance in his facts from the dispatch of Marshal Beresford himself? The reader will judge. "The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Martha by Gen. Blake." . . . . . "I determined to take up a position at this place," viz. Albuera. "The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th inst." . . . . . "Our cavalry had been *forced* on the morning of the 15th to retire from Santa Martha, and joined here. In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us." But Sir B. D'Urban, in another passage, describes the concentration of the army at Albuera, with even more measured solemnity of statement. "The allied army," he observes, p. 27, Appendix, "was thus united upon the Albuera, *having regulated*

all its successive movements by the progressive advance of the enemy, equally avoiding a late or a premature assembly, and having combined the removal of all the ordnance and siege stores with a timely arrival at the proposed position!!"

The author has now concluded the defence of General Long from the direct charges advanced against him by his anonymous accuser, and he earnestly desires the attention of the reader to the evidence by which it is supported. There are, however, one or two points immediately connected with the conflict at Albuera, which, far from being irrelevant, it is incumbent on the author, in justice to General Long's memory, to notice, and more especially as, in one instance, the high authority of Sir B. D'Urban is apparently at variance with General Long's version of the proceedings. In the first place, the repulse of the Polish Lancers at the fords near the bridge of Albuera, at the commencement of the attack, was entirely effected by the orders of General Long, and of this no notice is taken either in the "Strictures"—in Sir B. D'Urban's narrative—or in Marshal Beresford's dispatch. It would also appear that General Long had suggested the propriety of placing a force near the spot where the Polish lancers so fatally broke in upon the right flank of the infantry, but which suggestion was not attended

to. But there is one very material point in the day's proceedings which requires a more particular notice. At the conclusion of his Preface General D'Urban writes as follows:—" The masterly disposition of the 4th division and of the cavalry, to which General Dumourier adverts in his letter,* of which the results were so beneficial, and which is praised *even* in the History of the War in the Peninsula (see p. 556), emanated entirely from the Marshal, nor has any one a claim to participate in it; and this I securely affirm, because I placed those troops upon their ground, by *his* direction, and received from his own mouth the orders for their guidance, which I then gave to their respective generals."

Without at all questioning the applicability of the splendid panegyric which the French general, Dumourier, in a moment of patriotic enthusiasm at the recital of a narrative which detailed the fact that 5000 of his countrymen had fallen by the hands of the enemy he was eulogizing—without entering upon any classical *critique* as to whether the cavalry of Cæsar at Pharsalia, or of Marshal Beresford at Albuera, was the better disposed—the author

* A complimentary effusion of that officer, subjoined to the Preface, in which he writes to Marshal Beresford, " Vous avez fait plus que César," &c. &c.

may be permitted to doubt first (not of course the accuracy of General D'Urban's statement, as far as it goes), but, whether General Long did not previously point out the position where the cavalry was placed; ultimately, of course, in consequence of orders given by Marshal Beresford to General D'Urban, and by him, as he says, to the respective generals. And secondly, whether if such was not the case, and, allowing with General Dumourier that as the disposition of the cohorts of Cæsar was the cause of the one triumph, so that of the squadrons of Marshal Beresford was the cause of the other, some small portion of merit was not due to the officer who, in the beginning of the day, had *alone* directed the movements of all the cavalry and horse artillery, and whose disposition of the cavalry on the ground (admitting that Marshal Beresford is to claim all the merit of the disposition as respects the field of battle) was adopted, and whose suggestions were acted upon by the officer who had so suddenly assumed the command. There is no question, it is believed among military men, respecting the ability with which General Lumley performed his part; but it is a question whether the *whole* of the riches of the harvest should be gathered by the labourer who had come late to the reaping, and had not borne the heat or

burthen of the day. The least that could have been done would have been to have mentioned General Long's name, and had General Lumley himself been, as he was at Usagre, the recounter of the exploits of his cavalry, the details would, the author dares to assert, have been far different. Let the reader peruse the whole of Marshal Beresford's dispatch. Not even the *name* of General Long once occurs, although that officer was in command, in the early portion of the day, of *all* the cavalry, and for the remainder in command of all the British and Portuguese. What were the consequences of this reward of silence as affecting him when it became the duty of his Majesty's Ministers to submit to parliament whom they would desire to honour with their distinguishing applause as the chief actors by whom this victory had been achieved? Did the House of Commons preserve an expressive and ominous silence? Were its praises parsimoniously confined to Generals Cole, Stewart, Hamilton, Lumley, and Alten (all most fully and amply meriting them), as had been the case in Marshal Beresford's dispatch? On the contrary. The members of the parliament of Great Britain did, as became them: they made no exceptions, but unanimously resolved,—"That the Thanks of this House be given to Major-General the

Honourable Galbraith Lowry Cole, the Honourable William Stewart, John Hamilton, the Honourable William Lumley, Charles Baron Alten, *Brigadier-General Robert Ballard Long*, and the several other officers, for their distinguished exertions on the 16th of May last, in the glorious battle of Albuera, and that Lieut.-General Sir William Carr Beresford do signify the same to the Hon. William Stewart, &c. &c."

The Lieutenant-General did accordingly transmit, as he was desired to do, this vote of thanks to the several officers so named, and Gen. Long, passed over in the roll of praises by which the record of this victory had been wound up, was destined to receive at the hands of the person to whom his "distinguished services" must have been, if they were distinguished, more immediately known, that approbation which he, in his justice, had withheld from all notice in his dispatch, and which (from ministerial ignorance it must be presumed) had thus crept into the councils of the Sovereign, to be subsequently echoed by the consentient voices of the Commons of England.

If there are any of his readers disposed to cast censure upon the author of this Reply as wanting in propriety, though not in right, to retaliate while he defends,—to these be it answered that *he* was not the first to come for-

ward in the character of a masked assailant, and at the same time in all the apparent importance of a confidential ally. Had any one of General Long's friends put forward a work of such a complexion; had "foolish answers," "further mischief and folly," and posts "unaccountably abandoned," as applied to a third and a deceased party, been the basis of any dissertation on their part, while attempting a vindication of their relative against the censures of an antagonist, well might they expect to draw down the merited indignation of the friends of that party thus exposed to this collateral assault. But the writer has not only travelled out of the record in raking up the ashes of another, he has literally out-Heroded Herod, and has, in some instances, gone beyond, in others contradicted, Marshal Beresford's and Sir B. D'Urban's recorded statements.

If the author is wrong in his impression, that the writer of the Further Strictures has been authorized to undertake Lord Beresford's defence, and been partially, for it is as impossible to believe as it would be insulting to the veracity of that officer to assert, that he has been wholly furnished with the implements of his warfare, it rests with Lord Beresford to denounce the obtrusive officiousness of the writer, and to shake off the incubus that has

thus fastened itself upon his military reputation. If, on the contrary, the literary labours of the writer are the overstrained efforts of friendship, and the result of a partially confidential communication, it remains only to wonder at the hardihood that could hazard such assertions, or the reckless indiscretion that could risk a vessel so freighted with the renown of his commander, on the shoals and reefs which common care might have detected, and a cautious inquiry have enabled him to shun.

Conclusion of Letter to Gen. Le Marchant.

"After a considerable lapse of time in making a bridge over the Guadiana, for which no preparations appear to have been made, the army began crossing that river on the 5th of April, and on the following day and night the greater part of the infantry, with the 13th dragoons, were posted on the other side opposite to Jerumenha. About two o'clock on the morning of the 6th of April the enemy advanced from Olivenza with a battalion of infantry, three guns, and 400 hussars. Their object, believing us not to be in force, was to try to reach the bridge and destroy it. On their march they fell in with an

advanced picquet consisting of a squadron of the 13th dragoons, commanded by Capt. Morris, whom you must recollect at Wycombe. His being posted there appears to have arisen from some mistake between him and Major-General Lumley. Having passed the river myself that night only, and superintending the passage of the cavalry, I was not aware of what was going on in front. About three o'clock A. M. I retired to the village of Villa Real, having conducted the 13th Dragoons to their ground, to get my horse fed and refreshed before day-break.—Scarcely had fifteen minutes elapsed before I was alarmed by the enemy's approach. I ran out and found them pursuing some of the 13th Dragoons up to the very place where I stood. I alarmed a battalion of infantry that were sleeping near the village, and hastened to the 13th Dragoons to bring them up to the support of the infantry, among whom I really expected to see the enemy's cavalry enter before they could form and get under arms. Alarmed, however, at the fire of the infantry picquet, the pursuers returned, and the rest of the enemy halted, and then retired before there was sufficient light to discover their force or movements. In the mean time, however, they had completely surprised Morris, and carried off about 50 men and 60 horses of the squadron under his command. I

shall offer no comment upon this unfortunate event, because it would be unfair so to do, without hearing what he may have to say in his justification. I had so far a narrow escape, that General Stewart wished and proposed to me to take up my quarters for the night in an isolated house near Villa Real. I reconnoitred it, and from the surrounding ground and the light of the picquets which I observed in front, I thought it too exposed, and went to the village. The enemy surrounded the house, took some of the infantry picquets stationed there, and carried off two fine horses belonging to Captain Gabriel, General Stewart's aide-de-camp. The army remained in its position here, living only from hand to mouth, the cavalry posted in a plain, without a shrub or tree of any kind, where they remained for three days and nights exposed to very bad weather.

On the 9th of March the whole moved in two columns, and in due form, upon Olivenza. The enemy had retired a day or two before, leaving only 100 old fellows to shut the gates, and fire off a few three-pounders. The town was summoned and refused to surrender. What was to be done? It could not be stormed, and we had presumed on taking it without artillery! Guns were therefore sent for to Elvas, General Cole's

division of 6000 men left to besiege it, and the remainder of the troops marched next day to Albuera on the high road from Badajos to Seville. Here and subsequently the army appears to have been moved upon no premeditated plan, but according to the suggestions arising out of the intelligence hourly received. At length on the 15th of March we moved to Santa Martha, and on the following morning proceeded to this place with the declared intention of taking up a position at Zafra. We halted about two miles off, in a valley, whilst the ground in front was reconnoitring, and I received orders to feed the cavalry, and even cook. The first I acceded to, and we filled ourselves with green forage and water previously, as we concluded, to our taking up our ground. In about a couple of hours information was brought that 600 of the enemy's cavalry were advancing rapidly upon Los Santos. I was ordered forward. The fire of our skirmishers soon announced their proximity, and I trotted the column round the village till I got upon the Seville road. The rising of the ground prevented my seeing them, till I reached the top of the rise, where there was a narrow *débouché* into a triangular and open space, beyond which I observed the enemy posted in column of squadrons.

The moment the head of the 13th dragoons appeared they detached one squadron, of what had constituted their advanced guard, to attack us, and being only distant about 300 yards they were almost upon the 13th before they could form, the retreat of the *troupe dorée* on the enemy's advance having distracted the men's attention, and created some little confusion. However they closed, and the enemy was repulsed and fled. The 13th rallied, recollecting the jobation they had received for their zeal at Campo Mayor. I immediately formed the Portuguese (next in column) in a second line behind them, to support a renewed attack by the 13th Dragoons, and detached the heavy brigade to the right to gain the enemy's flank. They made off immediately. We pursued, but in the strictest order. The consequence was, that to preserve the regularity we could not gain ground upon them sufficiently to make a charge or cut them off. We however followed at a gallop for nearly ten miles, and our flankers cut down or secured all they came up with, which, by the time we pulled up, amounted to nearly three officers (one captain killed) and 150 men and horses. General Beresford desired me not to let them escape. I observed that this could not be prevented, unless the whole of the 13th Dra-

goons were let loose upon them. This could not be permitted, consequently we could not overtake them, having already a start of a quarter of a mile, and going as hard as they could lay their heels to the ground. We did not lose a man, but twelve horses, chiefly old blacks, died that night of fatigue. The enemy retreated the next day from the villages four leagues in our front, and fell back upon Guadal Canal, evacuating Llerena, which a small corps of Spaniards took possession of. Lord Wellington having reached Elvas, a communication, I suppose, took place between him and Marshal Beresford, in consequence of which the infantry retired on the 18th to Santa Martha and Almendralejo, the cavalry remaining distributed in Villa Franca, this place, and Zafra. Ballasteros with a small corps advanced towards Monasterio, Count de Penne, with 1,500 Spaniards, occupies Llerena, and General Blake, with 8000 men from Cadiz, is expected to land at Ayamonte, and then proceed to this frontier. Lord W. is about to undertake the reduction of Badajos, and this accomplished, it remains to be seen what will next be done."

Private Memorandum of the Affair of Los Santos, 16th April.

"THE army moved from Santa Martha at 3 o'clock, on the morning of the 16th of April, to take up a position near Zafra. The actual situation of the enemy was not at that time precisely known, but they were supposed to have parties in front and on both flanks. The cavalry led the column, and just as they reached Los Santos, received orders to halt and water their horses, whilst the Quarter-Master-General was reconnoitring a position for the army to occupy. Two hours elapsed in this situation, when some Spaniards brought intelligence that 600 of the enemy's cavalry were in sight, advancing upon Los Santos, into which their advanced guard pushed. Our cavalry was directed to advance, which they did in column, viz.

13th Light Dragoons—British.
Two guns.
Portuguese Brigade.
Heavy Brigade—British.

After passing the skirts of the village of Los Santos, they moved along the high road to Seville about 400 yards, when they debouched through a narrow space into an open, rocky ground, of a triangular shape, bounded on the

left and right by a wall, and towards the end of which, was another *débouché*, just wide enough to admit a squadron in front, and beyond which the enemy was formed, facing to it, in column. The moment the head of the British column appeared, the enemy detached one squadron, together with the advanced guard, to attack it; and they were on their march about 300 yards distant, when Brigadier General Long first saw them; he directed the 13th dragoons to form, and repel the attack, which they scarcely could do before the enemy was upon them. The latter were nevertheless repulsed, and the 13th dragoons rejoined their squadron in order of battle. The enemy's squadron fled, and rallied behind their column. Brigadier General Long directed the Portuguese to form up quickly in rear of the 13th dragoons, and the heavy brigade to move, between a wall, and a high mountain to the right, to endeavour to gain the enemy's flank, and favour the advance of the 13th dragoons through a narrow opening, in front of which the enemy was posted. The moment the enemy perceived this movement, they retired rapidly. The 13th dragoons were put in motion, detaching one squadron as pursuers; the Portuguese followed in support. The heavy brigade hung on their flank, and the object then was to follow

them at such a pace as, preserving our own order, should oblige them to halt, and form to receive our attack, or else, by the rapidity of their movement in avoiding it, to break into disorder, and give greater scope to the effects of our pursuers: the latter occurred—we pressed them so hard, that they broke completely, and went off as hard as they could go. Another squadron of the 13th dragoons and detachments from the heavy went next in pursuit, and as the enemy's troops were blown, or come up with, they were sabred, or taken prisoners. In this manner the pursuit continued on our part for nearly 10 miles at a gallop; when the exhausted state of our horses, many of which dropped down, unable to move further, obliged us to pull up, and call in the pursuers. The result of this day's business has been, a loss on the part of the enemy of 150 men and horses, and 4 officers, one of the latter (a Captain) killed; the rest prisoners. The enemy's regiments engaged were, the 2nd dragoons, and 10th hussars, the same that were beaten at Campo Mayor, and by these two conflicts are more than half destroyed.

Just as we had halted, a fresh regiment came out of Usagre to cover the retreat of their routed comrades, but they did not attempt to advance, or molest us in our retreat back to Los Santos."

Extract of a Letter to C. B. L. dated Villa Franca, May 30th, containing part of the Journal of Operations.

" HERE we remained in peace and quietness till the enemy having collected all his forces, about the 10th of May, put them in motion on the side of Llerena and Monasterio, to move forward, and attempt the relief of Badajos. The Spaniards on the outposts at these places fell back before them, and a part joined me at Villa Franca, on the 11th of May, the rest retiring upon Los Santos, where a part of my division (the 13th dragoons and the Portuguese) were stationed.

Never in my life did I experience greater anxiety of mind than during this period. My force was left in dispersed situations, whilst the enemy, whose advance and movements I was hourly reporting to head quarters, were concentrated in my front, and on my flanks. Not a single instruction had I received, nor could I obtain, though repeatedly applied for: my route or point of retreat were not even pointed out. I was only desired not to commit the troops under my command against a superior force, but, at the same time, not to lose ground without necessity; an undertaking not very easy of accomplishment in such a country

as this, when their first indication must naturally be so near to me, as to leave the result to chance and the enemy's intentions, rather than to my inclination.

On the 11th of May, Marshal Soult collected his force at Fuente de Cantos, (on the Monasterio road), and the corps at Llerena, marched upon Bienvenida and Calzadilla, occupying at the same time Usagre. He pushed patroles to Zafra and Los Santos, and also towards Ribera. On the 12th of May, he made a feint attack upon Los Santos, but was repulsed; at the same time it was evident, that that post could not long be maintained.

On the 13th of May he advanced with greater force upon Los Santos, and the officer commanding there retired. This circumstance, by opening the road of Fuente del Maestre upon my right flank, compelled me also to fall back, which I did accordingly, four hours afterwards, upon Almendralejo, where I halted 1½ hour, and then proceeded by Azeuchal, to Santa Martha. The enemy at the same time appeared at Ribera, and carried off some bread destined for my troops.

My whole force being now collected, my apprehensions and my anxiety ceased. My chief danger lay on the side of Solana, where B. General Madden was stationed, and I ur-

gently requested him to give me the earliest intimation of the enemy's approach in that direction, and more particularly when he should be obliged to abandon it, which he promised to do.

On the 14th, the enemy advanced to Almendralejo, and occupied likewise Azeuchal. I remained at Santa Martha.

On the 15th May, they advanced to my advanced posts in front of Santa Martha, and exchanged shots, and it was reported that a considerable body had been seen to advance in the direction of Solana.

Not having received any report from General Madden, I dispatched a letter to him at 3 A. M. on the morning of the 15th, but the orderlies fell in with a patrole of the enemy, retired *re infectâ*, and left me still in doubt about General Madden's position. Relying on his communicating his movements to me, I remained under arms at Santa Martha; and about 11 o'clock dispatched another messenger to ascertain whether or not Solana was really occupied by the enemy, and to open the communication with General Madden. Scarcely had this messenger been sent off half an hour, when we perceived a very strong column of the enemy's cavalry (apparently about 3,000), followed by infantry and artillery, coming over the hills

directly down upon Santa Martha. I made every necessary disposition for retreat, and called in the advanced posts. Their nearer approach having fully established their strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera, detaching the Portuguese brigade in advance, to cover the passage of the bridge at that place. The enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and they skirmished with us all the way to Albuera. On the road, I received a dispatch ordering me to retire upon Albuera, and near that village I met the Adjutant-general, who desired me to cross the river and take up a position on the other side. This was done accordingly, and the enemy occupied the ground on this side in our front. At this time, I heard that our infantry were also advancing upon Albuera, the position selected for the inevitable conflict that was approaching. None of these, however, made their appearance for several hours, a circumstance that would have put the enemy in possession of the field of battle without much difficulty, had he been aware of it, and advanced the same evening to the attack. His neglect to do so was our salvation.

Having taken up the position, I proceeded to reconnoitre the ground, and, to my utter astonishment, found that the heights which formed the key of the position were not in-

tended to be occupied, but that the lines were drawn up parallel to the Badajos road, conceiving the enemy's attack would be directed on our left, and not upon our right. A tyro in military matters ought to have seen otherwise; and, trembling for the consequences, I could not help pointing out to the Adjutant-general the result of my observations, with the probable consequences that would attend upon the error we were falling into. Soon after, I saw Marshal Beresford reconnoitring the ground himself, and I hoped for better arrangements. In the mean time, I distributed the cavalry along this strong line of defence, and we remained quiet during the night, my orders being to maintain that ground till relieved by the Spaniards.

The morning of the 16th May arrived, but no Spaniards appeared. I again reconnoitred the ground, became confirmed in all my preceding opinions, and, on my return, I met Colonel D'Urban, who desired me to move off directly the whole of the cavalry to the rear of the British line, on the left of the position; and he himself marched off with the 4th dragoons, thus abandoning the defence of the bridge and fords which I had placed them to protect. In the mean time, I had assembled the rest of the cavalry in order to fulfil my instructions, but so convinced was

I of the danger attendant on the movement, that I delayed their departure as long as I could. In half an hour afterwards we saw the enemy in motion, pushing a strong corps of cavalry towards the bridge, and crossing the greater part of their force over the rivulet on the right of our position, which evidently was to become the point of attack. I placed the 3rd dragoon guards on the ground from whence the 4th dragoons had been removed, to oppose the passage of the river, and distributed the rest on the right. The moment the enemy's movements were reported to Head-quarters, the 4th dragoons were ordered back, and fresh dispositions appeared to be making with the infantry.

In the mean time, the enemy's column on our left, or rather centre, formed opposite the bridge and ford, opened a cannonade which we answered, and pushed a corps of lancers across the rivulet. I directed the 3rd dragoon guards to charge and beat them back, which was done. The advance of the enemy upon the heights on our right obliged me to make a fresh disposition of the troops. Having placed the artillery, therefore, on the most commanding points, supported by detachments of cavalry, and having left the 4th dragoons (a part of them at least) to keep the enemy in check in

our front, I moved down with the rest to the position which I had selected for covering the infantry, and for meeting the enemy definitively.

Whilst in the act of making these arrangements, M. General Lumley rode up and assumed the command. Having explained to him the nature of the ground, and my ideas and intentions, he adopted them, and the line was formed behind a rugged ditch and rivulet which strengthened our position, and there we awaited the enemy's further operations. I felt convinced they would not dare to cross that ditch and attack us, but at the same time the ground near the source of the ditch offered great advantages for an attack upon the flank of our infantry. I pointed it out as the spot where their exertions would probably be made, and suggested the propriety of placing a British regiment in column opposite the opening, to counteract any such attempt on the part of the enemy. This being declined, I obtained permission to place a Spanish corps there, which was done; but they formed in two lines instead of column, and at too great a distance from the spot I pointed out to be of use.

Being now called to the right by the enemy's attempts to turn our flank in that direction, I remained there during the rest of the day.

The enemy having formed his infantry in columns of attack, proceeded to gain the heights in succession, covered by their immense force of cavalry in the plain before us.

The fault we had committed now became too evident. Our infantry were hurried on at a trot to anticipate this movement, but arrived too late, and instead of being the defenders of the strongest ground, they had to become the assailants of the enemy, to dispossess him of it. Their gallantry overcame all difficulties. They advanced to the charge under a heavy fire of artillery and musquetry, but the more they advanced, the more their flank became exposed and unprotected; and as the infantry omitted to secure their own flank by throwing back a battalion, or forming a square *en potence*, the enemy's cavalry took advantage of the omission, charged and routed them on the spot I had predicted, and they were pursued at the same time by their infantry. The day appeared to be lost, but a fresh division of infantry coming up, renewed the attack, and recovered the ground. They, too, having advanced with similar incaution, a fresh attempt was made by the enemy's cavalry to serve them in the same way. Two squadrons of the 4th dragoons were detached to their assistance, and a charge made

by them with some loss, partially defeated the enemy's intentions.

The greater part of the infantry being by this time brought into action, the contest was continued with unequalled gallantry, till the enemy's infantry gave way in all directions, which circumstance compelled their cavalry also to retire. We followed them to support our infantry, and thus the battle (as bloody a one as ever was fought) terminated by their flight to the woods whence they had advanced in the morning.

Be it observed, that not a shot was fired on the ground selected and originally taken up by us for the field of battle, and that the whole contest was carried on upon the strong ground and heights which form the key to the position of Albuera, and which we had neglected to occupy.

Had the French cavalry advanced and beat ours, the day was infallibly lost, and our army would have been annihilated, for never would retreat have been more difficult and arduous, or have offered greater advantages to a triumphant, pursuing and active enemy.

Thank God! it turned out otherwise, and bravery triumphed. The enemy, however, bore off some trophies of colours and guns, and from

this accident will claim the honour of the victory.

A violent rain fell during the action, and a still severer one during the evening and following day. This made the situation of the wounded most pitiable; not a house presented itself for shelter, not a carriage or beast of burden was to be found to transport them to the rear. On the ground, therefore, they remained some for 24, many for 48 hours, with bleeding wounds, where they fell, exposed to cold and drenching rain, and many of them stripped to the skin.

We remained during the night on the field of battle, our very bivouacs in the midst of heaps of the slain and wounded. Fresh dispositions were made of the troops, and they were placed for a second contest, in the event of the enemy re-advancing, as they ought to have been for the first onset.

We appeared to expect a second attack on the following day, and the position of the troops was strengthened and improved. On the 17th, therefore, we remained tranquilly on our ground, but evident symptoms appeared of the enemy's intention to retire, by the gradual drawing off of the troops formed in line before us.

On the morning of the 18th May, the fact of their retiring being ascertained, the cavalry

moved forward to the position they had occupied, where numbers of wounded, English and French, were left on the ground, and in the wood. We pushed back their rear guard of cavalry, followed them into the plain, and there discovered their whole force of cavalry drawn up to protect the retreat of the infantry. On the night of that day we bivouacked on the open plain, about a league on the Albuera side of the village of Corte de Peleas.

The next morning (19th May) we pushed our advance about a league beyond Corte de Peleas, and found the enemy, infantry and cavalry, posted at Solana. We continued to watch them.

On the morning of the 20th, they retired to Azeuchal. We pushed on to Solana, where we found several of their dead, and pushed our advance within half a league of Azeuchal, which it endeavoured to enter, but was repulsed.

On the 21st, we skirmished severely in front of Azeuchal, to press their retreat, but they were obstinate, and both parties maintained their ground.

On the 22d May, Marshal Beresford directed a division of infantry to advance from Albuera and support the cavalry. The enemy, however, retired in the morning upon Villa Franca, our advance followed them through Azeuchal

to a league beyond Almendralejo, the rest of the cavalry marching upon Almendralejo, where it was joined by the infantry, and the whole bivouacked there for the night.

On the 23d May, we resumed our march upon Villa Franca; the advance proceeding to Ribera, which the enemy had that morning evacuated, and, as reported, had fallen back upon Llerena. The cavalry bivouacked in front of Villa Franca, the advance at Ribera. The infantry halted at Almendralejo.

On the 24th May, the whole of the cavalry moved on to Usagre. Within half a league we fell in with their advanced posts, and observed about 400 formed in column on the heights, in rear of the village. I immediately detached the 13th dragoons to turn their right, whilst the Spanish advance, supported by the heavy dragoons, marched through the town.

An almost impassable ravine, which obliged the dragoons to break off by ranks, defeated my intention, and gave the enemy sufficient time to retire upon Villa Garcia. We took up the ground they had relinquished, and made a disposition to meet any attack on the side of Bienvenida, in front of which village, about a league distant, we observed a strong regiment (lancers) drawn up in line. They soon after withdrew and fell back upon Villa Garcia and

Llerena. At night the Spaniards remained in front of Usagre, towards Villa Garcia, and the British, Portuguese, and guns, retired behind the *défilé* and bivouacked.

Early in the morning of the 25th May, reports were brought that strong columns of the enemy's cavalry were advancing from Villa Garcia. General Lumley ordered the whole force to recross the village and *défilé*, and occupy the ground in front of them. I earnestly remonstrated against this disposition, which in case of a reverse exposed us to annihilation, and I obtained his consent to push over the light cavalry only, and to leave the heavy brigade and guns in reserve where they were posted. Scarcely had the light division passed the village, when the enemy's columns disengaged, bearing down in all directions, and they opened their guns upon us. A retreat was ordered across the rivulet at various points, and was fortunately accomplished without loss or confusion, the enemy not pressing us hard. A disposition was hastily taken up to defend the passages on the river, and that through the village. The enemy brought their guns together in battery, which was answered with effect. They now formed their plan of attack, which was to threaten our left, and at the same time push three regiments through the village

to make the first attack against the British; this attack to be supported by a second line, as the troops could be brought in succession through the village.

The three regiments were permitted to pass through accordingly. Two of them formed in column opposite the 3d Dragoon Guards, the third deployed in line upon their right. At this moment, General Lumley, not aware I believe of their operations, wished to carry the 3d Dragoon Guards more to their right, and they were wheeled in column of half squadrons for the purpose, moving behind the rise of ground up which the enemy's columns were advancing, and over a ditch and broken ground which threw several of the horses down, and deranged their regularity. I saw their situation with apprehension, and considered it so critical, as to determine instantly to proceed to the attack of the enemy with the 4th Dragoons, supported on the left by the 13th Dragoons. They advanced accordingly, but had not marched 100 yards before I observed the 3d Dragoon Guards wheel into line, and General Lumley, being made acquainted with the enemy's situation in his front, directed that regiment also to attack. The charge of both was therefore combined and simultaneous, though without any previous concert or agreement upon

this head, and both were successful in the highest degree. The enemy was completely routed, and having the *défilé* in his rear, which was choked up with fresh troops, their escape was impeded and their loss proportionate. This amounted to 29 killed on the ground of attack, not counting those killed by the artillery and in the village; to 78 prisoners exclusive of one Colonel, one Major, two Lieutenants, and one other officer killed, and upwards of 60 horses sent to head quarters, many others having been seized by the Spaniards and converted to their own use. The enemy thus discomfited retired to their former position.

In the evening, however, they brought up a reinforcement of heavier guns and cannonaded us. This obliged us to retire further from the village, out of range of their shot. They only killed however one of our men.

The troops took up a retired position during the night leaving only the picquets in advance.

The men had been mounted nearly all day, and neither man nor horse had had any thing to eat or drink. The same during the night. The environs presented no resources, and the strength and proximity of the enemy kept us in a state of incessant fatigue and vigilance, exposed all day long to the most distressing effects of a torrid sun, and parched up ground.

This state of things could not be continued without destruction to the troops. General Lumley therefore in the morning determined to retreat, and before daybreak drew off the heavy cavalry and guns to a position about a league from Usagre, whence, in the afternoon they fell back to Ribera. He requested me to remain with the rest and bring them off during the night. This I did at eleven o'clock, occupying in the first place a bivouac about a league from the town, and the next morning at day break, marched off leisurely, and without molestation to Ribera. I strongly believe the enemy was not aware of this movement till the day dawned on the morning of the 27th May. In the course of this day the troops were sent to their different cantonments, and occupied Ribera, Villa Franca and Los Santos. General Ballasteros with a few thousand men being stationed at Zafra.

This little affair has been brilliant, and from being bloodless on our part, gratifying; but what to me is also most gratifying are the acknowledgments made by General Lumley both in his letter to Marshal Beresford, and in his orders, as a tribute of approbation for the part I lent in seconding him upon the above occasion. This is all the reward I seek for and desire, and when it is deserved and bestowed, I am perfectly and amply remunerated.

May 28th. Every thing remained *in statu quo.*
——29th. ditto ditto.

The enemy reconnoitred our advanced posts, but made no demonstrations of attack. Major General Sir William Erskine arrived to assume the command of the united cavalry.

During the whole of the preceding fortnight, nothing could exceed the fatigue supported by the troops, exposed to a scorching sun by day, and heavy dews by night, without any covering save the canopy of Heaven, often without food, and as far as I am concerned, without a change even of linen; our supplies also uncertain and irregular, a necessary consequence of our position in large plains close to the enemy's force."

Extract of a Letter to C. B. L., dated Bivouac, near Vicente, June, 26, 1811.

"I hope you will ere this have been put in possession of a very long detail I sent from Villa Franca, containing the journal of our proceedings during the most interesting period of our operations in Estremadura. I do not pretend to perfect accuracy in my description of what relates to others, but when I narrate what I personally witnessed, you may rely, I hope,

not only on my veracity but impartiality. I am of opinion that Marshal Beresford never deserved at my hands, the zeal with which I served him, and endeavoured to merit his good opinion; but unfortunately the business at Campo Mayor, added to the collision which arose out of the circumstance of a Portuguese Brigade of despicable cavalry having been placed under my command, produced, perhaps, an alienation that he could not easily get over.

With regard to Lumley's appointment, it certainly arose out of an act of my own. I had written from Santa Martha to state the awkward circumstances arising out of the union of the Spanish brigadiers with the force under my command, and I there received a notification that General Lumley would be appointed to do away the difficulty. He did not arrive however, nor did he assume the command, till after I had manœuvred the cavalry for a considerable time against the enemy on the 16th of May, and was in the act of placing them in that position in which they afterwards defied, under General Lumley, the efforts of a superior enemy. You have seen the reward I have received.

This is all I have to complain of, for certainly I had no pretensions to a command of that magnitude, still less to assume or exercise any control over officers (Spanish) senior to myself.

I have just read the Marshal's account, and he has written it with more prudence than was shown in preparing for the contest. The whole sum and substance is confined in the words—"As the heights which the enemy had gained" (by our having neglected to occupy them, he might have added,) "*raked and entirely commanded our whole position,* it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them." Here is a just description of the position *as it was taken up,* and the cause of that blood that was so profusely spilled in the attempt to retrieve the error. The Marshal has here stated the fact, and by his own confession my observations, as to accuracy of narrative, may be appreciated. I have never said *half* as much against him as I hear from others very high in authority indeed, and therefore I am convinced that the battle of Albuera will for ever be to General Beresford the most unfortunate day for his military reputation that he ever encountered. You will doubtless have seen, read, or heard of various other private accounts of this memorable day, and I only beg that you will abide in your opinion by that which appears the most favourable, and at the same time the most impartial."

Extract of a Letter to H. H. dated Bivouac, near Vicente, June 26, 1811.

" I feel deeply the kind interest you take in my behalf, and I am sorry that any circumstance should deprive me of the full enjoyment I could not but derive from a fair acknowledgment of services performed to the best of my ability. But, I must confess, the Marshal, had he had been studiously inclined to throw me in the back ground, could not have adopted a better course than the one he has pursued. His last public dispatch, on the action of Albuera, in which so much is said in favour of his friend, and my successor in command, and not a solitary word for me, winds up of the measure of his injustice.* That very column which he describes as menacing so formidably his front, before he was prepared to resist it, was solely repulsed, and kept afterwards in check by the movements of the cavalry and artillery under my immediate orders, and, without at all questioning the superiority of General Lumley's abilities; still, arriving, as he did, in the hour of action, ignorant of the ground, position, or

* It will be seen in the conclusion whether the full measure was yet meted out.

movements of the enemy or of his friends, I may be permitted to say that the greater part of what he did was at my suggestion, and carried into effect with my most zealous co-operation. I completely rode down four horses during the action, and the result of all this labour, anxiety, and effort has been to receive the reward of—silence.

You will see the details which I sent from Villa Franca. With military men the action of Albuera will be a severe blow to the Marshal's reputation, and difficult will it be to wipe away the fact of having exposed his army in a position which he himself in his dispatch describes as being "raked and commanded by heights," which the enemy was permitted to gain without resistance, but from which he could alone be dislodged by torrents of blood, and the exercise of more than human courage. Such an army deserved a better fate than to be placed in such a position. According to every rational calculation their defeat was certain, and had it taken place you would have heard no more of the "Army of the South." I refer you to the facts which history will record, and which independence and impartiality will dictate for my excuse when thus speaking of others. Had I been his enemy I should not have taken the trouble I did to get him convinced, by personal

observation, of his error. I am too much a friend to truth to suffer it to be perverted for the greatness of any one. Let us each have our due, and that is all we are entitled to.

We require much time to place our army again on the same effective footing it was at the opening of the campaign. The sword and sickness have made dreadful havoc in our ranks, and reduced us at least to one-third our numbers. At Albuera the respective and opposing armies were not unequally matched. From every account I have received from prisoners, &c. they (the enemy) amounted to 24 or 25,000 men in all. Ours I estimate at 27,000. The dispersion of our cavalry scarcely left us more than 4 or 500 British at any point, and these, with two regiments of Spaniards that could not be depended upon, were all we had to offer by way of resistance to their numerous and overwhelming columns. The ground, however, favoured us, and the horse artillery did its duty with brilliant effect. They lost a great number of men and from 4 to 500 horses by the operation of this arm alone. Two regiments more of British cavalry would have gone near to exterminate the French army, retreating, or rather flying away, in the manner it did."

39, Mount Street, June 29, 1832.

MY DEAR SIR,

I WROTE to you at Warrington, about a week ago, respecting a reply which is in preparation to the work entitled "Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's 3d vol. &c. &c." in which the reputation of my relative, the late General Long, is assailed in no very measured terms of reproach.

I then expressed my intention of sending you some questions relative to the operations just previous to and immediately connected with the battle of Albuera, when you held the situation of aide-de-camp to General Long.

As my questions relate to distinct matters of fact, there can, I think, be no impropriety on my part in putting them, nor on your part in answering them. My object is to obtain evidence as to facts, and then to make the best use of it that I can, and for whatever opinions I may advance, or conclusions I may draw from those facts, I am, as I should desire to be, wholly responsible.

I enclose you the questions,

and am,

very sincerely yours,

C. E. LONG.

Lt. Col. Pitt, &c. &c.

Royal Barracks, Dublin,
3d July, 1832.

My dear Sir,

I am favoured with your note of the 29th ultimo, requesting me to answer some queries relative to the operations immediately previous to and during the battle of Albuera, when I was holding the situation of Aide-de-Camp to the late Lieutenant-General Long, and in reply beg to assure you, that I feel no hesitation in giving answers to such direct questions of fact as yours appear to be, at the same time, adhering most strictly to what I sincerely believe to be truth, to the best of my recollection, without offering any opinion of my own in opposition to those of my superiors in command.

In complying thus far, I conceive that I am only performing a duty I owe to the memory of a distinguished officer, whose reputation commanded the esteem of all who knew him.

Believe me,
very sincerely yours,

Geo. D. Pitt,
Lt. Col. 80th Regt.

Questions submitted to Colonel Pitt, and his Answers.

I.

Q. Did the cavalry, under the orders of B. General Long, on the 15th May, 1811, arrive at Albuera from Santa Martha in great confusion, when pushed back from the latter place by the advance of the enemy?

A. When the force of the enemy was distinctly observed descending from the heights towards the town of Santa Martha, on the 15th May, 1811, B. General Long commenced his retreat upon Albuera, where we arrived that afternoon without the least confusion, our rear guard skirmishing and retreating gradually before the advance of the enemy.

II.

Q. Was B. General Long, to your knowledge, continually reporting to Head-quarters the advance and movements of the enemy, previous to their approach upon Santa Martha?

A. Brigadier-Gen. Long did, to my knowledge, continually report to Head-quarters the advance and movements of the enemy previous to and after their approach upon Santa Martha.

III.

Q. Did the enemy's force appear to be more numerous than that under B. General Long?

A. The enemy's force, in cavalry alone, was greatly

superior to that under the command of General Long, besides which, infantry and artillery were distinctly seen moving upon Santa Martha before we commenced our retreat.

IV.

Q. Did B. General Long, in your hearing, express any surprise that infantry were not posted at the height beyond the Faria stream, through which the road from Santa Martha passed?

A. B. General Long did more than once express his surprise at not finding the wooded height, above the Faria stream, occupied by infantry at the time we passed it, this he did in my hearing then and often after.

V.

Q. Did you understand that B. General Long's orders were to attempt the defence of that height with the cavalry, unsupported by infantry? and did you hear any Staff-officer at any time remark that B. General Long ought there to have kept the enemy at bay?

A. The only orders I knew B. Gen. Long to receive were to retire upon Albuera: I never heard him or any other person hint at the idea of attempting to defend the height with cavalry; neither did I hear any Staff-officer or other person remark that General Long should have kept the enemy at bay at that point.

VI.

Q. Did you, soon after your arrival with the

cavalry at Albuera, when pushed back from Santa Martha, see Marshal Beresford ?

A. On the arrival of the cavalry at Albuera, when pushed back from Santa Martha, the whole crossed over the bridge: posts were placed along the left bank of the river, the fords watched, and the main body retired under the high ground. Some time after this was done, Marshal Beresford rode past our bivouac, and General Long accompanied him to the right of our position; this was the first time I saw the Marshal.

VII.

Q. Were the cavalry then in considerable confusion ? and did Marshal Beresford on that occasion form them and place them in their position—if so, in what position ?

A. I did not observe that the cavalry were in any confusion then or at any other period during the day, neither did I see the Marshal conduct them to any position.

VIII.

Q. By whom, to your knowledge, was B. General Long directed to cross to the left bank of the Albuera ?

A. I heard Lieut.-Col. Rooke, Assistant Adjutant General, order General Long to cross to the left bank of the Albuera and take up posts, as stated in my answer to Question VI.

IX.

Q. Was the cavalry after this ordered to the rear of the line ? and was it by B. General

Long's orders that a portion of the cavalry remained to protect the bridge and fords, and did they effect that object?

A. On the morning of the 16th, the cavalry were moved to the rear of the infantry line, with the exception of some heavy dragoons, which I heard B. General Long order to form opposite to a ford above the bridge, and when the enemy attacked the town and bridge a body of Polish lancers crossed the ford. I was present with General Long at the time, and near the dragoons when he gave them orders to charge, which I saw them do effectually, by driving the lancers in and over the river.

X.

Q. At what time did M. General the Hon. W. Lumley arrive and assume the command of the cavalry? and did you hear B. General Long explain the arrangements to that officer with respect to the disposition of that arm on the right of the line?

A. Some time after the charge before mentioned, I was in company with General Long, when M. General the Hon. Sir W. Lumley rode up and assumed the command of the allied cavalry. I heard him explain to Sir William the arrangements he had made with respect to the disposition of that arm on the right, also that he was prepared to obey his orders and render every assistance in his power.

XI.

Q. What did you understand to be the reason of M. General Lumley's appointment?

A. I understood then and since that General Long was superseded in the command of the allied cavalry in consequence of there having been Spanish brigadiers senior to him, and, to prevent any jealousy or misunderstanding, an officer of higher rank was appointed to command the whole.

XII.

Q. Was B. General Long actively engaged throughout the day?

A. B. General Long was actively engaged throughout the day.

XIII.

Q. Did B. General Long in your hearing express great anxiety about the right flank of the infantry, near to the source of a ditch where the charge of the Polish lancers took place? and did he suggest the placing some force near the spot to repel any attack that might be made?

A. B. General Long did in my hearing express great anxiety about the right flank of the British infantry, and his regret that a corps of Spanish cavalry did not advance to the ground he observed he had pointed out for them to occupy: this took place previous to the charge made by the Polish lancers upon the British infantry.

GEO. D. PITT,
Lieut. Colonel 80th Regt. and Aide-de-Camp to the late Brig. Gen. Long.

Royal Barracks,
Dublin, July 3, 1832.

The author cannot conclude the execution of the task he has undertaken, so far as it is connected with the defence of General Long from the accusations contained in the "Further Strictures," without directing the attention of the reader to one very material point, viz. that the very nature of the defence is egoistical, and as such, in some degree prejudicial to General Long's cause. Confidential communications contained in letters to relatives and private friends form a considerable portion of that defence, and the accused is thus, of necessity, made as it were the trumpeter of his own exploits. Had the case been otherwise, had General Long been alive to meet the accusations of his opponents, he might have given a narrative of the transactions freed from the impurities of a careless epistolary style, and the duty of conducting his defence would not have been consigned to the unaided efforts of one so little fitted for the task of a military critic. But there is happily more than that barren and proofless assertion whose value must depend upon the character of him who makes it. The evidence of those officers whose testimony has been sought for, (and who, it should be observed, were solely applied to as witnesses, and not attempted to be enlisted as partisans,) demands, as it deserves, something beyond the simple and sha-

dowy emptiness, of anonymous contradiction, and, like the cross-bow, its force is fortunately not rendered less effective through the weakness of the arm by which its arrows are propelled.

All bitterness and personal hostility, saving only that which has been engendered by the work in question, the author at once renounces; and most willingly would he have been spared the hateful task which has thus obliged him, perhaps, to do violence to those kindred feelings which must always be honoured, and which *he* had never desired to wound. But the public will judge on which side this aggression originated. A solemn duty to the dead was to be discharged, a defence of the defenceless, and it has been done.

There is, however, still remaining one supplementary portion of the history of this unfortunate association with Marshal Beresford, which, although irrelevant to the immediate matter in dispute, is yet in strict accordance with the general nature of the narrative.

On the occasion of the distribution of the medals for the battles of Albuera and Vittoria, General Long received the latter and not the former. In consequence of this marked omission he addressed a communication, through Sir Henry Torrens, to H. R. H. the Duke of York, complaining of this exception and ten-

dering the return of the Vittoria medal, " for," as he most justly observed, " if the exception in this case," viz. Albuera, " was merited, I could evidently have had no claim whatever to any greater degree of consideration or favor for my services at Vittoria," and, as the author would add, if General Long did not deserve a medal at Albuera, he deserved a court-martial. The official answer returned from the Horse Guards was, that the consideration of his case " did not come within the rules and regulations laid down for the grant of such distinctions," and that upon his returning the Vittoria medal " the notification of the distinction would be cancelled in the Gazette." On the receipt of this reply, General Long having examined the rules (which will be found in the subjoined note)* returned the following reply.

1.

No general officer shall be considered entitled to receive medals, unless he has been personally and particularly engaged upon those occasions of great importance and peculiar brilliancy, in commemoration of which the Prince Regent may be graciously pleased to bestow such marks of distinction.

2.

No officer shall be considered as a candidate for the medal or badge, except under the special selection and report of the Commander of the Forces upon the spot, as having merited the distinction by conspicuous services.

July 10, 1814.

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, which was only left at my lodgings late in the evening of the 4th instant. I beg you will be pleased to acquaint H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, that having at length obtained the sight of a Gazette containing the rules and regulations to which you have referred, as regulating the distinctions to be conferred upon officers, I perceive by the 2d & 3d articles that the act of recommendation, which determines exclusively the pretensions of officers, is vested in the discretion and rests entirely at the option of the Commander of the Forces for the time being, and consequently that the ungracious exception of which I have complained appears to admit of no appeal. It becomes my duty, therefore, to submit; but in so doing, I have at least the satisfaction of being able to appreciate every accurately the real circumstances of the case, and I find in this discovery abundant cause for consolation. I am content, therefore, that the injury intended me should rest where I shall not fail to

3.

That the Commander of the Forces shall transmit to the Commander in Chief returns signed by himself, specifying the names and ranks of those officers whom he shall have selected as peculiarly deserving.

place it. I accept with pleasure the distinction conferred at the recommendation of His Grace the Duke of Wellington, and I leave Lord Beresford to reconcile as he can to his own sense of justice and consistency, the fact of having transmitted to me a public vote of thanks with the annexed and expressed assurance that it was for my " distinguished conduct and exertions in the memorable battle of Albuera;" and in the very teeth of this assurance to feel himself justified in excluding my name from the list of officers who were actually recommended by him for those marks of His Majesty's gracious approbation, which are the allotted rewards of " distinguished conduct and exertion" in the field.

I, Sir, did not presume thus to describe any services of mine, but His Royal Highness is now in possession of the high authority that did so describe them to me.

It has become my further duty to state for His Royal Highness's information, that for some time previous to the battle of Albuera, I had held the command of the *whole* of the British Cavalry and Horse Artillery south of the Tagus, and that from the absence of Major General Lumley I continued to have that honor at the commencement and in the early part of the action, during which time I had the opportunity to

employ *both* arms efficaciously and successfully in repelling the enemy's efforts at a very critical moment, and (as appeared to my judgment) at a very critical point.

I will not permit myself to enter further into the details of that day's proceedings, however pleased I should be at the opportunity of doing so, nor will I attempt to draw any invidious comparisons between those who were equally zealous, inclined, and anxious to support on that trying occasion the honor and interests of their sovereign and country. I have only to lament, so far as I am personally concerned, that private feelings should ever be permitted to influence the conduct of any commander when discharging officially the duties of a great public trust.

I have the honor to be,
Your most obedient humble servant,

R. B. LONG,
M. Gen'l."

M. Gen. Torrens,
&c. &c.

It would be the height of arrogance and presumption to put the professional services of General Long on a par with those of that able and excellent officer and man, the late Lord Collingwood. But there is in the Life of that distinguished commander a case in the distribution of medals so strikingly similar in the injustice of its application, although not equally

analogous in the reparation of that injustice, that an allusion to it cannot be deemed superfluous.

" In the capricious distribution of rewards which followed on that day," viz. the " glorious 1st of June," " Captain Collingwood," says his biographer, p. 24, " found with extreme mortification and concern, that his services were passed over by Lord Howe without notice, though the rear admiral with whom he sailed was mentioned with well merited praise." " This act of injustice," he continues, " created much surprize in the fleet, and particularly in Captain Pakenham of the Invincible, who used to say, 'If Collingwood has not deserved a medal, neither have I; for we were together the whole day.' "

In 1797 " when Lord St. Vincent," it is added, p. 46, " informed Captain Collingwood that he was to receive one of the medals which were distributed on this occasion," viz. the battle of Cape St. Vincent, " he told the admiral with great feeling and firmness, that he could not consent to receive a medal, while that for the 1st of June was withheld. " I feel," he said, " that I was then improperly passed over; and to receive such a distinction now would be to acknowledge the propriety of that injustice." " That is precisely the answer which I expected from you, Captain Colling-

wood,' was Lord St. Vincent's reply." The two medals were subsequently transmitted by Lord Spencer, and, as Lord Collingwood observed, " the king ordered the medal of the 1st June to be sent to me, with that for February in spite of Lord Howe. * * * * * *"

To add further comment would be to mutilate the resemblance. It needs none.

LONDON:
C. ROWORTH AND SONS, BELL YARD,
TEMPLE-BAR.

A REPLY

TO

VARIOUS OPPONENTS;

PARTICULARLY TO

"STRICTURES ON COLONEL NAPIER'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE PENINSULA."

TOGETHER WITH

OBSERVATIONS

ILLUSTRATING

SIR JOHN MOORE'S CAMPAIGNS.

BY

W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

THE SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:

THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.

MDCCCXXXIII.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM MARCHANT,
Ingram-court.

A' REPLY,

&c.

THE publication of a second edition furnishes me with an opportunity, of which I avail myself, to answer some attacks which have been made on this history. Anonymous periodical criticisms are to be disregarded,—like wasps, they sting and die, but elaborate writings, controverting my arguments, and expressly impugning the accuracy of my statements, stand upon a different footing. I speak, however, of English works only, for to maintain my ground against Spanish writers would be endless labour; and it would be painful to support statements offensive to a nation which I have always respected, even while recording its errors. Sir Hew Dalrymple's excellent Memoirs, published after my second volume had appeared, show that I have in no degree strained my authorities; and if those authorities are not sufficient, I have no other justification as regards Spain.

The English publications which I propose to notice, are,—

1°. Notes on the Campaign of 1808-9 in the North of Portugal. By Colonel Sorrel.

2°. Narrative of the Peninsular War. By Major Leith Hay.

3°. Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns. By the Author of Cyril Thornton.

4°. Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War. Anonymous.

5°. Life of the Duke of Wellington. By Major Moyle Sherer.

To this list I would have added my lord Strangford's second Pamphlet, if Mr. Justice Bayley had not already answered it for me. See Trial lord Strangford v. Young, editor of the Sun.

Colonel Sorrel's Notes.—These were, I understand, dictated by sir David Baird, while labouring with a notion

that I, in concert with other authors, aimed to lower his reputation; a design never entertained by me, and not to be discovered in what I have said of that brave officer. But history would indeed be "an old almanac," if, out of respect to persons, errors, having a palpable influence upon great events, were suppressed: in this view only have I written aught against sir D. Baird, and what I have so written I will now justify, yet my own mistakes fairly acknowledge, with the sincere wish that they were fewer.

1°. It is charged, as a fault, that I have said, "*the rear of sir D. Baird's column extended beyond Lugo on the 26th November*, 1808."

Page 10. The accuracy of this simple fact colonel Sorrel does not deny, but observes, that "the column was well closed up to Astorga by the 29th of November." Nevertheless, sir D. Baird, writing at the time, informs sir John Moore that his troops *could not be concentrated at Astorga until the 4th of December.*

Vide Moore's Narrative, p. 79.

2°. In my work, it is stated, that, previously to his knowing of the fatal battle of Tudela, "*Sir J. Moore proposed, in case 'he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, throw himself into the heart of Spain, and, drawing round him all he could of the Spanish forces, defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.'*"

Colonel Sorrel thinks this "*must be a mistake.*" But that he thinks so without reason, the following extract from sir J. Moore's letter to Mr. Frere will prove. "Had this army been united and ready to act at the time of general Castanos' defeat, much as I think it would have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on Madrid, and to have shared in the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If I could not have sustained myself there, I thought, by placing myself behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies and the people of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportunity to assemble round me, and to march to the relief of the capital. That this was my intention is known to the officers with me, who are in my confidence; it is known also to lord Castlereagh, to whom I had imparted it in one of my late letters."

Moore's Narrative, p. 156.

3°. Colonel Sorrel corrects me for saying that sir D. Baird *retreated to Villa-Franca without orders.* And also for saying *stores were destroyed at Astorga.* Page 27. p. 28.

I admit the first to be an error. Nevertheless, a retrograde movement, without orders from sir J. Moore, was commenced. Crawfurd's brigade, which had been stationed in front of Astorga, passed that town before the retreat was countermanded; and as for the stores, I can assure colonel Sorrel, that I did myself walk ankle-deep in spirits poured into the streets.

4°. It is hinted that I should have refrained from censuring sir D. Baird for sending an important despatch by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost it. p. 51. "*It is doubtful,*" colonel Sorrel complains, "*whether the expression, 'blameable irregularity,' is applied to the inattention of the general, or the drunkenness of the dragoon.*" The colonel also intimates, that to say sir J. Moore personally directed the movements of sir D. Baird's division in the battle of Coruña, is derogatory of that general's reputation. p. 25.

I cannot admit that stating this last fact injures sir David. A general-in-chief must be somewhere, and where he is, he must direct. But touching the matter of the dragoon, I imputed "*blameable irregularity*" to the general; and the following statement, drawn up at the time by the *aide-de-camp* who carried the despatch in question to sir David, justifies the expression.

"On the night that the rear of the army passed through Villa Franca, and halted at a small village about two leagues and a half from that town, sir J. Moore sent captain George Napier (one of his *aides-de-camp*), about two o'clock in the morning, with despatches for sir D. Baird, enclosing orders to lieutenant-generals Hope and Fraser, the nature of which orders was to prevent lieut.-general Fraser's division proceeding on the road towards Vigo, and to make them halt at Lugo, as sir J. Moore had (owing to many circumstances) altered his intention of proceeding with the army to Vigo. When sir John delivered these despatches to captain Napier, he said, 'Have you a good horse, Napier? you must get to Nogales to sir D. Baird before five o'clock this morning, if possible, as otherwise sir David will have marched, and then you must follow him.' Sir John

also gave captain N. particular orders to be very careful of the despatches, as they were of the greatest consequence; and to tell sir David '*to forward those which were enclosed to generals Hope and Fraser as quick as possible.*' "

"When captain Napier arrived at Nogales, which he did a few minutes after five o'clock, he found sir David in bed, and delivered him *the despatches and orders.* Sir David asked, 'If he (captain N.) was to go on with those for generals Hope and Fraser?' 'No, sir, unless you have no other person to send; and, in that case, of course I will proceed; but I must first get a fresh horse.' Sir David then said, 'Were you ordered by sir J. Moore to proceed with these letters to general Hope?' Captain N. replied, 'My orders were to deliver the despatches to you, and you were to forward those for lieut.-generals Hope and Fraser, *with all care and despatch.*' On this he said, 'Very well;' *and in about two hours after, or perhaps not quite so long,* he sent the despatches off by an orderly dragoon of the 15th regiment. Sir David marched soon afterwards, with his division, to some heights on the road towards Lugo, about two or three short leagues from Nogales; and towards the evening he came himself back to Nogales, and said to captain Napier, who was waiting there till sir J. Moore should arrive, '*By God, the rascal of a dragoon by whom I sent those despatches this morning, has got drunk and lost them.*' Upon which captain N. immediately mounted his horse and went off to report the circumstance to sir J. Moore, whom he met on the hill coming down into Nogales. '*He seemed quite astonished and displeased with sir D. Baird for having sent despatches by an orderly dragoon, which were of such consequence that the commander of the forces thought it necessary to send one of his own aides-de-camp with them.*' "

Two forced marches were thus imposed upon M'Kenzie's and Frazer's division, which occasioned great distress and loss; and here I must observe that I never meant, nor did attribute blame to that general whose conduct was strictly in unison with his orders; yet I have heard that his friends were hurt at the mode in which I introduced his name, —perhaps at the lightness of the expression, "A pilgrimage" to St. Jago, which, I admit, is a trifling conceit, unsuitable to the gravity of the occasion.

Narrative of the Peninsular War.—Major Leith Hay is pleased so to term his work; but it is only a narrative of his personal adventures during about half the period that war lasted. He seems offended that I should have exposed the foolish conduct of the military agents employed by Government at the commencement of the Spanish insurrection; yet he has not, and could not, disprove my statements, seeing that they are supported by the letters of the agents themselves, and that the public voice has proclaimed their justice. He says, "*that to include the whole of the agents with exception only of colonel Coxe and lord William Bentinck, in one sweeping and unqualified censure, appears as little worthy of history as it probably will be hereafter considered of notice;*" and that to answer me he has only to mention the names of "*colonels Paisley, Jones, Lefevre, and Birch.*" But I have not included the whole in one sweeping censure; and the last-named officers, whose talents I acknowledge, and one of whom (colonel Birch) I have especially quoted as giving good intelligence, were not agents, but on the staff of an agent. The justice of their views only sets in a more disadvantageous light the errors of general Leith, under whom they acted. Narrative, vol. i. p. 18.

Major Leith Hay thinks my observations will be considered unworthy of notice hereafter, but intimates that his work is founded on perfectly authentic documents, meaning, thereby, his own memoranda.

Whatever may be the fate of my writings, major Hay's will scarcely serve as guides to posterity, when it is found that, treating of the battle of Busaco, he says, "on the forenoon of the 26th September, I was directed to advance in front, with a squadron of Portuguese cavalry, and report the movements of the enemy on the roads close to the right bank of the Mondego, directly communicating with the valley of Larangeira. *In the execution of this service we proceeded two leagues without encountering an enemy.*"—"*As we rode forward a cannonade and fire of musketry was heard in the direction of St. Combadaõ, where the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were forcing back upon the position the advance of the allied army.*" Now St. Combadaõ is about twenty miles distant from Busaco; the light division and Pack's brigade Ib. p. 231.

formed 'the advance of the army;' the former never were within ten miles of Combadaõ, and Pack retired from thence, without an action, on the 22d. Moreover, on the 26th, when major Hay heard this firing at Combadaõ, the duke of Elchingen and general Reynier were, and had been from one o'clock of the 25th, immediately in front of Busaco, and their light troops were actually skirmishing with the British in that position, which the major had just left two leagues in his rear! Hence it would appear that the merit of this authentic narrative does not arise from its accuracy.

Vide App. sec. 3. vol. iii. Napier's History.

Strictures upon Colonel Napier's History.—Although anonymous attacks should be disregarded, I notice this pamphlet, written in defence of lord Beresford, because the writer would have it understood, either that he is lord Beresford, or that he writes from his lordship's dictation. I, however, think, that lord Beresford's knowledge would reject the inaccuracy of this work, and that his modesty would shrink from dictating such gross praise of himself. It is not credible, I say, that lord Beresford should describe himself "*As a wise, firm, and conciliatory person*"—"*A man whose qualifications eminently fitted him for high important trusts*"—"*An officer of zeal, temper, discretion, and intelligence*"—"*A distinguished commander capable of the greatest things*"—"*A person evincing a knowledge of mankind, a skill in the various principles by which the human heart is actuated, and a facility in influencing and directing them, ranked amongst the exclusive characteristics of the highest class of mankind.*"

Pages 7, 8, 9, et passim.

The anonymous author, whoever he be, at first gives me credit for possessing "*very considerable qualities as an historian,*" and expresses his belief that "*my errors are unintentional,*" arising from "*inaccurate information.*" But he says that he answers my statements "*lest a work of such pretensions to consideration should bias posterity.*" Alas for posterity! He fears it will be biassed by "*an adopter and propagator of foolish and trumpery reports*"—"*A person of easy credulity*"—"*Of extraordinary ignorance of facts and of topography*"—"*Writing from exparte and false information*"—"*Presumptuous*"—"*Inexperienced*"—"*A caviller*"—"*A mere soldier of theory, presuming to*

Page 1 and 126.

Pages 5, 7, 8, et passim.

discuss the abilities, the opinions, and the conduct of so able and distinguished an officer as lord Beresford"—"*An historian without literary integrity or fairness*"—"*A special pleader*"—"*An illogical reasoner*"—"*An intrepid assertor*"—"*Excessively deficient in the most essential qualities*"—and one whose "*Intellectual vision is thickly offuscated by the mist of party prejudices.*"

As indications of "galled withers" all this may pass, but in the same vein I am told that I "*know nothing of lord Beresford whatever*"—that I had "*given myself no trouble to enquire into his military services or his personal character*"—"*Did not know when, or where, or how, that distinguished officer had been employed*"—and with "*a common and most senseless prejudice which is often found in connexion with a certain class of political opinions, took it for granted that because lord Beresford was highly allied, he must necessarily be deficient in professional skill, and because he possessed that family patronage which might bring his merits into notice, it must follow as an inevitable consequence, that he could not be in possession of the merit that might deserve it.*"

Being at least as nobly connected as lord Beresford, and therefore not likely to draw conclusions against myself, I leave his "high alliances" to those whom they may concern; but his family patronage is more to the purpose, and for his military services I will give some tokens of my enquiries after them.

As the pamphleteer calls me a "mere soldier of theory," although I have seen many more, and harder campaigns, than lord Beresford saw before he attained the command of the Portuguese army; he will, doubtless, permit me to begin with his lordship's expedition to Buenos Ayres, which was his essay as a general-in-chief. I happen to know many curious details of that event, which have been related by eye-witnesses, but it is needless to touch on them now; suffice it to say, that lord Beresford was there completely beaten by a pastry-cook, and laid down his arms.

His next appearance was as commandant of the island of Madeira, which had been secretly delivered up to England in trust, by the prince of Portugal. The Portuguese declare that, in violation of this trust, lord Beresford called

upon the authorities to swear allegiance to George III.; but I will not dwell on that point. He governed the island, well or ill, for some months.

At Coruña he, as I have stated, commanded the brigade covering the embarkation. It proved to be of no great importance, and if a conversation, such as I have heard, did really take place between him and an eminent staff officer, his lordship did not, at the time, rate the honor so high as his defender does now.

These indications that I am not entirely ignorant of lord Beresford's services, *before* he commanded the Portuguese forces, are only given in answer to the writer of this pamphlet. I have no desire to enlarge upon them unless pressed thereto; and for my knowledge of his services *after* he attained that command, let my work vouch. I may have seen them with a jaundiced eye. I may have been "*incapable from the circumstances of my military life, to form an adequate conception of the difficulties which the general of large corps has to contend with.*" I may have had my "*intellectual vision offuscated by the mists of party prejudice;*" but my opinion is still that marshal Beresford was not "*a distinguished commander,*"—not an "*enterprising general,*"—not "*capable of the greatest things.*" If I am wrong, his deeds are before the world to obviate my conclusions. Great actions cannot be smothered with ink. Here, however, I must observe, that the author of this pamphlet is unjustifiable in saying that I have "hinted at *professional backwardness.*" That would have been a gratuitous insult, whereas I have strictly confined myself to my undoubted right of measuring marshal Beresford's military capacity by the standard of his exploits; neither will it serve to cry out—political prejudices! because I have nowhere attacked lord Wellington, lord Hill, lord Lynedoch, lord Stuart de Rothesay, sir Edward Paget, and others whose political opinions were the same as lord Beresford's. These preliminary remarks made, I proceed to examine my opponent's arguments.

I. In relating the manner of lord Beresford's appointment to the command of the Portuguese army, I used the following terms:—"The Portuguese Regency, whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation, had offered the command of all the native troops to an

English general, with power to alter and amend the military discipline, to appoint British officers to the command of regiments, and to act without control in any measure he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition of the Portuguese army."

"It is said, that sir J. Doyle, sir J. Murray, general Beresford, and even the marquis of Hastings, then earl of Moira, sought for the appointment. The last was undoubtedly a man well fitted by his courtly manners, his high rank, and his real talents, both in the cabinet and in the field, for such an office; but powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, major-general Beresford was appointed, to the great discontent of many officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man, without any visible claim to superiority, should be placed over their heads."

"*This short extract,*" says the pamphleteer, "*contains as many fallacies as lines.*" "*It would be difficult, perhaps, to find in any other historian a passage equally short, and equally abounding in misstatements and mistakes.*" He then proceeds to show that marshal Beresford *never applied for the appointment;* doubts if any of the other officers named did so; is indignant that it should be supposed *parliamentary interest* had any influence in the matter; and taking advantage of a piece of bad composition, endeavours to convict me of "*arguing upon a rumour as if it were a certainty, with a view to draw an unfair conclusion against lord Beresford.*"

Rigorously speaking, he is entitled to prefer this last charge, because the remark upon lord Moira's qualifications separates the members of my sentence in a slovenly manner; but take that away, or put it in a parenthesis, and the whole passage will (as it was intended) rest on the rumour. This writer, indeed, rebukes me for noticing rumours; but the fact being interesting, and probable, why should I have suppressed it? And what are the misstatements? What the fallacies of which I am accused?

1°. *Marshal Beresford never asked for the office, and therefore parliamentary interest could have had nothing to do with the affair.*

It is, however, the essential business of a government conducted on a system of patronage, to solicit men of pow-

erful families to accept great offices; and who more powerful than the Beresfords? This system is now declared to be on its death-bed; but was it in its infancy in 1809?

2°. *The Portuguese Regency never offered lord Beresford full power.*

I confess my error here, and will explain how it arose. In lord Castlereagh's instructions to sir J. Cradock, I found that the Regency had applied for an "English general to *organize and command their army.*" Lastly, I knew that twelve days after lord Beresford arrived at Lisbon, he did in fact exercise a complete control over the Portuguese army. It appears, however, that those twelve days were devoted to the most difficult negotiations; that the marshal
Page 12. and Mr. Villiers had "*a world of difficulties*" to obtain the necessary powers, and that they were '*most reluctantly conceded to the determined representations of the British Minister.*' But of those negotiations I found no trace in lord Castlereagh's despatches, nor in lord Wellington's letter, nor in sir J. Cradock's correspondence; hence my error, insignificant in itself, was very difficult to avoid: nevertheless I stated the fact with some doubt of its accuracy, as the expression "*whether spontaneously or brought thereto by previous negotiation*" sufficiently proves. This is the only real foundation for the abuse so liberally bestowed.

But I will show that this writer has greatly exaggerated the difficulty of the negotiations; and when he states that one of marshal Beresford's qualifications for the command,
Page 8. was his being "*perfectly conversant with the language of the people,*" he states that which a better authority than he can be contradicts.

Extract of a letter from marshal Beresford to lord Wellington, Chamusca, 4th Jan. 1811.

"On lord Castlereagh's communicating to me his Majesty's pleasure that I should proceed to Portugal, to fill the situation I now hold, it was my duty to point out to his lordship what my experience in the country had made me think absolutely necessary to fulfil, with any prospect of advantage, the views of his Majesty, and of his royal highness the Prince Regent, in giving to a British general the command of the Portuguese army; and, amongst other things, I represented it as necessary that in all things re-

specting the organization and discipline of the army, the commander-in-chief should be perfectly independent of the government, and that it was absolutely necessary rewards and punishments should be exclusively with him. These claims lord Castlereagh told me Mr. Canning would give directions to his Majesty's envoy here to stipulate for, and that I need not undertake the task until they were granted. I consequently, on my arrival, declined accepting the command on waiting on the Regency, till Mr. Villiers should have made these necessary stipulations, and in consequence of which, *after he had some conference with the Regency*, I put down, at his desire, in English, something to the purport (for it appears a very bad translation or ill copied) of the propositions, in one of the papers enclosed, and to which the answer annexed to it was given. *I was not then very much master of the Portuguese*, but I recollect observing to Mr. Villiers that the answer appeared to me ambiguous, and wishing further explanation. He, however, assured me that it was quite proper, and that the *government intended fully to accede to my desires*, and to support me fully in every thing, and I remained with the understanding that, though for the dignity of the government it might desire particular forms, that virtually the power in every thing respecting the formation, organization, and discipline of the army remained with me; and on this principle I have ever since acted, with the full acquiescence and sanction of government."

Here we find no reluctance and no difficulty, except that which the marshal, from his *imperfect knowledge of the language*, experienced in trying to read the answer of the Regency.

3°. The pamphleteer says, *That although many officers, at a later period, wanted lord Beresford's situation, none were discontented at the time;* and *only sir J. Murray objected to the local rank of lieutenant-general, which accompanied it.*

But this local rank was a necessary adjunct to the command of the Portuguese troops, and any discontent occasioned thereby was a discontent at lord Beresford's appointment. Sir J. Murray's displeasure is admitted; and the following letter from general Sherbroke to sir John Cradock speaks for itself:—

" *Lisbon, March* 12.

Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MS.

" Sir,—Hearing, upon my landing here this day, that his Majesty has been pleased to confer upon major-general Beresford the local rank of lieutenant-general in Portugal, I wish to submit to your excellency that I am three years a senior major-general in the British army; and although I shall, under the present circumstances, perform, with the greatest cheerfulness, the duties which you may require of me, yet I think, on reference to the customs of the service, you will see my present situation in such a point of view as shall induce your excellency to lay my humble request before his royal highness the commander-in-chief, that he will be graciously pleased to move his Majesty to confer on me the local rank of lieutenant-general also, while serving in this country."——" J. SHERBROKE," &c.

Thus it appears that the discontent, even at the moment, was not, as this author "*positively asserts*," confined to sir John Murray; and though he also labours hard to show, that lord Beresford's superior claims were at that time "*very visible to any person whose intellectual eye was not blinded by prejudice*," I confess I have yet to learn that, in the opinion of the army, his lordship's merits, though they should even be enhanced by his share of the glory of Albuera, were greater than general Sherbroke's.

II. The writer expresses his indignation at my saying, that lord Beresford could never have overcome the difficulties of his situation if he had not been "*directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he worked.*"

Whether in this I am correct, or otherwise, will be made manifest in the course of my work; but this author discovers an irritable hastiness in commenting upon the expression; he supposes it applied wholly to the difficulties of discipline, whereas it evidently refers to political obstacles. I will, however, go farther, and say, that even the discipline of the troops was not more indebted to lord Beresford's than it was to the zeal and knowledge of the excellent English officers who served under him. Madden, Harvey, Ashworth, Elder, Oliver, Douglas, and others like them, were the spirits animating the system that raised the Portuguese troops so high in the scale of European armies;

and these officers were not instructed by marshal Beresford —some of them were capable of instructing him.

III. The pamphleteer denies the truth of the following passage:—"*In time almost all the military situations of emolument and importance were held by Englishmen.*" History, p. 154.

The word emolument is used in its simple sense. The nation was at war for its existence, the whole population in arms, the country lately ravaged by an enemy, and the treasury quite empty. In such a crisis all military situations were more or less places of "*emolument and importance,*" it being borne in mind that England paid the greatest part of the army. Now as to the facts. Lord Wellington, admiral Berkeley, and Mr. Stuart, were members of the Regency. The first was captain-general of all the Portuguese forces, regular or irregular;—that is to say, of the whole population able to bear arms. The second was admiral of all the fleet on the European waters. Marshal Beresford commanded all the regular land armies. Sir Thomas Hardy was commandant of the port and arsenal of Lisbon, and to these places salaries were attached. Lord Wellington, indeed, gave his Portuguese, as he also did his Spanish, pay to the military chest; but this was a private act of disinterestedness, and I believe his example was not followed. Here, then, were places of "*emolument and importance*" filled by Englishmen.

Let us proceed.

Colonel Trant was governor of Oporto; colonel Cox, governor of Almeida; colonel Austen, of Algarve; general Blunt, of Peniché. Sir Robert Wilson commanded the Lusitanian Legion; Trant, John Wilson, and Miller, were also at the head of different brigades of militia, and ordénança; colonel Grant and major Fenwick commanded smaller bodies of the same species of troops; colonel D'Urban, colonel John Campbell, and colonel Madden, had high commands in the cavalry; generals Hamilton, Spry, Harvey, Pack, Ashworth, and Collins, commanded divisions or brigades of the regular infantry; others held commands in the artillery; Hardinge, Arbuthnot, Warre, &c., were on the staff; and almost all the regiments of the line were commanded by Englishmen, or had English majors, captains, and subalterns; nor were these names, which readily

occur to me, the whole. Situations of importance were held by Englishmen without any particular title: thus a British engineer, especially appointed, had a voice in the council of war at Abrantes, so potential that the governor could make no capitulation without his consent. No doubt these appointments were requisite and necessary—I never said or thought otherwise; but neither is there a doubt that they hurt the national pride of the Portuguese, and this was clearly shown when the crisis of danger passed away.

IV. I come now to the most elaborate portion of this pamphlet, where the writer endeavours at once to uphold the superior ability of marshal Beresford in a discussion with sir John Cradock on a military movement, and to expose the partiality and hollowness of my observations in a contrary sense.

Page 27. The argument is thus commenced. "*It is difficult to understand why the consideration of this difference between two general officers, from which colonel Napier intimates, though I think erroneously, that no results ensued, should occupy so large a space in his history.*"

I have intimated nothing of the kind, and the difficulty is removed by my opponent himself, because, in the same page, he says, "*It must be owned that the subject is in itself a fair theme of historical discussion.*"

Proceeding in the same vein, the writer affirms that I "*sought for and procured all the arguments on one side, and never took the trouble to inquire for any on the other.*"

Page 33. Subsequently he says, "*with the aid of these four documents, I shall, I think, be enabled to set aside the arguments of the historian, and, consequently, overthrow the conclusion he has founded upon them.*"

But these "*four documents*" are extracted from my history, and two of them are letters of sir John Cradock and marshal Beresford discussing the very movement in question! They were printed at full length in my appendix; the substance of each fairly given in the body of the work; they tell their own story, and the only help given by me to sir John Cradock's view of the matter is, an opinion that marshal Beresford's proposition was, for certain stated reasons, "unsound." How, then, can this writer venture to assert that I "*sought for and procured only the arguments*

on one side," and that I have, on this occasion, "*descended from the seat of calm and impartial judgment, to exercise my powers of special pleading in favour of the views of one party?*"

The point of dispute between the two generals was, whether the allied army should *move to the succour of Oporto,* or *remain near Lisbon?* and I condemned Beresford's arguments in favour of the first plan, partly because Cradock's appeared to me conclusive against its propriety, and partly because of my after acquired knowledge of the real state of affairs. The writer of this pamphlet, changing the proposition, asserts, that I censured Beresford for proposing a *march to Leiria,* although my observations were plainly and expressly directed against a *march to Oporto.* The best mode of proceeding, however, is to place that which I did say, together with my authority, before the reader, praying him to remark the words in italics.

History, vol. ii. page 153.—"While thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Silveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. The Junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the Regency; and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and march to the *succour of Oporto.* Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the mutinous multitudes in that city; but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan." Again, at page 157.—"Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition, that Cradock could engage Soult *at Oporto,* and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on

positive data: it was conjectural that they could *relieve Oporto*, it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon."

Authorities. 1°. Extracts from marshal Beresford's letter to sir John Cradock, 29th March, 1809:—

"Upon the subject of marching a British force *to Oporto* under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be thence pushed on *to Oporto*, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was, that as there appeared an intention of co-operation *(of which, however, there is no certainty)* between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time; as, supposing on our arrival at Leiria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leiria to Oporto without apprehension from the army of Victor."—"It is for your excellency to judge, under the actual circumstances, of the propriety of *this movement towards Oporto.*"

2°. Extracts from sir John Cradock's reply to the above. 29th March, 1809.

"I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, &c. that I should move the British troops to the *succour of Oporto,*" &c.—"To venture upon an advance *to Oporto*, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding. If the British army sets out with the declared object to *succour Oporto*, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same. Nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character!"

These extracts show that the author of the pamphlet is not justified in asserting that I "completely misunderstood the nature of marshal Beresford's views and intentions; that I have injuriously treated that distinguished officer, and that I have strangely perverted his meaning by making him say it was doubtful whether Victor and Soult intended to 'cooperate on a single plan'"—above all, it is most disingenuous, first to assume that I objected to a march upon Leiria, and then to argue upon that misrepresentation in the following manner:—

"*This same military movement cannot be both right and wrong, politic and impolitic, correct and erroneous.*"—"*If the proposal of advancing the army to Leiria was evidently unsound when suggested by marshal Beresford, the movement itself ought, in impartial justice, to have been condemned by the historian as at least equally unsound when put in execution by sir John Cradock.*" Page 35.

But in what manner was it the same military movement? Every circumstance was different.—1°. It was a movement to Leiria—not to Oporto. 2°. It took place ten or twelve days later, during which time 5000 British infantry, and 300 artillery horses, had reinforced Cradock's army; and a regiment of dragoons was hourly expected. "*Since the present accession of strength,*" says sir J. Cradock, "*it may be advisable to make a short movement in advance as far as Leiria.*" 3°. Victor, instead of threatening Portugal, as the reports of the 26th March had represented him to be doing, had engaged himself with Cuesta, and had just fought the battle of Medelin; moreover, a march to *Leiria only* did not open Lisbon to that marshal. 4°. Lapisse, instead of joining Soult, was moving towards the Tagus by the passes of the mountains; and thus, while the enemy was weakened by a diversity of plans, the allies were become infinitely stronger. But what, in fact, can be more absurd than this writer's notion that the same military movements must be equally good at one time as at another? and, after all, Cradock's march to Leiria was made entirely at the request of lord Beresford. "*I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance, as he said it would give confidence to the body of Portu-*

Sir John Cradock to General Richard Stewart, 5th April, 1809.

Do. to do. 8th April.

guese troops assembled at Thomar, and enable him to undertake the defence of the bridge and station at Abrantes."

The author, having made this use of the march to Leiria, changes his ground to magnify lord Beresford's military genius in recommending a *march to Oporto.*

"*It appears,*" he says, "*from the evidence afforded by colonel Napier himself, that lord Beresford had exactly divined the intention of the enemy—nay, that he had anticipated the very orders of Buonaparte, in which the three corps of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse, are directed to co-operate—and yet his reasoning, the wisdom of which is proved by facts and by the documents recorded in the author's own volume, is condemned.*" "*Colonel Napier, forsooth, with a very superficial knowledge of the circumstances of the time, and scarcely any of the localities, has the presumption to record that those views are evidently unsound.*"

Hard words these, if founded in reason; if otherwise, foolish words. Let us examine their value. Three invading corps were hanging on the frontier: "*there appeared,*" says lord Beresford, "*an intention of co-operation.*" Here was no great divination; moreover other things were divined, such as the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which did not happen. Let that pass. The preservation of Lisbon was the primary object of the allies. Beresford proposed that their combined forces should march against one of the three invading corps, and he was bound to show,—1°. That while thus operating against one enemy, another could not take possession of Lisbon. 2°. That there should be some prospect of beating that body which the allies intended to fight. Were either of these things reasonably secure?

See his letter to Sir John Cradock.

Victor, rated 35,000 strong, and having just defeated Cuesta, was at Merida and Caceres, the head of his columns reported to be pointing towards Portugal. Was the safety of Lisbon cared for in a plan to march all the allied forces against Soult, who was two hundred miles from that capital, when Victor, a more powerful enemy, was thus threatening it from a nearer point?

The author of this pamphlet says yes, because "*Victor had no means of crossing the Tagus; he had with him neither pontoon nor bridge equipage of any kind, and the river*

from the frontier of Portugal was rolling down, as is always the case at this season of the year, a rapid, heavy, mighty, unfordable mass of water."

Indeed! What, then, is the meaning of the following extract from admiral Berkeley's correspondence with sir John Cradock, April 6th, 1809?—"There is a circumstance upon which, if both yourself and general Beresford are absent from Lisbon, it may be necessary that some decisive knowledge should be obtained—I mean *the boats and craft upon the Tagus,* the disposal of which seems to be confided to the commissary-general. That gentleman, I suppose, will naturally attend the army, and, of course, if we should suddenly require them, or if the enemy made a rapid movement across the Alemtejo, *he might become master of the boats* before an express could reach the commissary-general to remove them." What also is the meaning of the following passages in sir John Cradock's despatches to lord Castlereagh, 12th April, 1809.—"There is *a ferry* at Salvatierra, near Alcantara, and *another* up the left bank of the Tagus, in the Alemtejo, where there is also a *ford, and the river may be easily passed.*"

The admiral and general, however, soon discovered, that the control of the craft was not in the commissary-general's hands, but in those of the regency, and that the latter had "*made no register of the boats,*" and that, in fact, "*nothing useful was done, or likely to be done, in the matter.*" Thus it seems that Victor need not have been stopped by the Tagus, and that there was no security for Lisbon during the march of the army to Oporto. Cradock's Correspondence.

We now come to the second object,—namely, the chance of success against Soult. That general had more than 20,000 men, comprising a great body of excellent cavalry. Could 12,000 British infantry, without cavalry, with scarcely any artillery, and unprovided with means of transport,—could they, although assisted, or rather embarrassed, by an ill-disciplined native force, have brought the French general to action and beaten him?—or if they had, could they have rendered their victory so decisive as to leave him and return in time to cover Lisbon? and was Lapisse, who had 12,000 men and 30 guns, to remain a passive spectator of such

operations?—could he not have joined Soult, or have marched upon Coimbra, in rear of the allied forces?

It is intimated, by the writer of this pamphlet, that lord Wellington did thus march upon Oporto, and defeat Soult; but that happened five weeks later, and when the intentions of the English cabinet were no longer doubtful. It happened when, partly by the exertions of marshal Beresford, partly by the effect of the fall of Oporto, but chiefly by the reputation of lord Wellington, the Portuguese troops, from a "*lawless mob*,"—I use the writer's own expression,—"*were become an orderly force.*" It happened also when the allied army was increased by at least 7000 English infantry, four regiments of cavalry, horses for the artillery, money and commissary stores from England, and when more troops were on the voyage to Lisbon. It happened when Cradock's efforts, followed up by Lord Wellington's, had procured supplies for the movement; when Lapisse had passed into Lower Estremadura, and by this false march had marred the French combinations, placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether regular troops or auxiliaries, between Soult and Victor, so that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between them. It happened also when Victor, whose troops were suffering dreadfully from the Guadiana fever, was known to be forming an entrenched camp at Medellin, instead of moving on Portugal. It happened when Cuesta, who was again at the head of more numerous forces than before, had promised to follow Victor closely in any march towards Portugal; when, also, intercepted letters of king Joseph's indicated that Seville, not Portugal, was Victor's object; when Venegas was threatening La Mancha with a fresh army; and when Soult, after having lost time at Amarante, and men at Chaves, had spread his troops over a wide extent of country; when his offensive strength was exhausted, and when there was a powerful conspiracy in his camp, the leaders of which were in communication with the English general; and when, to crown all, the real numbers of the French being unknown, were underrated. Notwithstanding all this, the operation would have failed of any great result, had it not been for the astonishing passage of the Douro, an action not to be expected from ordinary generals.

Let us also observe the difference of the measures taken to secure the Tagus. Beresford wanted Cradock *to move at once with the whole allied force,* depending only on some calculations of time; but when lord Wellington moved, the false march of Lapisse had enabled him to draw down the Lusitanian legion, and the militia of the Beira frontier to defend the bridge of Alcantara, which was mined. Three British battalions were also drafted from the army at Leiria; to these were added two other British battalions, and two regiments of cavalry, just landed at Lisbon; and finally, 8000 Portuguese regulars, forming altogether an army which, placed under one general, could defend the line of the Tagus from Abrantes to Lisbon. An additional corps of observation was also formed from the garrisons of Badajos and Elvas, to watch the movements of Victor on the Guadiana; and finally, the seamen and marines, and the civic legions of Lisbon, formed a body of reserve. Hence it was that I said lord Wellington's plans were "neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward." He made, indeed, a daring movement, but it was the daring of a great general; whereas marshal Beresford only proposed a rash march of two hundred miles to succour a place which had actually fallen the very day on which he made the proposal. Nor is this all. Beresford proposed to march with the Portuguese and British troops combined, and the pamphleteer says, that "the allied force would have been *in every respect superior to Soult's whole army.*" Page 59. Now this movement was proposed the 29th of March, the British had two hundred miles to move; wherefore, allowing two days for preparations and unforeseen obstacles, the allies would have been in front of Soult about the 9th of April. Let us see then what, at that period, was marshal Beresford's own description of the Portuguese portion of this army, so "*superior in every respect*" to the enemy,—this force, which was not only to manœuvre before, but to drive Soult, with his veteran infantry and powerful cavalry, out of the kingdom.

"I this morning met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the *horrible state of mutiny*—for I can call it no less—in which the *troops every where are,* and *the inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other.*" M. Beresford to sir J. Cradock. Santarem, April 7, 1809. And what says sir J. Cradock?—

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3.

" No reliance whatever can be placed on the Portuguese troops. *If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments.*"

But why prolong this examination, when the broad facts that Beresford could not control the Portuguese troops, and that Cradock could not procure equipments or supplies for the British, are proved by the letters of those generals themselves? Cradock's difficulties, the pamphleteer says, could not have been known to marshal Beresford at the moment of his suggesting his plan; be it so; his proposition, then, was founded in utter ignorance of the real state of affairs, and therefore " *evidently unsound.*"

V. Of the points which I have enumerated as marking the difference between marshal Beresford's proposal and sir Arthur Wellesley's operation, the following have been either denied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the writer of this pamphlet. 1°. *Cuesta's promise to wait on Victor's movements.* 2°. *The amount of Cuesta's force.* 3°. *That the conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley decided to march against that general.* 4°. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c. was, by the false march of Lapisse, placed between Victor and Soult.* 5°. *That Abrantes was a fortress.* 6°. *That Soult's offensive was exhausted.* 7°. *That the intention of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

1°. *Cuesta's promise. Authority.*—Mr. FRERE to Sir JOHN CRADOCK.

Seville, 21st April, 1809.

" IF general Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of marshal Soult, general Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavour to harass and detain him, as far as possible, without risking a general action. This latter part I consider as agreed."

There was a direct communication between Seville and Lisbon, and this letter reached sir A. Wellesley either the 24th or 25th of April.

2°. *Amount of Cuesta's force.*—This was rated by me at 35,000 in the gross, and 25,000 actually in his camp.

Authorities.—Sir A. WELLESLEY to Lord CASTLEREAGH.

April 24, 1809.

"CUESTA is at Llerena collecting a force again, which it is said will soon be 25,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, a part of them good troops."

MR. FRERE to Sir A. WELLESLEY.

Seville, 4th May.

"WE have here 3000 cavalry, considered as part of the army of Estremadura." "General Cuesta has with him 4000 cavalry."

In addition to this, recruits were daily arriving in his camp, and he had several partizan detachments. Thus it appears I have underrated the actual force immediately in front of Victor.

3°. *The conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley, &c. &c.*

This is proved by the following facts, drawn from the original narrative of one of the parties concerned. John Viana, the agent of the conspirators, reached Thomar in the middle of April; and, in consequence of his information, an English field-officer was sent to Aveiro to meet D'Argenton, the principal conspirator. He did so, and then returned with the letter to Lisbon, whither Beresford had meanwhile repaired to meet sir Arthur Wellesley. It is evident, therefore, that marshal Beresford knew of the conspiracy before sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently the latter knew it when he planned his operations.

4°. *That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, &c. &c.*

When Victor was on the upper Guadiana, Soult was on the Douro; their most direct line of communication was by Alcantara, and coasting the Beira frontier. As long as Lapisse commanded this line with a strong corps, their operations were connected; but when that general joined Victor on the Guadiana, nearly all the central parts of Portugal and the allied armies were between the latter and Soult. The frontier line of Portugal, and the part of Spain adjoining it, immediately became insurgent, and the partizan corps before employed to watch Lapisse, were then placed to guard the bridge of Alcantara. My expressions are therefore strictly correct.

5°. *Abrantes.*—The pamphleteer says, "*there was not the vestige of a fortification*" at this place in May, 1809.

Authority.—In my notes taken from major Patton's original report, which is dated 12th April, 1809, I find that that officer, who had been employed to examine and strengthen Abrantes, describes the castle as commanding all around it, and secure from an escalade; that there was a garrison of 4000 men in the town; and that it would require 6000 when completely fortified. The fortifications, which were afterwards carried to a great extent, were then commenced; and hence, in the beginning of May, the place was undoubtedly in such a state as to justify my expression that "Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance."

6°. *Soult's offensive was exhausted.* This the writer of the pamphlet says was not more visible in May than in March. Now in March, Soult was in one compact mass, bearing down upon Oporto with the avowed intention of afterwards marching to Lisbon, having assurance from the emperor that Victor and Lapisse were co-operating. But in May, Lapisse had abandoned all co-operation; so had Victor; and both were cut off from any direct communication with Soult. The latter had remained five weeks inactive in Oporto, his troops were scattered, and he had shown, by feeling towards his left in force, that his views were no longer fixed upon Lisbon. It was therefore much more visible. Finally, sir A. Wellesley judged it so, for in a letter to Mr. Frere, 24th April, he says, "they (the French) have not passed the Vouga to the south, nor have they extended themselves into Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, but they have made some movement towards the Tamega, which divides Tras os Montes from Minho; and it is supposed they intend to acquire for themselves the option of retreating into Spain." "It is probable, however, that Soult will not remain in Portugal when I shall pass the Mondego."

7°. *That the intentions of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.*

Authorities.—Extracts from Sir JOHN CRADOCK's Correspondence, 1809.

January 19.—"We are determined to remain to the last proper moment, in the hopes of receiving orders from England."

February 9th.—"The orders we daily expect may be either for immediate embarkation, or to maintain Portugal." "We have but this one wish, to act for the credit of our country, and endeavour, under the want of all information, to *discover what may be the object of the government we serve.*"

February 26th.—"Since the 14th of January we are *without instructions from England.*"

Extract of a despatch from Mr. CANNING to Mr. FRERE.

April 11th.—"You will observe that in the alternative for which it is necessary to provide (though I trust nevertheless it is not likely to take place), of the evacuation of Portugal by his Majesty's forces, sir A. Wellesley is directed to proceed with the army to Çadiz, to be landed there on the acceptance, by the Spanish government, of the condition *which you have already been instructed to propose,* of the admission of British troops," &c. &c. Other proofs also exist, but it is ridiculous to deny a fact which is continually complained of in sir John Cradock's correspondence; and I have neither space nor inclination to unravel all the tedious confusion of this author's arguments. Having shown that he is inconsistent, and without offence be it said, not very scrupulous in misrepresenting my statements, I proceed to point out his errors as to facts.

Page 40.—The writer asserts that "*there is no other possible route from Portugal to Madrid than by the valley of the Tagus.*"

Answer.—In 1812 lord Wellington moved from the Beira frontier, through the pass of Guadarama to Madrid, *without touching on the valley of the Tagus.* In the same year lord Hill moving from Alemtejo, passed through Lower Estremadura, entered La Mancha, and arrived at Madrid *without touching on the valley of the Tagus.*

Page 43.—He says, "*It is demanded, and with great apparent emphasis, by colonel Napier, was it most desirable to protect Lisbon or Oporto?*"

Answer.—This question is not put at all as from myself; it is a part of the summary of sir John Cradock's arguments.

Page 45.—"*He* (Colonel Napier) *conceives that marshal Victor could pass the Tagus at any point, from its source to its outh!*" "*Indeed he appears to assert this as a fact.*"

Answer.—I profess never to have conceived this; neither have I anywhere asserted it. I have, indeed, called the Tagus "*a river fordable in almost all seasons.*" The pamphleteer says, "it exhibits a very culpable disregard of accuracy and precision, in any military man, to speak thus generally of a river of such extent;" and I have the utmost respect for the Tagus, but in an elaborate manuscript memoir on the defence of Portugal, drawn up by Dumouriez, that general, arguing like this writer, on the assumption that *the Tagus is a strong barrier*, says, "even if Alemtejo and Algarve fell into the hands of the enemy, it would not decide the war, which would become more dangerous for him, because all the means would be united in the four northern provinces." Against this passage lord Wellington has written the following marginal note:—"*He does not seem to be aware of the real state of the Tagus at any season.*"

My expression was, however, a general one. It is not found in reference to the dispute between Cradock and Beresford, but in another part of my work; and as this writer has been at the pains to search for it, let us see how accurate his own assertions with reference to this river are.

At page 47 he says that I "err most widely in supposing that river has any ford *in any place*, except during *the very height of summer*. From the time of the first rains, which fall towards the latter end of September to the month of June, it would be a very rare occurrence to find a ford below Abrantes, or indeed within the frontier of Portugal."

Now the following is an extract from a memoir upon the defence of Portugal, addressed to admiral Berkeley by lord Wellington, 26th October, 1809. "From what I have above stated, you will observe that in the event of an attack being made within the *months of June and November, when the Tagus is fordable*, the operations of the army would be carried on in a part of the country which would be cut off from Peniché," &c. &c.

Here we have it fordable for six months, and November

is certainly not *the very height of summer*. Further on we shall find that even this fell short of the fact, and that there are fords at other periods also.

Page 48.—The author, continuing his reprimand, says, "the Tagus *could not be forded by Victor*."

Answer.—The question is not whether he could ford, but whether he could pass it; but even as to fording this writer is not accurate, as the extract from sir John Cradock's letter to lord Castlereagh, dated 12th April, before quoted, proves.

Page 49.—It is asked, "*Supposing marshal Victor had, as colonel Napier points out, marched to Almada, what result would have ensued?*"

Answer.—The advance to Oporto would have been changed to a retreat; but, in fact, I have nowhere pointed out such a march for marshal Victor.

Pages 50 and 51.—"*The historian recommends Saccavem and Lumiar as advantageous and proper posts for the defence of Lisbon.*"

"*Place the British army at Saccavem and Lumiar, and the enemy could, without difficulty, turn it by Loures and Bemfica.*"

Answer.—It is again sir John Cradock, and not the historian, who recommends those positions; neither are they, as this writer would have it believed, spoken of at all as fields of battle, but as positions on which to concentrate the whole allied forces, with a view of covering Lisbon. It is idle to object that they might be turned. Where is the position that may not be turned? The thing to look to in such a case is, whether the army, in position, can by shorter routes intercept the march of the enemy, and offer battle again. In this view the French engineer, St. Vincent, after a careful examination, recommended those posts to Junot, and in this view only sir John Cradock decided to occupy them. "I shall," he writes to lord Castlereagh, "collect the British force on the heights of Lumiar, my cavalry and light troops at the passes of Monte Cabeços and Bucellar, and a supporting corps at Bucellar. From this station at Lumiar *I can move in any direction where the enemy can present himself.*"

Page 52.—The pamphleteer says, "*He has shown,*

and he trusts to the satisfaction of the reader, that the position, so much recommended in the History of the Peninsular War, was improper in every point of view; that looking to the position of the enemy's corps, neither Lisbon nor its environs could be considered as affording a central, but, on the contrary, a very retired position."

Answer.—The posts alluded to, namely, Saccavem and Lumiar, were neither commended nor discommended by me; nor are they anywhere expressly called a central position. I said, "sir John Cradock resolved to preserve his central position, covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off by one army, while he was engaged with another." This evidently refers, not to one, but to any place suiting that plan of action. Again, I remark, "it must not be objected to sir John Cradock that he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to be beforehand with the enemy in covering Lisbon, if the latter should march on his flank."

Cradock's position, however, being at Lumiar, I affirm that, in regard to Lisbon, and the expected advance of the enemy, it was a central position. For Victor and Soult, marching direct upon Lisbon, could not have formed a junction, without giving sir John Cradock an opportunity of pushing between them, and fighting either separately. And here, as this writer makes himself merry with what he calls my central position, I will take the trouble to inform him that, in a military sense, a central position is one from which a general can, when opposed by two adversaries, acting on different lines of operations, prevent his opponents from uniting except by circuitous marches; wherefore it may be central, and at the same time retired. Napoleon's position at the siege of Mantua was central, and yet so retired, that his opponents were close upon Mantua ere he could fight them.

Page 63.—*Lord Beresford departed from Lisbon, on the 8th of April, leaving sir John Cradock still opposed to his views of marching to Leiria.*

Answer.—"I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance."—*Letter from sir John Cradock to general R. Stewart, 8th of April.*

Page 76.—" *But where are these mountains which colonel Napier has placed between Oporto and Lisbon?*"

Answer.—Between Oporto and Lisbon!

They have various names—there is the Sierra de Caramula, Sierra de Busaco, Monte Junta, and the mountains of Torres Vedras, Mafra, and Montechique, &c. on which lord Wellington's famous lines were established in 1810. I am surprised this writer has never heard of these last.

At page 77, the pamphleteer says, that although I have mentioned many reasons, I have failed to mention the real and substantial one why lord Wellington moved against Soult instead of Victor, namely—that " *Lisbon would have been left open to the former general.*"

Answer.—The reasons given by me were,—

1°. That sir Arthur Wellesley preferred attacking Soult, because *he held a rich province, and Oporto, the second city of Portugal,* which both regent and people *desired to recover.*

2°. That, to attack Victor, it was requisite to combine operations with Cuesta, which required time, *that might be employed against Soult.*

Authorities.—Sir A. Wellesley's correspondence:—

" I should prefer an attack upon Victor in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of *a fertile province of the kingdom, and of the favourite town of Oporto;*"—" and if any operation against Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to concert it, *which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult.*" To Lord Castlereagh, April 5.

" An operation against Victor is attended by those advantages,—if successful, *it relieves effectually Seville and Lisbon,* and it," &c. &c. To Mr. Frere.

Thus the " *substantial reason*" falls to the ground. Sir Arthur does not mention it; and if he thought a movement against Victor would *effectually relieve Lisbon,* he could have had no fear of Soult.

Page 78.—The pamphleteer " *is at a loss to see how their* (Soult's and Victor's) *operations could have been carried on by the Zezere.*"

Answer.—My expression was not "*carry on,*" but "*connect, their operations,*" and the Zezere is only mentioned by me to indicate the line of country by which Soult and Victor,

after respectively reaching the Mondego and the Tagus, could best communicate, or, if necessary, form a junction,—and why not? If two armies make a flank march to effect a junction, the covering their movement by a river is an obvious advantage, not only as it protects the march itself, but as it renders the junction militarily secure, long before the troops actually meet, inasmuch as their opponents cannot with safety pass the river to prevent it.

Pages 93, 94, contain a laboured rebuke, for, that I have called small bodies of troops "*corps.*"

Answer.—It may be that "corps" is a barbarism, but it is found in Johnson's Dictionary, and there defined, "*a body of soldiers.*"

Page 101.—It is asserted that on Soult's retreat from Oporto, Silveira, in disobedience of the most positive orders, "*never turned his troops on the Mondin road or towards Salamonde,*" and that early on the 15th "*lord Beresford, leaving Amarante on his way to Chaves, overtook general Silveira's division.*"

Answer.—These assertions have little reference to anything I have said, but they are meant to explain that "*failure in marshal Beresford's operations*" to which the French owed their safety. I will not contradict them, but it is certain Silveira always affirmed that *his division did march on the* 14*th to Mondin, and thence through Cavez to Ginzo, where he took thirty prisoners on the* 15*th, and where his farther progress was arrested by unexpected orders from marshal Beresford's head-quarters.* He also said that the troops lord Beresford overtook, as above stated, were not his, but *Baccellar's Beira Division,* which, at that time, was only an auxiliary. I have, therefore, in nowise misrepresented the matter in saying, "*there was a failure in Beresford's operations,*" and that "*there seemed to be some misunderstanding between him and Silveira.*"

Page 104.—Adverting to my praise of Trant's advance to the Vouga, the writer says, "*the author, for a military man, has an extraordinary method of separating the subordinative or executive officer from the general under whose direction that officer acts.*"

Answer.—General Trant assured me that his advance

to the Vouga was, as I have described it, his own sudden and spontaneous act.

Page 110.—The following passage from my work is quoted. "*Early in June marshal Beresford was, with three brigades, directed on Castello Branco,*" upon which the writer observes, "*lord Beresford was neither directed on that place, nor did he go there.*"

Answer.—Lord Londonderry, in his "Narrative of the War," p. 305, says, "marshal Beresford, for example, instead of returning to the north, *was ordered to proceed with one British and two Portuguese brigades by Castello Branco to the Tietar.*" As his lordship was adjutant-general at the time, and must, therefore, have issued the order himself, I adopted the fact without a suspicion of its authenticity.

Page 115.—This pamphleteer says, "the duke del Parque would not give lord Beresford some *British biscuit left in store at Ciudad Rodrigo by the commissariat of sir John Moore's army;*" and he appends to this the following note: "*Colonel Napier, with his usual inaccuracy, says, by order of sir Arthur Wellesley,*"—that is, I said, "*the store was formed by Sir Arthur Wellesley's order.*"

Answer.—Extract from sir A. Wellesley's correspondence: "It is a curious circumstance respecting marshal Beresford's corps, that the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo actually refused to allow them to have 30,000 lbs. of 100,000 lbs. of biscuit which *I had prepared there* in case the operations of the army should be directed to that quarter." To the Marquis Wellesley, Merida, September 1st, 1809.

I come now to the last, but not the least, of this writer's mistakes. In my history it is said that marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness in the number of troops, as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajoz, that "Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to 8000 or 10,000 soldiers;" upon which, the pamphleteer (p. 112) remarks, "lord Beresford will, I apprehend, be surprised at this information: although reading of events with which he had no inconsiderable concern, he must feel himself indebted to lieutenant-colonel Napier for a great deal of very important intelligence relating both to them and to himself. The above relation will, I suspect, be received by his lordship as news of the very newest

description. I doubt whether lord Beresford, in the whole course of his life, ever communicated with the junta of Badajoz"—"Of course the historian will give his authority for the fact."—"This public announcement to the junta of Badajoz—this numerical accuracy with which lord Beresford's estimate of Soult's force is set down—all these particularities remind one vastly of the veracious anecdotes of the worthies of the 'School for Scandal,' and I can only reply to them in the words of sir Benjamin,—the lieutenant-colonel's account is more circumstantial, I confess, but I believe mine is the only true one for all that."

Authority.—Letter from his excellency marshal Beresford, to the junta of Badajoz; extracted from the British Press of July 7, 1809.

"To his Excellency the President and the Lords of Junta of Estremadura.

"I have already transmitted you an account of the forces I sent to Alcantara, and which were obliged to abandon that position to the enemy on account of his superior numbers. The resistance they made, however, was highly honourable to the small corps which ultimately remained to defend that pass, though the loss and damage sustained by the town in consequence gave me great concern. I have again sent to Alcantara four battalions, under the same brave officer, colonel Mayne. I flatter myself that in a short time all that part of Spain will be freed from its oppressors. I have much pleasure in transmitting to the junta copies of the letters received yesterday from Gallicia, and congratulate it on the favourable appearance of things in that province. You already know that upon the defeat of the corps of marshal Soult by general sir Arthur Wellesley, the enemy were reduced to a most disgraceful flight, abandoning their ammunition, &c., and the soldiers throwing away their arms; after which, they made such forced marches, that it was impossible to come up with the main body of the army before it had passed the bridge of Breuga. Our troops followed them with all expedition to that place, between which and Alariz we made some prisoners. I have previously communicated to all the juntas and generals in Gallicia, the probability that *the remnant of this army,*

amounting only to about 8000 *or* 10,000 *men, without any cannon or ammunition; and in every respect in the most wretched condition, flying from our troops,* would retire into that country, in order that they might be prepared in the best manner to receive them; and I entertain no doubt that the consequences of the capture of Lugo, and of Ney having left Gallicia, will be fatal to Soult. I have the honour to remain, with the most profound respect,

" Your most obedient servant,

Coimbra, May 29. " G. C. BERESFORD."

Is that sufficient authority? or will it be called a forgery, as some other letters have been, because the initial of the first Christian name is wrong? But even that would not suffice, because the letter having been written in Portuguese or Spanish, " William," which is the marshal's real name, would have been written " Guillielmo," and thus the newspaper, taking only the initials, fell into a mistake.

Having now tracked the pamphleteer through most of his tortuous statements, I pray my readers to observe that this mass of errors and scurrility is contained in a pamphlet of less than 130 pages; that it is the production of a writer who acknowledges to have spent three months in its preparation, because he was " *anxious that nothing should be published in reply to my mistakes which could be justly cited as a mistake of his own;*" and who, after roughly noticing even a false punctuation, in such an extensive work as mine, lays down the following rules for the guidance of contemporary historians. " *That they should not attempt to go farther than a bare register of facts.*" That they must " *cast aside all evidence which would be scouted in a court of justice;*" and that they must " *never allow the words, 'it is said,' to disgrace their work.*" In fine, that the public must be content, by a species of comparative anatomy, to judge of the size and form of the great transactions of the world from a few dry bones presented by the grubbers for small facts.

Since writing the above, " *Further Strictures*" from the same pen have appeared. The author is surprised that his former admonitions have had no effect upon me; perhaps he

will be more surprised to find that his present corrections are likely to have the same fate; for as they are written in the same style, and of about as much value in point of accuracy as those I have just analyzed, it would be waste of time to notice them; although, being twice as copious as the former, I, like greater authors, might thus hope to see commentaries upon my work more voluminous than the work itself. Sir Benjamin D'Urban has however mixed himself up in this controversy, and his objection shall have an answer.

Sir Benjamin's account of the battle I had before me when I wrote mine;—if I have not quoted him, it is because that was the condition on which a copy was placed in my hands;—if I have not followed him as a guide exactly, it is because other information justified me in quitting him at certain points, in matters of fact; and his opinions and conclusions I was in no manner bound to.

1°. I acknowledge an involuntary error in saying marshal Beresford's failure kept lord Wellington for nearly *two years* on the frontier of Portugal. I should have said more than one year; how the mistake crept in I cannot say, but I had already detected and corrected it in my copy for the second edition.

2°. I know that marshal Beresford obeyed lord Wellington's instructions by crossing the Guadiana at Jerumenha. It is so stated in my third volume, page 498; but lord Wellington had also given him a discretionary power of acting; and to invest Badajoz quickly was the principal object. It is his judgment in the use of that discretionary power that I have censured.

3°. In opposition to sir Benjamin, I adhere to my assertion that marshal Beresford fought an unnecessary battle, and *fought it against his own judgment.* Nor was it upon slight authority that I said the impatient feeling of the army was so strongly represented to him as to affect his decision. I am not bound to name that authority because sir Benjamin chooses to "regard the fact as imaginary," but that lord Beresford fought the battle against his own judgment, is undeniable, or there is no truth in the following extract from general Harvey's journal.

24th May, 1811.—"Met general Beresford, and rode to Vilalba, where there is an old castle," &c. &c. "*The mar-*

shal was remarkably communicative as to the policy of fighting at Albuera, which he blames himself much for, depicting the consequences of defeat in most serious colours."

Let me return to the Strictures. If marshal Beresford is content to have such a defender, I have no reason to regret his taste; but should the production reach a second edition, I would advise the writer not to let his authorities contradict his text.

At page 125, he says that sir Alexander Dickson having "*furnished me with the number of guns, I arbitrarily decided as to their calibre.*" But in page 51, Appendix, No. IV., general D'Urban (whom I followed) sets down, under the head of artillery employed in the battle of Albuera, six German, six Portuguese, and six British nine-pounders; wherefore, if three sixes make eighteen, *I did not* "*arbitrarily decide as to the calibre.*"

At page 35, it is said, "*as to the author's assertion that the Tagus might have been forded after a week's dry weather, nothing can be more imaginary. The whole allied army, and the whole French army, know the absurd incorrectness of this statement.*" But at p. 3, Appendix, sir Benjamin D'Urban says, "*The Tagus between Golegaõ and RioMoinhos was known to offer several fords after a few days dry weather.*"

At page 36, it is said, "The whole army was about 20,000;" but at page 13, Appendix, that there were 20,000 infantry and 1400 cavalry, besides artillery.

At page 75, it is affirmed, Beresford could form his bridge and pass over his troops in the sight and in despite of the French; and that it was "*perfectly impossible for them to frustrate the operation;*" but at page 12, in the Appendix, general D'Urban says, that the French "*might have opposed the operation with a rational prospect of success.*"

At page 77, "the night was so dark that the enemy neither was *nor could be seen;*" but at page 12 of the Appendix, sir Benjamin D'Urban says, that the enemy "*observed the heights occupied,*" and gave up his design.

At page 80, "*the army did not halt at Olivenza;*" but at page 13 of the Appendix, sir Benjamin says, that the army being without provisions, "*encamped in the woods round that town.*"

At page 162, "the *sudden shift of wind which co-*

lonel Napier has introduced with somewhat of dramatic effect, to clear away the obscurity of mist and smoke in which he had veiled the scene, *never occurred;*" but at page 31 of the Appendix, sir B. D'Urban says, "*the wind* at this moment blew aside the smoke and rain."

These indications suffice to prove that my opponent is not invulnerable; and, with regard to his other assertions, I reply generally, that there is not a single fact related by me for which I cannot produce some authority; and, before my work is completed, I will do so, on all contradicted points important enough to require it. Every body knows that to fix exactly the different periods of a battle, and the particular circumstances, is nearly impossible, and I am ready to admit, that in certain minor points of that of Albuera, this writer seems to be better informed than either general D'Urban or myself; wherefore, in a second edition, I will avail myself not only of his corrections, but also of other recent information, which will show, that both at Albuera and at Campo Mayor, lord Beresford's errors were much greater than I have represented them to be. I cannot indeed promise to say with Dumouriez, who it would seem is angler enough to know a trout from a gudgeon, that marshal Beresford at Albuera "*did more than Cæsar at Pharsalia,*" but I will endeavour to chastise "*the spirit of the inquisitor,*" and retain only the "*liberal*" in my composition; and meanwhile this writer, who, "being pestered with a popinjay answers he knows not what," may recover temper, which, next to "parmaceti, is the sovereignest thing on earth for an inward bruise."

From the labour of personal justification, I now turn to the more grateful task of replying to some unfounded criticisms on sir John Moore's campaign.

It might be imagined, that when time had blunted the keen edge of political malice, Moore's heroic death would at least have arrested censure which could not be substantiated; but in this, as in other human affairs, all opinions are not to be bound in one fetter, yet I trust to show that the authors whose censures I allude to, have nothing but opinions, unsupported by facts, to offer to the world. To effect this, however, in a concise manner, I must again advert to

"*Colonel Sorrel's Notes,*" classing them with "*The Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,*" and "*The Life of the Duke of Wellington,*" and quoting and answering all three indifferently, as their arguments or assertions present themselves.

They accuse sir John Moore—1°. Of vacillation and of losing time at Salamanca. 2°. Of taking counsel from others, rather than from his own judgment. 3°. Of neglecting Gallicia as a defensive position. And that it may be seen they do so, I will put down the words of each writer.

"*That time was lost at Salamanca is a matter of fact, and a subject of regret. The value of a day, or of an hour in war, is great. It is in vain to ask what might have been the consequences of a movement into the heart of Spain which was never made, and which, according to able and acute men, should never have been contemplated; but it is certain that between that measure and a retreat on Portugal, sir John Moore wavered long in his designs.*"—Life of the Duke of Wellington, page 163.

"*Part of his difficulties must be admitted to have proceeded from his own arrangements.*" "*While the infantry proceeded by Almeida, the cavalry and artillery were directed to advance by Merida and Truxillo; and the consequence was, that the difficulty of collecting his army was prodigiously enhanced, and sir John Moore was compelled to remain above a month inactive at Salamanca. Precious time was there lost. The thoughts of the general were bent only on retreat. The army did not move until the eleventh hour, and action was unfortunately delayed till the precise period when action could no longer be available.*"—Annals of the Campaign, page 102.

"*It is much to be lamented that sir John Moore did not feel himself fully at liberty to follow the dictates of his own excellent judgment, instead of yielding to suggestions and opinions which, being founded on false data, scarcely merited attention.*"—Notes on the Campaigns, 1808-9, p. 41.

Thus, these three writers agree in censuring sir John Moore, yet, in unfolding their own views, all disagree on what he should have done. The author of "*The Life*" would have had him retreat at once upon Portugal; the author of "*The Notes*" insists on the primary importance of defending Gallicia; and the author of "*The Annals*"

vacillates between that, and "*retiring*," as he phrases it, "across the Tagus to the south." Their discrepance shows a variety of fancy, but no difference of judgment, because none of them have examined the subject with a reference to facts. This shall be demonstrated.

"*He was compelled to remain a month inactive at Salamanca.*"—Annals.

Two thousand men, the head of Sir John Moore's column, reached Salamanca the 13th of November, the rear did not arrive until the 25th, and on the 11th of December the army marched towards Sahagun; thus, even supposing that the troops could have commenced operations the day after they arrived, the month is reduced to fifteen days. But were those days wasted in inactivity? Was it inactivity to keep so near a powerful enemy until Baird and Hope effected their junction? Was it inactivity in that short period, amidst a thousand conflicting and false representations and reports, to fix the true character of the Spanish insurrection, and with so sure a judgment, that every operation founded upon a different view failed, even to the end of the war? Was it inactivity to have arranged the means of throwing the army into the heart of Spain? and when the battle of Tudela, breaking that measure, obliged Moore to prepare for a retreat, was it inactivity, amidst such difficulties and anxieties, and without money to establish sure intelligence, and upon new prospects opening, to arrange a forward movement in the face of three hundred thousand men, at the same time changing the line of operations from Portugal to Gallicia? Are these things the work of a moment?

Suppose, however, that the artillery under Hope had moved with sir John Moore, and had been at Salamanca on the 25th November, the junction with Baird was still to be effected, and the separation of that general was not the work of Moore. Would this writer then have had the latter advance with fourteen or fifteen thousand men to Burgos, or to Aranda de Duero, or to Madrid? If to the last, Baird must have been abandoned, because the fourth corps, which was at Rio Seco the 24th November, would have intercepted his line of march. Burgos? He was still too late, because Blake's and Belvedere's armies had been dispersed on the 10th and 11th. But say they had not

been dispersed; then the arrangement of sending Hope by Madrid, was better than marching in one column to Salamanca, inasmuch as the latter, by being enlarged and troubled with a great train of carriages and guns, could not have reached that town so soon as the 25th; whereas, by moving as they did on separate roads, all marched more rapidly, and Hope could have united at Burgos, with a difference of only twelve leagues, and at Aranda, with a difference only of one league, in the distance traversed. Wherefore it is clear that sir John Moore's mind was not "continually bent on retreat," that his arrangements did not in any manner oblige him to remain a month inactive at Salamanca, and in fine that he was not inactive at all.

But, says the author of the Annals, "*the time chosen for action was precisely when action could not avail.*" And "*On the advance of the British, Soult, as a matter of course, would have fallen back to Burgos, where his corps would have effected a junction with that of Junot. Nothing therefore could be more visionary than the project of defeating Soult.*"

Is there any foundation in fact for all this? Sir John Moore reasoned thus, "Soult knows nothing of my march—he may be surprised and beaten; if he retreats, the French grand communications are exposed; in either case Napoleon must come to his succour. If he comes with a small force, he also may be fought withal; if with a large force, I incur danger, but a diversion for the south is effected." What was the result? Soult instead *of retiring as "a matter of course,"* stood his ground, the emperor came back with his whole army, and the only thing visionary is the argument of this writer.

"*It is certain that he long wavered.*"—Life of Wellington.

When only two thousand British had reached Salamanca, Blake and Belvedere, whose armies were to cover the junction of Moore's divisions, were utterly routed, and the French cavalry entered Valladolid. Moore then told the Junta that if the enemy advanced, he must go back; they did not advance, and he remained at Salamanca.

On the 25th his column was closed up, and on the 27th, the state of affairs being more clearly known, sir John Moore prepared, as we have seen, to throw himself into the heart of Spain.

On the 28th news of Castaños' destruction, and of Napoleon's movement on Madrid arrived, and as the wings of the British army were not then united to the centre, the proposed measure was no longer practicable. Wherefore sir John Moore resolved to retreat upon Portugal, as soon as his artillery and cavalry, under general Hope, should have joined him.

The 4th of December Hope arrived; the 5th, information came that Napoleon was resisted at Madrid, and by the 7th, from every quarter, came news, which whether from natives or Englishmen, private or official, was of the same tenor—namely, that the enthusiasm of Spain was again awakened; moreover, Napoleon's march from Burgos to the capital, not only permitted a junction with Baird's division, but opened a point to the attack of the united British army. On the 7th, therefore, sir John Moore, seizing the opportunity thus suddenly offered, resolved to advance to Sahagun, thereby meeting new combinations with fresh dispositions. Is that wavering? Is a general to shut his eyes to what is passing around him, and stupidly follow a plan preconceived upon circumstances totally different from the actual ones?

But "*he should have followed his own excellent judgment*," says the author of the Notes.—"*He should have retired across the Tagus to the south*," says the author of the Annals.

He could not have done both. When Napoleon was at Burgos, Moore might have retired across the Tagus; but the author of the Annals speaks of the period when the advance to Sahagun was commenced; at that time, Napoleon was at Madrid with 60,000 men, and the 4th corps was moving on Talavera; wherefore any movement towards the Tagus would have been an advance, and Sir John Moore's excellent judgment certainly would not have let him call an advance a retreat. But did he not follow his own judgment? Mr. Frere and the Spaniards wanted him to move upon Madrid, and he went towards Burgos. Sir David Baird wanted him to take a defensive position in Gallicia, and he made a forward movement to Sahagun. Others wanted him to retreat to Portugal, and, militarily speaking, that was most advisable; Moore said so, but the awakening enthusiasm offered a hope for Spain, and he advanced on political grounds, calculating, as indeed hap-

pened, that he should always be able to retreat by Gallicia, which was not worse than to retreat by Portugal. There was danger, but war is never a safe game; and when, as in this case, all the difficulties are foreseen, and boldly met or skilfully evaded, a dangerous operation is not rash, but great.

Let me now prove that he acted upon such a calculation, —that he foresaw and judged all the difficulties and results, military and political—that he adopted no man's recommendations, but executed his own plan.

Salamanca, December 6th.—"What is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country and our duty demand this of us with whatever risk it may be attended; yet I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for, if the bubble bursts, we shall have a run for it." Sir John Moore's Correspondence.

Salamanca, 8th December.—"Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to believe that efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena: as long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country." Ibid.

Salamanca, 9th December.—"After Castaños' defeat the French marched for Madrid, the inhabitants flew to arms," &c. "This is the first instance of enthusiasm shown; there is a hope that the example may be followed, and the people be roused, in which case there is still a chance that this country may be saved. Upon this chance I have stopped Baird's retreat, and have taken measures to form our junction, whilst the French are wholly occupied with Madrid: we are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope; but the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail, or, at any rate, they may not be able to resist—in short, in a moment things may be as bad as ever." Sir John Moore's Journal.

11th December.—"I shall assemble the army at Valladolid."—"By this movement I shall threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favour of the Spaniards, if they can take advantage of it; but I much fear they will not move, but leave me to fight the battle by myself, in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Gallicia." Sir John Moore's Correspondence.

Sahagun, December 24th.—"I gave up the march on Ibid.

Carrion, which had never been undertaken but with the view of attracting the enemy's attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hopes of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps, while it was still thought that the British were retreating into Portugal."

"*The experiment failed,*" says the author of the Annals.

In what manner? "The object of my movement," says sir John Moore, on the 12th of December, "*is to threaten the French communications, and attract their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and favour any movement which may be made by the Spanish armies forming to the south of the Tagus.*" Now, what was the result? The 5th corps left Zaragoza; the 4th corps withdrew from Estremadura; the 2nd corps came from New Castile; the 8th corps from Navarre; Napoleon, with 50,000 men, returned from Madrid—the whole plan of his campaign was overturned! Cuesta was then enabled to move an army from the Morena to the Tagus, Infantado to obtain refuge at Cuença, Palacios to descend into La Mancha; the siege of Zaragoza was delayed, Portugal was saved, and the conquest of Andalusia deferred. This is to fail! And it is thus that, turning from the steady light of facts, this writer endeavours, by the feeble glimmer of his own imagination, to trace Moore's career!

These authors seem bad generals in the plains of Castile; let us see if they are better on the mountains of Gallicia.

"*Had the information of the general, with regard to the country traversed by his army, been more accurate and extensive, he would have known that there was no road leading to Betanzos and Coruña by which the enemy could at any season have advanced with rapidity sufficient to have endangered his communications—in fact, the roads on the right and left, occupied by the British, most difficult at any season, must, at the period in question, when covered with deep snow, and intersected by swollen torrents from the mountains, have been utterly impracticable.*"—*Annals*, pages 112, *et seq.*

The brigades of Alten and Crawfurd, quitting Moore's main body near Astorga, marched by Domingo Flores and the Puente de Bibey to Orense and Tuy. From Orense there is a cavalry road to St. Jago; from Tuy there is an artillery

road by Ponte Vedra to St. Jago, and from St. Jago there is a royal road to Coruña. Soult desired Ney to march the whole of the 6th corps by this route to Coruña, and general Marchand's division did actually so move, reaching St. Jago soon after the battle of Coruña.

From Villa Franca, Franceschi marched with his cavalry into the Val des Orres, and then, remounting the Minho, rejoined Soult between Villa Franca and Lugo. This march took place during Moore's retreat; and, after that event, Soult moved from Coruña by Ponte Vedra and Tuy to Orense, sending La Houssaye's dragoons through Mellid to the same place: from Orense there is also a direct route to St. Jago.

From Lugo there is a carriage road to St. Jago, through Mellid. This was the route by which sir John Moore intended to retreat to Vigo, and along which Mackenzie Frazer's division did actually march and then return, and there were magazines at all three places.

From Lugo there is a road by Monforte to the Val des Orres, closely flanking the royal road from Villa Franca, by which Moore retired. Soult marched his whole corps by this route when operating against Romana, after the retreat from Oporto.

From Benevente there is a high road by Mombuey and Puebla de Senabria leading to Orense. Soult also traversed this route in June, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a road by the Conceja de Ibas to Lugo. This route was followed by Ney, in May, 1809.

From the Asturias there is a high road through Mondonedo to Betanzos and Coruña, and there is also the coast road by Ribadeo to Ferrol. These roads were marched by Ney and by Romana in April and May; and moreover, Romana moved from Mondonedo to the sources of the Neyra, and thence into the Val des Orres; his route being by the line of the Asturian frontier, and consequently flanking the royal road of Lugo. So much for "*impracticable roads.*"

But it is the opinion of these writers that sir John Moore ought to have defended Gallicia.

"*It has been matter of regret to many that sir John Moore was not led to regard with a more favourable eye the pro-*

ject of defending Gallicia. No part of Spain offers equal advantages for a defensive war."

"The documents given in the appendix to Colonel Napier's history, abundantly prove that it was to this quarter that the anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed."—Annals, p. 104, *et seq.*

"Perhaps it is to be regretted that the suggestion thrown out by sir David Baird's letter of the 8th December, from Villa Franca, was not adopted."

"Had the British army been collected on the frontier of Gallicia, about the middle of December, there can be little doubt that it would have been able to have maintained itself, at least during the winter; and long before spring the face of affairs was completely changed by the departure of Napoleon, and of the force which followed him, to the Austrian war."

"When the suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipment perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid."

"Lugo and other points might have been fortified, positions taken up and strengthened, depôts established, and, by a judicious disposition of our force, the danger of being turned by the road through Orense, and by those from the north of Portugal and the Asturias, might have been sufficiently guarded against."

"The opinion of Bonaparte on the influence which the occupation of Gallicia, by an enemy to France, might have had on the war in Spain, is recorded in a letter which was written under his dictation to general Savary."—Sorrel's Notes, page 41, *et seq.*

The argument of the author of the "Annals," being but a meagre copy of colonel Sorrel's "Notes," to answer one is to answer both; but previous to examining the question of the defence of Gallicia, I will mark some stumbling-blocks in the way of both.

1°. On the 8th of December, say the "Notes," "*our strength was unimpaired, and the French were occupied with Madrid.*"

The strength of the British army was the same on the 24th as on the 8th of December: no loss, save a few men hurt in the cavalry skirmishes, had been sustained. Madrid

capitulated the 3d of December; on the 4th the French took possession; and Napoleon was so little occupied with it on the 8th of December, that he had, on the 4th, detached his cavalry in pursuit of Castaños's fugitive army; sent the 1st corps into La Mancha, to menace Andalusia; and the 4th corps to Talavera, to form an advanced guard for the march against Lisbon!

2°. "*The anxieties of Napoleon were chiefly directed towards Gallicia.*"—Annals.

This expression is not very intelligible, but, taken with the context, it means that Napoleon feared opposition in Gallicia more than in any other quarter; yet two pages after we find the same author asserting that Moore should have "*retired across the Tagus,*" because "*there it was that he was most dreaded by Napoleon.*"

3°. The documents quoted from my appendix, instead of being favourable to, are directly opposed to the views of these writers.

Before the battle of Rio Seco, Napoleon tells Savary that "*Bessieres had to fight for the communications of the French, and that a wound, received by him, would give a spasm to the whole army.*" Nothing could be better expressed or more applicable to the state of affairs. The French then in the Peninsula were about 135,000, of which 48,000 were in Portugal and Catalonia. Of the remainder, 50,000 were scattered in Valencia, Andalusia, and the borders of Murcia. 10,000 were at Zaragoza, some at Madrid, and only 15,000 *under Bessieres* were left to protect the communications from Cuesta and Blake, whose united forces, exceeding 40,000, and containing the best body of regular troops in Spain, were then entering the plains of Leon; moreover the king was on his journey to the capital, and had Bessieres been defeated, would have been forced to fly. It was, therefore, the comparative strength of the Spaniards on this point, combined with the danger of the king, and the scattered state of the other French corps, especially that of Dupont's, which drew Napoleon's attention, not the geographical advantages of Gallicia.

What a vast difference, also, between the circumstances at the two periods brought into comparison by these writers!

When the emperor wrote, the heads of the French invasion were engaged in Valencia, Andalusia, and Aragon; the whole country was in insurrection, Spanish armies gathering in every quarter, and the Spanish courage untried, while the French communications were protected by a force only one-third of that opposed to it. When Moore retreated, 90,000 men, that is, four times his force, were united in pursuit of him. All the Spanish armies had been dispersed, the insurrections quelled, Zaragoza menaced by 35,000 French, 20,000 at Talavera, 30,000 in La Mancha, 10,000 in Madrid, Burgos in a state of defence, many thousand soldiers distributed on the communications and on the lines of correspondence, and 50,000 were marching under Napoleon upon Astorga. All that great man's combinations were compact, his communications protected, and the head of the principal operation turned not, as in the former case, away from, but against Gallicia, and this, not because of its geographical advantages (which it is evident he disregarded when he went from Burgos to Madrid, although he knew Baird's division was at Astorga), but because the united British army was on his communications. "Napoleon's dread," and "Napoleon's anxieties," sound grandly; but his arguments should be understood before they are quoted. At that time he feared neither British nor Spanish armies in Gallicia, nor any other part; his force was overpowering, and the head of his invasion wherever he chose to place it. If Moore had retired on Lisbon, Napoleon would have followed him to Lisbon. As Moore went to Gallicia, against that point the emperor immediately drove.

"*Bessieres is to-day at Medina Rio Seco: he will open communication with Portugal, force the rebels into Gallicia, and seize Leon.*"

"*If Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will be improved. If he does so after a defeat, it will be still better.*"

"*By driving Cuesta into Gallicia, we deprive him of his communications with Madrid, Andalusia, and Estremadura.*"

"*The two important points, and where they can make a*

real regular welfare, are Gallicia and Andalusia, because the troops of San Roque, of Cadiz, and Algarve, are nearly 25,000 *men, who have taken part with the sedition of Seville; and all those who were at Oporto have taken part with the rebels of Gallicia.*"

"*Not a peasant of the vallies but sees that the affairs of Spain at this moment depend upon Bessieres. How foolish, then, it is to have in this great affair voluntarily given twenty chances against him!*"

"*A defeat of Bessieres will be a blow at the heart; it will be felt at all the extreme points of the army.*"

"*The army of Bessieres ought to have at the least* 8,000 *men more to obviate all chances against him.*"

"*The great object of the army's efforts should be to secure Madrid. Madrid can only be menaced by the army of Gallicia.*"

"*If Bessieres is checked, his object should be to protect Burgos.*"

Such were Napoleon's expressions;—not a word about the geographical importance of Gallicia,—he only considers the danger from such a comparatively large Spanish force entering the plains of Leon: and, in his own campaign, he did not move against Madrid until he believed Moore was in full retreat upon Portugal. The instant he discovered his mistake, he returned with incredible rapidity, not because he feared opposition in Gallicia, but because it was necessary to protect his communications in the plains of Leon. Soult was in the same situation as Bessieres had been, but as the British were more formidable opponents than the Spaniards, Napoleon came with his whole army to protect the communications. Thus it is clear that sir John Moore's march against Soult was in the very spirit of Napoleon's warfare; and they who would have had him go to Gallicia, understood neither his view nor the emperor's reasoning.

Let us now examine whether Gallicia was really capable of being defended. The arguments, or rather lamentations, of these writers, rest on a letter of sir David Baird; it will be fitting, therefore, to see how far their foundation is secure.

Sir David Baird commanded only a division, and his knowledge of the real state of affairs was necessarily more confined than that of the commander-in-chief. He was

quite ignorant of the numbers and position of the French armies, and not fully acquainted with the extreme imbecility and falseness of the supreme junta. Any proposition, therefore, made by him on the spur of the moment, must be taken as the suggestion of a man who had no means of judging largely; and that this is exactly the character of Baird's proposal to defend Gallicia, is easily shown.

"*It has frequently,*" he says, "*occurred to me, that in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Gallicia and part of Leon, than by proceeding to join you at Salamanca to abandon these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the marquess of Romana; and, if you judged it proper by a flank movement to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence.*"

"*The royal road from Coruña to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous, and with the sea open to us we should be able to receive, with facility, such reinforcements and supplies as the British government might deem it proper to send. The country abounds in cattle; bread, indeed, would be required, but flour might be obtained from England, and in the meantime Gallicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection, and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards.*"

Sir David here puts his case hypothetically. He wishes to cover part of Leon as well as Gallicia,—Romana might occupy the Asturias, and the whole were to wait until it was seen what efforts the Spanish people could make. This clearly proves that he was but slightly acquainted with the state of affairs; for what part of the plains of Leon could have been covered by 25,000 men against 200,000? and how could Romana, who had only 6000 ill-equipped men fit for action, defend the Asturias from the operations of Napoleon's great army, when he had just fled from that province at the sight of only the foraging parties from Soult's corps? Again, Baird says, there would be little difficulty in pro-

curing provisions, yet in his manifesto to the Spaniards, published a few days before, he writes thus :—"*The kingdom of Gallicia, strong from the nature of the country, will require no force to defend it beyond its own brave army now assembling at Leon, under the marquess of Romana; and the presence of an additional number of troops in its passes and on its mountains, would but tend to exhaust its resources without adding to its security.*" But the best comment is the fact that sir John Moore did not only authorize, but pressed Baird, to prepare provisions for the army in Gallicia; and he was unable to procure more than a few days' supply for each station.

Authorities.—Sir JOHN MOORE to Sir DAVID BAIRD.

Moore's Narrative.

6*th December.*—"*Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back.*"

12*th December.*—"*I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon the Gallicias and Vigo, and it is that which probably I shall now follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am therefore most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication.*"

16*th December.*—"*I cannot help again pressing upon you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Coruña, for though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat upon Gallicia.*"

To lord Castlereagh. 30*th Dec., Astorga.*—"*I found no provision here: the little which had been collected had been consumed by sir David's corps in their passage. There is not two days' bread to carry the army to Villa Franca,—there are no means of carriage,—the people run away,—the villages are deserted.*"

14*th Jan.* 1809.—"*The want of provisions would not permit me to wait longer (at Lugo). I marched that night.*"

Let us now examine this question by dates.

Sir David's letter was written the 8th December. The 10th it reached sir John Moore. The 12th it was answered. The 16th, orders might possibly have reached Coruña, to forward stores and ammunition to the different positions intended to be occupied; on the 25th, Moore commenced a retreat before 90,000 men. This gives ten days for

"Fortifying Lugo and other points,"—"taking up judicious positions to secure the lateral roads from the north of Portugal,"—"establishing a regular system of supply from England,"—"calling forth and arming the population of Gallicia,"—"enforcing the necessary requisitions for transport, and persuading the junta of the province to give the requisite aid." Ten days to do all this, with a junta which had kept sir David's troops seventeen days in harbour ere it would suffer them even to land!—a junta that made a trading profit of his necessities; and, after extracting nearly half a million of dollars from him, had at last so scantily furnished him with transport, that he was obliged to leave his spare ammunition behind, and to march his troops by *half battalions*, to lessen the burden of provisioning them!

Authorities.—Sir J. Moore to lord Castlereagh. 13*th November.*—*"I am sorry to say, from sir David I have nothing but complaints of the junta of Coruña, who afford him no assistance. They promise everything, but give nothing."*

D°. 24*th Nov.*—*"The* 500,000 *dollars your lordship mentions, sir David Baird considered as sent to him; he detained them, and has nearly expended them."*

Sir David Baird to sir J. Moore. 19*th Nov.*—*"Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of this division; but owing to the total want of assistance which we have experienced in Gallicia from the local authorities, our success has not been great."*

D°. 21*st Nov.*—*"We are at this moment destitute of spare ammunition."*

And then Romana's army to defend the Asturias! Romana's army, which is thus described by colonel Symes, and by himself!

Colonel Symes to sir D. Baird. Dec. 14.—*"It is morally impossible that they can stand before a line of French infantry. A portion of, at least one-third of, the Spanish muskets will not explode; and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire twice."*

Romana to sir J. Moore. 14*th Dec.*—*"I have begun to clothe and to organize, but much is wanting. There are still at least two-thirds who are in want of clothing from head to foot. Almost the whole army are without haversacks, car-*

touche-boxes, and shoes; and notwithstanding all the exertions I have made, I have not been able to succeed,—the country offering so few resources."

Moore to lord Castlereagh. 31*st Dec.*—" *Nobody can describe Romana's troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do at the indifference of the inhabitants."*

Was ever so wild, so visionary a proposition, made by a general, as this of sir David Baird's, if we are to suppose he made it with a knowledge of the real state of affairs, and with a reference to a permanent defence! But it is evident that he suggested it with reference to an enemy not much superior in numbers; that it was so considered by sir J. Moore; and that these writers who lament it was not adopted, have understood Baird's views as little as they did Moore's and Napoleon's.

Let us now suppose " *Lugo fortified,*" and " *the army judiciously posted*" by the 25th December.

What system, what arrangements, could have obliged the poor mountaineers of Gallicia to bring in provision and means of transport for stores? Was this part of the plan to be effected by such a junta as has been described, or by applying to the people themselves? Was it to be effected by force or by money? If by money, where was it to be had? If by force, where was the force? Would these writers have had sir J. Moore detach troops from his force of 25,000 to raise contributions in a friend's country, when Napoleon, with 90,000 men, was in his front? Finally, what is meant by " *a judicious distribution of the troops?*"

There were two, and only two points, where a maritime base of operations could have been established, namely, Vigo and Coruña, which of course includes Betanzos and Ferrol. Now let us examine, in succession, the different positions of defence which an army could take up with reference to those bases.

1°. *Manzanal, or Rodrigatos.* This position is immediately behind Astorga. It is strong to the front, but is unfavourable for a retreat to Villa Franca; and it is turned by the old road of Foncebadon, which comes into the new road at Calcabellos, near Villa Franca. The British must therefore either have returned to Calcabellos, or occupied

See captain C. Smith's Report, sec. 11, Ap. xiii. Napier's History, vol. i.

that place in force. If the latter, 25,000 men would have been spread over thirty miles of ground; the enemy, 90,000 strong, could have thrown his whole power upon either extremity of the line; and Calcabellos once carried, there was no retreat for the troops at Rodrigatos.

2°. *Calcabellos, or Villa Franca.* To hold this position permanently, magazines must have been established at Lugo, and strong corps of observation placed, one at Orense, to cover the establishments of Vigo; one at Mondonedo, to cover those of Coruña; and one at Lugo. The first, because from Benevente the French could move a force against Orense and Vigo by the Puebla de Senabria; the second, because they might do the same through the Asturias to Betanzos and Coruña; the third, partly to connect these detachments, but principally to watch the road of Concija de Ibas, leading from the Asturias directly upon Lugo. From whence were these three detachments to be drawn?—would these writers have had the British army depend upon the peasants of the mountains for the protection of its flanks, its magazines, and base of operations—or upon Romana's army, such as he described it—or would they have had Moore to divide the 25,000 British into four equal parts on a line of one hundred and fifty miles, when Napoleon, with 90,000 men, was immediately in his front?

3°. *Lugo.* Here was the first position in which a small army could pretend to make a permanent stand. The communication with Betanzos is good, not above thirty miles long, and the army could have moved between those two points, and delivered battle at either with the certainty of a retreat to Coruña, or by St. Jago to Vigo; that is, if the French operated only from Astorga and the Asturias. But the roads to Vigo were still open by the Val des Orres, and by Puebla Senabria; and thus the position of Lugo and Betanzos would have been taken in reverse. And what was to be the gain of all this? To preserve an unsteady footing in a barren corner of the Peninsula, while the French rioted in the conquest of the south of Spain and of Portugal!

By reference to sir John Cradock's papers in my Appendix, second volume, it will be seen that Lisbon would have fallen the moment the 4th corps arrived there; and from Lisbon the French would have sped to Oporto and the

Minho, thus opening another line of operation against Vigo. But so far from Gallicia having any geographical advantages for defence by an inferior force, it is, when an enemy possesses the Asturias and Portugal, utterly indefensible, especially by a maritime power. 1°. It offers a salient angle to the adversary. 2°. The harbours at its base are wide apart, situated on a dangerous coast, and the lines of communication from them to Villa Franca are separated by difficult mountains. 3°. The lines of communication run close along the frontiers of Asturias and Portugal, and the enemy, embracing, as it were, the whole country, would be nearer to the harbours at the base, on both sides, than the army to whom they belonged, and he could thus attack at any point he pleased. It would be impossible, in such a situation, to remain about Villa Franca, and this was proved in after-times; for the Gallician army, although Portugal was in the possession of the allies, was always brought back to Lugo by the slightest demonstration of Bonnet's division from the Asturias. To call such a district strong in any other view than when the contending parties are equal in numbers, or as it affords a fugitive native force shelter in its mountains, is to discover a total ignorance of war.

Shall it be said Napoleon had not troops enough to operate in this extended manner? The 1st corps was left in La Mancha, and proved more than sufficient to beat all the Spanish forces that rallied in the south. 10,000 men garrisoned Madrid. The 4th corps was on its way to Portugal. 90,000 men were collected at Astorga the 30th of December, and 60,000 of these actually followed Moore to Coruña. Lapisse, with 12,000, was sent to Salamanca, and could have marched upon Orense by the Puebla Senabria road. Bonnet's division was already in the eastern passes of the Asturias. The 5th corps was actually drawn off from Zaragoza, and could have been sent into the Asturias also. The reserve of heavy cavalry could have occupied all the plains of Leon; and the imperial guards, the only troops Napoleon withdrew when he returned to France, remained for two months near Vittoria guarding the line of communication. Now, the withdrawal of the guards, and the departure of the emperor himself, were all the changes consequent upon the announcement of the Austrian war; and although Napoleon's

absence was doubtless an immense event, yet as he himself did not know he was to depart until he reached Astorga, sir John Moore cannot well be expected to have foreseen the consequences of that event.

Colonel Sorrel refers me to the consideration of lord Wellington's campaign, and dwells upon the population of Gallicia, which he estimates at a million and a half, as if all the population had been actually in arms, and organized to give battle—or as if they could have been so armed and organized in ten days! Lord Wellington's campaigns! Why there it is that I find the illustration that I want! Portugal had three millions of inhabitants; Portugal had fine harbours; Portugal had a regular government; Portugal had an army organized and disciplined; Portugal had an armed militia; Portugal had a long-established and vigorous system for the employment of the population in defence of the country; Portugal had strong mountains, difficult roads, great rivers; Portugal had actually in the field a regular force of 40,000 men, a militia of 45,000, an auxiliary British army of 30,000 men; Portugal had more than a year to prepare,—and yet when Portugal was invaded by 70,000 French, lord Wellington retired from the frontier, and would have retired from the country altogether, if he had not had time, and money, and means, to fortify a position which could neither be turned by the flanks nor stormed in front. Without any of these advantages either as to time, or system, or numbers, or local advantages, these writers would have had sir John Moore defend Gallicia against more than double the number of troops which invaded Portugal! In defending Portugal, lord Wellington also defended the cause of the Peninsula. Spain was prostrate—he relinquished nothing. But when Moore retreated, the south of Spain and Portugal were not even invaded, and offered a thousand times the advantages of Gallicia!

Having thus shown how little these writers have considered their subject, I take the opportunity of correcting an involuntary error of my own, and explaining how it arose. When narrating Charmilly's mission at Salamanca, I said sir John Moore "*tore the letter in pieces.*" It was not so. The story was first published by Charmilly to create a notion, which has been greedily received and propagated by Moore's

enemies, that, oppressed by the difficulties of his situation, he was peevish and irritable. Mr. James Moore "*disdaining*," as he says, "*to answer the knave*," not only did not in his Narrative contradict this mistatement, but rather confirmed it by his mode of treating the matter. The story was repeated, and I adopted it without further examination. Yet it is certain that the original letter is at this moment in existence without a rent or injury! Moore's enemies, foiled even on this trifling point, must therefore continue to draw upon their imaginations for facts, upon their prejudices for arguments, and their malice for conclusions; and when they have done so, there will always be persons willing and able to defend him.

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COLONEL NAPIER'S

JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME;

FORMING A

SEQUEL

TO HIS

REPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTS,

AND CONTAINING SOME

NEW AND CURIOUS FACTS

RELATIVE TO THE

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

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"There was a man in Islington,
And he was wondrous wise,
He jumped into a quickset hedge
And scratched *out* both his eyes."

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MDCCCXXXIII.

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A JUSTIFICATION,

&c.

In my Reply to various opponents, I pledged myself to give authorities for certain important facts disputed by the author of the work entitled, "*Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War.*" I now redeem that pledge, which I gave, not as thinking it necessary to take more notice of a writer, whose ill-founded pretensions to authority and whose incorrectness I had already so thoroughly exposed in my reply; but to shew that no weakness then withheld me from dissecting his second production as completely as I had done his first; and also because I thought it due to my readers, before the publication of a fourth volume, to substantiate the accuracy of my third volume. In this view, I will now take the disputed facts in the order of events, and placing my own statement first, in each case, support it by authority.

Almeida.—The lieutenant-governor Da Costa was tried and shot. "*The only evidence against him being an explanatory letter, written, to lord Liverpool, by colonel Cox, when a prisoner at Verdun.*"

Authority. Mr. Stuart to lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, July 25th, 1812.

"My Lord,—It may not be irrelevant to mention to your lordship that, *upon the evidence of a dispatch which general Cox, the late governor of Almeida, while a prisoner in France, addressed to lord Liverpool,* relating the circumstances which led to the fall of that fortress in 1810, *the person who exercised the functions of lieutenant-governor at the time of the capture has been condemned to death by a court-martial.*"

Battle of Busaco.—"*The 8th Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces.*"

Authorities. 1°. Extract from a memoir drawn up by colonel Waller, staff-officer of the 2d division and an eye-

witness. " As the French formed on the plateau, they were cannonaded from our position; and a regiment of Portuguese, either *the 8th or 16th* infantry, which were formed in advance of the 74th, threw in some volleys, but *was quickly driven into the position.*"

2°. Extract of a letter from an officer of the 9th British regiment, also an eye-witness. " *The 8th Portuguese regiment is extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside;* but he and they were amongst the very foremost of the ranks of the 9th British."

Before quitting this subject, I will notice a foolish accusation made by the author of the " *Further Strictures,*" namely, that I have, from partial motives, been silent upon a gallant charge made by the 19th Portuguese regiment. To which I answer, on my own authority, as an eye-witness, that *no such charge as this writer has described took place.* The 19th Portuguese were not posted in front of the convent; that ground was occupied by the light division in first line, and by the Germans in second line. There was, indeed, a Portuguese regiment (possibly the 19th) which was posted on the mountain, nearly a mile to the right of the convent, and in front of the brigade of guards; and when the skirmishers of Marchand's division pushed back their opponents, this regiment made an advance in support of the covering light troops. It was a handsome demonstration of vigour and courage; but it is an absurd exaggeration to call it a fine charge, because the line never was nearer to the enemy's skirmishers than a hundred yards: and for the truth of this I appeal to the light division, and especially to the artillery, who were at the time, firing upon the main body of the French troops said to have been charged.

Operations in the Alemtejo.—Under this head, it is scarcely necessary to notice the silly special pleading of the author of the " *Further Strictures*" relative to captain Squires and the batteries constructed on the left of the Tagus during Massena's stay at Santarem. Both that officer and colonel Jones say that the batteries were meant *to command the mouth of the Zezere.* It is ridiculous to suppose that captain Squires, who constructed them, did

Vide Jones's History of the War, page 444.

not know what their object was, or whether they were fitted to obtain it! I will not waste time in vindicating myself further; but upon the other points of importance, my answers shall be full and satisfactory to all but marshal Beresford and this writer.

1°. "*Beresford arrived at Portalegre with* 20,000 *infantry*, 2,000 *cavalry, and* 18 *guns.*"

Authority. Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Louzao, March 16, 1811.

"I heard of the fall of Badajos on the night of the 13th and 14th; and major-general Cole's division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in order afterwards to continue its route into the Alemtejo, and it marched in that direction yesterday. *We shall have in that province* 22,000 *men, of which nearly* 2,200 *will be cavalry.*" In addition to which, I found it stated in sir B. D'Urban's memoir, that even *after the passage of the Guadiana*, the army was still 21,400 strong, with 18 guns.

2°. *Combat of Campo Mayor.—The French and the* 13*th dragoons charged through each other twice.*

My authority for this fact was an eye-witness, whose testimony is confirmed in the following statement, drawn up by an officer of the 13th dragoons, who was one of those engaged; and whose statement I give entire, as confirming my account of the affair in other important points.

"On the morning of the 25th March, 1811, the army moved from its bivouac position towards Campo Mayor, and the 13th light dragoons in its proper place in the column of march, until the ground in front was found sufficiently open for the operations of cavalry when the whole were ordered to the front. The cavalry consisted of the 3d dragoon guards, and 4th dragoons under the command of colonel De Grey; the 1st and 7th regiments of Portuguese cavalry, under the command of colonel Otway; and the 13th dragoons, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Head and brigadier-general Long.

"On gaining the front, contiguous columns of half squadrons were formed, and the whole moved forward at a brisk trot, under the guidance of general Long, who directed the movements of the cavalry on that morning.

A troop from the 13th dragoons, and detachments from the other regiments, were sent to act as skirmishers on the rising ground on the right, and to protect the right flank of the column. At this period, the strength of the 13th dragoons was reduced to two squadrons, having one squadron detached with the light division under the command of colonel Colbourne, a troop with a Portuguese infantry brigade under the command of colonel Colliers, and the troop employed as skirmishers; in consequence, the actual strength of the two squadrons did not exceed 48 file each squadron, making a total of 192 men.

" General Long having found a fit opportunity, ordered a line to be formed, which moved on, and gained the top of the rising ground, when the enemy were perceived on the plain below, formed up and presenting three strong bodies of cavalry. From an intelligent troop-serjeant-major of the enemy, who was this day wounded and taken prisoner, and who, from being employed in the office of the French adjutant-general, had a perfect knowledge of the force now opposite; it was learned that it consisted of the following numbers and regiments:—2d hussars, 300 men; 10th hussars, 350; 26th heavy dragoons, 150; and 4th Spanish chasseurs, 80: making a total of 880 men. The Portuguese regiments formed on the left of the 13th, and received orders to support; the heavy brigade were formed at some distance in the rear of the 13th, and outflanked it on the right; and the British and Portuguese infantry and artillery were forming as fast as they arrived on the ground, coming up in double quick time.

" On the 13th being formed, which was done with as much regularity and precision as on a field-day, general Long gave his final orders to colonel Head to attack the enemy; and the two squadrons moved forward, receiving the words march, trot, canter, and charge from their respective leaders. The enemy came on in a gallant and determined style; and on the word charge being given, *every horse was let out, and the men cheered; the enemy did the same. The crash was tremendous; both parties passed each other, and at some short distance in the rear of the enemy, the 13th came about; the enemy did the same, and a second charge took place with equal violence, when the conflict*

became personal with the sabre. After some hard fighting in this manner, the enemy gave way, and the pursuit commenced. During this time, two battalions of French infantry, which were in the rear of their cavalry, formed line; and on their cavalry clearing their front, pursued by the 13th, they opened a heavy fire of musketry on the latter, by which many men and horses fell: in this pursuit, the two regiments of Portuguese cavalry under the command of colonel Otway joined. For some time on the road, the French dragoons, in small parties, made fight; but being at length totally dispersed, they no longer made resistance, but surrendered when come up with.

"The pursuit now continued at a rapid rate, it being the object to gain their front, and capture the whole, as well as the enormous quantity of baggage on the road, with their artillery; as it was taken for granted a proper support would have been sent after the regiment, and that there was not any thing to be apprehended from the enemy's infantry, which was behind; supposing a good account would be given of them, when it was considered the force of British and Portuguese that was left on the ground. And the pursuit did not cease till stopped at the bridge of Badajos, when, on consultation being held, it was judged prudent to fall back on the support, and secure all prisoners and captures. Sixteen pieces of artillery, each drawn by eight mules, numbers of waggons, immense quantities of baggage of all descriptions, provisions, stores, horses and mules; in short, the whole of the stores which the enemy had collected in Campo Mayor, and which, on that morning, were removed from thence to be placed at Badajos, owing to the rapidity of the pursuit, were captured.

"On nearing Badajos, some of the drivers, supposing themselves safe, when within the fire of the guns on the fortifications, refused to surrender, and kept whipping on their mules: those were sabred, and the mules mounted by men of the 13th. The retreat was continued for some miles in the most orderly manner, the men in high spirits, until information not to be doubted was received, that the French infantry which was left on the ground were coming forward, and supported by a considerable body of that cavalry, which had surrendered, and who, on seeing their

infantry coming on, recovered their horses and arms. To attack this force was considered so imprudent, that it was decided (as there appeared no hopes of support) to abandon all the captures, make a detour to the right of the road, and endeavour to join the army. It can only be felt by those in similar situations, what the feelings of all were, when this decision was found to be absolutely necessary. Late in the evening, the 13th, after a hard day's duty, went into bivouac in the neighbourhood of Campo Mayor."

To this clear, modest, and authentic statement, I add the following observations upon the general conduct of this action by captain Arthur Gregory, and colonel William Light, both serving at the time in the 4th dragoons.

Captain Gregory.

"The surprise of the French troops at Campo Mayor was so complete, that when the cavalry had got abreast of the fortress the enemy's infantry were only just turning out on their alarm post outside, arriving by two's and three's. The heavy brigade were bringing up their right shoulders to charge, *when the marshal himself rode up and stopped them.* The artillery which had opened its fire on the retiring column, were ordered to cease after a very few rounds, and the enemy allowed to retire, unfollowed and unmolested, to Badajos, over a perfectly open and flat country."

The situation of the French column of infantry, at the time when the heavy brigades were desired to halt at Campo Mayor, is thus described by colonel Light. "As they were retreating in close column a very short distance in advance, and on our left, I had a better opportunity of seeing them than those in the centre or right of our brigade, as I was on the left of the left half squadron of the whole brigade; consequently, nearer to them than any one else. We were so near that the whole nearly of the rear rank and some officers on the flank turned round, made a sudden stop, and it appeared to me they were going to lay down their arms. I recollect saying to the serjeant next to me, 'If we go on a few yards further they will throw down their arms, for, look, they are ready to do so now.' *At this very moment we were halted, the French shouldered their arms again, gave a shout of joy, faced about, and marched off.*"

This testimony, joined to the acknowledged fact that

the French did triumphantly carry off their recovered guns to Badajos, verifies the main points in my account of the affair of Campo Mayor; and with respect to the presence of colonel Colborne, which the author of the Strictures so flippantly denies, I repeat the fact, upon the authority of colonel Colborne himself. This writer also, although equivocally, denies that the 13th dragoons were reprimanded by marshal Beresford for pursuing the French; yet the fact was notorious at the time, and the actual reprimand, (a very severe one,) as given in general orders, has since been published by Mr. C. E. Long in his reply to this writer's aspersions of the late lieutenant-general Long. In my work I have said that they were, perhaps, *justly* reprimanded; I now retract that assertion. Having acquired more full information of the conduct of the 13th dragoons, and of the actual state of affairs, I retract it as unjust. I think they were *unjustly* reprimanded; I think they deserved the greatest praise, and that the "*unsparing admiration*" *of the whole army* was well founded.

3°. "*The breach of Badajos was not closed,*" *&c. &c.*

4°. "*Beresford should have marched upon Merida.*"

5°. "*Beresford believed that Soult would only act on the defensive.*"

These assertions involve matter of opinion and matter of fact. The opinions I leave to the judgement of others. The matters of fact are as follows:—

1°. That if he had moved by Merida or been less slow in his after operations, *Badajos was in no condition to resist.*

2°. That the road to Merida *was practicable for troops.*

3°. That the impression made on the French by the unexpected appearance of so large a force, and by the valorous conduct of the 13th dragoons at Campo Mayor, *rendered the movement by Merida a sure operation.*

4°. That Beresford, unable to judge rightly of the real state of affairs, *thought that Badajos would be evacuated, whenever the allies passed the Guadiana.*

5°. That up to the 21st of April, at least, *lord Wellington did not think well of the marshal's operations.*

The first of these facts scarcely requires any authority, seeing that, from the nature of the case, Badajos must

have been ill-prepared for a siege; yet I have abundant proof.

Colonel Jones in his Sieges, page 3, writes thus:—"At this time (26th March) the French had been in possession of Badajos only a fortnight, and the works and batteries of their recent siege, still afforded considerable cover. * *The breach was open,* and the garrison ill-supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores; the re-capture, therefore, not only seemed inevitable, but easy if speedily invested; but the river Guadiana interfered, and there was neither a pontoon train, nor other means with the army for crossing the river."

The last passage of this quotation shews that the movement by Merida was, as I have asserted, essential, because there was a bridge there, and it is foolish to plead in bar, lord Wellington's instructions to pass at Jerumenha. They were given under the notion that all things for an *immediate passage* were in readiness; but it was not so, and Beresford, following the letter, neglected the spirit of his instruction, which was to recover Badajos as speedily as possible.

The important fact of the denuded state of Badajos does not, however, rest on colonel Jones's single testimony. Colonel Lamarre, the commander of the French engineers, employed in the town at the time, in his journal of the siege, says, "The English committed a great fault in wasting eight days before Olivenza, which must have fallen after the taking of Badajos, and *with a little more boldness and penetration, Badajos might have been attacked with success in the beginning of April.* From the 12th of March the French had been working to fill up the trenches, to repair the breach, and to make other restorations, especially the Pardaleras, which was a heap of ruins. But materials were rare, and masons scarce. It was not until the 21*st of April that the breach was closed,* and the state of the said breach had been a source of great uneasiness, because if *five or six thousand men had appeared before Badajos at the end of March, that place, in a bad state and feebly garrisoned, must have fallen in a short time.*"

In this last paragraph we have also another proof that Merida would have been the best line of operations under the existing circumstances. But to proceed with Lamarre.

" The armament of the place was augmented by the *guns brought from Campo Mayor.*" (Those very guns which the 13th dragoons took and marshal Beresford lost again). " The former siege and the preparations for defence had, however, exhausted all the resources of the town, and the neighbouring country, and yet, so pressed were the engineers for wood, that so late as the 22d of April," (that is, fourteen days after Beresford had crossed the Guadiana) " a strong detachment was sent out to fetch timber." This detachment, as may be seen in the body of my work, was nearly cut off by lord Wellington, who lost no time, after he arrived, in ascertaining the real state of the garrison.

There is, however, other and even better proof than this of the denuded state of Badajos, namely, the original register-book of the French governor's orders and correspondence, from which I extract the following passages:—

1°. *To the royal commissary of the province,* 10*th April,* 1811.—" The place of Badajos being unfurnished of timber, it is proper to fix upon some place to cut it," &c. &c. " I pray you to make all diligence on this subject, and to employ all means in your power."

12*th April. To the same.* " I send you two states of the articles wanting in Badajos to complete us for three months' consumption of 4,630 rations of food, and 300 of forage per day, besides the objects necessary for the sick." The quantity required is not given, but it must have been considerable from what follows, viz., " I pray you, in consequence, to make *immediate requisitions on the villages of the province* for the quick supply of the same." " The paymaster-general *has no funds to pay for the works of the place.*"

Order of the day, 10*th April.*—" From to-morrow the troops of the garrison will receive only *three quarters ration of bread daily.*"

14*th April.*—" *Our mills can make no more flour for want of charcoal.*" (*à faire battre les meulles.*) " The engineers also are much embarrassed for want of this article, which is, however, indispensable."

26*th April. To the royal commissary, &c.*—" No brandy can be given to the workmen; there is none in the maga-

zines, except that which I have reserved for the gunners in case of a siege."

Thus there is no doubt of the real state of Badajos up to the end of April.

But I have said that "general Imas, when he surrendered to Soult, *had plenty of provisions,*" and the writer of the "*Strictures*" asks how this can be reconciled with the French garrison *being in want.*

The following extract from lord Wellington to lord Liverpool proves the fact as to Imas. "Louzao, March 16th. *The garrison* (that is the Spanish) *wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.*"

Imas had only to hold out *a few days that succour might arrive;* and with respect to the cavil in the Strictures, I answer, that after he surrendered, not only his garrison but the other prisoners and the French army were principally fed from the resources of Badajos, and that the French garrison also had been living for a fortnight in that town. It is therefore quite possible that Imas might have had plenty, and the French garrison very little. For example, captain Malet, an officer employed near Mendizabel, at the period of Soult's siege, writes thus:—"Badajos, 8th February. There are sufficient provisions for several months for a garrison of 6000 men, but if the present number of troops are kept here, amounting to *nearly sixteen thousand men,* the place cannot hold out long."

I now come to the other four facts, namely, *the practicability of the road to Merida, the impression of terror made upon the French, the false notions of Beresford relative to the enemy, and lord Wellington's opinion of the operations.*

The proof of the three first will be found below in an extract from a letter addressed by marshal Beresford to the plenipotentiary, Mr. C. Stuart. For it is not a little curious, that the writer of the Strictures, who pretends to have direct authority from the marshal to contradict my statement, and who accuses me of ignorance, should yet be so ignorant himself, that I am able to rebut his charges by the testimony of the very man, whose cause he espouses. Meanwhile, I make little account of his argument about the army of the centre advancing, and of the danger of

the position beyond the Guadiana; because the latter would have been in no manner different from what it was after passing at Jerumenha; and it is evident, from the marshal's letter, that the army of the centre (if, indeed, its existence was even known by him) did not enter into his calculations; and is only introduced by this writer to mystify the subject. The notion that Latour Maubourg, (Mortier was not, as this ill-informed writer supposes, then with the army,) by passing through Badajos, would cut off the retreat, is also unsustainable. My proposition was to place the allies *between Badajos and the French army;* basing its feasibility upon the fact, that the latter was feeble, surprised by the presence of the former, and astounded by the charge of the 13th dragoons. Moreover, Beresford, in his public dispatch, calls Latour Maubourg's army only five thousand; he could, therefore, have had no fear of it: and, with the allied army on both sides of the Guadiana, it would certainly have been easier to throw a bridge than when possessing only the right bank. But that there was little danger in having the communication by Merida, is still better proved by the fact, that lord Wellington did order Beresford, when the bridge at Jerumenha was swept away, to occupy Merida, to establish his communications by that very line, and to alter his cantonments accordingly.

Authorities. Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, Elvas, April 1, 1811.

"*I scarcely think the French will remain in Badajos, as I cannot believe they will let so considerable a force as will be necessary for its defence be isolated from their field army, which of itself is not very great, and cannot relieve that part so isolated, but by abandoning Andalusia, and then, perhaps, not equal to it.* I hope to be able to pass the Guadiana, at all events, the 4th; but most vexatiously a vagabond officer of the driver's corps, in conducting the five Spanish boats saved from Badajos, absolutely overset two in as fair a road as any in England; and which, with the present swell of the river, will give me some difficulty. The pontoons sent from Lisbon (English) were only fit for infantry." "I have got the Spaniards at Albuquerque, at least all the armed; and the sooner the arms are sent for the others the better, that we may send them to their

own country, *that I have now opened for them.* I propose, in passing the Guadiana, *that they march to Merida; and, if the enemy remain in Badajos,* I shall bring them on my right to Lobau or Talavera. The chace which my countrymen of the 18th dragoons gave on the 25th was literally a fox-chase of two leagues, without drawing bit; and which, though it lost me three battalions of infantry that must else have been surrounded, *has given a terror to the French that is, perhaps, equal to the capture of the infantry.* The Portuguese joined very handsomely, and appear equally to have enjoyed the chace."

How the 13th dragoons by beating the cavalry, taking the convoy, and interposing between the infantry and Badajos, while the heavy dragoons, the artillery, and infantry of the allies were on the flank and rear of the French infantry; how this prevented the latter from being surrounded, does not, I say, very clearly appear; but *it is clear,* from the above letter, that the marshal, by *sending the Spaniards to Merida, thought the road practicable;* that he *anticipated little or no opposition from the French after the Campo Mayor affair,* seeing that he says, *he had then opened the Spaniards' country for them; that the enemy were struck with terror; and that their field-army was not great.* Finally, it is as clear that he was quite unable to judge of the true state of affairs, inasmuch as his expectations were all signally frustrated by the course of events. *Badajos was not evacuated;* it would have been strange if it had. *The French did suffer its garrison to be isolated, and they did also relieve it,* and *without abandoning Andalusia.* This letter confirms also my assertion that *marshal Beresford thought Soult would act entirely on the defensive;* and that no doubt may exist on that head, I will give an extract from another letter of the marshal's to that effect, supporting it by one from lord Wellington, which I transpose from my Appendix to this place.

Marshal Beresford to Mr. C. Stuart, 27th April, 1811. Extract.

"*It is said Soult is assembling a force on our side of Seville; his number is, however, I think, much exaggerated,* but I cannot speak certain about it."

Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Elvas, May 2, 1811.

"On the night of the 15th instant, I received from marshal sir William Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that marshal Soult had broke up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, *notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia; I, therefore, set out on the following morning!*"

The last paragraph indicates pretty broadly that lord Wellington had not much confidence in the talents of marshal Beresford, when opposed to Soult; but the following extract from another letter more fully discloses the cause of his repairing in person to Estremadura.

Elvas, April 21st, lord Wellington to Mr. C. Stuart.

"*I am afraid that we have lost some valuable time here, and I am come to put matters in the right road;* and to come to an understanding with Castaños and, if possible, with Blake, respecting our future operations."

6°. *Want of guns, stores, provisions, and pontoons.*— My charge against the Portuguese government was, perhaps, put too broadly: yet it is untrue to say, as this writer has done, that the government had not to do with these matters; they had a great deal to do with them, and also with the storing of the fortresses, the food of the Portuguese troops, and with the means of transport for every thing. If the writer of the "*Strictures*" has really received any information from the marshal upon this subject, he must know that on all those points the negligence of the government, and of their "*Junta de Viveres,*" and the false reports and assertions by which they endeavoured to cover that negligence, were sources of continual and most serious distress to lord Wellington, who could not, until the end of the year, procure even a decree for the abolition of the "*Junta de Viveres;*" and who could at no time get delinquents punished. He must know also that, after the battle of Fuentes, the Portuguese troops were without any ammunition, because of the negligence of the government; that one of the principal reforms in the administration sought for by lord

Wellington was the consolidation of the branches of the arsenal under one head; and that it was not till February, 1812, (one year after this period,) that Mr. De Lemos returned from the Brazils with full authority for Beresford to control the administration in all that regarded the Portuguese army. This writer should also have known that the engineer's stores ordered up to Elvas for Beresford's siege (for which see colonel Jones's Journal) were not, as colonel Jones supposes, kept back because *the exhausted state of the country would not afford carriages,* but because government *would not enforce the requisitions for them.*

Lord Wellington's operations undoubtedly depended much upon the Portuguese government; and I am justified in blaming that government, because it almost always failed to do its duty. I am unwilling, therefore, on this pamphleteer's authority, to diminish the censure. I am unwilling to suppose lord Wellington relied not upon the government but upon Beresford; because if the guns and ammunition were under the control of the marshal, he alone would be answerable for deficiencies of that kind, which would be a most serious charge. Let us now hear colonel Jones upon the extent of those deficiencies.

Journal of Sieges, by colonel S. Jones.

"The strength of Badajos had not been duly appreciated; and the means prepared for its reduction in artillery, ammunition, and stores, were altogether too inconsiderable."—"It may be considered fortunate that the approach of marshal Soult's army caused the siege to be raised; as otherwise, after a further sacrifice of men in other feeble attempts, it would have brought itself to a conclusion from *inability to proceed.*"

Were I malicious, I might here leave marshal Beresford to the care of his kind friend; but as I am desirous of clearing myself more thoroughly from any charge of injustice against the Portuguese government, and although it would be sufficient to observe that, without means of transport, neither guns, nor ammunition, nor stores could be brought up to the scene of operations, I will insert some extracts from lord Wellington's correspondence which bear more directly on the question, and which show that, although Beresford might nominally have had the

control of the arsenals, the government, through the junta of the arsenal, had in reality the charge of supplying the guns and ammunition and provisions.

To Mr. Stuart, Celerico, March 31, 1811.

"I also beg you to draw the attention of the government to the operations on the frontiers of Alemtejo; these are becoming of the utmost importance, not only to Portugal but to the allies in general. It is obvious they cannot be carried on without a constant communication with the magazines, as well at Abrantes as with those at Lisbon; for the inhabitants of Alemtejo will supply nothing to the troops. I now request you to give notice to the government that *they must either enforce their own law strictly, and oblige the inhabitants of Alemtejo to give the commissaries of the army the use of their carriages for* the payment of hire, *or the operations upon that frontier must be discontinued, and I must draw the army back to its magazines. That province has been untouched by the enemy; the carriages must be in it; and yet I have been able to procure only thirty-four, to remove the articles necessary to establish an hospital for marshal Beresford's corps at Estremos. If the government are tired of the war, and do not choose to exert themselves to oblige the people to bring forward the means which are required to enable the army to carry on its operations at a distance from its magazines, it is necessary that it should be known to the British government, that they may adopt such measures as they may think proper.*"

Elvas, May 20, 1811.

"I enclose the copy of a memorial which has been put into my hands by major Dickson, of the artillery, regarding *the march of certain guns demanded for the service of this garrison from Lisbon. I trust that the movement of the guns has not been suspended, as their early arrival is very important; and I shall be obliged to you if you will make enquiry upon the subject.*"

"*It is perfectly true that major Arentschild left the reserve of his artillery, that is, his spare ammunition, at Sarogoza between Celerico and Ponte Murcella. Why? Because his mules and cattle had been starved on the Rio Mayor, and could not draw it any farther; and because*

the magistrates of the country would supply no means of transport to draw it on."

Elvas, May 27.

"*I hear from colonel Le Mesurier that, notwithstanding the breeze which colonel Rosa has made about Arentschild, there is no ammunition for the Portuguese troops and artillery, even at Coimbra*"!!

Let me now close this part of the subject by a conclusive extract from marshal Beresford's own correspondence. In a letter to lord Wellington, dated January 25, 1811, he says:—

"*That their difficulties are increasing fast; that matters, in his opinion, are coming to a crisis; that he is in the greatest alarm about them, and is afraid to look at the state of things, as far as any Portuguese authority is concerned.*"

1°. *Siege of Badajos.*—On this head, the main fact disputed is *the want of due concert in the double attack.* In my history I gave ample authority for asserting it; and this writer's cavils merely prove that he is angry, and that he does not know the meaning of the word concert, which he thinks to be synonymous with simultaneous.

But I am also accused of having, from inadvertence, marked the investment on the 5th instead of the 4th of May. So nice a critic should himself have avoided marking the Campo Mayor affair on the 26th instead of the 25th. Yet I did not, as he supposes, commit the error, if error it be, from "*inadvertence:*" I find my authority, as usual, in the author's own appendix. Colonel D'Urban says, "On the morning of the 4th, general Stewart was put in movement," &c. and "*on the morning of the 5th invested Badajos.*"

In like manner this writer, curiously exact, asserts that the army "*was not over the Guadiana until the 8th.*" By his appendix, however, it appears that, on the 7th, only one brigade of guns was left on the other side. He says, also, that "*no Spaniards joined the marshal from Montejo,*" and that two of the ten days, assigned to his operations by me, are to be deducted; yet, in the next page, he himself assigns the same term of ten days! and with reason, because it was not till the 18th that Latour Mau-

bourg retired to Guadalcanal,—and ten and eight make eighteen. Moreover, the operations were begun on the 7th, for on that day the picquet of cavalry was surprised.

As to the Spaniards from Montejo, *I did not say they joined the marshal,* I said that, including them, he commanded 25,000 men, for which I again have the authority of Colonel D'Urban's memoir, as given in this writer's own Appendix, viz. " On the 10th, General Castaños *(at Sir William Beresford's desire) had caused Count Penne Villamur, with the Spanish cavalry from the side of Montejo, followed by general Morillo with his division of infantry, to occupy Merida, from which the French garrison had withdrawn, and the count pushed on his advanced posts to Almendralejo.*" Wherefore these men, acting thus against the enemy in concert with the marshal, and by his desire, were justly reckoned by me as being under his command. Let these trifles pass: but before I refer to the battle of Albuera, which is the next in the course of events, I will venture upon another extract from captain Squire, who, notwithstanding this writer's displeasure, I still hold to be good authority for what fell under his own observation; and not the less so, that he supports my opinion as to the marshal's want of skill at the siege; corroborates the account of his blunder at Campo Mayor; and attests the fact, that the army did generally hold his talents in scorn, and were tired of his command.

" 17th May, 1811. Thank God! they say that Lord Wellington or General Hill may be soon expected in the neighbourhood; *this will be a revival to our spirits,* for we have lost our character on this part of the frontier. On the night of the 12th, the real attack on the east side of the town was begun, but suspended by the marshal after one hour's work; the soil was excellent. *Had we begun there on the 9th, Badajos would have been our own on the morning of the 15th. But, after the affair of Campo Mayor, &c. &c.!!! what can be expected?*"

Battle of Albuera.—1°. " *Thus the youngest officer commanded.*" This is true; for, although Blake's appointment as captain-general of Valencia and Murcia took place after the battle of Albuera, he had been created captain-general

of the Coronilla in March 1809, and, as one of the Spanish regents, was also of a higher rank than Beresford.

2°. "*The position was about four miles long.*" That is to say, from the extreme left, where the Portuguese cavalry were placed, to the extreme right, where the battle ceased. And here I may observe that my plan, which is cavilled at by the author of the "*Strictures,*" was only given as an explanatory sketch, yet it was taken from the same source as his, and it does not, as he asserts, extend the wood over the tongue of land to the banks of the Albuera, although some plans of the position that I have seen do make it wooded. Moreover, with reference to his description of the ground, this writer, as usual, forgets to make his Appendix agree with his text. At page 113 he says, "*the rear of the position was only practicable for infantry;*" but general D'Urban's memoir says, *it was easy for cavalry throughout.*" Which is right?

3°. "*The position was occupied by* 30,000 *infantry, above* 2000 *cavalry, and* 38 *guns.*"

First, I will expose the disingenuous manner in which the author of the "*Further Strictures*" attempts to bolster up a bad cause. Having printed a running commentary upon my pages, written by somebody who is not named, he makes this anonymous critic state, that the allies had only 34 pieces of artillery, thus leaving out four Spanish guns; and at the end of D'Urban's memoir there is also the same false detail; and yet these persons, who cannot, in so small a matter as they have undertaken, attain any correctness, are brought forward to censure the inaccuracy of my work! The official returns of Sir Alexander Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery in the battle, make the numbers amount, as I have stated, to 38, viz.—

British horse artillery	4
Ditto foot ditto	6
King's German Legion, ditto.....	12
Portuguese, ditto.....	12
Spanish artillery	4
	38

Detail of troops.

Beresford's corps.			*Spaniards.*		
Infantry,	British....	7,500	4th army,	Infantry,	11,000
	Germans..	1,500		Cavalry,	1,100
	Portuguese	10,000	5th army,	Infantry,	2,000
Cavalry,	British....	700		Cavalry,	500
	Portuguese	300			14,600
Total		20,000	Deduct for stragglers and deserters from the 4th army,		1,100
			Total.....		13,500

Beresford's	20,000
Spaniards	13,500
Grand Total	33,500

Authorities.—1°. Lord Londonderry (who was adjutant-general) rates the British at..... 7,500

2°. Two battalions of Germans I estimate at.. 1,500

3°. General D'Urban, who rates the Portuguese at..... 10,000

4°. General Harvey's journal, in which the British cavalry are rated at..... 700

And the Portuguese cavalry at..... 300

20,000

I find, also, in a very accurate journal kept by Colonel Thorne, a staff officer, that the heavy British cavalry, on the 20th of March, that is, only twenty days previous to the battle, amounted to 752 men under arms, viz.

3d dragoon guards.....	379
4th ditto	373
	752

Wherefore, taking the 13th dragoons at a low rate, the British cavalry alone had a thousand troopers in the field. But the reader will observe that I have already given authority for a greater number of men than I allowed in my work; it is therefore necessary to explain that, being in

doubt whether lord Londonderry included Alten's Germans under the general head of British, I deducted the latter from the gross number. I have never been able to procure an official return of the whole army in the field that day, probably none ever was made, but my belief is, that, instead of over-rating, I have under-stated the number by nearly two thousand men.

Since writing the above, I have obtained the weekly states of general Long's division of cavalry for the 8th and for the 29th of May, that is, one week before and a little more than a week after the battle of Albuera, and, unless it can be shown that in the day of battle there were fewer men in the ranks than at other periods, they will be found conclusive as to the numbers of cavalry. On the 8th of May the present under arms at Villa Franca, in front of Albuera, were, exclusive of 230 officers and serjeants, 1429 Portuguese and British troopers, the latter having 1109 men and 1076 horses; and, on the 29th of May, there were 1587 men and 225 officers and serjeants and 1489 horses, the increase arising from the junction of men who had been detached. It is clear, therefore, that, (the 13th dragoons, the Portuguese and the Spanish horse being added) the allied cavalry must have been near three thousand men in the field, and that I have under-stated their real numbers.

My mode of estimating the numbers of the 5th Spanish army was as follows:—in D'Urban's memoir, Morillo's division of the 5th Spanish army is said to consist of a few weak battalions, and Carlos d'España's brigade of five battalions is called 2000 strong. One battalion of the latter was sent to Olivenza, the remaining four battalions I therefore took to be 1600 men; to these I added 400, as supposing that Castaños must have brought up some of Morillo's people to the action; and Penne Villemur's cavalry I know, from several sources, to have been at least 500 strong.

The numbers of the 4th army I obtained more certainly from the following passage in a letter of lord Wellington's, dated Nissa, April 18, 1811:—"From a letter from Mr. Wellesley, of the 11th, I learn that general Blake was himself about to come into the Condado de Niebla, to

take the command of general Ballasteros' division and of the troops which had been under the command of general Zayas, and which were to return to that quarter. *The whole corps will amount to* 12,000 *men, of which* 1100 *are cavalry.*" Now, I subtracted 1100 men, as stragglers or deserters during the long march from Ayamonte, which I believe was too many, because I found, in another letter from lord Wellington, dated the 4th July, 1811, six weeks after the battle, that Blake's corps was still from 10 to 12,000 strong; and in an abstract of the head-quarters returns, made 1st July, Quinta St. Ioa, Blake's corps is again set down at 12,000. However, my estimate is thus borne out as well as the nature of the case will permit; and what does a thousand or two, more or less, signify in this matter, when it is plain that there were already more than marshal Beresford was able to handle, seeing that in so bloody and critical a battle one-third of his troops never fired a shot.

4°. *The French had* "*above* 4000 *veteran cavalry, but only* 19,000 *chosen infantry.*"

In the imperial muster-rolls I found that on the 1st of May, the present under arms of the 5th corps, including the garrison of Badajos and 3500 reinforcements in march to join, were 15,885, of which 752 cavalry and 590 artillery,

leaving.....	14,543	infantry.
Deduct garrison,....	2,887	
Total.....	11,656	
Soult drew from the 1st corps one battalion of grenadiers.....	500	
Ditto, from 4th corps two regiments of infantry, Werle's brigade.....	4,000	
From Dessolle's reserve at Cordova, Godinot's brigade.....	4,000	
	20,156	
For officers and non-combatants, who are always included in French returns, I deducted.....	1,156	
Total infantry....		19,000

The division of heavy dragoons was	3,000	
The light cavalry of the 5th corps	752	
Drawn from the 4th corps two regiments,	500	
Including officers, total cavalry,		4,252
Grand total, including a detachment left at Villalba,		23,252

Having thus worked out my estimate from authentic documents, I turned to the French authors who have treated of this battle, and I found that Jomini, "*Vie de Napoleon*,"—Lamarre, "*Relation du Siège de Badajos*,"—Lapene, "*Conquête d'Andalusie*,"—and Bory St. Vincent, (who was on Soult's staff,) "*Guide de Voyageurs en Espagne*,"—all agree in stating the French at twenty-two thousand men of all arms, while the "*Victoires et Conquêtes Français*," reduces them much lower. I have, therefore, most probably overstated the force of the French.

5°. "*Nearly* 7000 *of the allies*," and "*above* 8000 *of the French were struck down.*"

Authorities.—The official returns make the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese..... 4547

The loss of the Spaniards I estimated from common report at the time, from the authority of Colonel Jones's History, and from the Spanish accounts of the day..... 2200

Total..... 6747

It is also to be recollected that the British official return does not include a number of men who, having been made prisoners, escaped and rejoined their regiments in a few days after the action. The writer of the "*Strictures*" reduces the British loss, and estimates the Spanish at only 1700; but, to effect the first, he strikes out the officers and serjeants, and, with respect to the last, he knows well that it is under-rated; indeed in his own text, there is proof of the inaccuracy of his statement, for he says that before the British came into action, the Spaniards had lost 1500, and yet he would have us believe, that, in all the

after-fight, though they were constantly exposed to the fire, they only lost 200 more!

With respect to the French loss, I found in general Gazan's intercepted letter, that he had, a few days after the battle, more than 4000 wounded under his charge; and that some had died on the road. By marshal Beresford's despatches, I found that 350 wounded were discovered at Almendral, and that 3000 were lying killed or mortally wounded on the field. This loose estimation, taken at the highest, accounts for about 8000; taken at the lowest, about 7000. This last number is what French writers admit, and I found a confirmation of it in the official abstract of lord Wellington's analysis of the numbers opposed to him in July, 1811. He there twice estimates the French loss at Albuera at 7000 men; but with that liberality which is usually practised towards enemies on such occasions, marshal Beresford added 2000, sir Benjamin D'Urban adds 3000, and the author of the "*Strictures*" adds 4000 to this number. How far future writers of this school will go, I cannot pretend to say.

6°. *Already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority.*

This is verified by the facts stated in D'Urban's memoir, viz. "that, although Blake's corps had little more than a league to march from Almendral, by a good road, guided by an officer sent for the purpose, and which the general had engaged should be upon its ground at noon, did not commence arriving till eleven at night, and was not all up till three in the morning of the 16th; and, farther, that the posting of the corps was only "*effected after much delay upon the part of general Blake.*" Now, if the exquisitely bad grammar of this extract will permit any meaning to be attached thereto, it is, *that Blake was not acting cordially with the marshal;* but this shall be made clearer. My observation was written with allusion to Blake's *refusal to change his front;* and my authority for that fact was a staff officer of high rank who was present. In the first impression of general D'Urban's memoir, which I had before me at the time, I also found, written against that part of the memoir which says that "*Blake only delayed the execution of the order,*" the following note

by sir H. Hardinge, who carried Blake the order, " *He positively refused;* saying the attack was evidently on the front by the village. When told that the village was sufficiently occupied, *he still persisted in his refusal;* and when he consented at length to do so, gave such tedious pedantic orders of countermarch that Beresford was obliged to interfere and direct the movement himself." This is precisely what I have stated.

Here I will notice another of those absurd charges made by the writer of the " *Strictures,*" the contradictions of which are to be found in Beresford's own correspondence. He remarks, in a note on D'Urban's memoir, that, from a false print in the first impression, the words *first and second* (referring to the Spanish lines) *were reversed, and that I have adopted the error.* Now, without stopping to remark upon the *generalship* that would have drawn away the first line when Godinot's attack was commencing in its front, and when, from being on the edge of a descent, the evolutions must have been cramped and confused, and have the appearance of a retreat; whereas the second line, having more room, could have more easily changed its front, and without offering any advantage or encouragement to Godinot's people;—without stopping, I say, to dilate upon this, I answer that *I did not follow the misprint in sir B. D'Urban's memoir,* but *I did follow marshal Beresford's despatches to lord Wellington and to the Portuguese government,* in both of which he says, " *I requested general Blake to form a part of his first line and all his second to that front.*" And so also runs my text.

7°. " *The narrow ravine of the Aroya,*" *&c.*

The writer of the Strictures says there was *no ravine,* but if the rear of the position was, as he also asserts, " *practicable only for infantry,*" my expression is just. Nevertheless, I have changed the word to valley, to which he cannot object, until he proves that two hills can be found without a valley between them.

8°. " *The right of the allies and the left of the French were only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from either. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult.*"

If the reader will look at the plan given by the writer of the "Strictures" himself, he will there see that the hill in question is precisely as I have described it, "*about cannon-shot from either army;*" and, by referring to my text, he will see that I did never argue (as this writer asserts) that a large corps should have been placed there. But I do maintain that if a small body of men had been placed there, Soult could not have united fifteen thousand men and forty guns behind it without Beresford knowing anything of the matter; and if, as is probable, the French had first driven this party away, that would have indicated their intentions, and the right of the army would not have been surprised as it was. Moreover, patroles of cavalry and single mounted officers might have gone across the Albuera higher up, and so have looked behind this hill, which was, as I have said, entirely neglected by Beresford. It was a gross error; and it was a more gross error to permit the French army to pass over that hill, to cross the Albuera, and to mount the opposite height without the slightest resistance, although during the whole movement they were within cannon-shot of the right of the allies' position. Why were they not watched? and where was the allied cavalry? We shall see anon! But what sort of general is that who suffers his enemy to move for an hour within cannon-shot, and without molestation, against a position which did not exceed three miles in length? Why, Mendizabel himself did not discover greater incapacity at the Gebora! But his troops were not so good! English soldiers can sustain even a Mendizabel.

9°. "*The French cavalry outflanking the front and charging here and there,*" *&c.*

The idiomatic expression, "*here and there,*" shows that I never meant to say the French cavalry charged home; but that they menaced the Spaniards' flank. Nevertheless I have authority, whether good or bad, for an actual charge. The author of the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,*" who, I believe, served with the 29th regiment in the battle, writes thus: "An endeavour was made to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge. This failed. A heavy fire was kept up by the French artillery, and a *charge of cavalry again forced them to retire in confusion.*"

10°. " *The Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them.*" This circumstance, which occurred on the right, was related to me by a staff officer of high rank who was present. But it appears from a statement in the " *Strictures*" that the *English fired upon the Spaniards;* and what the confusion was on the right, in the beginning of the action, is thus very clearly shewn. Let us proceed.

11°. *At this critical moment General Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with Colborne's brigade,*" *&c.*

The author of the " *Strictures*" says, *there was no hill,* " *only a gradual slope,*" *that the troops did not mount it, they* " *came up it in the regular manner!*" The regular manner of coming up a slope without ascending it must, no doubt, be a very modest and unassuming manner, but until I know what it is I cannot describe it. Let me, however, show that there was a *height* if there was not a *hill.*

Extract from D'Urban's memoir. " This *height* was of great importance, inasmuch as it commanded the right of the position; and the second division, under the honourable major-general William Stewart, which was now rapidly advancing to support the Spaniards, and *which arrived just as they had been forced to abandon it,* was immediately ordered by sir William Beresford *to attack and recover it.*" The writer of the " *Strictures*" says *they never lost it!*

12°. " *The* 31*st still maintained the height.*"

Authority, D'Urban's memoir. Extract. " Favoured by this" (darkness from smoke and rain) " as the first brigade under colonel Colborne fell upon the enemy with the bayonet, and were driving him before them, some squadrons of Polish lancers, &c. charged." " *The* 31*st regiment, which was on the left of the brigade, &c. &c., extricated itself from the confusion, and continued the attack alone.*" It should be defence.

13°. " *Houghton's regiments soon got footing on the summit.*"—" *Dickson placed the artillery in line. The* 2*d division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward.*"

Authority, D'Urban's Memoir. Extracts. " The 3d brigade of the 2d division, under major-general

Houghton, following the first with equal intrepidity and better fortune, deployed very judiciously, and with admirable precision, under cover of the lower falls of the heights, moved on in line to the attack, and supported and *followed by the 2d brigade, under the hon. colonel Abercromby, and the Spaniards under generals Ballasteros and Zayas, carried all before it, gained the contested ground and took post upon it.*"—"Scarcely had sir William Beresford (who had conducted this attack of the 3d brigade in person) *placed the troops and artillery to the best advantage on the ground they had gained,*" &c. &c.: and yet the writer of the "*Strictures*" says I cannot name the Spanish corps, because none moved forward! I will now give another and more correct version of these attacks; the version which I adopted, and which I copied from a note made by sir Henry Hardinge in the margin of the original impression of D'Urban's Memoir.

"The 1st brigade, when they had gained the crest of *the hill,* found it so hot that Stewart ordered a charge, which the Buffs and 48th alone made in line against the enemy's column, of at least 10,000 men. Fortunately *the 31st, being the left regiment, had not had time to deploy when the two other regiments charged; it therefore held the ground while Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear, and under cover, and moved up to the support of the 31st,* holding the position, and keeping up a hot fire in line against the close column of the enemy, which attempted to advance and sometimes to deploy; keeping, however, within short musket-shot, both sides firing grape: the destruction being infinitely greater in the dense order of the enemy than in our thin order."

In conjunction with the above, may be taken the following extract of a letter from major Elliot, of the 29th regiment, an actor in what he describes. It confirms my statements in more than one particular; and it does a justice to the 29th regiment, which, from ignorance, I had omitted to do.

"The attack of the 16th May commenced on the right; *and most correctly is it described by colonel Napier.* The fate of the 1st brigade, except the 31st regiment, was very soon decided; our brigade moved to the right in

open column of companies under a very heavy cannonade, by which we had a captain and a good many men killed. The 29th led the brigade; the deployment was made very steadily under this fire, and we became hotly engaged. *At this time a body of Polish lancers appeared on our right, charged, and attempted the attack on us which had proved so successful against the* 1*st brigade; but major Way (now sir Gregory) foiled them by throwing back the grenadiers and* 1*st battalion company, who, with an oblique fire, sent them off,* and we saw no more of them. We kept at it *while our ammunition lasted;* then the 4th division came up."

This last passage verifies the fact that *ammunition failed;* a circumstance which is also mentioned in the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaign.*" It proves also that there were more charges of cavalry made than the writer of the "*Strictures*" knows of: and here I may mention a curious example of the impudent falsehood of the Spanish accounts of this war. Penne Villemur's cavalry fled in a shameful manner, as the following statement by colonel Light proves.

"After our brigade of infantry first engaged were repulsed, I was desired by general D'Urban to tell the count de Penne Villemur to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy, the whole pulled up, and there was no getting them farther; and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could." The comment of the Spanish government in their official gazette at Cadiz upon this part of the action was, that Penne Villemur, seeing three English regiments broken by the French cavalry, withstood the latter, protected the former, and was fired upon by the very regiments he had saved; finally, that the Spaniards alone defeated the whole French army!!

Having now established most of the important disputed facts related in my history, and truth being my great object, I will notice the errors I have really made.

1°. I supposed that the second charge of the lancers (that against the 29th) took place at a later period, and that it was then the guns were captured; whereas it

appears the guns were taken in, the charge against Colborne's brigade. And here it is worthy of remark that marshal Beresford's despatch hides the fact, that more than one gun was taken, although six pieces of artillery and other trophies fell into the lancers' hands; and the fact was well known to the whole army at the time. Five of the guns were, indeed, afterwards recovered; but in the first instance they were captured, and might have been carried off.

2°. I supposed that the mutual firing between a British and Spanish regiment happened at the time the fusileers were mounting the hill. I had understood that it was so, and that colonel Robert Arbuthnot rode between both parties; but as the writer of the "*Strictures*" asserts that he has sir Robert's letter contradicting the fact, I have expunged it. Nevertheless, I still maintain that, at one period of the battle, such an event did take place; and, indeed, it is proved by the contradictory evidence as to which party fired upon the other, before noticed. The reader must, however, feel that many circumstances may be satisfactorily verified to a historian by conversation and by other means, and yet he may not be able to detail the chain of evidence in print. In such cases, he has a right to the confidence of his reader, if he has shewn that his statements are generally accurate, and that he has been diligent in searching for truth. This I think I have shewn, both in my Reply and in the present Justification. I have, I think, shewn, 1°. that my inquiries were extensive; 2°. that my authorities, even for trifling points, were sound and numerous; 3°. that the writer of the "*Strictures,*" being a person of no knowledge, and very unscrupulous, cannot be marshal Beresford, but is probably some expectant, ready to vouch for any thing, "if thrift might follow fawning." I have not noticed his continued scurrility, because I despise it. Neither have I exposed above one half of his mis-statements and misrepresentations, because I thought it a waste of time; and his arguments are upon a par with his facts; to prove which, one or two examples will suffice.

1°. He says that Soult took an hour to execute his movement across the Albuera against the right; and that

the Spaniards resisted afterwards for an hour and a half! That is to say, that the French general was permitted, for two hours and a half, to act against a point of the position on the possession of which depended the safety of the army. They were allowed to act there for two hours and a half unopposed, save by a few thousand Spaniards, who were confused and disordered by a sudden change of front, and by this unexpected attack; and yet the 2d division was within a mile of them, and the rest of the army not two miles distant! And this is meant to prove the skill of marshal Beresford! Fortunately for the latter, the story of the Spanish resistance is a Spanish romance.

2°. This writer would have it believed that Beresford did at the time disapprove, and does still blame, the advance of the fusileer brigade, because the enemy's cavalry might, he says, have penetrated by the gap thus made, and because he was in no danger of being beaten, and never thought of retreating! Marshal Beresford, then, by bringing up general Collins's Portuguese and the Spanish reserves to the aid of Houghton's brigade, and joining them to Abercromby's troops, expected to have defeated the enemy, and, without the assistance of the fusileers, to have won that battle which was so hardly gained with their assistance! Truly he expected much! The regiments of Houghton's brigade, having lost two-thirds of their number, being without ammunition, and having a French column already advanced upon their right flank, were to have maintained the height until all the troops above-mentioned could be brought into line! and then Spaniards and Portuguese were to do what the fusileers did!

There was no danger of the French cavalry pushing *through the gap* made by the advance of the fusileers. General Cole had provided against that by placing general Harvey's Portuguese brigade *in the gap*, and that brigade did actually repulse an attempt made by Latour Maubourg to push his light cavalry through. But if marshal Beresford was so certain of victory, so composed and confident, so little thinking of a retreat, why did he, when the battle was gained, write to lord Wellington that he anticipated

defeat if attacked the next day, and was determined not to survive it? But the whole argument of the writer is nought, seeing that marshal Beresford, in his despatch, praises the attack of the 4th division, saying, "it was judicious and opportune."

There is, however, a more certain proof that marshal Beresford did contemplate a retreat, namely, that he gave the order for it, and that order was in part obeyed. *The bridge and village of Albuera were actually abandoned in obedience to his orders, by Alten's Germans and by the artillery!* This fact, which I have often heard, but have ascertained to be true since the foregoing pages were written, shows that, far from being moved by common reports, or by prejudice against marshal Beresford, I was even too careful to reject what was at all doubtful. The annexed extract is from a narrative of the campaign of 1811, written by sir Julius Hartman, who commanded the British artillery in the action, and it places the fact beyond all contradiction unless sir Julius be the most imaginative of men; and certainly marshal Beresford had good reason to call the arrival of the fusileers *opportune*, for, like Bunyan's Pilgrim, he was then in the "Slough of Despond."

"The enemy made repeated and very serious attacks on the bridge, which, however, were unsuccessful, until the troops received an order to assemble *to cover the retreat upon Valverde.* The general-in-chief had given this order at a moment, when the result of the struggle for the possession of the heights had appeared to him doubtful. In pursuance of this order, general Von Alten and the commander of the Portuguese artillery, major Dickson, *abandoned the village and bridge, which was immediately occupied by the enemy.* Directly after, the re-taking of this was most urgently ordered, which, by the valour of the troops, with great sacrifice and spilling of blood, was accomplished; but, notwithstanding, the possession of the bridge was never completely obtained."

I can now also, upon another point, more completely fulfil my former promise, to shew that marshal Beresford's errors were far greater than I had supposed them to be.

Statement of captain Arthur Gregory.

"A deserter came in, about one o'clock A.M. on the

16th; he said that an *order was issued for an attack at eight* A.M., *he was immediately sent in to head-quarters* and I suppose arrived."

" *Between seven and eight, orders came for the cavalry, and I believe for the horse artillery, to go to the rear to forage and make themselves comfortable.* As there was a difficulty about watering, one regiment went down to the river at a time. The first was the 4th dragoons, *which, after watering, went to the rear; the* 3*d dragoon guards were going to water, and the horses (I believe) were taken off the guns of the horse artillery for the same purpose, when an orderly of the* 13*th dragoons came in from a picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river!* General Long immediately galloped off and *found half their army across,* under cover of a hollow, which had completely masked the operation. *I was dispatched to report it to the marshal, whose head-quarters were in the village of Albuera; after being detained a few minutes at the door he came out, and after questioning me sharply upon my intelligence was going in, when* I took the liberty of mentioning that *the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and that one regiment had already gone; and I asked him if it should be brought up again, and to where?* His orders were, *' Let them go more to the right than they were before.'* I galloped off to the spot where the cavalry had been ordered, and found *the* 4*th dragoons with their horses unbridled and linked with the collar chains; the men had taken their accoutrements and jackets off, and were going in all directions to cut forage.* A few minutes brought them together. *Before I could get back, the cannonade had begun. Had Soult delayed his attack half an hour, all the British cavalry would have been in the rear dispersed over the country.* I do not know if the brigades of foot artillery had the same orders."

Extract of a letter to captain Gregory from lieutenant-colonel Wildman, a lieutenant in the 4th dragoons at Albuera.

" I perfectly recollect the 4th dragoons being ordered to the rear on the morning of the 16th May, 1811, to cut forage for our horses, and I think it was you who came to order us up again, but whether we had begun cutting it or not before you arrived, I cannot remember."

Extract of a letter to captain Arthur Gregory from colonel Leighton, who commanded the 4th dragoons at the battle of Albuera.

" In regard to the morning of the 16th, we had, as usual, been under arms for an hour before day-break, and to the best of my recollection, between seven and eight o'clock, received orders to proceed for forage."

Thus it is proved that if Soult had only delayed his attack for half an hour, *not a single British cavalry soldier would have been in the field!!* How is it, then, that with the consciousness of this in his heart, marshal Beresford did not spurn the ill-timed sarcasm of Dumouriez? How is it that he did not reply, This is not Pharsalia, but Albuera. Here were not Romans, but Englishmen. The Roman soldiers could not save Pompey, but the English soldier, he who " comes on with such a conquering bravery," saved me! I am not Cæsar, but Beresford!

THE END.

MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT.

LETTER

TO

CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq.,

ON

THE EXTRACTS RECENTLY PUBLISHED FROM THE MANUSCRIPT JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE

LATE LIEUT.-GEN. R. B. LONG.

BY

GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,
G.C.B.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

MDCCCXXXIII.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES,
Stamford Street.

[redacted]

ERRATA

TO

LORD BERESFORD'S LETTER TO C. LONG, Esq.

Page 14, line 5: *for* "Badajoz," *read* "Campo Maior."
— 22, — 6: *for* "force," *read* "face."

[redacted]

LETTER

TO

CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq.

Sir,

Though the pamphlet, which has recently appeared under your name, professes to have no other object than the vindication of the late Lieut.-General Long from some statements made in a work, entitled "Strictures on Colonel Napier's History;" so many parts of your publication are levelled with a direct and personal aim against myself, that I cannot allow them to pass without observation.

Very sincerely do I regret that the work to which your Reply is addressed—a work written, as it seems, with no other view than that of correcting certain erroneous accounts of my exertions in the Peninsula—should have contained any passages calculated to give pain to the relative of a deceased brother officer: far more deeply should I be grieved, if I imagined that those passages had been inserted with a bitter feeling, or for an unworthy purpose. I certainly do not perceive in the "Strictures on Colonel Napier's History," the slightest trace of that prejudice and hostility against General Long, which seem to be so conspicuous to yourself. It appears to me, that the conduct of that officer never entered into the author's

contemplation as an object either of censure or of praise; and that it is never alluded to by him, except incidentally, and when, from its immediate connexion, with the facts under review, there was no possibility of leaving it unnoticed. You, Sir, are of a contrary opinion; you consider that the fame of General Long has been unfairly dealt with; and you suppose that his actions have been misrepresented, with the view of sheltering the misconduct of his Chief. Having received these impressions from the work in question, it is impossible for me not to respect the feelings which have induced you, as a relative, to come forward in defence of his reputation. The zeal of the attempt is more, I think, to be admired than its prudence. It will not, unless I am greatly deceived, redound eventually to the honour of the party whose cause you have undertaken to advocate. The attack upon myself, with which your vindication is accompanied, can only be repelled by a full and uncompromising statement of facts. The power of exercising any delicacy in discussing the military conduct of General Long has been taken from me. You have forced me, Sir, to depart from the course of forbearance which I have always, hitherto, maintained towards him. If, in repelling that charge of injustice towards your late relative, which is advanced against me on the authority of his private correspondence, I am constrained to lay details before the public, and evidence substantiating those details, which,—derogatory as they are to the military character of a deceased brother officer,—it is as distressing for me

to afford the record of, as it can be for you to read; the painful necessity of publishing them in which I am placed, has been created by yourself, and with you alone rests the responsibility of whatever censure they may cast on the reputation of the dead. It is much to be lamented, for the sake of General Long's fame, that you were not more fully and accurately informed of the facts in question, and did not consider it expedient to seek the aid of some candid and experienced military friend, whose knowledge might have enabled you more properly to appreciate the very limited and partial information of which you were possessed. Great and manifold are the mistakes into which the want of such assistance has betrayed you; but they are, perhaps, such as would be incurred by almost any author who, not being himself a soldier, undertook to write upon a subject so foreign from his habits and pursuits. I shall not therefore pause to criticise your military views; nor, Sir, shall I condescend to notice the criticisms which you have lavished on my military conduct. My observations will be strictly confined to those passages of your pamphlet that treat of the transactions in which General Long and myself were engaged.

Your attack on me is founded on certain statements taken from General Long's private correspondence and his equally private manuscript journal. If I disprove those statements, the superstructure which you have raised upon them must necessarily fall to the ground.

The first point on which I shall observe, is that which you consider as the source to which all my alleged ill-treatment of General Long may be traced. It is said, in the second page of your "Reply," that "differences unfortunately existed between Marshal "Beresford and General Long." To this assertion I must give a most full and unqualified contradiction. I never was acquainted with that officer till we met at Thomar, on his coming under my command. He then accepted the hospitality which I offered him in my house, and only ceased to be my guest two or three days before the affair of Campo Mayor. After that event, we only met casually on the field, or when, on his coming to head-quarters, he occasionally may have dined with me. During the short time that corps was under my orders, the habits of acquaintance between General Long and myself, which existed before the affair of Campo Mayor, were never interrupted by any difference whatever.—After my command had ceased, I never, to the best of my recollection, came in contact with that officer again.

For my own part, Sir, I disclaim altogether the existence of any, even the slightest, feeling of prejudice or ill-will against your deceased relative. Neither had it ever entered my imagination, during the period of his serving under my orders, that he had entertained any such feelings towards myself. It is said that "several officers now living were aware of those differences." Who are they? Did any of my own staff, the officers who were immediately about me, ever hear of any incident of the kind? Had these

differences really taken place, they must have been known to Sir Henry Hardinge, who was Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the Portuguese army, and with me during the whole time that General Long was under my command. The following question addressed to Sir Henry, and his reply, will show you he is ignorant of such occurrence :—

Question.

" Had you any knowledge, or were you aware, of " any dispute or misunderstanding between General " Long and Marshal Beresford during the period " that officer was under the Marshal's command ? "

Answer.

" I never knew that any dispute or misunderstanding " had occurred between Lord Beresford and General " Long during the period he was under the Marshal's " command."

By what means, then, did the " several living officers," of whom you speak, become acquainted with these differences? Do they profess to have been present when they occurred? If not, from whom did they hear of them? Certainly not from me. Could General Long have been their informant? If he was, Sir, the report which they received, instead of proving that I was actuated by any feeling of animosity against your relative, would only add another testimony to the abundant mass of evidence, afforded by his private letters and journals, of the defamatory spirit by which he was influenced against myself.

But when, Sir, did the late General Long himself first discover that these differences existed? His cor-

respondence with his friends whilst under my orders, though abounding in the most ungracious observations on my conduct, does not contain a single hint of such a circumstance. Even so late as the 26th of June, in a letter written long after the events of which he speaks had happened, and when he had ceased to be under my command, we do not find him referring to any past "differences" as the cause of what he represented as unfair conduct on my part towards him; but, on the contrary, we find him doubting and speculating about its origin. "*I am of opinion,*" he writes *, "that Marshal Beresford never deserved at "my hands the zeal with which I served him, and "endeavoured to merit his good opinion; but, unfor- "tunately, the business at Campo Mayor, added to "the collision which arose out of the circumstance "of a Portuguese brigade of despicable cavalry "having been placed under my command, produced "*perhaps* an alienation that he could not easily get "over."

Now, Sir, I do not desire to criticise the epistolary style of your deceased relative; its air of injured merit, and the tone of affected candour with which his secret accusations against his superior officer are disseminated among his friends, by the means of private journals and of a most voluminous correspondence: I do not wish to observe upon those unmeaning pretensions to "zeal in my service," which are self-refuted by every extract from every letter that you

* Letter to C. B. L., June 26, 1811. REPLY, p. 126.

have thought fit to publish; but I must observe that this passage distinctly proves, on the authority of the General himself, that up to the 26th of June, the date of the letter, after the battle of Albuera had been fought, and when I had seen him for the last time, he was not aware of the existence of any "differences" between us. He is only "of opinion" that such and such causes "may *perhaps* have produced an aliena-"tion that I could not get over." Of the collision that occurred to General Long and his "Portuguese brigade of despicable cavalry," I must confess myself totally ignorant; but with regard to the affair of Campo Mayor, I can most truly say that it did not produce in me any permanent feeling to the disadvantage of that officer. Unhappily, his conduct upon that occasion did not inspire me, as it ought perhaps to have done, with a sufficient general distrust of his military qualifications. It certainly vexed me at the moment; but your relative was new in his command: he had only recently arrived in the Peninsula; and I attributed the errors of the day, as I told him at the time, to the want of practical experience in the field. Under this impression, I alluded to his extraordinary movement, without direct censure in my despatch, pointing out the slight advantage, and forbearing to mention the grievous disadvantages that had resulted from his neglect of my instructions. If this forbearance on my part was reprehensible, the family and friends of General Long are not, I presume, the persons to whom it will be necessary for me to defend myself.

It must thus be evident that I had no "disagreeable "remembrances to bury in oblivion;" and whatever reproach may attach to "the bitterness of that long "rankling hostility" which you speak of, belongs exclusively to General Long and his relatives and friends, and can have no reference whatever to myself.

You say, Sir, that "neither the letters of General "Long, nor his private journal, were ever intended "to meet the public eye." I most firmly believe this statement. I am also most confidently persuaded that, had General Long been still alive, they would not have been produced on the present occasion. They would still have retained their place among the secret archives of your family. There is this striking difference between the accounts relating to the affairs now under discussion, afforded by your late relative and myself. All my letters and despatches were meant for the public; and were immediately given to the public. While writing them, I felt well assured that, if I did injustice to any officer, he could, and most probably would, seek redress by an open, direct, manly and soldier-like representation. But what was the course pursued by General Long, who saw all these despatches, who criticised them so minutely, and who described himself as unfairly treated by them? Why, Sir, not one word of complaint did he utter publicly against the injustice that he represents himself to have received, at the moment, and on the spot, when the truth of every fact could have been easily ascertained, and when it could not have been concealed: but, on the con-

trary, leaving me in total ignorance of the wrong that he complained of; continuing to live on with me in the same habits of acquaintance, and avoiding every open and direct appeal, he sought to indemnify himself by despatching to a few chosen friends and relatives in England, a collection of private charges against me, to which, in all human probability, no opportunity of making a reply would ever be afforded me; or, as you distinctly say, was ever intended to be afforded me. Can you, Sir, be so strangely blinded by the partiality of private friendship, as to be incapable of perceiving the gross impropriety of such a course of proceeding? Have you "no honest feeling of indignation" left in your breast against such conduct?

I am thankful to the author of the Strictures for having been the means of bringing these papers to light. They treat of interesting matters. They have been preserved, and would, perhaps, have continued to be preserved with considerable care. They would have descended as heir-looms in your family. They would in all probability have been discovered by some future historian; and, when they could no longer be contradicted, when the circumstances under which they were written, and the objects of the author in writing them, could no longer be ascertained, they would have been eagerly admitted and employed as a body of most valuable contemporary documents.

In proceeding, Sir, to comment upon the statements of your pamphlet, I feel myself bound to acknowledge, that you have sought your intelligence

from fair sources, and laid it, with such evidence as you could obtain, fairly and without reserve before the public. But, from being little conversant with military affairs, you appear on many occasions not to have understood the purport of the information you received, and still more frequently to have failed in apprehending the bearing of your relatives correspondence. The evidence you have adduced, and the letters of General Long, are, in most instances, contradictory to each other; they generally unite their forces, to overthrow the positions you would establish on their authority, and nullify the conclusions you would deduce from them. In discussing the objectionable matters of your pamphlet, I shall avail myself of the testimony afforded me by yourself, and of other documents, which I have obtained since your publication fell into my hands, and in collecting which some delay has unavoidably occurred, and prevented the earlier appearance of this answer to your attack.

To those officers, Sir, on whose evidence you depend for the support of your case, I take this opportunity of saying that, from my knowledge of each and of all of them, I entertain the fullest assurance of their impartiality, and am satisfied that their statements are fairly and honourably given according to their best recollection of the circumstances as they occurred. But there may be some particulars, on which I differ from them. The events in question took place more than twenty years ago. After such a lapse of time, the memory may, and very often does, prove treache-

rous, even with regard to the most material points of fact; and those officers will not, I am sure, feel hurt, if I should occasionally find myself compelled to doubt the perfect accuracy of their recollections. Their accounts will never be disputed by me, unless I am supported by the corroborating evidence of some admitted fact, or of some officer who was personally engaged in the affair under consideration.

Campo Mayor.

The first subject connected with the affair of Campo Mayor that demands my notice is the détour made by General Long on approaching the enemy. On this subject there are two questions to be considered; whether in that détour, he did, or did not, make a wider circuit than was necessary; and whether he did, or did not, act in obedience to my instructions. That this détour was of a very considerable extent is admitted by General Long himself; when he says, "The "enemy, observing the movement, evacuated the "town, nor could General Long close with them, "till he had nearly gained the flank and rear, and to "which he was obliged to advance *at a trot near five* "*miles.*" That could not have been a very narrow détour, which described an arc of *five* miles to a chord of *two.* That it was wider than the case required is manifest from Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle's note,* who says, "Brigadier-General Long did, at "first, make rather a wider détour than was perhaps

* Reply, pp. 41, 42.

" absolutely requisite;" that is, however, matter of " opinion, *but I incline to it as the light cavalry had* " *to bring up their left shoulders frequently*, before " the enemy was observed formed in the low ground " behind the town of Badajoz."—That the détour was very extended, and more extended than the case required, seems to be pretty satisfactorily established. But, Sir, the principal question is, whether General Long did, or did not, on this occasion act in compliance with my orders.

Your defence of that officer, according to the strangely contradictory statements of his private letters, would seem to intimate, first, that my orders were strictly carried into execution; and secondly, that the execution of them was impracticable. It is self-evident that both these positions cannot be true; and I expect, Sir, to convince you that both are equally erroneous.

Your first plea, that my instructions were not exceeded, is grounded on Sir Charles Dalbiac's answer to the second question which you addressed to him; but in what manner does that answer bear upon the point at issue? It has no application whatever to the circuit made by your late relative. Sir Charles Dalbiac was with the *heavy* brigade of cavalry, and his recollections are expressly confined to its positions and operations. General Long, as he himself informs you, "was ordered, in the first instance, to " make his détour with the *light* brigade of cavalry " *alone*, which he did;" and it is manifest from the General's own correspondence that, during the move-

ment in question, the heavy brigade was not acting with him. In his letter from Elvas of the 28th of March, he says, "I had orders to lead the columns "of *light cavalry* (five troops of the 13th, and five "weak squadrons of Portuguese) so as to turn and "gain the rear of the town;"* and again, "it is "necessary to observe that I led the *light* division "over a ridge of heights and broken ground."† Your uncle thus carefully points out that his first movement, in the course of which he received those messages from Sir Henry Hardinge which will be presently given, was made with the *light* cavalry *alone*. But, to preclude all doubt upon the subject, he adds, after describing his previous operations, "the heavy cavalry now *joined* me."‡ I do not pretend myself to recollect these particulars. I take them as recounted by General Long himself in a letter written within a few days after the affair. From his own report of the transaction, it is clear that Sir Charles Dalbiac's reply to your inquiry does not touch upon the case. That highly meritorious officer's account of his position with the *heavy* brigade can have no reference to General Long's position with the *light* brigade of cavalry, when the two were acting separately.

But, Sir, unless I very much mistake your meaning, you consider that General Long, in pursuing this course, acted in obedience to the commands which he had received from me, and, with a view of establish-

* Reply, p. 41. † Reply, p. 44. ‡ Reply, p. 42.

ing this point, have published his letter of the 22d of April, in which he mentions that "his column was "never more distant from the town than Marshal "Beresford directed."* This is a bold assertion: but does the General any where inform us what that distance might have been?—Yes, Sir, he does. In his letter to General le Marchant, speaking of this affair about a month after its occurrence, he writes,† "At length an aide-de-camp brought me an order to "proceed round, and to the rear of the town so as to "turn it, and to keep at *two* or *three* gun-shots from "the works."

If the General so understood his orders, well, indeed, might he assert that my commands were virtually executed. But no such orders as he has described were ever communicated or sent to him by me. My original instructions, which, if my memory is correct, I gave to him in person, desired him "to proceed and threaten the flank and rear of the "enemy, as the latter then stood‡, keeping clear of "the fire from the ramparts." But this order, to "keep *two* or *three* gun-shots from the works," were, he says, "brought to him by an *aide-de-camp*." He does not mention the name of this aide-de-camp, though, from having lived with me some time, he must have been personally acquainted with every individual of my staff. Sir Henry Hardinge was the only officer sent to General Long by me, throughout

* Reply, p. 66. † Reply, p. 76.

‡ It must be observed, that when this order was given, the enemy were formed on the glacis of the place, and were stationary.

the whole of the day; and Sir Henry Hardinge informs you*, Sir, that by him no such instructions were borne, nor any that could have been mistaken for them. The two immediately succeeding messages which he was charged with, expressed "my dissatis-" faction at the wide range General Long was taking, " and my injunctions that he should take a shorter " line, in order to place the cavalry on, or near the " road leading from Campo Mayor to Badajos."

You must, Sir, I should conceive, admit that, with whatever confidence your late relative may "maintain" the contrary, he could not have been following any instructions received from me; when I twice found it necessary, in the space of a few minutes, to express my dissatisfaction at the course he was pursuing. But, Sir, though I have met you on the question of what might have been my original orders to General Long, it will appear to every military man unnecessary for me to have entered on the discussion of that subject at all. It is most strange that your relative should have laid any stress upon orders, which, if they had ever existed, were superseded almost the moment he began to put them into execution. Whatever my original instructions were to General Long, or whatever he might have considered them to be, the *last* commands which he received from me through Sir Henry Hardinge, were the commands which, according to every military principle, he was bound to follow. But, with a most

* Reply, p. 8.

extraordinary inconsistency, though "maintaining "that he was never more distant from the town than "I had directed," he has given two different reasons to account for his being at a greater distance than I had ordered. I shall be able to demonstrate to you that both those reasons are alike destitute of any foundation in fact.

The first reason which the General advances for not complying with my orders, is drawn from the nature of the ground. "The Marshal says the move- "ment I made to get round the town was more "circuitous than he wished; he should have added "the reason, namely, that ignorant of the ground, he "was not aware that a deep and impassable ravine "separated me from the enemy, and prevented my "getting over at any other spot but where I did."* Now that this ravine had no existence will, I conceive, be proved most satisfactorily by Sir Henry Hardinge's reply to the following question which I addressed to him.

Question.

"When on the 25th of March, 1811, the forces "under Marshal Beresford's orders arrived at Campo "Mayor, and when on that day you delivered his "second message to Brigadier-General Long, what "was the nature of the ground the cavalry was then "on and had to pass over in the execution of those "orders? Did it offer any obstacles to the passage "of the cavalry? or did Brigadier-General Long

* Reply, p. 66.

" allege such a cause for not conforming to the " directions you delivered?"

Answer.

" The nature of the ground, on which the cavalry " had to move round Campo Mayor, was undulating " but open, and offered no obstacles to the movement " of cavalry. General Long *did not* allege to me, " as the cause of the détour he was making, any " impediment of ground."

But, Sir, this statement of Sir Henry Hardinge was not wanted to the refutation of your uncle's assertion. Its contradiction is afforded in your own pages. In one of his letters,* General Long, forgetting his "impassable ravine," says, "it is neces- " sary to observe that I led the light division over a " ridge of heights and broken ground." On this passage Colonel Doyle observes, in a note which you have printed, "the ground could scarcely be termed *broken*—it was undulating." It is manifest, then, that the General was not prevented, as he affirms, from fulfilling his instructions by a " deep and impassable ravine," or by any other natural obstacle opposed to him in the field of his operations. There was not only no "*ravine*" to impede his progress, but the ground was not even " broken." But what was Sir William Lumley's opinion on this head? I find, Sir, in a MS. note to that officer's copy of your Reply—" I used to take the light- " horse volunteers over worse ground on Finchley

* Reply, p. 44.

"Common." I shall not, Sir, make any comment on Brigadier-General Long's epistolary mode of relating facts. His excuse for not following my directions at the time was of a very different nature. "The General urged the propriety," Sir Henry Hardinge informs you,* "of securing his left flank "against any enemy's cavalry force, which he was of "opinion might be concealed under cover of the un-"dulating ground on the left."

Great, indeed, was my surprise at the moment when this answer was reported to me. General Long had received precise instructions relative to a visible enemy on his right flank, and acting as he was under the immediate personal direction of his superior, he had no concern with any possible contingency of a concealed enemy on his left. The whole responsibility of the operation devolved upon myself; and the only duty of Brigadier-General Long was to carry my commands into exact and immediate execution, or, at the utmost, to make a representation of his fears, and allow me to decide whether they should be acted upon or not.

Singular, Sir, as such a reason for evading the fulfilment of my orders will appear to every military man, it had not even the shadow of fact for its foundation. There were no troops of the enemy to the left. No reason existed for suspecting any to be there. Sir Henry Hardinge told the General at the moment that "*there was no necessity for his precau-*"*tion.*" Indeed, had his fears been well grounded,

* Reply, p. 8.

the precautions that he adopted in consequence of them would appear most strangely unmilitary. No other officer, I apprehend, acting under a similar suspicion of a concealed enemy, would have executed his movement *en masse*, instead of sending out patroles or flanking parties. But, Sir, is it not somewhat remarkable that to Sir Henry Hardinge, who was present, General Long should only have spoken of a force "which *might be concealed* under the "cover of the undulating ground to the left:" while to General le Marchant, who was at a distance from the scene, he stated that "the enemy's *demonstra-* "*tions* on his left, *obliged him* to extend to cover "that flank." But what was the real state of the case? The General has himself described* the enemy as "retreating in compact order along the "road from Campo Mayor to Badajos." No other enemy was that day seen; and not even a single French soldier appeared upon General Long's *left* from the commencement of his détour, till he came in contact with their columns. I need add nothing further on this point.

I proceed to the consideration of the occurrences that took place after General Long came up with and attacked the enemy.

It appears to me that, if the most bitter foe of General Long had desired an opportunity of destroying his military reputation, he could not have met with a document more favourable for his purpose than your relative's own account of the affair near

* Reply, p. 32.

Campo Mayor, elucidated as it is by his explanatory diagram of the manœuvre. What do these papers show? First, that General Long so developed the five troops of the 13th light dragoons from the rear of his column, as to expose their flank *in threes* to the fire of a whole force of a square of infantry; and then let those troops, the very pith and flower of his light brigade, so completely out of hand as not to have the slightest knowledge of what had happened to them!—You seem surprised, Sir, that I should have credited a report "*so absurd*" as that the whole of the 13th had been captured *en masse*. As you appear to lay some stress upon that point, I shall trouble you with some observations respecting it. Brigadier-General Long represents himself as never having received the slightest hint of such a report, till nearly two months after the affair. In a letter to E. L. he writes,* "Things come out by degrees. "General Lumley has just told me (May 29) a fact "I was never before acquainted with, and which "accounts for the Marshal's feelings and conduct at "the time. After the charge of the 13th dragoons, "an officer rode up to the Marshal and assured him "that the whole of that regiment had been sur- "rounded by the enemy, and carried off." From this passage it may fairly be inferred, that when your relative thought fit to be aware of the impression by which I was influenced, he considered my conduct, under the circumstances, as natural and prudent.

Sir William Lumley has no recollection of the conversation mentioned in the above extract. But, Sir, does it not strike you as extraordinary that General Long should have been the last person acquainted with this report? It is, on all hands, acknowledged to have been general at the moment. It was known to Colonel Doyle of his own staff; Sir Charles Dalbiac and Sir William Lumley, when General Long was certainly present, heard it from the staff of the head-quarters; it was supposed to have owed its origin to Baron Tripp, who, though General Long has nowhere said so, was the senior *assistant-adjutant-general attached to his corps of cavalry.* It would, under such circumstances, have been a thing almost incredible that your relative should have remained for *more than two months* without any knowledge of so extraordinary a rumour. But, Sir, your publication informs me that such was not the case. Colonel Doyle states that he heard the report when sent by General Long to the heavy brigade, and that he "*returned* and *acquainted* him of what he had been told."* The truth is, that General Long was himself the person from whom the capture of the 13th regiment was reported to me. Little as I could comprehend the case as he stated it; reluctant, as I was, to admit the fact; I was compelled to yield belief to his account of the transaction, and frame my measures accordingly. Baron Tripp is now said to have been the author of this

* Reply, p. 50. Note.

wild and unfounded story. Whether it originated with him or your relative is perfectly immaterial. He was, as I have said, his assistant-adjutant-general. Any report made to me through him would have been equivalent to a report from General Long, and, derived from so authoritative a source, would have fully justified my adopting it as the grounds of any subsequent operation. The Baron is no longer alive. He indeed appears "to have left no one to "defend his fame," and my present purpose would be fully answered by allowing the military discredit, that attaches to the author of this report, to rest with him. But I cannot acquiesce in such injustice. Baron Tripp, no doubt, contributed to extend the belief of it, by confirming General Long's account, and by narrating the story after the halt to all among the surrounding group, who were willing to receive his intelligence; but he most certainly was not my informant. The account came to me directly from General Long. He represented the affair as having happened, precisely as Colonel Doyle in his note* supposes such a mistake might have occurred.

I do not wish you, Sir, on this occasion to depend on the accuracy of my memory alone, but shall adduce for your satisfaction the corroborative testimony of Count de Villa Real, the aide-de-camp who accompanied me, in proof of the correctness of my recollections. "We proceeded," he says, in a letter now lying before me, "immediately to General Long,

* Reply, p. 45.

" who reported that the 13th light dragoons had " charged the French cavalry and broken it; but " that they had gone off after them, with part of the " Portuguese cavalry which supported them, and he " thought *the whole had been taken prisoners*, as the " French cavalry re-formed in their rear, and the " infantry kept together. The Marshal, being very " much displeased, asked General Long if he could " not stop the 13th dragoons, and if he had not sent " after them to know what had become of them. " General Long said, he had done all he could, and " that he had been getting the remaining Portuguese " cavalry in order, again to be able to move."

But, Sir, that your relative and his adjutant-general were at the time considered as the authors of the rumour, is confirmed by Sir Henry Hardinge, who writes, in an answer to some questions that I addressed to him, " When Colonel Head regained " the head-quarters and heard the report, he " expressed himself warmly, directing *his remarks* " *against General Long and Baron Tripp.*" The natural inference from which passage is, not only that the report was commonly received and the subject of conversation in the presence of General Long and Baron Tripp, but that Colonel Head conceived it to have originated with them. And yet, after having been my informant; after having had it reported to him by Colonel Doyle; after hearing Colonel Head's observations on the subject at the time, and on the field, General Long thought fit, *privately*, to assert, that he never heard of this rumour till it

was mentioned to him by Sir William Lumley more than two months after the circumstance occurred. But in fine, from whomever received, the account of the 13th having been captured bodily was most implicitly believed at the moment; in proof of which nothing can be stronger than my public observation on halting the heavy cavalry, that "the loss of one "regiment was enough."

From General Long's representations it would appear that no communication whatever passed between him and myself during the whole course of the affair before Campo Mayor. Any military man will perceive that such a state of things, at such a time, between two persons in our relative positions could never have existed. The extracts above cited from the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge and Count de Villa Real will show that I had immediate, direct, and frequent communication with him.

Such an anomaly might indeed more easily have happened, if I had really occupied the position that General Long has assigned me in his letters. In one place* he says that I took the heavy brigade "a "mile and a half," and in another,† "two miles off "to some elevated ground on the opposite side of the "valley." I never made this manœuvre. I know of no reason that could have authorised it. I cannot conjecture how it suggested itself to General Long's imagination. The *facts* were these. When proceeding in pursuit of General Long, I first came

* Reply, p. 46. † Reply, p. 79.

in sight of the contending troops, I was about half a mile from the scene of action. I immediately descended at a quick pace towards the plain, and joined the Honourable Colonel de Grey, who had the command of the heavy brigade. When I came up with that officer and his corps, they were about 500 yards to the rear, and rather to the left of General Long and the residue of his and the enemy's forces. I commanded Colonel de Grey to take post on a rising ground near him, and then pushed on to the front. The evidence afforded by your own publication is sufficient to confirm this account. Sir Charles Dalbiac, in his reply to your sixth question, states,* that, soon after the charge of the 13th dragoons, "Head-quarters passed the heavy brigade, "which was then ordered to halt upon some rising "ground." I am here described, as was actually the case, as merely *passing* the heavy brigade, which was then ordered to *halt*. Yet, according to General Long, I not only sent it two miles across the plain, but accompanied it in person. As Colonel Doyle appears in his note to confirm this statement, I shall here insert some inquiries on this point which I addressed to Sir Charles Dalbiac, with his replies to them.

Question.

"In your answer to Mr. Long's sixth question "respecting the affair of Campo Mayor, you say, "'about this time head-quarters passed the heavy "brigade, which was ordered to halt upon some

* Reply, p. 62.

'rising ground.' By 'head-quarters' you, of course, "mean me with my staff. I will ask you if I made "any or what stop with the brigade on that occasion? "how far distant it halted from the spot at which you "saw me pass it? and whether it can be said to have "diverged from the direct line towards the enemy?"

Answer.

"When the brigade of heavy cavalry, commanded "by Colonel the Honourable G. de Grey, (having "passed Campo Mayor to the distance of about one "mile and a half,) was ordered to halt upon some "rising ground, your Lordship, with the staff of head-"quarters, pushed on, without any halt, to reconnoitre "what was passing in front. In less than a quarter "of an hour, the heavy brigade received orders again "to advance. It did so, at a smart trot, and inclin-"ing to the right, so as to enter upon the line of the "enemy's retreat. It crossed the Badajos road, "upon which the French column was then moving, "and formed line with its left bearing upon that road "and upon two of Major Hartman's guns. Your "Lordship and staff were of course in advance "during the movement thus made by the heavy "brigade. And, at the time it formed line, your "Lordship and staff were upon or contiguous to the "Badajos road, and near the aforesaid two guns, at "a distance of 200 or 300 yards from the retreating "enemy."

The above evidence must convince Colonel Doyle that General Long's statement of my having "sent "the heavy brigade two miles across the plain" is

entirely without foundation. I cannot, indeed, think that he even meant to corroborate that account. He has himself afforded the testimony of facts by which it can be circumstantially refuted. A very few moments' reflection must convince him, that, if I had really been so distant from the scene of action, he never could, in a space of time during which the enemy was marching little more than a mile, have accomplished all that he has described himself as having done. He accompanied Colonel Head to where the guns were captured; this, as reported to me, was at least a league in advance. The going and returning therefrom would have been *six* miles. On reaching General Long, he was despatched to me, who, according to that General's account, was with the heavy brigade *two* miles to the flank or rear, and returned again, which makes *four* miles farther; these, added to the other *six*, complete a distance of *ten* miles performed in somewhat more than a quarter of an hour. The thing is impossible. The movements of Colonel Doyle are perfectly incompatible with any supposition, but that of his having found me, as I conclude he must have done, though I have not now any recollection of it, about 500 yards in the rear of General Long and the enemy. That I was or had been there *en passant* is distinctly stated by Sir Charles Dalbiac, who not only in the passage above given, but in his answer to your seventh question, confirms my account of the halt and movements of the heavy brigade in every particular, and as decidedly contradicts General Long's account of my

having conducted that force two miles on the other side the valley. In confirmation of the statement of Sir Charles Dalbiac, I shall add the testimony of the Count de Villa Real, the aide-de-camp, who was with me during the whole of the transactions. That officer says, " We rode on quickly, and coming up " with the heavy brigade, the Marshal inquired what " was going on in front. He was told that there had " been some charges, in which it appeared the French " cavalry had been broken, but having seen only part " of the light cavalry, and learning that the 13th " light dragoons had been taken prisoners, the Mar- " shal, expecting the infantry to be up soon, desired the " Honourable Colonel de Grey to take post on the " left of the road, until he could know what had " occurred in front."

It cannot then be doubted, Sir, that the heavy brigade was halted for only a few minutes, on the left side of the road, the same side with General Long; as, after being put in motion, it crossed to the right, having its left on the two guns, which were actually on the road. What then could have induced your relative to represent this brigade as going to and halted at a distance of two miles on the opposite side of the road, which it must have been to have crossed the valley, as he calls the plain?

I must here advert a moment to a part of Colonel Doyle's evidence. Nothing can be more fair than the manner in which that officer's statements are made. It is manifest that he always speaks with perfect impartiality, and to the best of his recollection. Neither,

Sir, can I forbear expressing my admiration of the candour with which you have laid his evidence before the public, telling, as it most frequently does, so much against the representations of your relative. In the instance I am about to cite, their authorities are diametrically opposed to each other. Colonel Doyle reports* that the "heavy brigade had orders to sup-"port the 13th light dragoons;" and, though he does not actually assert it to have been the case, appears to intimate that my movement of that force took away their support and disconcerted the plans of General Long. Now, Sir, so far is your relative from saying that he had ordered the heavy brigade to support the 13th light dragoons, that he *more than once* declares the contrary to have been the fact. After describing the charge of the 13th, he writes,† "I followed, as rapidly as I could, to support this "attack, still supposing the heavy brigade in my "rear, occupying the attention of the remaining part "of the enemy's force;" and again he says,‡ "the "Marshal is wrong in describing the attack. Colonel "Otway never charged the enemy, and was never "directed so to do. He was on my left flank with "two squadrons, to support the pursuit of the 13th "dragoons, and as a point for them to rally upon, "and I supported him with the rest of my troops." The *first* of these extracts affirms that the heavy brigade was stationed to observe that part of the enemy's force which the 13th had left behind; and

* Reply, p. 52. † Reply, p. 46. ‡ Reply, p. 69.

the *second* extract states that, from the beginning, Colonel Otway was intended to support the 13th; and that, as soon as its successful charge had been made, he was actually detached with two squadrons of Portuguese for that purpose; while he was himself supported by General Long with the rest of the troops, including three squadrons of Portuguese and the heavy brigade. But it does not appear that Colonel de Grey, who commanded the latter corps, had any orders whatever respecting the 13th light dragoons. If not entirely forgotten, till long after the 13th were out of sight, we find from your relative's account, as was actually the case, that Colonel de Grey was left altogether in the same position. How all these troops were to remain and watch the infantry column, and, at the same time, support either the 13th dragoons, or Colonel Otway, who were galloping some miles away from them, the General has not explained. But, as a final proof that the heavy brigade never received any such orders from General Long, as Colonel Doyle supposes, it is only necessary to refer to your relative's letter to General le Marchant. In that paper he describes the charge and pursuit made by the 13th dragoons, the detaching Colonel Otway to its support, and the disbandment of the whole; but he does not drop the slightest hint of the heavy brigade's having received any instructions to act in support of the 13th. All he says is, "On look-
"ing round to make fresh arrangements and dis-
"positions, I discovered, to my astonishment, that
"the whole of the heavy brigade, which I had

" stationed in my rear in two lines, but out-flanking " to the right *to support me*, and *observe the column* " *of infantry*, had been drawn across to the other " side of the valley, and were halted on the opposite " height, about two miles from me."

General Long here declares that the heavy brigade was stationed in the rear, with the express purpose of supporting him, or the three remaining Portuguese squadrons, and to observe the enemy's infantry. These corps were, I believe, pretty near together. When I came up, the heavy brigade was situated as described by Sir Charles Dalbiac; but, at that time, the 13th light dragoons must have been much nearer to Badajos than they were to him. It cannot require a military eye to see that, if the Honourable Colonel de Grey was meant to support the 13th dragoons, who was out of sight and a league or two in advance, he could not have been placed in a worse position than that which he held in the rear of General Long, and of the enemy's infantry. If General Long did really give the orders mentioned by Colonel Doyle, (and it is not in the least my intention to question the fact,) why, in letters written so immediately after the affair at Campo Mayor, has he omitted to allude to so important a circumstance? or rather why has he directly stated the contrary? But on this point more, perhaps, has been said than the case requires.

You censure me, Sir, for relating in a *private* letter to the Duke of Wellington, the irregular conduct of the 13th light dragoons in their pursuit of the enemy. Were you a military man, it would be

unnecessary to inform you that, though not an actual despatch, or a formal report, the communication was nothing less than of a private nature; as you might, indeed, have understood from the public order issued in consequence of it. But I would observe that, not having been present at the commencement of the transaction, all the information that I received with regard to the troops under Colonel Head and Colonel Otway was delivered to me by your relative himself. In my communication to the Duke of Wellington, I did no more than detail the report he had made me. General Long's letters most amply testify that I could not have been guilty of any exaggeration, in repeating his opinion of the irregular proceedings of the 13th light dragoons and the two Portuguese squadrons of Colonel Otway. He speaks of these troops as "having disbanded;"* of the light dragoons he says,† that "they dispersed in pursuit of the "flying and beaten cavalry, and that his every effort "to stop them proved useless;" of the two squadrons under Colonel Otway, who were sent to their support, he relates,‡ that, "instead of obeying his orders, they "also broke away in pursuit, and continued unsup- "ported till they reached the bridge of Badajos." Such, at the time, I understood the state of these troops to have been; and such, relying on General Long's authority, I had always supposed it to have been till the publication of your pamphlet. I am now disabused of my error. I am, at length, in-

* Reply, p. 79. † Reply, p. 47. ‡ Reply, p. 47.

formed that General Long's representations were wrong; and that my report, which was grounded upon them, was consequently incorrect. For what is the account of Colonel Doyle? That officer accompanied the light dragoons far beyond the point where their movements must have ceased to be visible to General Long; and, in his comment on the above statements, he declares that "the 13th "light dragoons did not disperse in pursuit; but "that they followed in mass and closed in upon the "French cavalry." It appears then that General Long was manifestly in error with regard to the 13th light dragoons. I shall here add Sir Henry Watson's testimony respecting the Portuguese squadrons which he then commanded and accompanied. "Having "perused Long's pamphlet, I find the following mis-"take: the General says that he detached Colonel "Otway with two squadrons to support the 13th; "but that instead of obeying orders, they also broke "away in pursuit: now," adds Sir Henry, "the fact "is that the support was conducted in the most "regular manner nearly to Badajos by the 7th "Portuguese cavalry in columns." This account is also confirmed by Colonel Otway. Thus it appears, Sir, that, through the inaccuracy of General Long's report to me, and which he repeated in the strongest manner in his private letters to his friends, these corps have been most unjustly treated. Sir Henry Watson, Colonel Doyle, and Colonel Otway, men of honour and integrity, who were present at the events they speak of, and whose memories on so simple

and obvious a matter of fact are not likely to deceive them, are on this point all agreed in giving the most decided contradiction to the General's representations.

I will just allude to the short evidence of Colonel Gabriel, an officer whom I much respect. I cannot help regretting that he should have given so decisive an answer on a point, with regard to which it can be shown that his recollections are most imperfect. In reply to the question referred to him, he has stated,* that, "when the cavalry halted and desisted from "pursuit of the enemy near Campo Mayor, the head "of the infantry column was a few hundred yards, "about 400 or 500, in rear of the heavy brigade." I shall not discuss this account, but content myself with stating that it is distinctly contradicted in evidence, now lying before me, by Sir William Lumley, who I believe commanded the front brigade of Sir William Stewart's division, by Sir Henry Hardinge, by Count de Villa Real; and by another,—last, though not least on such a question,—I mean by Brigadier-General Long himself. They all agree in stating the distance at about *two* miles. Your relative is the only witness whose testimony I shall cite in contravention of Colonel Gabriel's report. In a letter, written three or four days subsequent to the affair, and abounding in the severest animadversions on myself, he says,† "Sure I am that Lord W. "would never have conferred such an honour on the "enemy, and entailed such a disgrace on his own

* Reply, p. 65. † Reply, p. 54.

" troops, as to suffer two battalions of infantry and " four squadrons of cavalry to bid defiance to, and " retreat in safety before eight squadrons of British " and three of Portuguese cavalry, two pieces of " artillery, and a large column of infantry, that were " following the same route, and were *within a couple* " *of miles* of the scene of action."

When my adversary, summing up the chief points of a case that he has been endeavouring to make out against me, in a private letter, and where he feared no contradiction, states the distance of the infantry as being *within two miles*, we may very reasonably assume that it did not fall far short of that distance; and that Colonel Gabriel must be most egregiously mistaken in estimating it at not more than "400 or 500 yards."

Two guns are spoken of in this affair. It is mentioned as General Long's opinion, that, "if two guns " could have been brought forward, the rest might " have followed." That officer also insinuates that I halted these two guns without any sufficient reason. In the first of these opinions Colonel Doyle coincides with him.

Nothing can be more certain than that, where two guns had passed, the remainder might have followed; but is it not equally undeniable that, if the horses drawing two guns for any given distance were so thoroughly exhausted, as to be rendered incapable of all further exertion, the horses of the remaining

guns, treading the same ground, would be rendered equally unfit for service? The fact is, that, could these two guns have kept up with the troops, they would have been sufficient for the purpose. The few shots discharged from them were ill directed; an error that would have been quickly remedied. But, after those few shots had been fired, the officer reported that his horses could proceed no farther. I did not desire, or deem it expedient, to expose the only cavalry that remained entire to the risk of loss; and it was only when the guns could be no longer kept up with the troops, that I commanded the whole to halt. I shall, Sir, on this subject proceed to lay before you the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, and the Count de Villa Real, both of whom were present. "The artillery horses," says Sir Henry Hardinge, "were so blown and fatigued by the rapid movement "they had made in advance of our infantry, that, "after firing a few shots, it was found impossible to "urge them forward, and overtake an enemy who "had undergone no previous fatigue."

The Count de Villa Real, in continuation of an extract from his letter which I have given above, says, "As the French continued to retreat at a quick "pace, the Marshal sent instantly back to the artil- "lery that some guns should come forward rapidly, "and ordered also the heavy brigade to advance "upon the right of the French as they retreated. "Two guns having arrived, fired a few rounds upon "the French, but with little effect, though at a short "distance. They moved on after the enemy upon

" the road as they continued to retire. I was then " sent to Colonel de Grey to desire him to charge " the French infantry as soon as he should see it " broken by our artillery, or that he considered he " might do so with advantage, as we had already " lost one British regiment of cavalry.

" Expecting to join Colonel de Grey in the charge, " I rode along with him at a jog-trot to keep up " with the French, with which we found ourselves " almost in line, and not further from them than " about a hundred yards. Colonel de Grey asked " me whether our infantry were advancing. I said " that it had been ordered to do so. We could not " help regretting the bad effect of our guns, of which " not a single shot struck the French column; and " observing at the same time how well they kept to- " gether, though we were so close upon them, and they " were moving at such a quick step. I accompanied " Colonel de Grey more than a mile, until he " received orders to halt, *in consequence of the artil-* " *lery not being able to move any farther.* The " allied infantry was then very far in the rear, and not " much in advance of the town of Campo Mayor."

I am not aware, Sir, of having left any of your objections connected with the affair of Campo Mayor unanswered. With regard to the other passages of your publication, in which I consider myself interested, I shall do little more than extract the obnoxious statements of General Long or yourself, and place beneath them the evidences by which they are refuted.

The occurrences near Jerumanha were of such in-

considerable importance, that I shall pass them by without observation.

Los Santos.

Of this affair General Long's memoranda afford rather a good and accurate description. He speaks little directly of himself, and leaves the reader to form what estimate he will of the value of his exertions. I should have observed an equal silence, had you not, Sir, raised* a charge of injustice against me for omitting to make any particular mention of his name in my report of the transaction. It was in the course of this affair that I first began to suspect the military qualifications of General Long. His services did not in my opinion entitle him to praise; and my disposition did not incline me to censure. My judgment of his efforts on that day may, if necessary, be confirmed by many witnesses; but I shall content myself with observing, that Los Santos presented one of those instances of unfortunate conduct in your relative, to which Sir Benjamin D'Urban has alluded in a letter, that you will presently have the pain of reading.

Albuera.

(First Extract.)

Letter from Gen. Long to C.B. L. de Villa Franca, May 30, 1811.

"Not a single instruction had I received nor "could I obtain, though repeatedly applied for. My "route or point of retreat were not even pointed out.

* Reply, p. 109.

" I was only desired not to commit the troops under " my command against a superior force; but, at the " same time not *to lose ground* without necessity."

The last sentence very plainly intimates that he was aware of the direction in which he was to lose ground upon necessity. I believe there is no other officer in General Long's situation who would not have been fully satisfied with such instructions. Indeed, what further information could he have required?

General Long asserts that he "*had no instructions.*" What says Sir Benjamin D'Urban?* "The " cavalry, which had concentrated at Los Santos and " Zafra, had orders to fall back leisurely upon the " enemy's advance, by Santa Martha upon Albuera, " with flanking parties by the roads of Solano and " Torre de Almandral." Such was exactly the course that was eventually pursued.

In a memorandum of instructions given to Major-General Sir William Erskine, on his coming, some time after the battle of Albuera, to assume the command of the cavalry, which had again taken up the same advanced position, I find the following passage: " Brigadier-General Long will lay before Sir Wil- " liam Erskine the instructions he received previous " to the arrival of Major-General Lumley, which " will still be adhered to, as far as the present or " future circumstances of the advance posts may " be like those which existed when those instruc- " tions were given."

* Letter, dated Cintra, Aug. 29, 1811.

Lieutenant-Colonel Pitt, in answer to your fifth question, says, "the only orders I knew Brigadier-"General Long to receive were to retire upon "Albuera."

How, Sir, do these things correspond with your relative's assertion that he had "no instructions, nor "could obtain any though repeatedly applied for?"

(Second Extract.)* *Same Letter.*

"The enemy's nearer approach having fully "established their strength, I fell back *at a walk* to "Albuera, detaching the Portuguese squadron in "advance to cover the passage of the bridge at that "place."

This account of General Long's retreat is supported by the testimony of his aide-de-camp Lieutenant-Colonel Pitt; but, after reading the evidence below, he will, I am satisfied, find cause to distrust the fidelity of his memory, and consider me most fully relieved from the necessity of noticing his further answers to your inquiries. General Long, acting without instructions as he affirms, appears to have fallen back upon Albuera by instinct. It is fortunate that, thus wholly undirected, he should have hit upon the very spot where his presence would best coincide with the plans, and best atone for the omissions of his commander! But, by whatever means his information was obtained, he seems to have been sufficiently well acquainted with the point to which he was to retreat. His manner of

* REPLY, p. 112.

effecting that retreat cannot be allowed to pass without observation. I shall be able to prove to you, Sir, by authorities beyond the reach of suspicion, that General Long's march from Santa Martha to Albuera, instead of being performed "at a walk" as he has described, was made in a manner the most confused, unconsidered, harassing, and unnecessarily hasty.

Count de Villa Real's *statement*.—"While riding "over the ground of Albuera on the 15th May, 1811, "the whole of our cavalry except Brigadier-General "Madden's Portuguese brigade arrived near the "village. It was reported that it had retired in too "great a hurry, without leaving any pickets behind, "and without having ascertained the real strength "of the enemy. It being doubtful whether the "whole strength of their army was up."

Major-General Sir Henry Hardinge's *statement*.—"When the allied cavalry came into our position at "Albuera from Santa Martha, on the evening of the "15th May, 1811, the horses *from hard riding were* "*greatly distressed*, and the retreat was condemned, "as having been made with a rapidity not usual, or "necessary."

Major-General Sir Loftus Otway's *statement*.—"In reply to your letter of yesterday's date, and in "answer to the questions you have put to me "respecting the march of the cavalry under General "Long, on the 15th May, 1811, from Santa Martha "to Albuera, I have to state that it was hurried and "harassing. The rear of the column being obliged

" to gallop most of the route; and in this manner we " took up our ground at Albuera. Finding on the " march that my brigade could not keep its place in " the column, I begged of General Long to moderate " the pace, as the rear could not keep up. *He was* " *with the leading division;* he told me he appre- " hended the enemy was on his flanks, in the wood " on each side of the road, and desired my brigade " to move into the woods to cover both his flanks. " I told him that if I were to do so, the brigade " could never reach Albuera, and that it could not " keep up on the high road, at the pace he was " then marching. He then trotted rather slower, " and persisted in his order for the dispersion of the " brigade on his flanks. I returned to the rear and " sent out a few flankers."

The late Major-General Lord Walsingham's *state-ment**.—" General Long all at once (most unaccount- " ably to me) ordered us to withdraw, and during " that retreat perpetually sent to me, either to hasten " the pace, or again to be slower, but he still con- " tinued it, and never rested until he ordered us " across the bridge at Albuera."

Sir Benjamin d'Urban's opinion of General Long's retreat from Santa Martha appears to me sufficiently marked in his observations already printed. But, as you regard the passage in a light different from that in which it has hitherto been viewed, I propose laying before you a more distinct and une-

* Extracted from a letter now lying before me.

quivocal expression of that officer's sentiments on the subject.

Major-General Sir Benjamin d'Urban's *statement**.

" —Upon the 15th, the second and Portuguese divi-
" sions and the light brigade of General Alten
" arrived upon the Albuera, and took up their ground
" between one and two o'clock, P.M.; and between
" three and four, P.M., our cavalry, which instead of
" retiring leisurely had fallen back (*indeed, I may*
" *say, fled*) rapidly before the advanced guard of that
" of the enemy, abandoned precipitately the right bank
" of the Albuera, and crossing the rivulet, was there
" found by Sir William Beresford at four o'clock, on
" his return from posting the left of the line, having
" thus given up, without the slightest dispute, the
" whole of the opposite ground to the enemy's
" pickets of cavalry, which immediately occupied it
" to the banks of the stream."

" This was a great error upon the part of the
" officer commanding the cavalry, and so completely
" of a piece with his previous conduct upon more
" than one occasion," (I think I may affirm that Campo Mayor and Los Santos are here alluded to,) " that
" it became imperatively necessary to relieve him,
" (however harsh the appearance of the thing,) as
" soon as General Lumley arrived on the morning
" of the 16th."

Can it then, in the face of these good and sufficient witnesses, be believed, as General Long has asserted, that his retreat was effected in a *walk*, or that the

* Letter, dated Cintra, Aug. 29, 1811.

Portuguese brigade was really sent in advance to cover the passage of the bridge. Colonel Otway himself declares, that this corps was all the while in the rear of the whole column. General Long talks of an enemy "skirmishing in his rear." It is strange that Colonel Otway, who was the whole time in the rear, should have known nothing of this enemy; and that no officer should have been aware of its presence except General Long and his aide-de-camp, who it seems were both "with the leading squadron," and heading the retreat.

Third Extract*. (*Same Letter.*)

"At this time I heard that our infantry were also "advancing upon Albuera, the position selected for "the inevitable conflict that was approaching. None "of these, however, made their appearance for several "hours, a circumstance that would have put the "enemy in possession of the field of battle without "much difficulty, had he been aware of it, and ad-"vanced the same evening to the attack. His neg-"lect to do so was our salvation."

From the statement of Sir Benjamin d'Urban, which has been already given, it appears that our infantry had arrived at two o'clock P.M.; and the cavalry did not arrive until after three. I was not present when either one or the other reached Albuera; but, on my return to the ground, the infantry was most certainly there. Baron Alten was in possession of the village near the bridge; and General Long could not have come up more than an hour

* Reply, p. 112.

before me.—I know not in what manner to account for such mistatements of facts. But we must bear in mind that these private dispatches were "never meant to meet the public eye!"

Fourth Extract*. (*Same Letter.*)

"I proceeded to reconnoitre the ground, and to "my utter astonishment found that the heights, which "formed the key of the position, were not intended "to be occupied; but that the lines were drawn up "parallel with the Badajoz road."

I believe that every one, except General Long, who has either spoken or written on the subject of this ground, has considered the Conical Hill, which is about perpendicular to the rear of the village, as the key of the position. This hill was nearly in our centre, and the Badajoz road, instead of running parallel with our lines, crossed them towards the left, and almost cut them at right angles.

Fifth Extract†. (*Same Letter.*)

"The morning of the 16th arrived, but no Spaniards "appeared."

Every man of the Spanish army had arrived during the evening and night. I and my staff had visited them long before morning; and the whole British army had seen them manœuvering, as day-light appeared, and changing the position which they had erroneously taken up in the dark, for the station assigned them in the line.

* Reply, p. 112. † Reply, p. 113.

I shall offer no observation on the account which General Long has given of General d'Urban's marching off with the 4th Dragoons, nor on the description he has given of his own conduct in the following page. I was not fortunate enough to have any of these matters reported to me at the moment; neither did I ever receive the slightest hint of any such occurrences, till I read of them in your publication.

To your Reply I am also indebted for my first intelligence of an exploit achieved by the 3rd Dragoon Guards. Acting under the orders of General Long, it is asserted that they beat back a corps of French Lancers near the bridge. It was reported to me, that a small corps of French light cavalry had thrown themselves across there, and, after receiving some shots from our infantry, had galloped along the left bank of the Albuera, and, turning higher up round the rear of their columns of infantry, had joined their own cavalry, which were in front of ours, and where, consequently, the heavy brigade had some time been stationed.

General Long proceeds to insinuate in no very equivocal terms, that he directed the exact position of the cavalry, not only at the bridge, but also at its extreme opposite point where the great body of that force lay. This gentleman has a most insatiable thirst of fame. He might, surely, have allowed his commander-in-chief some slight portion of the credit of these arrangements, had it only been the posting the two squadrons at the bridge. It may appear cruel to strip him of all his laurels; but a brief state-

ment of the circumstances of the case will be sufficient to show how unjustly he has assumed them.*

'Every military man will, I think, perceive that my account is in strict accordance with the usual course of such affairs. I found General Long posted on a height, midway between the river and the front of our position. As soon as the enemy's real point of attack was perceived, which happened immediately after my reaching him, he was directed to assemble the corps of cavalry he commanded to the rear of our right, sending two squadrons to support the defence of the bridge. The nature of the ground he had to occupy was in a few words described to him. After delivering General Blake his instructions, I proceeded to give my instructions to the British and Portuguese infantry divisions, and despatched Sir Benjamin d'Urban, the Quarter-Master-General, to post Sir Lowry Cole's division and the cavalry. I should observe that, on the change of position, the right of the new line being marked, Sir Lowry Cole occupying his ground, and the course of the bed of the rivulet being considered, any instructions to the General in command of the cavalry became almost unnecessary. No other ground could be taken up by him; but the cavalry were actually placed in their position by my Quarter-Master-General, acting under my directions. We have, in passages already quoted, seen Sir Benjamin d'Urban's testimony to this fact; and I shall only add, in corroboration of them, the last paragraph from the preface to his published "Observations

on the Operations of the Troops under Sir William Beresford in the year 1811:"—

"The masterly disposition of the fourth division "and of the cavalry, to which General Dumourier "adverts in his letter, of which the result was so "beneficial, and which is praised even in the history "of the war in the Peninsula, emanated entirely "from the Marshal, nor has any one a claim to par- "ticipate in it;" (this seems a curious anticipation of General Long's pretensions) "and this I securely "affirm, because I placed those troops upon their "ground by his direction, and received from his "own mouth the orders for their guidance, which I "then gave their respective generals."

The above was written in America many years after I had seen Sir Benjamin, and most certainly without any reference to, or suspicion of, the claims of General Long.

There is, Sir, only one other circumstance to which I would recall your attention. You consider the case of General Long as parallel to that of the late Lord Collingwood. You might have compared him with the greatest heroes and generals of ancient and modern times, without encountering any objection on my part, had you not sought to exalt his fame by casting an imputation of injustice upon myself. You charge me with having dealt unfairly by your relative, in not having recommended him for the Albuera medal.

I scarcely know, Sir, whether the parallel you

have drawn between General Long and Lord Collingwood, or your charge of injustice against myself, is most destitute of foundation.

I most certainly did not recommend Brigadier-General Long for the medal at Albuera. My reason for this omission was very simple;—I did not conceive that he came within the scope of the regulations by which such distinctions are granted. But was General Long the only officer in command of a brigade of cavalry on that day, who was similarly circumstanced? I can inform you, Sir, that he was not. There was another British officer omitted, (as, I believe, were both the Spanish Brigadiers,) whose name, had my instructions allowed, it would have given me the highest gratification to have added to the list of those whom I recommended for medals. It is only, Sir, your total ignorance of the subject which could have betrayed you into so great an error as to suppose "that, if General Long did not deserve "a medal at Albuera, he deserved a court-martial*."

The very rules for granting medals, which you have quoted, contradicts this conclusion. The *first* of these rules prescribes, that "no general officer "shall be considered entitled to medals, unless he "has been personally and particularly engaged upon "occasions of great importance." Now it is not every general present in a battle, to whom the opportunity of being "personally and particularly engaged" may occur; and it would, indeed, be singular

* Reply, p. 140.

if every one were to be brought to a court-martial who remained at the post allotted him, and forbore seeking an occasion of distinguishing himself. It is not *rank*, but *conduct*, that entitles an officer to a medal; and, where a fair opening has presented itself to him and been taken advantage of, the captain commanding a brigade or regiment has as strong a claim to this honourable reward as any general in command. With regard to the grounds of General Long's claim to the Vittoria medal, whether he deserved it more than he did that of Albuera, or whether he did more for one than for the other, he must himself have been a better judge than I can be; but it must be observed, that the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army on that occasion gave, without distinction, a medal to every general who was present. I never conceived myself to have had any such authority; and, as I then thought, and still continue to think, I acted in strict conformity with my instructions.

Of the *three* articles which you cite on the subject of the grant of medals, the *first* contains the conditions under which officers become qualified for recommendation; the *second*, alluding to the special selection and report of the commander of the forces on the spot, refers to the first,—for it is only as the conditions are fulfilled that his report or selection can be made: and the *third*, as confirmatory of the whole, directs that he shall specify the names and ranks of those officers whom he shall have selected as peculiarly deserving.

It is manifest from these articles, though the whole instructions are much more particular and detailed, that an officer, to deserve the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation for this honour, must have performed some particular and gallant service. I had no grounds for supposing that General Long had so distinguished himself at the battle of Albuera. I have inquired of others; and I do not find them more conscious of his merits and services than myself. I will add the question addressed to Sir Henry Hardinge on that point, and his very conclusive answer.

Question.

"Were you, being then the Deputy Quarter-"Master-General of the Portuguese army, and pre-"sent at Albuera with Marshal Beresford, aware at "the time, or at any subsequent period, of Brigadier-"General Long's having, during that battle, per-"formed any signal or particular service, or such as "to make him deserving of especial mention, recom-"mendation, or commendation."

Answer.

"I was not aware of any particular services ren-"dered by General Long during the action. The "duties of the cavalry having been, with few excep-"tions, most judiciously restricted to the defensive."

To confirm the above, and at the same time refute Brigadier-General Long's account of the great services he had performed in repulsing on the right, and keeping in check some formidable column that menaced my front, I shall present to your consideration the report of Sir William Lumley, describing the

state in which he found affairs on his arriving to take the command.

Lieutenant-General Sir William Lumley's *Statement.*

"Having travelled all night, I joined you, on the "height above the village and bridge of Albuera, "about eight in the morning, just as the attack "commenced. The first cannon-shot fired, I believe, "on the left; you sent me at once to General Blake, "and I was in full command of the allied cavalry on "the right, where I found them posted as I concluded, "and still suppose, by yourself in person, or by your "order through your Quarter-Master-General; and "I was so in command in less than a quarter of an "hour after I received your orders in person. The "attack had not then commenced on the right, what-"ever the hour was.

"I recollect that Brigadier-General Long (with "whom I was not previously acquainted) was at the "time very importunate in offering his advice, which "I was obliged abruptly to decline, as, having re-"ceived clear and explicit orders from the Marshal, "I chose to trust to my own judgment in putting "them into execution."

The whole of the above most exactly coincides with my recollection of the circumstances at the time. On returning from the left of the original line to the place on which the Spanish line ought already to have been formed in the second position, even at a later period than is spoken of by Sir William Lumley,

perhaps as much as a quarter of an hour, the enemy's force had not yet come up.

I must, Sir, repeat my assurance that it is really painful for me to be called upon to give publicity to such details. But, charged as I have been with injustice towards General Long, the measure has been forced upon me as an act of self-vindication. I can make every allowance, Sir, for every feeling of hostility which you may have entertained towards myself, and for the asperity with which it has been manifested in your recent publication. You have relied on an authority which ought not to have deceived you; and, as you naturally yielded an implicit confidence to the accuracy of your relative's representations, I am not surprised that you should have been so far misled, as to regard my conduct towards him in an unfavorable light.

The omitting to recommend General Long for the Albuera medal, is, I apprehend, one of the strong grounds on which you would rest the supposition of my being actuated against him by feelings of private prejudice. I should refer, Sir, to a subsequent part of my conduct connected with that transaction, as a decisive proof of the contrary. General Long's letter to Colonel Torrens, dated June 29, 1814, in which he tendered his refusal of the Vittoria medal on account of not receiving that of Albuera, was at the time enclosed to me from the Horse Guards. On this occasion strict justice would almost have demanded from me an expression of the real opinion which I entertained of General

Long's military qualifications and conduct. But I exercised my accustomed forbearance towards him. I do not think, Sir, that you will perceive in the following reply to Sir Henry Torrens, any indication of those hostile sentiments with regard to your relative, by which you suppose me to have been influenced.

Wigmore Street, July 1, 1814.

"MY DEAR TORRENS,

"I return you the letter of General Long, who, "unfortunately for himself, labours still under the "malady of a high opinion of his own talents, and "therefore will write. You are aware that the circumstance of an officer's not being returned for a "medal for any battle, at which he may have been "present, cannot be considered as any mark of "dissatisfaction towards him on the particular occasion. The decision is governed by the nature of "the instructions on which it is made; and was the "present letter deserving of any answer from me, "such would be sufficient. In fact, on the occasion "alluded to, no officer, if my recollection serves me, "commanding a brigade of cavalry, was recommended for a medal; and Colonel Otway, of "whom, with every deference for the talents of "General Long, I had a much higher opinion as a "practical cavalry officer, was equally excluded "from this honor, and to my great regret. It is "obvious from General Long's letter, that my report, "in what respected him for the battle of Albuera,

" has been favorable on every point, when I was not
" myself limited by instructions. Nor was I sin-
" gular, at the battle of Albuera, in withholding
" medals from general officers who had received
" thanks from their country and Parliament. How-
" ever, not being called upon, I would not wish that
" what I have thus observed should be considered
" otherwise than generally applying, and not as
" giving any opinion for, or against, General Long,
" on the occasion alluded to. He has thought fit to
" do himself a wrong, to which I have no right or
" reason to object.—Believe me, &c.

(Signed) " BERESFORD."

I cannot conceive, Sir, that the traces of any personal hostility towards General Long can be discovered, even by the most microscopic eye, in the contents of the foregoing letter,—which was written on an occasion, when, had I been really influenced by the feelings you ascribe to me, they must either, voluntarily or involuntarily, have exhibited themselves. It is to be observed, Sir, that your account of Sir Henry Torrens's answer contains a most material mistake, with regard to the terms of the communication. You say,* " the official answer returned
" from the Horse Guards was, that the *consideration*
" of his (General Long's) case did not come within
" the rules and regulations laid down for the grant
" of such a distinction." The words of Sir Henry Torrens are, " your name was omitted in the return

* REPLY, p. 140.

"of those officers, recommended for medals at the "battle of Albuera, because the *circumstances* of "your case did not come within the rules and regu- "lations." Now, Sir, the different reading which you have adopted makes a most important alteration in the sense: by substituting the word *consideration* for *circumstances*, you cast the *onus* of your relative's having been refused the medal entirely upon me. You make it appear that, though there was an appeal made to the Horse Guards upon the subject, the Commander-in-Chief had no authority to interfere with the list of officers whose names I had submitted to him. But, Sir, what was the fact? General Long's appeal was received; his case was *considered*; and then, after *consideration*, it was found that "the *circumstances* of his case did not "come within the rules and regulations."

I now, Sir, proceed to offer a few remarks on the parallel which you have drawn between the cases of General Long and the late Lord Collingwood; a very little attention will suffice to show that these cases differ in the most essential particulars. Lord Collingwood, on having the medal for the battle of St. Vincent's forwarded him, refused accepting it, because that of the first of June had been withheld. He considered himself as deserving of one as of the other, and was determined to receive neither or both. General Long, on having the medal of Vittoria forwarded to him, refused accepting it, because that of Albuera had been withheld; and he also considered himself as deserving of one as of the other. So far,

I admit, that the parallel is exact; but, as you have very justly observed, "to add further comment would "be to mutilate the resemblance." The subsequent circumstances, which you have not thought it expedient to produce, but to which I shall call your attention, are strangely dissimilar. The superiors of Lord Collingwood considered his claims well founded; and, on their transmitting him the medal for the first of June, he accepted the medal for St. Vincent's. But, Sir, with General Long the case was in every respect reversed. His superiors decided that he was *not entitled* to the medal for Albuera. They informed him, that the Vittoria medal would not be pressed upon him; and that, on his returning it, "the "notification of the distinction would be cancelled "in the Gazette." On receiving this most unflattering communication, General Long found it his duty to submit, and he accepted the one medal, when the second was denied to him. I do not say that General Long was wrong in acting thus; but I do say, that his conduct was as contrary as possible to the conduct of Lord Collingwood. You represent that great naval officer as saying, "I feel that I was "then improperly passed over, and to receive such "a distinction now, would be to acknowledge the "propriety of that injustice." Now, Sir, according to the principle intimated in these words, and with which you apparently coincide, your relative in accepting the medal for Vittoria, acknowledged the justice of his being refused the medal of Albuera.

Is it not somewhat extraordinary, Sir, that though

in his letter of the 10th of July, 1814, General Long admitted to Major Torrens, that he had never before seen, or known what the regulations were by which the grant of medals is regulated,—yet, totally ignorant as he was on the subject, he did not refrain from accusing me of injustice for excluding him from the number of those officers who were to receive that distinction. With whom then, Sir, does the imputation of injustice rest? Does it lie with your relative, or with myself? It is assumed that General Long must have deserved the Albuera medal, because he had, through me, received the thanks of Parliament on the occasion of that battle. But the two things have no connexion whatever with each other.

The thanks of Parliament are invariably given to *all* generals present in an engagement, against whom there exists no actual complaint of misconduct. The medals are expressly designed for, and only conferred on, those officers who have personally and particularly distinguished themselves in an engagement, at least on the occasion of a defensive battle.

Vittoria was, I believe, one of the few instances, throughout the whole of the war in the Peninsula and France, in which all the general officers present were recommended for medals; but I am not aware of any occasion on which they were not all included in the thanks of Parliament.

Having disproved the statements contained in these extracts from General Long's "Private Journals and Correspondence," which you have submitted to the public; having refuted the accusation of pre-

judice and injustice towards that officer, with which I have been charged; having shown that my conduct on all occasions in which he was concerned was influenced by feelings very different from those which are ascribed to me; having done all that the duty of self-vindication demanded at my hands, I shall not extend my observations further; and shall abstain from noticing any of the various criticisms and censures, which you have thought fit to bestow upon my military conduct.

The points in discussion between us, Sir, are simple matters of fact. The case of either party is now laid before the public to which you appealed; and it remains for them to determine on which side the statements appear most consistent with probability, and are supported by the strongest weight of evidence.

I have the honor to be, &c.

BERESFORD.

THE END.

LONDON:
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES,
Stamford Street.

A

SECOND LETTER

TO

CHARLES EDWARD LONG, Esq.,

ON THE

MS. JOURNAL AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE LATE

Lieut-Gen. R. B. LONG;

BY

GENERAL

LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, G.C.B.

LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCC XXXIV.

LONDON:
Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES,
Duke-street, Lambeth.

A SECOND LETTER

TO

C. E. LONG, Esq.

Sir,

I regret being obliged by the tenor of your late publication to enter again on the discussion of those parts of General Long's military career and correspondence which formed the subject of my previous letter to you. The further considerations which I have to offer will be compressed into as short a space as possible; and, without any professions of candour, any inquiry into the motives that may have led you to continue the controversy, or any observation on the prudence of such a measure, I shall at once proceed to the refutation of those passages in your late Pamphlet which I conceive to be erroneous, and to which I shall strictly confine my attention.—However widely we may differ on many points, I can assure you, sir, that such differences of

opinion can never excite in me any angry feelings towards yourself, neither shall they ever betray me into any uncourteousness of expression; but, as this is the last notice that I shall ever allow myself to take of these matters, you will not be surprised at my producing on the present occasion such evidence as I have in my possession, with such remarks upon it as I feel requisite to the proof and establishment of my case.

I have no doubt, sir, with regard to the opinion which the public will form of that correspondence, in which your relative privately detailed to his friends at home a long catalogue of grievances against his superior officer, of which not a single hint was ever heard among his comrades abroad. I have made, you say*, "all but *direct assertions* that he was in the "daily habit of forwarding to his family and friends "*deliberate misrepresentations* of facts, for the express "purpose of injuring the credit of his commander."—The conclusion, sir, is your own; and I will not disturb it by any observations of mine.—I have nothing to do with the motives from which the errors of General Long's statements sprung. My only concern is with the errors themselves, and to them my observations will be exclusively addressed.

You state † that I devoted "no less than three "pages to a discussion respecting the word 'differ-"ences.'"—I was not conscious that any doubt existed,

* Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 7. † P. 12.

or had been entertained, respecting the meaning of the *word*; but, as you seemed to advance it as a fact of which several officers were aware, that differences had occurred between myself and your late relative, and that my feelings towards him had been consequently warped, I thought it right to prove that your information on that point was incorrect. It appears, however, that I mistook your meaning. And, as you now say that you "did not mean to "allude to early differences antecedent to the affair of "Campo Maior, or of any particular quarrel subse-"quent," it is manifest that, whatever General Long might find to object to in my conduct towards him on military points, I could not have been influenced by any feelings of personal prejudice. The short previous intercourse that subsisted between us from the 15th to the 25th of March was more likely to prepossess me in his favour, than against him. We were evidently, at that time, mutually well disposed towards each other. He says, in one of his letters: "From the "three days' intercourse I have had with the Marshal, "I am disposed to like him exceedingly. I find him "unreserved, affable, open, sociable, and obliging, and "the revolution he has effected here" (alluding to the discipline of the Portuguese infantry) "bespeaks his ability."—This extract has been published by yourself from your late relative's letter of the 21st March, 1811; and I do not comprehend why, or in what manner, any difference of opinion that I might have had with General Long on purely military matters should have

force to annul the good qualities which are ascribed to me above; and it most certainly could never have undisciplined the Portuguese army.—You proceed to acquit me of any hostile feelings towards General Long during the time of his remaining under my command, although you produce reasons to show why your relative should not have been equally well disposed towards myself. "The schoolmaster," you say, "does not suffer from the effect of his own "lecture or his own rod. The scholar does, and, "perhaps, profits by them."—Your illustration, sir, is most defective. The poor schoolboy has no one to look to for redress. The officer, and more especially the general officer, is not placed in so unfriended a position. He knows that he has an effectual resource under any species of military wrong to which he may be subjected. And I am not acquainted with a single officer who would have refrained from appealing to it, if he had encountered any kind of indignity, oppression, or injustice. But if, sir, your simile fails in this case, in another particular it applies more justly. The schoolboy gives vent in *private* complaints to those angry feelings which are engendered by the imaginary injuries of his pedagogue, and against which he cannot venture to offer any *public* remonstrance. In this respect, I admit that the figure you have employed is admirably descriptive of the case. With regard to that conduct, in defence of which you do not appear to have any excuse to suggest, I continue to hold the same opinion

that I expressed in my previous letter to you. The only palliative that you have attempted to advance is one drawn from the precedents afforded by the practice of others: of itself a miserable plea and no justification.—But, in this instance, the very precedents adduced afford no authority for the conduct of General Long.—The circumstances bear no resemblance. In General Long's case, the party who conceived himself aggrieved and was most interested in giving a peculiar colouring to the transactions, was the person who had recourse to private correspondence as the means of gaining circulation for his own views. In both the other cases which you have cited, the parties could have had no personal interest whatever to influence the accounts they delivered of the events, and they had no other object in writing than to describe what actually occurred, or what appeared to them to be the truth. You have referred to Sir Benj. D'Urban's letter, dated 29th August, 1811. He sent it to me with other papers, three or four years since, from Demerara. It was originally written in answer to a friend, who had communicated to him the various reports concerning the battle of Albuera, which, flowing from some hidden source, had obtained circulation in London. The letter touches upon points which must, then, have been fresh in the mind of the Quartermaster-general of the allied army. It contains an account of many of the principal events of the time. The reader will perceive that such a letter, written at such a moment,

in refutation of error, and by a person who could have had no reason either for concealing or misrepresenting the truth, is a document deserving the highest possible degree of credit and consideration. With regard to the statement of Lieut.-General Sir William Lumley, I cannot understand why that officer, because he had "never up to the summer of 1832 entered upon those occurrences in writing even with his oldest friends," should therefore refrain in 1833 from giving the information which was required of him, and which he considered himself called upon by common justice to afford. The public, sir, will fully comprehend and appreciate Sir W. Lumley's reasons for remaining silent on the affairs of the Peninsula in 1832, when applied to by yourself in the cause of General Long, since it has been shown that he had no intelligence to give which could have answered your object, or which would have proved of a welcome description. It is a work of supererogation even to say thus much in reply to your observations on the statements of two officers so much esteemed and honoured wherever they are known, as Sir Benj. D'Urban and Sir Wm. Lumley. Be well assured, sir, that censure, whether direct, or by insinuation, levelled against such persons, cannot fail of proving pernicious to the cause of the advocate who allows himself to hazard it.

I have said in my letter, that "after my command had ceased, I never, to the best of my recollection,

"came again in contact with General Long." You doubt the accuracy of the account, and appeal to "a "certain controversy respecting two Portuguese Aides "de Camp." I have a perfect recollection of that circumstance, and did not overlook it when making the statement to which you object. But, I believe that even on that occasion no direct communication took place between General Long and myself. He was not at the time under my command. The act of which he complained was my ordering, I conclude through the Adjutant General of the Army, the two officers whom I considered to be employed contrary to the rules of the service to join their regiments. It was most satisfactorily proved that I was correct in my view of the subject, and in the course which I consequently adopted; for my orders were confirmed by the Duke of Wellington, to whom General Long appealed, and were immediately carried into effect. The Commander in Chief, as is usual on such occasions, forwarded to me General Long's letter of appeal, and I wrote my reply, perfectly aware that it would also be submitted to the inspection of General Long. But I do not think that we were brought into personal contact with each other, or that even any direct correspondence ever passed between us. Such was the sum of this transaction. I regret, sir, that you did not publish the whole of my letter on this occasion, as it would have rendered the case more clear.

I do not feel myself at all hurt at your being com-

pelled occasionally "to doubt the perfect accuracy of "my recollections." The events happened a great many years ago; and, never imagining that I should be so unfortunately called upon to engage in this public discussion of them, I did not, at the time, adopt the precautions, which I might have taken, and which experience has shown to be so expedient, of furnishing myself with memoranda to which reference might afterwards be made to support or to refresh my recollections of facts. But still my memory is, I believe, pretty correct respecting them. It was fortunate for me, perhaps, that the various rumours then propagated in England came to the knowledge of myself and many others, and naturally led us to reconsider the then recent events, to compare our views of them, and to discuss them so fully and so frequently as served to impress them indelibly upon our memories. To the several false reports concerning those events which we were continually receiving, I am most probably indebted for much of the vividness with which many of the minor events are still remembered; though, as you will readily believe, sir, from the nature of my position, the greater and more prominent transactions of the time—at least such as can be matter of doubt—are those of which I was not only best informed and am likely to have the clearest recollection, but with regard to which no other person can be acquainted; except the few officers immediately about me, and who, from their military position, were necessarily in my confidence.—In concluding the pre-

fatory part of your letter you say, "I shall number these "charges, (those advanced in the '*Strictures*') "subjoining a short notice of your lordship's confirmation "of them, or, through their abandonment, of your "virtual contradiction of them." I only quote this passage for the purpose of protesting against the interpretation which you have put upon my silence. There are, I believe, many statements made in your "*Reply*," which I forbore noticing—as I shall, perhaps, many more on the present occasion—on different accounts,—sometimes because they did not appear to be of the slightest consequence, and, at others, because I really did not happen to know anything about them. Such, for instance, was the case with regard to Col. Colborne's position at Campo Maior. When writing my "*Letter*" to you, I was really ignorant of the matter. I have since, however, received some information upon it, and shall be able to gratify you with such an explanation as will most satisfactorily prove that I never intended my silence on that or any other point to be considered as a virtual abandonment of it. But, sir, as this is a principle which you lay down, I necessarily conclude it to have been the principle on which you have acted yourself; and that all those parts of my letter to you are to be considered as unanswerable which you have omitted to notice.

I shall not, sir, imitate the tone of irony in which you have thought it expedient to address me. In discussions of this kind, which relate to mere matters of fact, any deviation from the plain straightforward

style of writing must, whether adopted with that intent or not, always have the effect of bewildering the reader, and seems to betray a want of confidence in the force and connection of our proofs. I now proceed to reconsider those charges of misconduct in and from General Long, which you have made the object of your attention.

The first point which you have touched upon, is your relative's extraordinary detour at Campo Maior, with regard to which, after quoting the words of the "*Further Strictures*," you add, "the enemy, perceiving that the movement was made, began to "retire to Badajoz; by which means your lordship's "intentions of surprising and capturing the whole "were frustrated."

The expectation of "*surprising*" the enemy, which you have here ascribed to me, is particularly unfortunate. General Long informs us in the letters which you have published, that the enemy had discovered our approach on the preceding evening, and again early that morning. He also tells us, that he had seen them previously to the commencement of his detour; that they reciprocally manœuvred; and that, being in sight of them, he halted "to wait for further orders."—You will, therefore, see, sir, that the intentions which you have imputed to me could never have engaged my mind; as I never could by any possibility have designed to surprise an enemy, whom I knew, by the usual reports and by ocular demonstration, to be fully aware of my pre-

sence. But to return to the fact.—You are "willing "to give to me the benefit of the detour to the fullest "extent of Col. Doyle's evidence, of which evidence," (you say) "I approve." This latter conclusion is perfectly gratuitous, and not warranted by any expressions of my letter to you, not even by the passage you have produced in proof of it. I certainly said, as you have quoted, that "nothing can be more fair "than the manner in which that officer's statements "are made." But I added, which you have *not* quoted, "It is manifest that he always speaks with perfect "impartiality and *to the best of his recollection*." I still entertain the same opinion of Col. Doyle's statement. It was made, I am convinced, according to the best of his recollection; but that I did not think that recollection always accurate, has been shown in my previous letter to you, on more than one occasion. I approve the *spirit* in which Col. Doyle's evidence is given; but I am very far from approving all the details of the evidence itself. But, sir, I cannot comprehend why you should think fit to tie me down to the evidence of this officer, unless it be with the view of keeping out of the reader's sight the far stronger weight of opposite authorities adduced by myself upon the same subject, which is a most principal one, not only in a military point of view, but as being the primary cause of this most disagreeable discussion. Besides the evidence of Col. Doyle on this detour, we have that of Sir Henry Hardinge, and of General

Long himself, with,—which is of more weight than all,—the broad and plain fact of the Commander in Chief having sent *twice*, at the time and on the spot, to inform General Long that he was making too wide a circuit, and acting in disobedience to his orders. This, sir, is the plain state of the case, which it is impossible for you to controvert, and which, when Col. Doyle, an officer of some experience, gives due attention to, he will immediately perceive that, whether your relative's *detour* was, or was not, too extended, can no longer be "a matter of opinion." In such a case, no one can have an opinion except the Commander in Chief on the spot. His orders are imperative; and, if every subordinate officer were to be allowed to deviate from them at discretion, he would, as in the present instance, be deprived of the direction of his own troops. I certainly object to your deciding the question of General Long's *detour* by the evidence of Col. Doyle alone; though he most distinctly shows how incorrect you were in saying no *detour* was made, and proves, as every military man will see, that it must have been pretty considerable, when he says that "in the course of the five miles' trot the troops had frequently to bring up their left shoulders to meet the enemy." But, sir, your relative's own description of this movement, even without the facts and statements adduced in my former letter to you, is quite sufficient to establish the extent of it.—This, however, is really of very little importance.—General

Long disobeyed my orders *twice sent to him*: he withdrew the cavalry from my immediate direction and controul: what his own views and intentions were it was impossible for me to divine; but he so entirely separated the cavalry from the infantry, that, whatever my views and intentions might have been, the execution of them was necessarily frustrated. You have, sir, allowed yourself to be somewhat ironical respecting the objects I had in contemplation. I am not aware by what possible means they could have become known to you, as the only intimation respecting them that has fallen from myself, was with regard to the case of the enemy's retaining possession of Campo Maior;—a case which did not occur.

I now proceed to the *Ravine*, which General Long conjured up, as his excuse for disobeying my instructions.

"It is," you say, "as obvious as words can make "it, that this ravine was met with in approaching "Campo Maior," and in proof of this position you refer me to General Long's journal as given in the 41st page of your "*Reply*," and his letter to General Le Marchant, in the 75th page of the same publication.

I have, sir, consulted the 41st page of your "*Reply*," and do not there find it intimated that your relative met with any the least impediment in his progress towards Campo Maior. His words are, "I was directed to "move, circling round a considerable height, over

"which the infantry marched, but from which I was "separated by a deep ravine;" but he does not say that he had this ravine to pass. He describes himself, on the contrary, "as trotting away with the light "gentry," (cavalry), and, "after driving the enemy's "picquets from the positions they occupied, at length "passing over a considerable plain, which brought "him to a small ridge from whence he looked down "on the town of Campo Maior, &c."

From page 41 of your "*Reply*," I turn to page 75, to which you have also referred me; and there only, or rather in the following page, I find that General Long mentions and describes a ravine which separated him from our infantry, and which he had to pass before he came in sight of Campo Maior; but in crossing which he does not appear to have encountered any opposition. Thus, in his journal of the 28th of March, written at most three days after the affair, he omits mentioning an obstacle of which, just one month after the affair occurred, he has a most clear and particular recollection, and which actually led to no result whatever.

But how, sir, did it happen that you have neglected to notice an intermediate letter of your relative—an intermediate both with regard to its date and its position in your "*Reply?*"—In a letter from Los Santos, of 22nd of April, 1811, only three days earlier than that to General Le Marchant, General Long says, "Our debût at Campo Maior, but for the untimely

"interference of others, would have been attended "with perfect success and little loss. The official "representation I have seen of it in the Lisbon "Gazette is very unfair. The Marshal says, the "movement I made to get round the town was more "circuitous than he wished; *he should have added* "*the reason, namely, that, ignorant of the ground,* "*he was not aware that a deep and impassable ravine* "*separated me from the enemy,* and prevented my "getting over at any other spot but where I did; "but even with this fact, I maintain that my column "was never *more distant from the town than he* "*directed.*"

If you will turn to the official document, to which your relative above alludes, and by which he would make it appear that injustice had been done him, you will perceive that he could have nothing to object to in any observations of mine respecting his conduct on our *approaching* Campo Maior, as in that part of the official account of the affair I neither mention his name, nor make any allusion to him whatever. It is evident, sir, from my despatch that, while approaching the town, we did not meet with any opposition from the enemy, and that even the skirmishing did not commence till we arrived under the walls. Such was the fact.

Indeed, General Long and I are both agreed that the enemy's force was first seen by us respectively on our approaching the height, about a mile distant from Campo Maior;—he says in one place "about 1200

yards." We are both agreed upon the orders he received, which were, he says, "to lead the column "of light cavalry so as to turn and gain the rear of "the town," or rather, according to the terms of my despatch, "to turn the enemy's right, keeping out "of the reach of the place." We are also both agreed that these orders were given and received, after he had arrived and halted in sight of Campo Maior and of the enemy's main force. What then could any movement he made, or any impediment he met with in the execution of my orders after this, have to do with a ravine which he had long before passed, and left in the rear? Or why should General Long complain, or defend himself upon a point to which there was not the slightest allusion made in the official account of the affair to which he objects? My despatch does not mention any delay occasioned, or any circuit made by General Long in our approach to the town, nor say that he was directed to go round it before he saw it, or knew any reason for such a measure; but it *does* state that, after he had halted in sight of Campo Maior and the enemy, and after he had received my orders to turn the right of the enemy, who were then halted under our eyes, he "made a greater circuit than was necessary." It was this remark that he complained of in his private letter, when he observes, "The Marshal says, the "movement I made to get round the town was more "circuitous than he wished; he should have added "the reason, *that, ignorant of the ground, he was*

"*not aware that a deep and impassable ravine sepa-*
"*rated me from the enemy,* and prevented my getting
" over at any other spot than where I did." It is in this passage, sir, "as obvious as words can make it," that General Long pleaded the impediment of "an " impassable ravine" as his excuse for not carrying my orders into effect, and making a less circuit than he did make. I do not dispute his saying that, in the earlier part of the day, he had "a ravine on his right;" but he does not describe that ravine as separating him from the enemy, but from our own infantry. However, with that ravine, or any other ravine, which your relative met, or fancied, I have nothing to do; the only ravine with which I am concerned is the one which General Long, in discussing the correctness and complaining of the justice of my official account, alleged as his excuse for not acting in compliance with my commands. He most distinctly states, that he encountered this "impassable ravine" in the course of his second movement, that is, after halting to receive my final instructions, and whilst proceeding in the execution of them. He says, expressly, that he met with this obstacle during his movement to get round the town, which, according to his own account, he received orders to do after his halt. I need not pursue this subject. It is incontrovertible that your relative, as stated in my former letter, describes himself as having been prevented by an impassable ravine from fulfilling my orders; a fact, sir, which you could not for a moment have doubted, had you not overlooked—though you

had published it—your relative's letter to E. H. of the 22d of April. It is also equally incontrovertible from the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir W. Lumley, and Col. Doyle, that no such ravine was in his way.

But General Long also speaks of a "ditch, or rivulet," and you reproach me for having given a partial quotation from a passage of his journal, and omitting all mention of this circumstance. I shall now cite the whole passage. Having forgotten his impassable ravine, he says, "It is necessary to ob- "serve, that I led the Light Division over a ridge of "heights and broken ground, which overlooked the "valley in which the enemy were formed, and through "which ran a nasty, boggy, and almost impassable "ditch." In my former letter, sir, I quoted only the first part of this passage, as confirmatory of my own and Sir Henry Hardinge's statement, and to shew, from your relative's own account, that, notwithstanding the ravine which we have just discussed, he encountered no real impediment to his movement. I have no objection whatever to the existence of this "nasty, boggy, and almost impassable ditch." I cannot perceive how it affected General Long's operations, who only looked down upon it from the heights on which he was moving, and perceived it in the valley below, where he describes the enemy as being. He does not state, you say, that this was "an *insuperable* "impediment to his movements:" to which I would add, he does not even say it was any impediment.

Indeed, if this "ditch" was an obstacle to any party, it must have been to the enemy; and Col. Macallister, your own witness, says, "Having gone over "the ground after the affair, I observed a portion "of swampy ground with an ugly gully, or ditch, "part of which appeared to have been passed." Now General Long certainly did not pass over this swampy ground; and, since he describes it as lying in the valley where the enemy were formed, it would appear pretty clear, from Col. Macallister's account, or rather from the conjoint accounts, that it had been passed over by the enemy. I cannot comprehend, therefore, what advantage I deprived General Long of by omitting the latter part of the above-cited passage in my previous letter. I might, indeed, have used it to my own advantage.—Before I quit this subject, I would observe, that the evidence of Col. Macallister, as far as it goes, confirms Sir William Lumley's account of the ground; an account which, sir, I feel satisfied no one but yourself could ever feel inclined to censure, and which must give the reader a far clearer notion of the country over which your relation had to move his troops, than any the most elaborate and minute description could have afforded. "I used," says Sir William Lumley in his comment on General Long's letter, "to take the Light Horse "Volunteers over worse ground on Finchley Com"mon." In confirmation of this opinion, I shall here insert a question on the point I lately put to Sir Henry Hardinge, and his answer.

QUESTION.

"When we proceeded in pursuit of General Long "and the cavalry with him, going as we did at a "quick pace, and in a direct line so far as we could "judge, did we meet with any impediment of ground "to check our pace, such as *ravine, boggy ground,* "or an almost *impassable ditch;* that is, before we "came up with the cavalry?

ANSWER.

"In answer to your question, I do not think that "there was any impediment of ground to check cavalry, "such as *ravine* or *impassable ditch*, from the place "at which the cavalry left the high road to turn Campo "Maior, until they again got into the Badajoz road. "There was a part of the ground near the high road "on the Badajoz side of Campo Maior, where the "Heavy Brigade, having turned the town, regained "the road, which was wet, and might be termed "swampy, but by no means constituting an obstacle "to cavalry."

In proceeding after General Long, Sir Henry Hardinge and I took a shorter and a more direct line than he had done, and we were consequently never so far from the high road on which the enemy were marching as he; and yet it is proved that we met with no obstacle, and that the ground exactly corresponded with the description given of it by Sir W. Lumley. Having thus, sir, got rid of ravines, and every other impediment adduced by General Long, as reasons for not complying with my

orders, I leave the reader to form his own opinion of the character of these various and incongruous excuses. I have shewn in my former letter to you, that your relative, in writing to E. H. on the 22d of April, introduces "an impassable ravine" as his excuse. To Sir Henry Hardinge, on the spot, "he urged the pro-"priety of securing his left flank against any enemy's "cavalry force which he was of opinion *might* be con-"cealed under cover of the undulating ground on the "left." While in his letter of the 25th of April, to General Le Marchant, he actually *introduces* the enemy on that left flank, and says "the enemy's *de-*"*monstrations* on my left obliged me to extend to "cover that flank."

Disagreeable as the task is, sir, to point out and dwell upon such unaccountable contradictions in the statements of a departed officer, I am driven to it by a sense of justice to myself. General Long's correspondence, if we may judge of that which is still unpublished by the portions which have been submitted to the public, teems with aspersions on my military character; and in defence of myself it is necessary for me to show how undeserving of credit that correspondence is. If I should point out only *one* palpable and obvious misstatement, with regard to a fact of which he had a personal knowledge and ought to have been able to give correct information, his authority as a good and competent witness is annihilated for ever; and his praise or censure of my conduct become equally valueless. I do not impute—I do

not inquire about General Long's motives for making such misstatements—I leave that to the reader. I content myself with producing instances to prove that he made them, and I will here advert to a most obvious one. General Long, speaking of this circuit, says, in his letter to General Le Marchant, as cited in your Reply, page 76, "Though the Marshal and "I differ on this point, I do not believe that I was "ever more than the prescribed distance from the "town, although *the enemy's demonstrations on my "left obliged me to extend to cover that flank.*"

I must here quote from my letter to you, page 20, where the above assertion is discussed. I say, "His "(General Long's) excuse for not following my "directions at the time was of a very different nature. "The General urged the propriety, Sir Henry Hard-"inge informs you, of securing his left flank against "any enemy's cavalry force, which he was of opinion "might be concealed under cover of the undulating "ground on the left."

"Great indeed was my surprise at the moment "when this answer was reported to me. General "Long had received precise instructions relative to "a visible enemy on his right flank; and acting as "he was under the immediate personal direction of "his superior, he had no concern with any possible "contingency of a concealed enemy on his left. The "whole responsibility of the operation devolved "upon myself, and the only duty of Brigadier-Gen. "Long was to carry my commands into exact and

" immediate execution, or, at the utmost, to make a " representation of his fears, and allow me to decide " whether they should be acted upon or not."

" Singular, sir, as such a reason for evading a " fulfilment of my orders will appear to every military " man, it had not even the shadow of fact for its found- " ation. There were no troops of the enemy to the " left: no reason existed for supposing any to be there. " Sir Henry Hardinge told the General at the " moment *that there was no necessity for his pre-* " *caution.* Indeed, had his fears been well grounded, " the precaution that he adopted in consequence of " them would appear most strangely unmilitary. No " other officer, I apprehend, acting under similar sus- " picion of a concealed enemy, would have executed " his movement *en masse,* instead of sending out " patroles, or flanking parties. But, sir, is it not " somewhat remarkable, that to Sir Henry Hardinge, " who was present, General Long should only have " spoken of the force '*which might be concealed* " under the cover of the undulating ground to the " left;' while to General Le Marchant, who was at a " distance from the scene, he stated that '*the enemy's* " *demonstrations on his left obliged him* to extend to " cover that flank?' But what was the real state " of the case? The General has himself described the " enemy as retreating in compact order along the road " from Campo Maior to Badajoz. No other enemy " was that day seen, and not even a single French " soldier appeared upon General Long's left from the " commencement of his departure till he came in con-

" tact with their columns. I need add nothing further " on this point."

The above passage, sir, is extracted from my previous letter to you. As you have not attempted to answer it, I may fairly conclude, according to your own maxim, that you have "virtually admitted it." But I will give substantial evidence to confirm it, in Sir Henry Hardinge's reply to some questions which I addressed to him on the subject:—

QUESTION.

" To obviate the possibility of any misunderstand- " ing on such a point, I will call your attention to " page 76 of Mr. Long's '*Reply*,' where, in a letter " to General Le Marchant, General Long states, " 'Though the Marshal and I differ on this point, I " 'do not believe that I was more than the prescribed " 'distance' (two or three gun-shots, he says) 'from " 'the town, although *the enemy's demonstrations on* " '*my left* obliged me to extend to cover that flank.'

" I ask you if there was any the slightest ground " for such a belief by General Long? or if the enemy " ever appeared on, or near, his left?

ANSWER.

" In answer to your Lordship's questions embraced " in the extract from General Long's letter to General " Le Marchant, in the publication of 1832, page 76, " beginning with the words 'Though the Marshal " and I differ on this point,' &c. &c., I have " to state, that the order carried by me to Gene- " ral Long, was to turn the town by the shortest " line, keeping the cavalry out of the range of the

" guns of the place, which object was pressed upon
" General Long's attention in both the messages I
" conveyed to him by your order.

" To the other question I have to state, that I did
" not see any enemy on Gen. Long's left flank during
" the day, and consequently no demonstration of an
" enemy which obliged him to extend to cover that
" flank, as stated in his letter to Gen. Le Marchant;
" and that when I was sent a second time by you to
" urge him to take a shorter line, his explanation to
" me for extending to his left was, that an enemy *might*
" be concealed behind the undulating ground on his
" left, which opinion I resisted; and reported to you,
" on rejoining you, that the movement was an unneces-
" sary loss of time, as the only enemy to be seen or
" apprehended was the force moving out of Campo
" Maior on the road to Badajoz."

I thus present to the consideration of yourself and the public a broad fact, stated by Gen. Long in one of his private letters, only one month after the affair, which was distinctly pointed out to your notice in my former letter to you; which is now proved by direct evidence to be without any the least foundation, and which indeed is as strongly contradicted by Gen. Long's description of his further progress and coming up with the enemy, as it is by the above statement of Sir Henry Hardinge. I might here, sir, leave your case as quite broken down; but from respect to the public, I shall, though as summarily as possible, proceed with the consi-

deration of it. You inform me* that, since the publication of your "*Reply*," an opportunity has been afforded you "of referring to a more detailed "account of the operations than that given in Gen. "Long's Journal, in which the name of Col. Har- "dinge appears as the bearer of the order to Gen. "Long to turn the town.—I further find," you add, "the name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the "Aide-du-Camp, who appeared to flatter Gen. Long "with a hope of meriting your Lordship's approbation "by attempting something against the enemy."

These two extracts appear to be very cautiously inserted. We are not informed from what source they are derived; it must, however, be presumed that they are taken from the family archives, as it can hardly be supposed that any one would or could give a more full and particular account of the General's operations than himself.—But be this as it may, it is actually impossible that Col. Hardinge, *who never was my Aide-du-Camp,* could have been the officer who, at the moment so precisely marked in the correspondence you have published, thus flattered Gen. Long with the hope of meriting my approbation by attacking the enemy. Sir Henry Hardinge was at that time with me. It will be remembered that I twice sent that officer to desire your relative to change the direction of his movement. On his last return the cavalry was either altogether or nearly out of sight. Gen. Long was leading them, as he has described, *at a trot:* he was, in fact, on his way

* Letter, p. 28.

to re-discover an enemy which he had seen fit to lose sight of, but which, when he was put in motion, was halted before his eyes. But on this point Sir Henry Hardinge shall speak for himself. "I shall endeavour," he says, "to answer your "question whether the passage in Mr. Long's pub- "lished letter to your lordship of 1833, at p. 28, "be correct, in which he says, 'I further find the "'name of Col. Hardinge used to designate the Aide- "'du-Camp who appears to have flattered Gen. "'Long with the prospect of meriting your Lord- "'ship's approbation by attempting something against "'the enemy.'

"If I were to answer the question according to "my first impression of what I believe to be correct, "I should say, that the Aide-du-Camp holding that "communication with Gen. Long must have been "some other officer, and could not have been me. "But when I am called upon, at this distance of "time, twenty-three years after the event, to speak "to a point on which my recollection is at variance "with a written document, made by Gen. Long, "shortly after the event, I am most anxious not "to trust to my memory alone, in answering the "question. I am, therefore, obliged to be more "tedious than I could wish, and to show, by a "reference to Gen. Long's letter, addressed to Gen. "Le Marchant, dated 25th April, 1811, published in "1832, that there is so decided a mistake as to the "time and circumstances under which your Aide-du-

" Camp is stated to have joined him, that it is impos-
" sible for me to reconcile his account with my
" recollection of the facts, if I am supposed to be the
" Aide-du-Camp in question."

" At page 76, I find Gen. Long says—' I had
" ' proceeded in a direction that intersected the line of
" ' march, or rather of retreat; and as every step I
" ' took brought me more and more upon their flank,
" ' and towards their rear, it was not long before we
" ' closed so much, that I was enabled to distinguish
" ' their whole force and position. I should here
" ' mention, that one of the Marshal's Aides-du-Camp
" ' having joined me about this time, whilst I was
" ' reconnoitring the position and strength of my
" ' opponents, rather urged my attempting some-
" ' thing against them, as likely to give the Marshal,
" ' his master, considerable satisfaction.'

" The passage I have quoted represents the allied
" cavalry as having closed so much on the enemy,
" when the Aide-du-Camp joined Gen. Long, *as to*
" *enable him to distinguish the enemy's whole force*
" *and position.*

" At no period, whilst I was with Gen. Long,
" having delivered your second order, was there any
" enemy to be seen, either on his left flank, or in his
" immediate front; the enemy on the outside of the
" town on the Badajoz road being then too distant
" to distinguish their force or position.—And the
" message from your Lordship, urging Gen. Long to
" take a shorter line, would have been unnecessary

" and inapplicable to the state of things described by " Gen. Long about the time the Aide-du-Camp is " stated to have joined him."

" Further, Gen. Long being personally acquainted " with me, knew that I was the deputy Quarter- " master-general of the Portuguese army, and not " your Aide-du-Camp; and as Gen. Long's account " to Gen. Le Marchant, at p. 76, confirms mine " given at p. 8, that you and he differed as to the " mode in which he had moved the cavalry round " the town, I am confident that my letter to Mr. " Long, at p. 8, was the substance of the conver- " sation which passed between me and Gen. Long, " when I delivered your second message, urging " upon him the propriety of taking a shorter line to " intercept the enemy's retreat."

Thus, sir, it appears that Gen. Long describes a positive fact as having taken place—a fact which appeared to afford very little opening for mistake or misconstruction, and with regard to which he was deceived in every particular when writing an account of it only thirty-four days after the event. A person, sir, whose memory was so little tenacious that it deceived him on such very material points as the import of his orders,—the mode in which they were to be executed,—the individuals he saw,—and the subject of the communication he held with them,—cannot be admitted, on any point whatever, as a witness of the slightest authority.

Before I proceed any further, I will pause a

moment, to show that two short sentences in my despatch, on the affair of Campo Maior, to which you attach great value in your defence of the late Gen. Long's conduct, are wholly unavailable to your purpose. You would endeavour to make it appear that there is a discrepancy between the opinions which I then expressed and those that I at present entertain. It is with regret that I find myself compelled to deprive you of such valuable auxiliaries. The sentences of my despatch, to which you have alluded, are the following: First—"Brigadier Gen. "Long, seeing a favourable opportunity, ordered Col. "Head to charge;" and secondly, "Gen. Long manœu- "vered with great ability, and made the greatest "exertions to moderate the excessive ardour of the "cavalry, and regulate their movements."—On these expressions of commendation from my despatch, you have rung the changes with unwearied perseverance and great triumph. But, I think, a very few words will be sufficient to annihilate all the advantage to your late relative's cause, which you have so industriously, and, I must add, with so much ingenuity derived from them.—I was not present at, I was not the personal witness of, the transactions which are here commended.—An official report on such occasions must necessarily give information upon many details which have not fallen under the immediate observation of the Commander-in-chief, and are reported to him by others, and especially by those officers who commanded where he was not. Such

was precisely my case in the present instance. I saw nothing, either of Gen. Long, his corps, or their movements, during any part of the transactions that are commended in my despatch. From the time of his leaving me I did not see him again till long after the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons; and, after again catching sight of them on my advance, the first thing I saw was the affair of the Portuguese cavalry, and that at a very considerable distance.

All that part of my despatch, sir, which expressed approbation of your late relative's conduct in the affair of Campo Maior, was founded on information reported to me by that officer himself. That such is indisputably the fact, you will perceive from the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, stating the time and manner in which I was left by Gen. Long, and from every evidence relating to the period when I rejoined his corps. Had I, sir, under these circumstances, written unfavourably of your relative, what weight or value would you have attached to my account? I merely acted, as is usual on such occasions, and reported the information that was given me. I was not, I repeat, present at the evolutions against, or the attacks upon, the enemy near Campo Maior; and my report of them was made, if not in the exact words, certainly according to the tenor of the account delivered me by Gen. Long himself.—But, sir, from the manner in which I gave such information, one thing is most manifest: it is clear that my mind had imbibed no prejudice

against General Long from any thing which occurred during that day. It does not appear to me that I have really censured him in my despatch. You say that I highly eulogized him; and, as my official report was written after the affair, and on reflection, his only ground for supposing that I had imbibed any personal prejudice against him from his conduct on that occasion is removed, and both he and you are left without any assignable cause for the unfavourable feelings towards him which you have thought fit to ascribe to me, except such as naturally and gradually arose in the course of service.

I now turn, sir, to the reported capture of the 13th Light Dragoons.

You state that you did not intend to convey, by your extract from General Long's letter of 29th May, 1811, that "he *then first* became acquainted with "the report that such an idea (as that of the capture) "had existed in the minds of some persons, but that "he then *first* heard Baron Trip had stated it as a "*fact direct!*" The distinction is curious; but you have a right to give an explanation of your own words, and I have no doubt but such was the sense in which you designed them to be received. But it was not, sir, so much *your* showing on this point, as that of *General Long*, upon which I was commenting. And I do not believe that any person could read the isolated passage from his letter, which is given in your "*Reply*," without inferring from it that your relative had then, three months after the affair, heard of

the report for the first time. I will here repeat that extract.

"Things come out by degrees: *General Lumley* "*has told me a fact I was never before acquainted* "*with, and which accounts for the Marshal's feel-* "*ings and conduct at the time.* After the charge "of the 13th Dragoons, an officer rode up to the "Marshal, and assured him that the whole of that "regiment had been surrounded by the enemy and "carried off."

General Long does not here drop the slightest intimation of his ever having had the idea of such an occurrence suggested to him before by a single individual, nor is the name of Baron Tripp alluded to. But you can show in evidence, you say, that he was previously aware of it. I want not the evidence. Supposing that it could have been a matter of doubt, your assurance on the subject would have been sufficient; but, sir, I have, myself, in my former letter to you, distinctly proved that he knew it.—Indeed it had been proved in your former publication, for Col. Doyle says* that on coming to where I was, towards the end of the affair, he then learnt "it had been re-"ported that the 13th had been all cut to pieces or "bodily taken," and adds, that he "of course re-"turned and acquainted the Brigadier General of "what he had been told." But the fact which I propose to show, and which I hope to do most distinctly, is, that General Long was not only aware of the

* C. E. Long's "Reply," p. 50, note.

report at the time, but that he, himself, was the person who communicated it to me. I certainly quoted the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge, with the understanding that General Long was in the group at head-quarters. After the halt, nearly every one of the general staff assembled there, or came momentarily, either from curiosity or for information; and my memory assures me that your relative was among the number. Sir Henry Hardinge intimates that he was there, in stating that Col. Head, on regaining head-quarters and hearing the report, "expressed himself "warmly, directing his remarks against General Long "and Baron Tripp."—If this passage does not actually declare the presence of General Long, it at least proves that Col. Head had heard and believed him to have given the information; I admit, as I before admitted, that Baron Tripp was in this group, and that he assisted in spreading the report. You have brought forward the evidence of Col. Leighton, Major Doherty, and others, to show that this report did not originate with your relative. The officers whose statements you have produced are, most undoubtedly, gentlemen of the highest honour and credit; but to what does their testimony amount?—It is all of a mere negative description.—They either say that they did not *hear* of the report coming from General Long," or that "they did not *understand* it to come from General Long." Such evidence can be of no avail against the positive evidence by which it is opposed. The Count de Villa Real proves that I saw and

spoke to General Long, who then actually reported to me the capture of the 13th Light Dragoons. I thus, sir, received the intelligence from the officer who was in command of the corps, who was on the spot, who saw what passed, who was the best channel of information on the subject, and who was, certainly, the only channel which I was likely to apply to. That we met at the time indicated could scarcely be doubted, even without the evidence of the Count de Villa Real. It is proved, beyond dispute, that I made but a momentary stop with the heavy brigade, and then passed on to the front. From this place to General Long and to the enemy was not more than 500 yards.—Where then, or to whom, did I go? There was but one corps of three squadrons remaining; and with that corps your relative was. To them, therefore, I necessarily went. It is impossible to suppose any other course of proceeding, and that I pursued that course is confirmed by the statement of the Count de Villa Real, which is itself confirmed by the circumstances of the time. Yet, sir, there does not appear a single expression in the passages you have hitherto produced from your family archives, in which General Long makes any allusion to these events; on the contrary, he clearly intends it to be understood that we never met, still less spoke to each other, during the whole course of the affair, and he sends me *to a distance* with the Heavy Brigade which it is proved I was not with, and to a spot where it is equally proved that corps never was. All this, it must

be admitted, is singularly strange. But I shall at once wind up my review of this point with the conclusive statement of Lieut.-Col. Owen. This officer was then a captain of one of the three squadrons of Portuguese cavalry which remained with General Long after the disappearance of the 13th Dragoons. His letter, after describing the affair, proceeds in these words: "Soon after the halt, a staff-officer rode up to "me with an order to go to the Marshal. As he had "known me long before, he kindly said to me, on my "way, 'Be careful how you answer the questions "'going to be asked you; for it is reported that the "'13th are all prisoners, and the cavalry move-"'ments are all paralyzed.' When I reached the "Marshal he said, 'Where do you come from, Capt. "'Owen? Are you hurt?'—I was covered with dust, "my overalls torn, and my cap lost.—I answered, "'I come from the mélée, sir; my horse was thrown.' "The Marshal said, 'Have you seen any thing of the "'13th Dragoons?' 'Yes, sir, they passed me in "'pursuit of, and are beating the enemy.'—The Mar-"shal replied, '*Why, General Long tells me they are* "'*all taken prisoners.*'—I answered, 'That I was not "'of that opinion; that I knew the ground well, and "'did not believe that the regiment could have been "'taken.' The Marshal then said to General Long, "'Do you hear, sir, what this officer says?' The "General made some observation, with which I can-"not charge my memory, when the Marshal some-"what angrily turned quick round to him, 'Damn it,

" 'sir, why did you not do something?—why did " 'you not support them, or send to bring them " 'back?'"

I give the words as I find them plainly recorded by Col. Owen. No one, I think, after reading the above, will doubt whether General Long was, or was not, the person who reported to me the capture of the 13th Light Dragoons.

Allusion is made, in Col. Doyle's evidence, to the support of the 13th by the Heavy Brigade; and in the 46th page of your letter to me you observe, " I " am of opinion that both your Lordship and the " Count appeared to have laboured under an utter " misapprehension of my relative's meaning. He " may have said (I do not state that he even said " that) that the regiments, if not supported, might " be taken prisoners or cut to pieces. I merely offer " this in solution of the mystery." This, in very truth, does appear to me a most strange comment on a very plain matter of fact. It is a curious guess, and a still more curious mode of disproving testimony which you would not, I fancy, be inclined even to attempt in Westminster Hall.—But, sir, if you had had recourse to the assistance of any military friend, he might have informed you that the support ought to have been given *by your relative*, when the charge was made, or when the pursuit began, and that when my conversation with him took place, it was altogether too late to render such support, as the

13th Dragoons were out of sight, and their position and circumstances perfectly unknown to me. I have also, in my former letter, proved, from his own correspondence, as given in your own publication, that General Long never intended the Heavy Brigade to support the 13th Dragoons.

The last point that I shall take notice of on this subject is part of the evidence of Lieut.-Col. Macalister. He, as is the case with the other respectable officers whom you have adduced, only speaks negatively. He says, "It is the first time that I ever "heard General Long's name coupled with the report "to which you allude."

I implicitly believe the above; and he adds, "I "remember to have heard him frequently express "himself in the most unqualified terms of indignation "against the author of what he termed a *wicked* and "*scandalous* report."

Even supposing that General Long had not been the officer who originally informed me of the capture of the 13th Dragoons, knowing, as he did, from Col. Doyle, that such a report had been made and was prevalent, it is very extraordinary that he did not hasten to me, as every military man knows it was his bounden duty to have done, and inform me of what he considered the real state of the case;—and be it remembered, I was then not more than 300 yards from him. But how very extraordinary does it also appear, that after having ascertained, as he states, that

Baron Tripp was the originator and propagator of the account, and regarding it in the odious light described by Col. Macalister, he should never have required any explanation from that officer, nor ever have made any representation or complaint against him on the subject. The Baron still appears, after the date of this discovery, to have remained with your relative in the same state of social intercourse; and he probably went to his grave without ever receiving any mark of his General's displeasure, though named in his private letters as the author of a report, against which, in conversation, he had been frequently heard to express the most "*unqualified indignation*," and to describe as "*wicked* and *scandalous*."

I now proceed to consider the position, object, and movements of the Heavy Brigade during this affair of the cavalry. The representation of Brigadier-Gen. Long is positive, direct and circumstantial on this point, and is given with a marked design and application.

In his letter to General Le Marchant, he writes, "On looking round to make proper arrangements and "dispositions, I discovered, to my astonishment that "the whole of the Heavy Brigade, which I had stationed in my rear in two lines, but outflanking to "the right *to support me*, and *observe the column of "infantry*, had been drawn across to the other side "of the valley, and were halted on the opposite "height about two miles from me." Now, sir, what

character must we attach to General Long's correspondence, if it be shown again, as it already has been, in my former letter, that no such movements as those which he has above described ever occurred; and that, consequently, no plan of his could have been marred by them? I quite agree with you that there may be *vagueness* in your relative's, or in any one's, account of distances on such an occasion; and, if the above extract referred to distances only, I should be most willing to make every reasonable allowance for any mistake that he might have incurred. But in the present case there was an express object for describing the Heavy Brigade as removed to the station assigned them by General Long. He wished to prove that his plans were frustrated by their being taken so far off; and it cannot be expected that that allowance for error in the computation of distances, which might be available, under ordinary circumstances, to another, should be granted to him; when that error constitutes the very grounds on which he endeavours to justify himself, and to cast reproach upon his commander. But, sir, it is distinctly proved by Sir C. D'Albiac, that the Heavy Brigade never deviated from its direct line, in proceeding, as it was ordered, to take post near, and on the right of, the enemy's column. He says, in answer to your 7th question, "I should say the Heavy Brigade halted "for some minutes (not a quarter of an hour), after "which it descended from the rising ground *in the* "*direction of Badajoz.*" And again, "The Heavy

" Brigade crossed the road to Badajoz, and formed " line about 250 yards short of the enemy; the left " of the brigade bearing on two of Major Hartman's " guns placed on the Badajoz road." You say, "*it* " *was first halted,* and then moved in a direction " away from General Long." But this is the very reverse of your relative's own story. He says, it was first moved in a direction away from him, and then halted two miles off. You have not advanced any authority to support the above assertion; unless the note of Col. Doyle, which is attached to this part of your letter to me, is meant as such, and which could be of no avail against the clear and direct evidence of Sir Charles D'Albiac, as published in your former pamphlet. But what does Col. Doyle say?—His note is given in explanation of his own previous note and of my remarks upon it. His words are, "In page " 27, Lord Beresford says, 'Col. Doyle, in his note, " ' appears to confirm this statement,' viz., 'that Lord " ' Beresford not only sent the Heavy Brigade two " ' miles across the plain, but accompanied it in per- " ' son.'" "I" (says Col. Doyle) "*mention no dis-* " *tance in my note,* which refers solely to the move- " ment of the Heavy Brigade from the left to right " of the Badajoz road, instead of direct to the front; " neither do I here mention *anything regarding* " *Marshal Beresford's person.*"

The explanation which Col. Doyle here offers of the note published in your "*Reply,*" confirms the opinion respecting it that I suggested in my former

letter to you. He states, that "his observations "merely related to the movement of the Heavy Bri-"gade from the left to the right of the road, instead "of direct to the front." This brigade was on the left of the road. General Long's small remaining force was on the same side and in front of it, the enemy were on the road; and consequently, to place itself to the right of the enemy as ordered, the Heavy Brigade must necessarily have crossed the road, as Col. Doyle has stated; but, so far was it from making any circuit in effecting this operation, that, Sir C. D'Albiac informs you, it went to its point in a direct line. He tells you that, on receiving the order to advance, "the brigade descended from the rising "ground, where it had been halted, in the direction "of Badajoz." Thus it appears, sir, that the Heavy Brigade, so far from proceeding in a different direction to the enemy, was marching on the very same point with them, and did not cross the road till it came within two hundred and fifty yards of them. This distance was most certainly not increased after crossing that road; where (as Sir C. D'Albiac has said) "the Heavy Brigade formed in line near the "enemy." Thus, sir, the account in your relative's letter is found to be fallacious, in every particular. I will here give what General Long has stated, as published in your "*Reply*" *—"Upon turning back, "however, he (General Long) discovered that the "Heavy Brigade had been withdrawn from the situ-

* C. E. Long's Reply, p. 34.

"ation he had directed them to keep, and halted two "miles off, on a slope of ground across a valley on "the other side of the route, Fig. 2, and moreover "putting a valley and impassable ditch between "them." In this Figure 2, your relative has absolutely indicated the line of march which this brigade took on returning from its distant position, thus—



It is quite impossible to mistake General Long's meaning in the above extract and accompanying plan; and they are too particular and circumstantial to allow the admission of any plea of "*vagueness of distance*" as an excuse for the gross errors they contain. But I will cite another passage from your relative's correspondence on the same point. "Col. "Otway," he states,* "with the two supporting "squadrons, disbanded also in pursuit, and away they "all raced, without further support, to the bridge of "Badajoz. On looking round to make fresh "arrangements and dispositions, I discovered, *to my* "*astonishment*, that the whole of the Heavy Brigade, "which I had stationed in my rear in two lines, but "outflanking to the right, to support me and observe "the column of infantry, had been drawn across to

* Letter to General Le Marchant.—C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79.

" the other side of the valley, and were halted on the " opposite height about two miles from me." Now, sir, I believe that every one of the facts which Gen. Long has here stated has been proved incorrect. It has been shown that the halt of this brigade was only for a few minutes; that it took place at the spot and time I passed it; that it was on the left of the road; that, therefore, it neither did, nor could, have moved across a valley on the other side of this road; that, on being again put in motion, the corps pursued the enemy in the direction of Badajoz, so as to place itself on their right flank, and cross the road at only 250 yards in their rear; and that it continued in this position till the general halt. It is, moreover, proved that I came up with the brigade at about 500 yards in rear of the enemy; that my stay with it was only momentary; that, having halted it, I passed on to the front; that I saw and spoke with General Long immediately after; and that I did not rejoin the Heavy Brigade from the time of my passing it in the first instance, till it came within about 250 yards of the enemy.

Sir C. D'Albiac and the Count de Villa Real establish the above facts beyond dispute; and Col. Doyle, who is no longer (indeed I never thought he was) a witness in favour of General Long's most extraordinary statement, tells us that he " never, in his former note, referred to distance," and, by his present explanation, as given by yourself, confirms the testimony of Sir Charles D'Albiac: while, with regard to

my being with this cavalry beyond the impassable ditch, he states, that on being sent by General Long to order up the Heavy Brigade, "he found Marshal "Beresford and his staff with two of Major Hartman's "guns contiguous to the Badajoz road, and not above "300 yards from the enemy;" and concludes this note with saying, "Be this as it may," (the distances,) "I was only sent once during the day to Marshal "Beresford, and this was only at the close of the "affair." All these several accounts agree with my recollections of the occurrences of the day, and with what every military man would consider as the natural course of events. I left our column of infantry on the point where we first halted on coming in view of Campo Maior. After I had lost sight of the cavalry under Brigadier-General Long, I went in pursuit of them, and from the height I was going on, caught sight of them again at a distance of about half a mile from me. On descending towards them, I first came up with the Heavy Brigade, which was in the rear, and halted it, on account of my perceiving that a great confusion existed among our light cavalry near the enemy, and that very few of them were to be seen. I then passed on to the front, to learn how matters stood; and having received General Long's report, I sent back instructions for the Heavy Brigade to advance, and for two of the nearest guns to be sent forward. Till these arrived I remained with or near the remaining Portuguese and the enemy, from which I was not seen at any moment after, at a distance of more than 300 yards.

The evidence of Col. Doyle has left, sir, another vacuum to be filled up. He was most clearly not the officer whom General Long says he sent to me, when I was two miles off, and who is described as desiring me to bring up the Heavy Brigade, which it does not appear I was with till it came within 250 yards of the enemy, and from a position which it is quite certain that corps was never near. There is thus, sir, a great deal more than an inaccurate estimate of distances to be accounted for; and to a most strange vagueness of vision, or of conception, must that man be subject, who could suppose that a person whom he had just seen and spoken with, and who was not more than a distance of 300 yards from him, was two miles off! However, I leave the point to the judgment of the reader.

In the 55th, 56th, and 57th pages of your last publication, you have argued at some length to prove that that passage of my letter to you, in which I say "it does not appear that Col. de Grey, who com-"manded the Heavy Brigade, had any orders what-"ever respecting the 13th Light Dragoons," is inconsistent with that part of my official account of the affair which describes the charge (that of the 13th Light Dragoons) as "followed by Col. Otway with "two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, and *supported* "by General Long with the remnant of that regi-"ment and the brigade of Col. de Grey." I repeat, sir, that I was not on the spot when these events occurred; and any military man will inform you that,

on such occasions, the General in Chief states what is reported to him by the officer actually in command. In the present instance, that officer was Brigadier-General Long. In commenting on the passage, you observe, that, in 1811, when writing my despatch, I "really thought that the Heavy Brigade did actu-"ally support somebody or something." I then believed and reported what was reported to me. It was not possible for me to state, on my own authority, that which I did not witness. And I never doubted the truth of that report, sir, till I read, in your own publication, General Long's explicit contradiction of the account he had supplied me with for that part of my despatch, in which I was obliged to trust to his intelligence. It was in your own "*Reply*" that I found the evidence which proved that Col. de Grey, who commanded the Heavy Brigade, had no orders whatever respecting the 13th Dragoons; and, consequently, that the account of the support, which General Long had caused me to insert in the despatch, was as imaginary as many of the details of his correspondence have been shown to be. The quotation you adduce from Sir C. D'Albiac's first answer, as given in your former pamphlet, is quite inapplicable to the subject. "His impression," he says, "was that the allied cavalry were to attack "that of the enemy, if a favourable opportunity "offered." This evidence is general as to the cavalry, and can have no allusion to any detail, or particular events. Besides, it was given in answer

to a question that referred to a time antecedent even to the first movement of the cavalry from the first halt before Campo Maior. I shall here cite the question to which the above answer applies, that the reader may perceive what a very extraordinary mode you have of making use of your evidence. Your question to Sir C. D'Albiac was, "When the allied "cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General "Long, was ordered to advance on the morning of "the 25th of March, 1811, was it your impression "that no attack was on any account to be made on "the enemy's cavalry?" It is quite manifest, sir, that no answer to the above question can fairly be brought to bear upon the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons, which happened at an after period of the day. The orders to the cavalry, as supposed by Sir C. D'Albiac, relate only to what might occur during a general movement on the advance. But you have furnished us with your relative's own account of the directions which he gave on coming up with, and on proceeding to the attack of the enemy. He informs us, in one place,* that he "commanded the Heavy "Brigade *to support him,* and observe the column "of infantry;" and in another place†, that he followed "to support the attack of the 13th; still "supposing the Heavy Brigade in his rear occu-"pying the attention of the remaining part of the "enemy's force." Such, sir, is your relative's own account, and it seems extraordinary that *you* should

* C. E. Long's Reply, p. 79. † Idem. p. 46.

question its accuracy; though any other person might say it was contradictory. To conclude this point, I will merely observe that, though I might, as you say, "suppose the Heavy Brigade supported somebody or "something," I could not possibly suppose that, after the charge, it supported the 13th Light Dragoons; for, on reaching the field, I found the Heavy Brigade 500 yards in rear of the enemy, and the 13th Light Dragoons not anywhere within sight.

With regard to what you designate "the order of "reprimand," it is only necessary for me to say that the account which appeared in my dispatch was taken from your relative's after-report of the events that had taken place. I have had occasion more than once to mention, what every military man is perfectly aware of, that, for facts of which I was not an eye-witness, my intelligence could only be derived from the officer in command on the spot. I have never said, sir, that Colonel Head was altogether blameless; but I have said, and I repeat, that the statements of Colonel Doyle, Sir Henry Watson, and Colonel Otway, prove the account given in your relative's correspondence, as published by yourself, respecting the 13th Light Dragoons and the Portuguese under Otway after the charge, to have been altogether without foundation; and, as that account exactly corresponds with my official report of the affair, it very clearly indicates the source from which the information contained in my report was derived.

You next speak of the state of the artillery horses. Upon this point you adduce the evidence of Colonel Doyle, who says, "it was currently stated that the "officer commanding the Artillery (Major Hartman) "had been anxious to bring up the entire brigade," and of Major, now Sir Julius, Hartman, who confirms this account. To the last-mentioned officer, (since Colonel Doyle only speaks of what was rumoured, without pretending to have any personal knowledge of the subject,) the authority on your side of the question is confined, and it can hardly be regarded as sufficient to stand against the opposing testimony of Sir Henry Hardinge, the Count de Villa Real, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban. An extract from a work of Sir Julius Hartman has been cited by Colonel Napier, as evidence upon certain events at the village of Albuera, during the battle to which it has given the name; and no one who has read the exposure of the strange misstatements embodied in that extract, will thenceforward feel inclined to attach much value to the accuracy of its author. On the present subject, his account is given from memory. I can only say, that his recollections are diametrically opposed to mine. At the time the two guns in question arrived and commenced firing, I was with my staff on the right flank of and near to the enemy's column; and it was not till they had fired a few shots, and every one around me was complaining of the little effect produced—I did not see

any—that I proceeded to the guns. After being some short time with them, I urged the officer who commanded them to take up a position nearer the enemy; but he replied that his horses were so fatigued, as to render it impossible for him to continue the pursuit any longer. Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir B. D'Urban, and the Count de Villa Real, my Aid-de-Camp, were all with me; and it was on receiving this answer that I commanded the whole to halt. But, Sir, this is one of those cases in which argument is useless. The facts speak for themselves. What other probable, or imaginable, motive could there have been for my order at this moment? I had sent up for these two guns, which, could they have continued to act, would have proved quite sufficient for the object, perfectly conscious that, if I withheld my cavalry from going upon the enemy, he could not possibly do me any injury. With what imaginable view, then, should I have prevented these guns from injuring him, if they could have continued so to do? The case speaks for itself. As to Sir Julius Hartman's proposal of bringing forward the whole brigade of Artillery, I should like to know to whom and when it was made. He does not say that it was made to me, though that may appear to be his meaning; neither does he intimate at what moment it was made. If it was when he received the order for the advance of the two guns, it could not have been to me, as I was then two miles in front of him: if it was when the guns were desired

to halt, this would appear, under the circumstances, an extraordinary time for addressing such a proposal to a Commander in Chief. I have not the slightest recollection of ever receiving any such suggestion; and to say the least of it, I could not but have regarded such a proposal from Major Hartman very strange and unmilitary, when, having sent for two of this brigade, I must have been perfectly aware that at the spot they came from there were still four others remaining. Sir Julius Hartman says, "the Artil-"lery were immediately in the rear of the advanced "guard," that is, of the advance of the infantry. We have more than enough evidence to show that that advanced guard was about two miles in the rear.—You observe upon this, "Sir Henry Hardinge's "informant was most egregiously in error." Sir Henry Hardinge, sir, was his own informant; he was an eye-witness present with me on the occasion.

I will now proceed to the case of Lieut.-Colonel Colborne, respecting which, with an evident, but, I trust, a very short-lived triumph, you say,* "As this offer of Sir John Colborne," (to cut off the enemy's baggage), "given in p. 70 of my Reply, has unfortu-"nately escaped your Lordship's notice, I am tempted "to relieve it from its obscurity by the evidence of "Colonel Macalister of the 13th, who was attached "to that Officer on the occasion in question. His

* C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 63.

" reply respecting the baggage before the attack, " and the guns after the attack, is as follows:—

" 'I always understood,' says Colonel Macalister, " 'that Sir John Colborne had made an offer to cut " 'off the baggage. With respect to the guns I am " 'positive, as I volunteered the service myself, and " 'I understood from Sir John that the Marshal " 'would not allow it, saying that too much had " 'been done, or words to that effect."—It is true, sir, that I did not take any notice of this passage in my former letter. One reason of this omission was, that the absurdity of the account, as far as I was concerned, appeared to be evinced by a single line of it. Colonel Macalister has stated " that Sir John Col- " borne sent back word to beg he might be sup- " ported." It is clear, as was proved in my letter to you, that at the time indicated I had left the infantry to follow the cavalry, and, therefore, could not by any possibility have returned Sir John Colborne an answer from the rear, where I was not. But, I confess, my principal reason for omitting to mention it was my not retaining the slightest recollection of the circumstances; and it was not till after my previous letter to you was written that I sent Sir John Colborne the passage from General Long's Letter to C. B. L. of the 3rd Dec. 1811, in which the statement concerning him is made, and requested him to inform me how far it was correct. I shall lay his account of the transaction before you. It will not be found to confirm the statements either of General

Long or Colonel Macalister. This latter officer, by-the-by, talks of having "volunteered his services to "cut off the enemy's guns," which he never could have seen, as they never were within sight of Colonel Colborne, but were, as is on all hands acknowledged, a great distance in front of the enemy —about a league—and were never seen by any one except those who advanced with the 13th. This is passing strange!—But we will proceed to Sir John Colborne's Letter.

"*York, U. Canada, May* 25, 1833.

"I have been for so long a time and so fully "occupied in the situation which I at present hold, "that I have paid but little attention to military "publications.

"I am anxious, however, to inform you, in answer "to your note of the 3rd March, that I met General "Long frequently at Villa Viçosa after the affair at "Campo Maior, and my Brigade Major was after-"wards attached to his brigade of cavalry. I may, "therefore, have conversed with him on the move-"ments of which we were all at that period interested "in giving our own version. I will state to you the "impression which I now have of the extent of my "conversation *with him*, or *with any person*, on the "occurrences that were brought under my notice "connected with the affair of Campo Maior.

"At Arronches I was very unexpectedly appointed "to command the advanced guard of your corps

" d'armée from the bivouac, between Arronches and " Campo Maior, on the morning of the march on that " place. When we arrived at the commencement " of the hill, where the arrangements were made " for ascending the position near Campo Maior, I " found the whole of my advanced guard disposed of " and placed under the immediate command of Sir " W. Lumley, with the exception of a squadron or " troop of cavalry and the 66th regiment. Sir W. " Stewart, perceiving that I had received no orders " to advance, rode up to me and desired me to ascend " the hill with the cavalry and the 66th regiment to " the right of the town. I immediately hastened up " the hill with Major Boyce in command of the squa- " dron, and ordered the 66th to follow. I had pa- " trolled up this hill a few hours before daylight, " and alarmed a picket of the enemy, and was, " therefore, persuaded that the town was evacuated. " On reaching the summit of the hill southward of " Campo Maior, accompanied by the squadron of " cavalry, I observed a column of French infantry, " protected by cavalry, marching rapidly towards " Badajoz, abandoning from time to time two or " three horses or mules, apparently loaded with " baggage. The head of the column was a very " short distance from Campo Maior. I moved " through some inclosures to the southward, and " ordered the 66th regiment to follow the cavalry " under my command, as rapidly as possible. While

" we were greatly excited, and the commanding " officer of the 66th receiving my instructions, an " Aid-de-Camp from the General commanding the " brigade came from the northward of the town, " and delivered me a message that I was separating " too far from him. I hastily said, 'Tell the General " 'I can see better than he can from this ground;' " and proceeded through a small ravine or valley, at " a gallop, till we found ourselves on the flank of the " enemy's column, and, perhaps, at about six or seven " hundred yards from it. I think we must have been " in this situation not more than a quarter of an hour " after we had separated from Sir W. Stewart.

" We halted when the French column formed " square, and their cavalry trotted towards Col. " Head's squadrons to receive their charge. After " this charge the two bodies of cavalry were so mixed " that we could scarcely judge of the result, till the " infantry opened a fire on the 13th Dragoons, on " their passing through their opponents.

" The French retired, pursued by our cavalry, " and, from the ground we occupied, the Portuguese " Skirmishers and the Heavy Brigade appeared to " be advancing in the form of a crescent. I men- " tion all these details to explain to you that what- " ever conversation I may have had with General " Long, it must have referred to my detached corps, " and to the accidental position in which we were " placed. *I never communicated with any officer of*

" *your staff, nor with any General during the affair,*
" *nor received any message except that which I have*
" *related above.*"

I omit, for the sake of brevity, some further details in this letter, all of which, however, are corroborative of the foregoing account, as will be clear from its conclusion. " I advert to these circumstances, that " Sir W. Lumley and Major Boyce may confirm " my statements, and that they may show how far " it is probable that I made the remarks attributed to " me. In fact, I am positive that I have now com- " municated to you the *substance of all my conver-* " *sation with General Long, or with any other* " *officer* relative to the affair of Campo Maior."

The reader will here perceive that I had nothing whatever to do with the movements of Sir John Colborne, but that they were divisional or brigade arrangements. I do not believe they were ever reported to me, probably because they had no particular result.

You have, sir, as you say, though under the impression of a different result, enabled me " to relieve " this matter from its obscurity." The whole story, as related in your relation's correspondence, turns out to have been no more than a mere creature of his imagination, fostered, it is true, by yourself, and receiving some degree of sanction from the vague and imperfect recollections of Col., then Capt., Macalister. It is curious to observe that, notwithstanding the very prominent part this latter officer ascribes to himself in

the transactions in question, Sir John Colborne does not appear to recollect that any such person was near him. His name is never mentioned. No one circumstance of his evidence is alluded to; and what he states respecting the cutting off the baggage, the capturing the guns, and the directions which he attributes to me, is positively contradicted by Sir John Colborne; unless, indeed, the two or three horses or mules, which were from time to time abandoned by the enemy, constituted the baggage which Col. Macalister proposed to cut off, but which, according to Sir John Colborne, had been cast off. Is it not intolerable, sir, that I should be called upon, after such a lapse of years, to defend myself against imputations, produced upon the authority of a private and hidden correspondence, and these confused and imperfect recollections of regimental or subaltern officers?—Is such conduct fair and just?—It is, sir, an extraordinary thing that I should be able to rebut such attacks at all. If Sir John Colborne had not survived to declare the truth, what defence could I have put up? I could have done no more than simply state that I had no remembrance of the circumstance; and what would that have availed me?—It would only have afforded matter for sarcasm and ironical observations. Yet, how clear and simple does this military operation appear, when truly described by the officer who commanded. You also conceive, sir, that glorious results would have ensued if General Stewart's proposal had been acted upon,

and Sir John Colborne's wishes had been attended to. The foregoing letter has spoiled this combination.—But with regard to the proposal of General Stewart: I am surprised that an officer of Col. Doyle's experience and judgment should have noticed it, or assisted in propagating a rumour of this description. It is not, indeed, said to whom this proposal of Gen. Stewart's was communicated; but it is, of course, to be inferred that he made it to myself. Now it has been distinctly shown in my former letter to you, and also, I believe, in the "*Strictures*," that during my course after General Long and the cavalry, the Count de Villa Real brought me information of the enemy having evacuated Campo Maior, and that, on receiving the intelligence, I sent back to order our infantry to advance. I thus never saw Sir W. Stewart from the time he and the infantry were ordered to advance, until they rejoined us after the final halt. He could not, therefore, have made the proposal in question to me. This sets the rumour at rest, as far as I am concerned with it.—But, indeed, the instructions which were sent back to Sir W. Stewart* were of such a nature, that, as he com-

* The Count de Villa Real relates that, having been desired by me to ascertain whether the town was evacuated, he spoke to some persons on the ramparts, from whom he learned that the French, after having sent on before them the artillery to Badajoz, had left the town. "I returned," he says, "towards Marshal "Beresford immediately, *and met him at some distance from the* "*infantry*, going towards the cavalry. He sent immediately to "the infantry to advance as quickly as possible, but so that it "might not be exhausted on coming up with the enemy."

manded the leading division, he would have been fully authorized in acting during the absence of the Commander in Chief, as he is said to have proposed, if he had really considered such a measure as expedient. So much for the validity of all these *rumours*, against which I have to defend myself.

You have said a great deal, sir, about a discretionary order which General Long in his private correspondence has thought fit to represent himself as having received from me. He writes to General Le Marchant*, "However, I had a conversation in "the morning with the Marshal. He told me the "enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry, and that "I must hug the infantry for support, if necessary. "I asked him *peremptorily*, if I should attack them "wherever I met them. His answer was, 'Do not "'commit yourself against a superior force; but, if "'the opportunity to strike occurs, avail yourself of "'it.'" On a former occasion, not wishing to meet this extraordinary statement of General Long by a mere unsupported contradiction of my own, I showed you how inconsistent it was with what he had written in other places, and what he is known to have done.—But the whole account involves a mass of contradictions and inconsistencies. The latter half forgets the beginning—He informs us that "I first "cautioned him not to expose himself, telling him "that the enemy was exceedingly strong in cavalry:" Here, by-the-by, I must have told him more than I

* C. E. Long's Reply, p. 75.

knew, and more than proved to be the case. Next, sir, this inferior officer "*peremptorily*" demands from his superior, decided orders:—and for what? Why, it would appear that he was preparing for some service which was to be effected at a distance, and not immediately in the view and under the control of the Commander in Chief. He asks if he should attack the enemy "wherever he met them;" and my answer, as he has reported it, is precisely such as would be given on the understanding that he was about to execute some duty where I should not be present. No officer, I apprehend, ever heard of such a question under similar circumstances. He goes on to say, "With these instructions I proceeded "to move, and was ordered to the front (as usual) "with all the cavalry. The "*as usual*," here, might have been very well left out; as this was positively the *first* time, since your relative joined, that we had come near the enemy. He then moved on, having the light portion of his division supported by the Heavy Brigade. "I followed," he says, "implicitly "the *instructions* I received as far as the ground "permitted." It is thus, then, clear that he had particular and precise instructions, in pursuance of which he proceeds to file his column across the ravine, drives the enemy's pickets back on Campo Maior, advances across a plain, and halts about a mile from the town. He now perceives the enemy's cavalry, and informs us that they began to manœuvre behind the heights, as if intending an attack upon

him; and that he employed himself in making, what he considered, the best dispositions to counteract their intentions, "waiting the Marshal's further "orders."—Here then, again, he distinctly proves that he did not consider himself acting under such general and discretionary orders as he had before represented himself as receiving, and with respect to which I can say no more than that, if the conversation General Long has reported ever took place, it has totally escaped my recollection. But, I think, every military man will allow that a conversation of the nature described could scarcely have arisen under the circumstances of the time, and that it was wholly inapplicable to the occasion, which required that the several arms should act in unity and conjunction, a combination which could only be effected under one command.—But what General Long has stated is not only inconsistent with our then position, but is altogether inconsistent with itself. I caution him, because the enemy is exceedingly strong in cavalry, to hug the infantry; and he consequently abandons the infantry entirely, and sets out after the exceedingly strong cavalry of the enemy supported by their infantry. He has precise orders for his approach to Campo Maior; and, on coming in sight of it, he halts his corps to wait my further instructions. He receives his new orders, is put in motion, is twice informed that he is not fulfilling my intentions, and peremptorily desired to conform to them; but he pays no regard to these repeated commands, and

then endeavours to shelter himself under the pretence of some previous order, which, if it ever existed, had been superseded and annulled by the recent and direct instructions applied to the occasion itself as it occurred.

On this case you further observe*: "Either General "Long was intrusted with the direction of the "cavalry operations, or he was not. If he *was*, "your Lordship should, I submit, have allowed him "to carry his intentions into effect. If he was *not*, "your Lordship should have been at hand, to have "directed him, as you say, *immediately* and *per-* "*sonally*." If this is the reasoning of a civilian, it may be smiled at and excused; but, if it has been directed by any military critic, it is not very creditable to its author. General Long was the officer in command of the cavalry; but, sir, they were not *his* intentions, but *mine*, that he had to carry into effect, and after the manner that I directed. In the first instance, he might have mistaken his orders; but he was informed *twice*, of the mistake which he had made; and, persisting in disobeying my instructions, he withdrew the cavalry from me. I had momentarily other points to attend to, before I could go after him. His letter has informed you of the pace he proceeded at, and, considering the distance to which he had removed himself from me by the time Sir Henry Hardinge returned from his second message, it is manifest, your relative had precluded

* C. E. Long's Letter, p. 65.

the possibility of my being, as you say, "at hand to "direct him." It has been seen that, though I went after him at a quick pace, so far was I from being able to be "at hand," that the 13th Dragoons had made their charge, and were out of sight before my arrival. So much for your well-advised paragraph.

I consider your evidence to show, that the Portuguese cavalry did not charge the French infantry by orders of General Long, as perfectly satisfactory, and acknowledge myself in error with regard to that fact. Looking down on the parties, at the distance of half a mile to the rear, I might easily have been deceived as to whether the affair I witnessed was between our cavalry and that of the enemy, or between our cavalry and his infantry—the whole being close together. My attention, in the distance, was first attracted by the fire of the enemy's infantry, and seeing our cavalry flying from it immediately afterwards, I concluded that they had charged and were repulsed. It appears that I was in error; but I do not perceive what General Long can possibly gain by my mistake. It is almost more incomprehensible that he should have exposed his light cavalry to the fire of the enemy, without intending to make any attack. But this point I will not discuss: my only object in reverting to this movement, is to acknowledge that I was deceived with regard to the nature of it.

ALBUERA.

You have, sir, filled several pages to prove, if I

clearly understand the drift of them, that General Long had not sufficient instructions to direct him on the approach of the enemy to the battle of Albuera, and that he was not informed in time of the point of his retreat.

I shall merely observe in reply, that I never received the slightest hint of such a circumstance until, some twenty years after the events, you thought fit so to state, on the authority of your late relative's private correspondence. You demand,* "Are we to understand that General Long did not "repeatedly apply for orders?" This, sir, has never been denied. On the contrary, he was considered as making those applications far too frequently and most unnecessarily. The Quarter-master-general's letter of the 14th of May, from Valverde, will pretty distinctly point out the feeling entertained at head-quarters respecting General Long's correspondence. The second paragraph shows, that your relative was thought to entertain opinions which were neither founded on the instructions he had received, nor fitting the nature of his position. The third shows, that he was considered as too timid of incurring any responsibility. From such responsibility, however, it appears that I had no objection to relieve him, and consequently issued to him such precise and detailed instructions, as I had never previously thought it necessary to deliver to any officer in a similar position, and such as I am certain never

* C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 82.

ought to have been required. I should be glad to be informed, if any other general officer of cavalry, situated as General Long was, would not have considered such orders as your relative applied for and received as derogatory to his military skill and intelligence? Every document you have published proves him to have had the most ample notice that he was to retire on Santa Martha, three leagues from Albuera. And on the 14th, he writes from the former place*, "as far as my private opinion goes, I "have no reason to expect that I shall be forced "from this position *to-day*, nor *perhaps to-morrow*." The above was stated after receiving a report from the Alcalde of Los Santos, three or four leagues in advance of Santa Martha. Now, sir, General Long in this passage, does not express the slightest doubt respecting the point of his retreat, which he most assuredly would have done had he been in ignorance respecting it. Nay, you relate that, in the letter from which the above extract is made, he expresses his "readiness to dispute every inch of ground "between Santa Martha and Valverde," by which he distinctly proved that he was, at least, aware of his *line* of retreat; as Albuera is on the Valverde road, and two leagues nearer Santa Martha. You have published† a letter from Sir B. D'Urban of the 12th, which General Long would receive early on the 13th, informing him, that head-quarters would

* C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 79.
† C. E. Long's Letter, p. 78.

be transferred on the latter day to Valverde or Albuera, the road to the former running through the latter. If your relative had been previously in the dark respecting his line of retreat, this alone, in the absence of any command to the contrary, would have been sufficient for his instruction; and when he wrote on the 14th—the day after the above-mentioned letter was received—that he would dispute every inch of the ground to Valverde, it was evident that he understood it in that sense. We have only General Long's own evidence, detailed in his secret correspondence, that the order of the Quarter-master-general, directing him to march immediately to Albuera, and which was sent at half-past seven in the morning of the 15th, did not reach him till he had commenced his retreat from Santa Martha. If this was the case, it is obvious, from the very movement he was making, that he was quite aware of the line he was to retire on, a fact which in your present publication has been proved to demonstration. Lieut. Heathcote, then an officer in the Quarter-master-general's department, relates, that*, "on the morning "of the 15th, General Long's division of Cavalry, to "which I was attached, was posted about a mile "in rear of Santa Martha on the road towards "Albuera." And, after describing this position of the cavalry, Mr. Heathcote goes on to say. "General Long, having left General de Grey in "charge of his division, joined Count de Penne

* C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, p. 105.

" near the church of Santa Martha situated on " an eminence commanding an extensive prospect, " *where we remained several hours.*" It is thus manifest, not only from the documents that you have published, but from the very conduct of your relative, that he was perfectly aware *of the line* on *which he was to retire.* He acted as if he had a perfect knowledge of it. No doubt on the subject was apparent; nor did any mistake occur; and we find him, early on the morning of the 15th, before, according to his account, he had received the Quarter-master-general's instructions for such a measure, posting his troops on the road to Albuera from Santa Martha, several hours before ordering the retreat, or the appearance of any enemy. Whether General Long was really left in ignorance on this subject, the reader may decide.

I now proceed to consider the manner in which this retreat was conducted. You have adduced the evidence of many most honourable officers to support your representation of this matter. But their testimonies are strangely at variance with each other*.

* I cannot forbear introducing here, as a note, the observations of a general officer on this part of your letter to me.

" *The Retreat from Santa Martha to Albuera.*

" Although fifty-two pages of Mr. Long's letter are devoted to " discussion relative to the retreat from Santa Martha to Albuera, " the points in controversy may be brought into a very small " compass.

" The following questions appear to me to comprise the whole of them.

" 1st. Did General Long occasion the British Cavalry to " retreat from Santa Martha, *before the French advanced guard*

At this I am not greatly surprised. Such discrepancies to a certain extent may easily be accounted

" ONLY; and with *more precipitation* than there was occasion for?

" 2nd. Was the retreat, or the end of it, on crossing the Albuera, " *hurried*, and *more precipitate than was necessary?*

" 3rd. Was the representation of the proceedings, (which " General Long's account of them to his private correspondents " seems intended to convey,) namely that 'the enemy's nearer " approach to (Santa Martha) having fully established their " strength, I fell back *at a walk* to Albuera'—and that 'the " enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and skirmished " with us all the way to Albuera,' *a correct and true statement* " *of the facts, or was it not?*

" To form answers to these questions, I will call for no testi- " mony, nor use any materials but the written evidence which " Mr. Long himself has laid before the public. I must, however, " first say, that it is with grief and pain that I submit myself to " point out the contradictory and erroneous statements which the " documents alluded to contain!—with still more pain that I feel " compelled to show how very indiscreet and ill judging an ad- " vocate has started up to vindicate the military fame of General " Long!!

" Question 1st. The evidence of Mr. Ralph Heathcote, who " was an officer of the Quarter-master-general's department, and " who (as he says) 'hardly quitted General Long's person, (p. 104, " Long's Letter,) during the whole of the 15th of May, (which " was the day of the retreat,) states, (p. 105,) when the enemy's " '*advance-guard* APPEARED, driving in the Spanish outposts, " 'General Long sent off orders to General de Grey to commence " 'his retreat towards Albuera.'

" The evidence of Col. Light shows (p. 108) that the Spanish " Cavalry *covered the British rear*, and that they were so little " pressed upon, that they were enabled to retreat 'in good order' " and had not one man killed.

" It further appears from the evidence of Mr. Heathcote, " (p. 105,) that General Long remained in person with his staff, " &c. a 'considerable time' at the church of Santa Martha *after* " he had ordered the retreat of his division, (and that it was by " so remaining that he became able 'distinctly' to see 'a strong

for by the different views which they took of the state of things at the time, and by the many years

" ' force of cavalry as well as infantry was advancing in several " ' columns,') and ' until the enemy's skirmishers were on the " ' point of entering and passing the village' !!!

" After the perusal of this evidence, does a soldier exist who " will doubt, that the British cavalry, by General Long's orders, " DID retreat before *the French advance-guard only*? Or who " will not deem that the commencement of the retreat *was* more " precipitate than there was occasion for?

" It appears clearly that even the *skirmishers* of the French " advance-guard did not commence pushing into the village of " Santa Martha until *a considerable time* after the British had " received orders to retreat on Albuera, and that General Long " was not able to overtake his corps, on their route, until they " had retired about eleven miles, and were within ' one or two " miles of Albuera (p. 105) !!!

" As to question 2nd, General Sir Loftus Otway could not " have mistaken the pace at which his Brigade was obliged to " move, in order to keep up! We have, moreover, the testimony " of Col. Wildman, that, at one period of the retreat, the 4th " Dragoons (p. 101) *trotted two miles* in *retreat:* and that they " were *hurried* over the bridge of Albuera, and that there was " confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood.

" Is not all this then quite enough to have fully justified every " word of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's letter? And was not the " whole of the ground on the right bank of the Albuera stream " given up to the enemy ' without the *slightest* dispute,' so far as " General Long was at all concerned? And was not the hurried " manner in which the 4th regiment passed the bridge, and the " confusion amongst the Portuguese in passing the wood, sufficient " to account for the impression on the mind of Marshal Beresford " that the retreat *was* made with unnecessary hurry and confusion?

" As to question 3rd, I think it must appear to every person " who peruses General Long's account to his friends, that the " account was meant to convey the idea of a *skilful retreat*, at a " slow pace, in the face of the enemy! Let us quote what he " says—' The enemy's nearer approach (to Santa Martha) having " ' fully established their strength, I fell back at a walk to Albuera'

which have elapsed since the events occurred, but most of all the incompetency of those officers from their

" —that 'the enemy's advance soon came up with our rear, and " ' skirmished with us all the way to Albuera.'

" It is truly painful to dissect this account! and to contrast it " with that which is detailed as *the fact* by one of Mr. Long's " own witnesses, Mr. Heathcote, who was the assistant Quarter- " master-general attached to the cavalry division !!

" Mr. Heathcote writes, 'on the APPEARANCE of the French " ' advance-guard, General Long sent orders for his corps to " ' commence their retreat towards Albuera.' And from what " follows, it appears that, at the time of sending this order, he " was NOT assured of what force was approaching him. He " (in person), with his staff, waited 'a considerable time' (after " the order for the retreat of his corps was sent) at the church of " Santa Martha; and it was then only, and after the lapse of " ' a considerable time,' that he could 'distinctly' see that 'a strong " ' force of cavalry, as well as infantry, was advancing in several " ' columns.' It was also after the lapse of this 'considerable " ' time,' that 'the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of " ' entering and passing the village below.'

" General Long then rode off *leisurely;* and at *six miles* to the " rear of Santa Martha, he found the Spanish cavalry formed, and " he discovered his own corps four or five miles *farther* to the " *rear*, on to the wood of Albuera.

" (How will Mr. Long reconcile this with 'the enemy's advance " ' *soon* came up with our rear, and skirmished with us all the " ' way to Albuera'? !!!)

" On passing the Spaniards, it seems that the General deemed " it prudent to 'mend his pace,' and he trotted to overtake his " corps; but while so trotting, '*hearing* the French attack the " ' *Spaniards* in his rear, he hastened on as fast as possible.' He " did not, however, succeed in overtaking General de Grey, until " he had retired through the wood of Albuera, and was within " one or two miles of that place; and was 'retiring by alternate " ' regiments towards the bridge of Albuera.'

" The 4th dragoons were then *hurried* over the bridge, and " the Portuguese (p. 102) were in *confusion* in the wood of " Albuera; although Col. Light declares, that 'the Spanish

respective positions to judge justly of what they even saw. But do not the very circumstances that thus

" ' cavalry covered the retreat of the British,' and he ' knows no " ' reason why the retreat should have been disorderly or con- " ' fused, for there was no confusion with the Spaniards, who " ' were between General Long's corps (p. 108) and the enemy.'

" These accounts relative to the retreat, being placed in juxta- " position with that written by General Long, no comment seems " requisite !!

" Mr. Long may be able to reconcile them !—I cannot !

" I have said that it is with *pain* that I must point out the con- " tradictions of Mr. Long's witnesses. I must justify the expres- " sion; but I will go as little into the subject as possible. Col. " Leighton says (p. 99), ' skirmishing *did* take place with the " ' enemy's advance and our *rear* guard.'

" Col. Light (p. 108), that the Spaniards were *between* the " French and General Long's corps !!

" Major Spedding has no recollection (p. 100) of the retreat " being ' *hurried.*'

" Col. Wildman (p. 101) says the 4th Dragoons ' trotted' at one " time for ' *two miles;*' that they again ' *trotted*' through the wood, " and that they were subsequently ' *hurried*' over the bridge at " Albuera !

" Col. Macalister says, ' General Long (p. 104) certainly was " not at the head of the column during the whole of the retreat, " ' as *I repeatedly saw him,* and never left my own station.'

" Ralph Heathcote, Esq., says (p. 106-7), that General Long " never *overtook* the column until they were eleven miles to the " rear of Santa Martha; that the General then directed him to " ' proceed on to General de Grey, while he remained with the " ' 13th or Portuguese ;' but it will appear that the General " *altered his mind* about remaining with this part (namely the " rear) of his column, as he overtook Mr. Heathcote again *before* " *he* ' *joined the Heavy Brigade,*' which was retiring on the bridge " of Albuera, on the other side the wood !!

" However there is no use in pursuing this subject.

" Mr. Long's criticisms about taking up and occupying the " position of Albuera are unworthy of any notice.

" I must, however, remark on one other piece of information

account for the variations, also tend to prove of how little value such evidence must be? Col. Leighton prefaces his account by saying that, 'to the best of " ' his recollection, the enemy did appear in force " ' near Santa Martha on the 15th of May, before " ' the retreat;' and states that 'the cavalry cannot be " ' said to have *fled* before the enemy, not did any " ' thing like it take place during the retreat. *The* " ' *pace was not rapid.*'

" given by one of Mr. Long's evidences (Mr. Heathcote) as well " elucidating General Long's character (p. 105)!

" ' While posting our piquets for the night (says Mr. H.), " ' General Long repeatedly expressed his surprise at the manner " ' in which the army was drawn up, &c. &c.' ' He was so much " ' annoyed at the disposition of the respective corps on the " ' ground they occupied,' (on the morning of the 16th,) ' that he " ' ordered me, on the spot, to make a sketch of the position of " ' Albuera.'

" We have thus exhibited to us the General in the evening " condemning '*repeatedly,*' to a subaltern officer, the manner in " which his chief had drawn up the army!! And in the morning, " (instead of bestowing all his watchfulness and care upon the " course of the Albuera stream, which separated the opposing " armies,) we have him finding fault with, and '*annoyed*' at the " ' disposition of the respective corps on the ground they occupied,' " and employing one of his staff, at that critical moment, to make " a sketch of the position of Albuera!!

" Mr. Long's ignorance of military matters has led him to " endeavour to attach some blame to Marshal Beresford, about " the unprepared state of the cavalry; and its having received " orders to go and forage immediately antecedent to the com- " mencement of the action. But every officer of experience will " perfectly well know that this is a sort of detail into which a " commander in chief would never enter, and that any such order " would necessarily emanate from the chief of that particular " corps! Therefore, if any blame was to be imputed, it must lie " on the proper shoulders!"

Besides this account of Colonel Leighton, you bring forward the statements of eleven other officers, exclusive of Mr. Heathcote, to substantiate your representation of this movement, and to contradict that which has been given by myself, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Sir Henry Hardinge, and others; but you appear, sir, to have forgotten altogether that the latter were produced in contradiction to the previous statements of General Long, which you had dragged from their darkness into light, and published in your "*Reply*." Your relative had asserted in his correspondence*, "not *a single instruction* had I received, nor could I "obtain, though repeatedly applied for; my route or "point of retreat were not even pointed out."

This extract, be it remembered, is from a letter written after the battle; and the evidence, which you have yourself produced, proves that it is unfounded. Again, he says†, "I remained under arms at Santa "Martha, and about eleven o'clock dispatched another "messenger, to ascertain whether or not Solana was "really occupied by the enemy, and open the com-"munication with General Madden. Scarcely had "this messenger been sent off half an hour when we "perceived a very strong column of the enemy's "cavalry (apparently about 3000), followed by in-"fantry and artillery, coming over the hills directly "down upon Santa Martha." Such is General Long's account of the first hostile force which he saw approaching him; and which is directly contradicted

* C. E. Long's Reply, page 109. † Idem, page 111.

by the very full and particular description of the enemy's advance, which has been given by Ralph Heathcote, Esq., and printed in the 105th page of your letter to me. "The nearer approach having "fully established their strength, *I fell back,*" says General Long, "*at a walk to Albuera,* detaching "the Portuguese Brigade in advance *to cover the* "*passage of the bridge at that place.*" It has been proved by the officer commanding this brigade, and by every one of your own witnesses who mention the Portuguese cavalry, that no such order could have been given, as it continued the whole retreat in rear of the British. Mr. R. Heathcote states*, "it was "to take up a position, covering the bridge over the "little brook that crosses the road between Santa "Martha and Albuera, about six English miles from "either place."—These are most strange and unaccountable contradictions!

Many of the officers, whom you have produced as witnesses, speak only to the "best of their recollection," or "from the impression now remaining on their memories;" though some positively confirm General Long's statement of the enemy having "ap- "peared in great force at Santa Martha before our "cavalry retreated." I shall be able, however, to prove most distinctly that such was not the case; and that it was not possible for any of those officers to have seen what their memories now betray them into the belief of. Indeed, the evidence of Mr. Heathcote would be quite sufficient and decisive for that object.

* C. E. Long's Letter, page 106.

With regard to General Long's assertion, that "he "fell back at a walk to Albuera," it is contradicted by every officer who has written on the subject. The word, sir, is a military one, and is, therefore, not to be explained away, or taken in any other than its simple meaning. Your relative might have said "leisurely," which is also a military term, and need not have implied, as his present expression does, that the retreat was altogether made in a walk. As to whether it was more or less quick, or whether it was, or was not, *hurried*, each individual may have a different opinion, according to his view of the circumstances of the case; but it appears from more than one of your own witnesses, that there was considerable *trotting*. Not having been personally present at any part of this retreat, I can have no other knowledge of it than such as is derived from the report of others; and, perhaps, the Commander in Chief is the person who was most likely at the time to have received the best information on such a matter. But I shall at once bring forward my authorities on these points. They are no less than the two officers commanding the two brigades of cavalry: Major Osten, Brigade-Major to the Heavy Brigade; the Quarter-Master-General of the Army; Sir Henry Hardinge, the Deputy Quarter-Master-General; Count de Villa Real; Col. Napier, Ralph Heathcote, Esq., your own witness, and whose evidence I shall cite from your own publication; and lastly, I shall add the corroborative testimony of Captain Lapène, an officer

on the staff of the 5th French corps, and then and there present.

I will give precedency to your own witness. Ralph Heathcote, Esq., says*, "On the morning of the 15th "of May, 1811, General Long's division of cavalry, "to which I was then attached as Deputy-Assistant-"Quarter-Master-General, was posted about a mile in "rear of Santa Martha, on the road towards Albuera."

Thus then to begin: the cavalry was placed a mile from Santa Martha, on the line of its retreat, and General Long, at this early hour, leaving Col. de Grey in charge of his division, placed as stated, joins Count de Penne Villa-mur near the church of Santa Martha, which is situated on an eminence, and commands an extensive prospect. "From this height," continues R. Heathcote, Esq., "when the enemy's "*advanced guard* was seen driving in the Spanish "outposts, Gen. Long sent off orders to Colonel de "Grey to commence his retreat towards Albuera." It thus then appears that the cavalry, being already a mile from Santa Martha, had orders to commence their retreat, as soon as from this height the enemy was seen driving in our outposts: and yet several officers, relying on the impressions of their memory, have stated, more or less decidedly, that they saw the enemy *in force* before the commencement of the retreat. But Mr. Heathcote marks the fact, if possible, still more distinctly. He informs us that "General

* C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford, page 104—107.

" Long and the officers of his staff remained for a " considerable time longer, till they had distinctly " seen that a strong force of cavalry as well as in- " fantry was advancing in several columns, and till " the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of enter- " ing and passing the village below." Thus then it is proved that, after dispatching orders from this height for the retreat of this division, General Long remained there "a considerable time," and it was only after this considerable time that, from this height, which commanded an extensive view, the enemy's masses or columns were seen, and none but the very advanced skirmishers of the French advanced guard had approached near the village. Now, during all this considerable time that the General had been stationary, our cavalry had been retreating; and they could not have been less than two or three miles off when the enemy's skirmishes only had arrived at Santa Martha. And yet, sir, some of your witnesses, though they were not at any time nearer than a mile of the place, and though it would appear, from the remainder of Mr. Heathcote's evidence, that our cavalry must have been three miles to the rear of it, when only the advanced skirmishers of the French were seen, have asserted that the enemy appeared in great force before Santa Martha previously to the commencement of the retreat. It is, sir, manifest that no officer, a mile to the rear of Santa Martha, could have seen the enemy in great, or considerable, or even any force, before our troops began to retire.

Mr. Heathcote's description of the advance of an army is military, and according to general practice; and I will corroborate his account by the testimony of other officers who, from their position and experience, were more likely than any of your own witnesses, who were then all young men and never, with one exception, above the rank of Captain, to have paid attention to the circumstance. Mr. Heathcote has informed us that Colonel de Grey was at this very point of time in the command of this division of cavalry. Let us then hear his account of the case. I will now, sir, lay his letter before you more fully than in my last address: it is dated April 17th. The year is not mentioned; but it was written very shortly before his death.

"My Lord,

"Relative to the retreat of the cavalry, on "the 15th May, 1811, from the plain, I forgot to "mention to you yesterday, *that we never saw a* "*French soldier, either horse or foot, previous to* "*General Long commencing a retreat.* We were "drawn up in two lines upon the plain, equal to any "advance the enemy might have brought against us "in the first instance.

"General Long all at once (most unaccountably "to me) ordered us to withdraw, and during that "retreat, perpetually sent to me either to hasten the "pace, or again to go slower, but he still continued "it, and never rested until he ordered us across the "bridge at Albuera."

This will be corroborated, first, by Major Osten of the 16th Lancers and then Brigade-Major to the Heavy Brigade; and, secondly, by Captain Lapène, who was on the staff of the 5th French corps, and who distinctly proves that the French never got sight of the British near Santa Martha, nor were aware of their presence until they came within a league of Albuera. Major Osten, to whom I forwarded a copy of Colonel de Grey's note to me, answers—

"*Hatch, Beauchamp near Taunton,*
"*Sept.* 20, 1833.

"Your Lordship's letter, dated August 6th, reached "me only yesterday, a considerable delay having "occurred in its being sent to Hanover instead of "Wiesbaden, where I have been staying. This will "at once account and plead my excuse for this late "acknowledgment.

"With respect to the copy it incloses of the late "Lord Walsingham's letter, I perfectly recollect and "can bear witness to all the circumstances therein "mentioned; and I remember that considerable hurry "and confusion took place on the retreat of the "cavalry from Santa Martha to Albuera the 15th "May, 1811, (although no enemy was in sight, and "not a shot was fired,) in consequence of many orders "of a contradictory nature issued by General Long. "In fact, orders and counter-orders followed each "other in such quick succession, that it was diffi-"cult, almost impossible, to carry them into ex-"ecution."

Both the above letters tally perfectly with Mr. Heathcote's account as to the appearance of the enemy near Santa Martha. I will now produce Captain Lapéne's statement on this point, and it will be seen whose story it confirms.

" On the night of the 15th Marshal Soult was six " leagues from Badajoz at Santa Martha. The " French army had all arrived there. The half of " General Werlé's brigade only had remained two " leagues in the rear at Villalba.

" Soult, uncertain for a part of the day if Beres- " ford had taken up a position, was rather inclined " to believe that the enemy would avoid a decisive " battle and repass the Guadiana. His views, with " regard to the real intentions of the allies, were soon " decided by Gen. Briché, *commanding the Light* " *Cavalry of our advance guard.* He had encoun- " tered the enemy *posted at two leagues from Santa* " *Martha,* on the road to Badajoz, and had made " them fall back before him. Informed of this dis- " covery, &c." It is thus manifest that the French were ignorant of the presence of any British till they came within a league of Albuera; and that they were then made acquainted with the circumstance by the information of their advanced guard. And yet we find it affirmed that the British did not retire from Santa Martha till the enemy appeared in great force before it!

The reader must judge on which side the weight of authority lies, and whether those superior officers,

whose business it was to look to the general movements, who received the orders and who had to execute them, were likely to be the best judges of the matter in dispute; or the regimental officers whom you have cited, who had their own, though more restricted, duties to attend to, and who could scarcely have been so well informed of what was in progress, or so aware of the general scope of a movement, as to be able to form a correct opinion even of what they saw.

The hurried and confused manner in which the retreat was conducted is distinctly proved by Colonel de Grey and by Major Osten who received General Long's orders, and had to put them into execution. Your own evidence, sir, clearly speaks to the same effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman says that they "retired about half the way, and were halted for a "short time*; that they were then ordered to the "rear in a trot for about two miles; and that after-"wards they were again desired to trot." This may certainly have been done without confusion; but it certainly has the appearance of hurry, and corroborates Col. de Grey's account. When they differ, it must be remembered that Lieut.-Colonel Wildman was at that time only a subaltern in the 4th Dragoons; and that Col. de Grey, as the officer in com-

* This may serve to mark the time of the respective commands of Colonel de Grey and General Long: the former commanding during the first period, the latter during the after period, when the hurry and confusion is said to have commenced, according to every witness who admits that there was any hurry or confusion at all.

mand of the brigade, must have seen and known more of what was actually going on than he, and must, therefore, be received as the most perfect witness on the subject. No one has pretended, nor can pretend, to deny the nature and the frequency of the orders with which General Long harassed Col. de Grey during the retreat, and which sufficiently evince the state of confusion your relative himself was in. The Brigade Major, who, next to the officer immediately in command, was the individual most likely to be well informed upon this point, most fully corroborates Colonel de Grey's statement. Lieut.-Col. Wildman most distinctly says, that "after passing "the wood, the heavy brigade were formed in line, "and *halted* facing the wood, when the light cavalry "went to the rear, the 3d Dragoons then retired, "and the 4th followed soon after, retreating in line, "covered by the skirmishers, to the bridge, over "which *the regiment was hurried*, but by whose "orders, *or for what reason*, I never knew, as I was "with the skirmishers, but had seen no enemy to "skirmish with." Col. Wildman had previously "stated "that there was some confusion in the Portu-"guese cavalry in passing the wood," which confirms the impression received from the statement of Sir Loftus Otway. I will also assert as a military man, that nothing can show more plainly the confusion that actually existed than the foregoing paragraph from Lieut.-Col. Wildman. To halt a corps of cavalry with its face to a wood, from which it

could not be a musket-shot distant, and with the obstacle of a river in its rear, while the enemy is supposed to be near at hand and even pressing it, is certainly a most extraordinary proceeding; nor can I wonder, under such circumstances, that Lieut. Col. Rook should have desired the commander to pass to the left bank of the stream. The place chosen for the halt was, besides, in a bottom. I know of no other officer who would have required an order to place his corps in a position, where the obstacle would be between himself and the enemy from which he was retiring. It is you, sir, who have supplied me with this evidence, which proves not only hurry and confusion on the part of your relative, but something more. Besides these ample evidences of the state of affairs, we have skirmishers sent out, where there was no enemy to skirmish with; and, after all, without an enemy in view, the rear regiment is hurried over the bridge.

You next produce the evidence of Major Norcliffe, who answers for his own brigade, by which, I presume, he means the brigade in one of the regiments of which he was then a subaltern. He retired, he informs us, "in *admirable order*, and took up his "ground on the field of Albuera without hurry, "confusion, or disorder of any kind." Lieut. Norcliffe, sir, was not only in the same brigade but in the same regiment, the 4th Dragoons, with Lieut. Wildman. I need only observe that the memory of one of these officers must have sadly failed him. But

I would here revert to the evidence of Colonel, now Major-General Sir L. Otway. He says, "the "march from Santa Martha to Albuera was *hurried* "*and harassing, the rear of the column being obliged* "*to gallop.*" Col. de Grey's account of the contradictory orders that he received now to go faster and again slower would, as every military man knows, cause the rear of the column, even where the horses were of equal power, which was not the case in the present instance, to proceed at the pace above described. Gen. Otway states that "he went up to Gen. Long and "reported this fact to him." There can, therefore, be no doubt upon that point. This was done on the spot, at the time, and by an officer commanding a brigade. On this representation being made, Gen. Long was induced to trot rather slower. This again is confirmatory of Col. de Grey and Major Osten's statements. Sir Benj. d'Urban's account of the manner in which this retreat was effected will be found, as well as the others above alluded to, in my former letter to you. They all speak positively to the fact, that the cavalry retired from Santa Martha in a hurried and unmilitary manner; and there is not, sir, a single individual of your own witnesses who corroborates your relative's assertion, that "*he fell back, at a walk, to Albuera.*"

The last evidence which I shall offer in confirmation of this point is derived from a source to which, I think, you will not object. Col. Napier * says, "In

* History of Peninsular War, vol. iii, p. 531.

"this posture of affairs, about 3 o'clock in the even-
"ing of the 15th, while Beresford was at some
"distance on the left, *the whole mass of the allied*
"*cavalry*, closely pursued by the *French light horse-*
"*men*, came in from Santa Martha in a hurried
"manner, and passing the Albuera, abandoned the
"wooded heights in front to the enemy, &c." I do not, sir, know how it can be denied, in the face of this great mass of evidence, that the allied cavalry under the immediate orders of your relative retired unmilitarily, and that they retired in this hurried manner when (as appears more particularly from Lapène*) there was no enemy in pursuit of, nor was there any near them, except Briché's brigade of light cavalry.

In discussing the third extract from General Long's correspondence, on which I offered some observations in my former letter, you enter into a minute inquiry respecting the time when the cavalry and infantry arrived at Albuera on the 15th of May. No one can be more willing than I am to make every allowance for mistakes in the calculation of time and distances, and more particularly under circumstances of strong excitement and absorbing interest. I would not, therefore, engage in any discussion upon such matters, unless, as is the case in the statement of your relative, I observed some extreme exaggera-

*This author states the same fact several times in his History of these events, and says, indeed, that no other cavalry arrived till the next morning.

tion. General Long relates that, having left Santa Martha about noon and reached Albuera about 2 o'clock (Col. Napier says about 3 o'clock), "none of "the infantry made their appearance *for several* "*hours* after his arrival." Before this period, I had no personal knowledge of what occurred; for the rest, I can speak upon my own authority. Previous to the arrival of my troops, I had been over and made my observations on the ground of Albuera, and left officers to place them as they arrived. I then went a considerable distance to the left down the stream, but certainly could not have been absent more than two hours; and, though on my going to the left I was not even informed that your relative had left Santa Martha, I found on my return that he had been some time at Albuera. Some infantry had then arrived. If General Long, therefore, had come up immediately on my leaving it, and the infantry only just before my return, it must be quite evident that the account of his having arrived "several *hours*" before them is wholly incorrect. I only refer to this point for the sake of noticing a passage which you have quoted from "*Recollections of the Peninsula*," and in which it is said, "on the 14th we broke up and "marched upon Valverde, halted for the night and "moved forwards, at mid-day on the 15th, to Albu-"era, *which place we reached about five in the* "*evening*."—You have, sir, given the last sentence in italics; why did you not print in a similar character "*and moved forwards at mid-day?*"—Now, Sir

W. Stewart's division was bivouacked considerably in front of Valverde towards Albuera. He was, when I passed him, ready to march. The total distance between the two places is two leagues. The route, which is generally speaking a gradual descent, was as good as troops could have to march over; and yet they are described, by your authority, as having been *five* hours marching six miles over such a route*.

The author you have cited styles his book "*Recollections*," and never, I dare say, dreamt of being adduced as an authority for hours and minutes; but, if the troops marched at mid-day, as I believe was the case, they would scarcely have reached the point where they halted after half-past two or three at the latest. I will not, at this distance of time and from recollection, take upon myself to say at what hour of the day the several movements began or ended; but I most distinctly affirm, that I could not have been absent more than two hours from the ground at Albuera; that, on my leaving it for the left, I was not even aware of General Long's retreat from Santa Martha; and that, on my return, I found his cavalry, and the infantry of Sir W. Stewart and Baron Alten had arrived in my absence. How long each of these corps had arrived on the ground I can only know from what was reported to me at the time;

* The distance from Valverde to Albuera would be between 7 and 8 miles, but Sir W. Stewart was considerably in advance of Valverde, and halted short of Albuera.

and, without disputing which came up first, I cannot believe there was an hour's difference between the arrival of the several corps.

You state it as your opinion, which you support by a quotation from Lord Londonderry, "that Soult "was beforehand with me." I confess myself unable to divine from what single circumstance such an opinion is derived. It is not supported by—it is contradicted—by the facts of the time. Were any of the troops that I calculated upon absent when Soult made his attack? I had more objects to attend to and combine on this occasion than he had; and I was fortunate enough to secure them all, and to be prepared to meet him. You say, sir, that General Madden's brigade was away. It was so; but I could no more have prevented its absence, as you are well aware, than I could have hindered General Long's unexpected arrival at Albuera, or his disobeying my orders at Campo Maior. The brigade of Brigadier-General Kemmis was likewise not present, but it was on service and employed elsewhere for military objects which could not be dispensed with; and, if this diminution of the number of my army is to be made a ground of charge, you should also object to Soult's having left a small garrison at Villa Alba, and coming to the ground without that force.

This battle of Albuera has, indeed, been canvassed and sifted to the very bottom; and I cannot imagine

any effort that has not been attempted, to destroy whatever credit the commander of the Allied army might derive from the victory which he was so fortunate as to have achieved. With what success it is not for me to decide.

I shall not, sir, stop to notice Mr. Heathcote's statement of the opinion entertained by General Long respecting the disposition of our force at Albuera. That point has been most fully discussed by the author of "*Further Strictures*," and his observations are still unanswered. I shall merely further observe that the account of the ground on the right, which I did not deem it necessary to occupy, as given in the "*Strictures*," is most fully corroborated by Lord Londonderry and by Col. Jones in their respective histories of those transactions.

I now turn to your relative's assertion that "no "Spaniards had appeared at daybreak;" and to your attempted explanation of this extraordinary mistake. You say that, from their having taken, upon their arrival, an erroneous position in the dark, the "Spaniards did not pass near the spot where General "Long was stationed." You also accuse me of having separated the sentence of General Long's correspondence which I gave from the context, with the view of fixing a mis-statement on your relative. I will now publish the passage as it stands in your letter, and leave the reader to discover what difference could possibly have been made by my omission; or,

if there be any, whether my view is not more strongly confirmed by the whole passage, than by the brief extract previously cited.

"In the mean time," says General Long, "I dis-
"tributed the cavalry along this strong line of de-
"fence, and we remained quiet during the night, my
"orders being to maintain that ground till relieved
"by the Spaniards."

"The morning of the 16th May arrived, but no
"Spaniards appeared."

Can any one suppose that your relative does not here distinctly state, that those Spaniards had not arrived at the break of day, who, in fact, according to my former showing, had arrived during the night, and who, at daybreak, were tediously manœuvring in the sight of the whole army? But, sir, so far is your mode of accounting for this misrepresentation from being correct, that the exact reverse is true. It was from the error committed by the Spaniards in taking up their position that they passed near the spot where Brigadier General Long was stationed, as, instead of forming on the right of, and in alignment with the 2nd British division, which was placed under and to the rear of the hill, they passed in the dark to the front of it, and formed in line with the support of the advance posts near the village and bridge, thereby slanting close to the rear of General Long; while, again, on retiring in the morning to take up the position that had been marked out for them, they had to press immediately under his view up the slope from the river. On this I say no more. There

can, I think, be no doubt but your relative's statement and your explanation of it are equally inaccurate.

"If the enemy," you demand,* "did not make "some attempt near the village in the early part of "the morning, what is the meaning of the passage in "the '*Further Strictures*,' p. 138: 'some guns were "'immediately brought to bear upon them and with "'considerable effect?'"—Your question, sir, is answered by the passage from which your extract is taken. That passage, which relates to the first movement of the enemy in his grand attack, states that I was present and perceived the movement. It cannot therefore, as you seem to represent, refer to any attack previous to the general one; and most certainly not to that mentioned by your relative, which I never heard of till your former publication, and which General Long describes himself as having discomfited. No other account that I have seen speaks of any such early attack. If you turn to Col. Napier's History,† you will see what I have stated fully confirmed. But, sir, you seem to have misunderstood Gen. Long, who, I think, agrees with all the other accounts respecting the attack of the enemy, and states it to have been at the beginning of this operation that he directed the 3d Dragoon Guards to beat back a corps of Lancers which attempted to pass the river. It was this I alluded to in saying, "I was not

* P. 117, C. E. Long's Letter to Lord Beresford.

† Vol. iii., p. 534.

"fortunate enough to have had it reported to me at "the time," which I not only now repeat, but add, that every authority describes this corps of cavalry as having passed the brook, then wheeled to their left, and joined Latour Maubourg on our right. Such is the account given by Colonel Napier and Sir Benjamin d'Urban, neither of whom make any mention of their having been charged by our cavalry, nor of their having been beat back. All are agreed, on the contrary, that they continued their route on our side of the rivulet, and then joined their main body.

The statements made in your ensuing pages* relate to one of the marvellous facts advanced by Col. Napier in his "*Justification.*" It is affirmed, on the authority of an officer, that the cavalry, just before the advance of the enemy, were sent to the rear to cut forage. This circumstance has been fully discussed in my "*Refutation of Col. Napier.*" I shall not again enlarge upon the subject, but refer you and the reader to that publication, merely observing, that the author of this report has never intimated by whom these orders were issued, or how they reached the cavalry; and it has been proved that they did not emanate from me. The orders which I actually gave respecting the cavalry have been distinctly ascertained by the evidence of the officer who bore them, and also of the officer by whom they were received. The former was Sir Benjamin

* Pp. 118, 119, 120, of Mr. Long's Letter.

d'Urban, the Quarter-Master-General of the army; the latter was Brigadier-General Long, then in command of the cavalry.

On the 30th May, fourteen days after the action, your relative appears to have been entirely unacquainted with these foraging parties; to have been equally ignorant of the enemy having passed the rivulet above our right, as stated by Capt. Gregory; and to have been no less uninformed of his having made any report to me on the subject. He, on the contrary, most decidedly contradicts it; for, after describing the real advance of the enemy, he says—"*The moment the enemy's movements were reported to* "*head quarters, the 4th Dragoons were ordered back,* "*and fresh dispositions appeared to be making with* "*the infantry.*" These measures General Long describes as having been taken after, and as soon as the enemy was seen moving down on the right bank of the river towards the bridge; and he immediately adds, "In the meantime" (that is, whilst fresh dispositions were making with the infantry) "the "enemy's columns on our left, or rather centre, "formed opposite the bridge and ford, opened a can- "nonade which we answered, and pushed a corps of "Lancers across the rivulet." The corps of Lancers here mentioned is that which General Long says he ordered the 3d Dragoon Guards to attack, a measure of which I expressed my ignorance. In every other respect, his statement agrees with all the accounts which have been published, except that of

Captain Gregory, which it most decidedly contradicts. It will be seen that the cannonade, which Gen. Long says we answered, corresponds with the guns mentioned both by the author of the "*Strictures*," and by Col. Napier, as having been at that very time brought to bear with considerable effect against the enemy.

I have thus, sir, gone through the main points touched upon in your pamphlet, though it really appears to me that they were fully answered already in my former letter to you. I have said that, as this is the last notice which I will ever take of any comments or attacks on my military conduct or reputation, I would avail myself of this opportunity for laying such documents before the public, as tended to the full elucidation of the facts under discussion between us:—and, as you have referred to Los Santos—a subject which I was not anxious to touch upon, I shall here submit to you a letter from Sir Benjamin d'Urban relating to that affair, which will not only clear up many points respecting it, but may serve to show that my forbearance towards Gen. Long was great and continued, and deserved a better return than it has encountered from himself and his friends.

This letter of the Quarter-Master-General of the army was written, as the date will show, from British Guiana, of which he was then governor, and before he had read your observations on the "*Further Strictures*." It affords therefore a refutation by anticipation of your letter, and a full confirmation of the

contents of the "*Further Strictures*," which he had read.

"*British Guiana*, 26 *Jan.*, 1833.

"I have received your letter of the 3rd Dec. last, "and I will most readily go through the '*Strictures*,' "and the other works, with all care and attention, "and send you such observations as may suggest "themselves upon the whole. But I have not yet "seen that which you mention of General Long's "nephew, nor can I find, upon inquiry, that any one "here has yet received it.

"I cannot comprehend what there is in my "pamphlet which can bear the inference of my "approving anything that the General did. My "desire, when that narrative was written, was to "bear lightly upon him, and not to bring into notice "anything to his prejudice that could be avoided. "The same feeling, I know, had actuated you during "the operations I was relating, and especially on his "supercession in the command of the cavalry, which "was ostensibly attributed to the difficulty of recon- "ciling the '*jarring pretensions of the Spanish* "'*Brigadiers*' (the rank which he then held) and "the consequent necessity of our having a Major- "General to command the whole. This was, indeed, "one reason; but it was, perhaps, the slightest of "all. The main reasons were, that he was appa- "rently incapable of the charge in which he had "been placed, and that the period was too critical,

" to risk the advantages of our small cavalry being
" thrown away. The general circumstances that led
" to this conclusion were shortly as follows; and,
" although I never made any remarks reflecting upon
" him or any other person in my journal, yet all that
" happened in regard to any officer does not the less
" forcibly strike me in running my eye over their
" names; even if it were not otherwise in my recol-
" lection.

" General Long's incapacity for cavalry command
" above adverted to had, as I think, early shown
" itself. The affair of Campo Maior was the first in-
" stance that I am aware of. His share in that affair
" appears very correctly described in the '*Further*
" *Strictures*,' concluding by the wild and improbable
" (and fortunately unfounded) report of the Light
" Cavalry having been cut off and lost.

" Then follows the scene at the entrance of Los
" Santos, which can never be forgotten by any one
" who saw it; and you must well remember that a
" small brigade of French hussars were there caught,
" in presence of all our cavalry, heavy and light, and
" that much precious time was lost by General
" Long's indecision, until you, yourself, were at
" length obliged to ride up to him, and urge him to
" charge; that he still galloped about calling for his
" *guns*; and that in the end they were charged by
" the 13th Light Dragoons (the regiment then in
" front of the column, upon somewhat narrow
" ground) by your own personal order to the com-

" manding officer.—Nay (if my memory serves me)
" so strong was the impression on your mind at the
" time of the vacillation which had before prevailed,
" and of the crisis to which it had led, that you said
" to Boyce, ' Charge them, or they'll charge you.'
" The ensuing charge and pursuit there is no need
" to dwell upon, they had nothing to do with the
" question before us.

" Then followed a series of reports from the out-
" posts, concluding, as I think, with the memorable
" one from Santa Martha. These reports I have not;
" the last time I saw them, as well as I remember,
" was among the papers of your English military
" secretary's office at the Pateo de Saldanha, but I
" cannot be mistaken in their tenor, which (if I do
" not greatly err) was full of difficulties, complaints,
" alarms, and despondency. The spirit of these
" papers, combined with the recollections of Campo
" Maior and Los Santos, induced me to propose that
" you should take advantage of the report, in which
" General Long had set forth the inconveniences
" arising from the collision of ranks, and replace
" him in the command of the cavalry by General
" Lumley; for the vital object of having it under
" some officer on whom dependence in emergencies
" might reasonably be placed. You yielded reluc-
" tantly to this advice, which it was painful to *you*,
" on the General's account, to follow, as I am sure
" it was to *me* to offer: and he was then, I believe,
" apprised, ' that, on account of the difficulties arising
" from the ill-defined ranks' which he had reported,

" he should be speedily relieved by a Major-General.
" Immediately afterwards occurred the movement
" from Santa Martha. Among the other arrange-
" ments for assembling upon Albuera on the 15th
" May, General Long was directed to march upon
" that place (by the enclosed order);* but that
" march could never have been intended to have
" been so hurried before an enemy's advance, even
" supposing that any enemy had been near him,
" which he had not reported; whereas, you know
" the cavalry came back so rapidly, that it scarcely
" even skirmished, if it did so at all; but crossed the
" Albuera, without drawing bridle, and without
" leaving even a piquet on the other bank, which the
" French videttes immediately took possession of; and
" the whole of that ground was left to the enemy.

" The morning after this adventure, (which was
" the battle-day of Albuera,) General Lumley, who
" had been already called to the cavalry from his
" brigade of infantry, arrived; and when he did so,
" I recollect your reluctance, even then, to displace
" General Long, which occasioned me to express
" myself in these words, or words to the same effect.
" 'If you do not, sir, the cavalry will be worse than
" 'useless, and perhaps thrown away.' So strongly
" had the series of proceedings, to which I have
" shortly adverted, impressed me with that appre-
" hension; nor do I now think that it was un-

* This order was that before spoken of, and which was sent to General Long at half past 7 a.m., of the 15th May.

" grounded. You then placed General Lumley in " the command of the cavalry. That he conducted " it admirably is unquestionable; and I cannot re- " gret the measure.

" I well remember that Hardinge and myself had " for some time before come to the conclusion, that " there was imminent danger to the cavalry whilst it " remained under General Long's management.

" The above is, I believe, the substance of all that " mainly relates to the subject, and I have no doubt " that the whole will be in the recollection of Har- " dinge, as clearly as it is in mine.

" (Signed) BENJAMIN D'URBAN."

I sent the above letter to Sir Henry Hardinge for perusal, and I am authorized by him to give the statements it contains his full confirmation.

I repeat, sir, that I had no wish to rip up this affair of Los Santos in all its details; but I should be now wanting to myself, and still more to those who have stated the foregoing circumstances, if I did not add the corroboration of the Count de Villa Real. This statement was given before the letter of Sir Benjamin D'Urban was written; and each officer was totally ignorant of what the other had related.

He heads his account

" *Los Santos.*

" I was with Marshal Beresford on the 16th April, " 1811, at Los Santos. The army had completed " its day's march, and halted at a very short distance

" from Los Santos, while the Quarter-Master-Ge-
" neral was marking the ground it was to occupy.
" Head-quarters were established at Zafra, where
" they were arrived, when a Spanish officer came
" in great haste to report to Marshal Beresford,
" that a column of French cavalry was advancing
" upon Los Santos. This information came totally
" unexpected.

" The Marshal got immediately on his horse, and
" in a few minutes reached the ground upon which
" the cavalry were halted. It was still dismounted.
" The Marshal ordered General Long to mount imme-
" diately, and to keep under the high ground in order
" not to be perceived by the enemy.

" While giving the orders above-mentioned, it was
" reported that the French were moving on, and had
" already entered Los Santos, where it appeared we
" had no outposts. At this moment a party of the
" French showed itself on our side of the village;
" but, on perceiving our cavalry, they retired imme-
" diately. The Marshal having seen them, then de-
" sired General Long to make the dispositions he
" thought proper to advance quickly. General Long
" said that the Portuguese cavalry having their left
" in front, he thought he must bring their right to the
" front, and asked whether he was to move right or
" left in front, adding something about the time it
" would take. The Marshal replied briskly not to
" lose time in whatever he did, lest the opportunity
" of acting might escape him.

" I consider that our cavalry was not above two " hundred yards from Los Santos.

" The Marshal, after giving orders to General " Long to advance, rode on towards the village with " the officers of his staff. He entered it, and stopped " in the street waiting for the cavalry, which I was " desired to go and hurry on. General Long said " he was manœuvring; and would advance the " moment he got the cavalry in order.

" Upon my delivering General Long's answer, " Marshal Beresford, not seeing the cavalry come " up yet, sent me back again to General Long im- " patiently to order him to come on without any " further delay, as the French would be off before he " arrived.

" The 13th Light Dragoons being in motion, the " Marshal proceeded farther on; and, on getting out " of the village, we saw the French cavalry halting " in column fronting us, at about two hundred yards " beyond it, among some stony ground and low " walls, which only left a narrow open space before " them. As soon as the 13th Light Dragoons got " sight of the enemy, they formed in front of them " rather obliquely. The French, on their side, when " they saw that the 13th had formed, detached their " leading squadron to charge them. The first squa- " dron of the 13th did not wait to receive the charge; " but advancing instantly in a gallant style, they met " the French squadron, drove it back to its column, " and reformed in the greatest order. At this mo-

" ment two Spanish guns were brought up, but did " not fire.

" The Marshal was very anxious that the cavalry " should act, and pressed Gen. Long to be quick, and " to attack the enemy; but, though he remained " a while in presence, there was no charge from our " cavalry, except that already mentioned of the squa- " dron of the 13th. The French, however, seeing " our cavalry advancing, opened from the rear, and " went off. Upon this the Marshal ordered one " of the squadrons of the 13th to disperse, and to " pursue: he rode himself with the remainder of the " regiment in support of the pursuing squadron. " Being myself with the advance, I saw the soldiers " of the 13th getting in the rear of the French co- " lumn, cutting down and taking prisoners many of " the French soldiers in their ranks. The French " finally broke, and galloped off in confusion."

I might, by a simple relation of this affair, perhaps make its several events more clear to the reader, and show the bearings of the foregoing testimonies upon them. But I leave them to tell their own tale, without any comment or observation on my part.

I finally, sir, proceed to the consideration of a subject to which you personally appear to attach some importance, my not having recommended Gen. Long for the Albuera Medal. Upon this head you say*,

* C. E. Long's Letter, p. 123.

" I am now, my Lord, arrived at that portion of your " Lordship's Pamphlet and of my own reply, with " which I am, individually speaking, more imme- " diately concerned." Again*—" I am now put upon " my own defence"—and again*—" Your Lordship " has been so obliging as to advance an accusation " against me, of having made a most important alter- " ation in the sense of Sir Henry Torrens's answer " to Gen. Long, by substituting the word *considera-* " *tion* for *circumstances*, thereby, as you say, casting " the onus of my relative's having been refused the " medal entirely upon your Lordship."

I open my observations on this subject with the foregoing extracts, that I may, at once, put all personality out of the question. I cannot even now perceive any thing in what I previously advanced upon this head, which intimated the slightest charge against yourself. Most assuredly, sir, no such accusation was intended; and I had mentioned with commendation, the very fair and candid manner in which you have laid your evidences before the public. But, the words of my letter to which you object do not, I think, justify the construction you have put upon them. They are as follows: " It is to be " observed that your account of Sir Henry Torrens's " answer contains a most material *mistake* with " regard to the terms of the communication." This is the only passage to which you could possibly

* C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131.

object; and it merely states that a mistake had been made. Having thus exculpated myself, at least, from all intention of personality, you will allow me to doubt whether you have disproved the mistake I have pointed out by "an indignant denial of its "existence." You add,* "I own I was somewhat "surprised at your lordship's statement, in as much "as a mere walk to the Horse Guards would have put "you at once in full possession of the real facts of "the case." It is a trite observation that persons seldom practise what they preach. Such, sir, must have been the case with yourself on the present occasion. It is evident that you have not taken this "mere walk to the Horse Guards." I, on the contrary, had anticipated your recommendation, and can assure you, from having personally inspected and compared them, that the communication from Sir Henry Torrens inserted in my published Letter to yourself is a true and exact transcript of that at the Horse Guards. You say, "the copy in your possession is "different;" of this I entertain no doubt. It is clear, therefore, that the mistake which I pointed out exists; but I cannot understand upon what authority you assert yours to be the *original*, though I do not pretend to say it may not be such. The priority of its claims must depend on whether the copy of the Horse Guards was taken from your Letter, or yours from it. This is not, however, of the slightest consequence, for I shall, in proceeding to consider your

* C. E. Long's Letter, p. 131.

further observations on the subject of this medal, show, that the rules, regulations, and practice of the army, with regard to such honorary distinctions, are conformable with the copy of Sir Henry Torrens's Letter which I gave, and with my explanation of it.

Reverting to the comparison which you drew between the cases of Lord Collingwood and your relative, you say, in "nothing but the particular case "as regarding the medal, could I, or did I attempt "to compare the individuals in question." I am not aware of having ever stated that you did; but, as you did not consider it expedient to pursue the comparison even on the point of the medal to its end, and state the result in either case, I thought it just to myself to take up the parallel where you left it, and, following out the conduct and the feelings of both the officers alluded to, show that the course they pursued, the feelings that influenced them, and the effects produced on them, were in every respect diametrically opposite.

You undertake to prove that I was mistaken in stating that I acted according to precedent in not recommending General Long for the Albuera medal; and, after citing the first of the three rules which you had before quoted from the Official Regulations for the granting of the medal (viz. "no General Officer "shall be considered entitled to receive medals unless "he has been *personally* and *particularly* engaged "upon occasions of great public importance,") you proceed to say that, "with the aid of a multitudinous

" assemblage of synonymes, I had extracted an " answer from Sir Henry Hardinge to the effect, " that he was not aware of any particular service " rendered by General Long during the action.' The question, sir, which I addressed to Sir Henry Hardinge was a very simple and direct one. The answer which he gave to that question was equally laconic and direct. You object to the vagueness of the word "*particular*." This I am not surprised at; as the sense in which the word is generally understood can by no means be made to apply favourably to the case of your relative. But, sir, the word is neither mine, nor Sir Henry Hardinge's. It is taken from the Official Regulations which you have quoted, and describes the circumstances under which an officer would be entitled to the distinction of the medal; and, notwithstanding your criticism on our military terms, I must think that, according to the above rule, an officer is required to have been *personally* and *particularly* engaged. My inquiry of Sir Henry Hardinge, whether he knew of General Long's having rendered any such particular service, and his reply, knowing as he did the object of the question, and the full military sense of the word, " that he was not aware of any such particular " service," will, I apprehend, be considered by every reader as most appropriate to the subject in discussion between us; and many, I doubt not, will think they ought to have been received as conclusive. You proceed to quote some terms of general commenda-

tion from my despatch, with a view, I suppose, of proving that your relative really did effect some "particular service." But it appears to me that your quotations prove too much. When, for instance, you cite, "the Marshal feels that *every* officer, and "every soldier, deserve particular mention," or "the "conduct of all was noble," expressions which, in their general application to the whole army, were strictly true,—a person of so nice and discriminating a talent as yourself must perceive, that it never could have been my intention to assert that there might not be some few individuals among the 20,000 men which were at Albuera, who were not deserving of such commendation. Many, indeed, were never in the action; and, sir, though all might deserve particular mention, the whole army would not, consequently, have been all entitled to medals; for the grant of which clear and special regulations were prescribed. "I find," you continue, "that "your lordship could not omit also mentioning with "praise Brigadier-General Long and the Honourable "Col. de Grey, for the part they had in conducting "the cavalry." To adopt your own expression, sir, "when the *general* note of thanksgiving was "to be sounded, I mentioned him with praise." But, still, this general note does not tend to establish any such "particular services" as are required from those who are recommended for medals. Indeed, sir, had I not mentioned him in "the general note of praise," the omission would have been considered as

particular in an unfavourable sense; and my silence would have been construed by you, as it was on the occasion of Los Santos. But, sir, your relative, on finding that he was not included in the list for medals, might have appealed—at the time and on the spot—through Sir William Lumley to myself, or direct to me, or immediately to the Duke of Wellington. Many other officers have so done, as you will presently see. But, I would here call your attention to this very extraordinary circumstance. Your relative never, during the period of his remaining in the Peninsula, deemed it expedient to make any representation on a matter, which, *privately*, he so bitterly complained of as an act of personal injustice. What was the cause of this forbearance? Was General Long averse from seeking redress when he considered himself injured? Was he ignorant of how or where to apply for it? When, sir, as mentioned in your last publication, we call to mind the complaint that he subsequently made to the Duke of Wellington on a point, which he need not have considered as personal to himself, and on which he was proved to be in error, the above questions must be answered in the negative. Is it not then, I demand, very extraordinary that a person, by no means backward in asserting his claims, and doing justice to himself, should have omitted doing so on the occasion in question, if he really thought himself personally aggrieved? I will not follow you, sir, any farther on this subject, but lay before the reader a letter from the Horse Guards, which will confirm

what I stated to you in my former letter, *that medals were not indiscriminately given to every general officer who was present in a battle;* and, that *when any officer considered himself overlooked, an appeal was open to him* and known to be so, and he would find redress if he was entitled to it. Brigadier-Gen. Long, by his private correspondence, appears to have considered himself in that predicament; but instead of having recourse at once to the authorities on the spot, he delayed his appeal for five years, when his pretensions were considered by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, the Commander in Chief at the time; and though your relative had then actually received the thanks of Parliament with all the other General Officers present at the battle of Albuera, his claim to the medal was negatived, and, as I think, neither in a soothing nor a flattering manner. I must here observe, that several other officers, like General Long, appealed to the Duke of York, and that, according to the following letter, their claims were admitted or negatived according to the justice of their respective claims.

"*Horse Guards, 17th August*, 1833.

"It very frequently occurred in the Peninsular war "that the distribution of medals to general and other "officers in command of corps, or in situations of "responsibility, was not made general, but was con-"fined to those who were actually engaged under a "musketry fire: one instance of this is as good as a "hundred; and, therefore, it may be sufficient to cite

" Lord Hill, who commanded a large corps d'armée " at Busaco, but, not being particularly engaged, did " not get the medal. I might also mention Sir Miles " Nightingale, who had a brigade of infantry in the " 6th division, at Busaco, which was exposed to a " cannonade, but who was not recommended for a " badge of distinction. The same thing happened " with the brigade of Guards on the same occasion, " notwithstanding that the loss it sustained from the " enemy's artillery was far from inconsiderable.

" It *frequently happened* that the names of officers " who were entitled under the regulations, were by " mistake omitted in the first instance, and were after- " wards inserted in supplementary lists. Of these I " have now several lying before me, and among others " they contain the names of Sir John Elley, Sir Fre- " deric Ponsonby, Lieut.-Col. Charles Beckwith, Sir " Dudley *Hill*, &c.

" I send you an extract of the regulations under " which the lists were prepared by the Duke of " Wellington.

(Signed) " FITZROY SOMERSET."

I will add the copy of the extract of the regulations above-mentioned.

" The distribution of medals, or badges for military " services of distinguished merit, shall be regulated " as follows, viz.

" 1st. That no General or other officer shall " be considered entitled to receive them unless he has " been personally and particularly engaged upon those

" occasions of great importance and peculiar bril-
" liancy, in commemoration of which the Prince
" Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Ma-
" jesty, may be graciously pleased to bestow such
" marks of distinction."

" 2nd. That no officer shall be considered a can-
" didate for the medal or badge except under the
" special selection and report of the Commander of
" the Forces upon the spot, as having merited the
" distinction by conspicuous services."

" 3rd. That the Commander of the Forces shall
" transmit to the Commander in Chief returns signed
" by himself, specifying the names and ranks of those
" officers whom he shall have selected as particularly
" deserving."

Any one, sir, who reads those instructions with attention, will see that an officer may have done his duty most perfectly, and yet not have had the opportunity of rendering any particular or conspicuous services. Indeed it must be obvious to any one, that if, as you suppose, every general officer present at a battle was entitled to the medal, the instructions would be superfluous and absurd. I am quite satisfied that I did Brigadier-General Long most ample justice for all the services he performed at the battle of Albuera; nor can any one, I apprehend, be led to suppose, from the extracts which you have quoted from my despatches or general orders, that I had ever entertained any feelings of personal unkindness towards him, or still less that I had any intention of treating him with

injustice. I must here, sir, again repeat, that during the whole time Brigadier-General Long was under my command, I was altogether ignorant of his being in any respect dissatisfied with my conduct. I had always believed that, from the commencement to the conclusion of that period, the same good will had subsisted between us, and that we had parted as amicably as we had met. The nature of your relative's feelings, while he was, thus, outwardly, living on terms of kindly intercourse with one whom he was habitually maligning in his private letters, I shall not attempt to describe, or comment on.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

BERESFORD.

August, 1834.

LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES,
Duke Street, Lambeth.

LETTER

TO

GENERAL VISCOUNT BERESFORD,

G.C.B. &c. &c.

IN REPLY TO HIS LORDSHIP'S LETTER TO
THE AUTHOR RELATIVE TO THE
CONDUCT OF THE LATE

LIEUT. GENERAL LONG

IN THE CAMPAIGN OF
1811.

BY

CHARLES EDWARD LONG, ESQ.

LONDON:
J. RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

1833.

LONDON:
C. ROWORTH AND SONS, BELL YARD,
TEMPLE BAR.

LETTER, &c.

My Lord,

In the letter, which your Lordship has done me the honor so recently to address to me, you have expressed your "thanks to the author of the Further Strictures," (the work to which mine was written in reply,) for "having been the means of bringing to light" facts with which you were previously utterly unacquainted, enabling you to exhibit "the objects of the author," (viz. of General Long,) in detailing those facts, and to disprove, as you imagine, the statements which I had advanced in defence of that officer against the censures of his anonymous (though, as I conceived, accredited) antagonist. I am equally indebted to the author of the Strictures, and I owe him those thanks for empowering me to turn aside from the "spirit of the inquisitor," and to meet in open Court some real and responsible accuser of my relative. It is no longer an ostentatious display of information dealt out from behind a domino; the incognito of Junius, though without his talent; the mystery of the iron mask, though without its impenetrability; I have now no shadow to combat; but one whose name might

by many be thought to impart the force of argument to the feebleness of assertion—sufficient to elevate an opponent into ephemeral importance, while the weight of official infallibility should be eventually cast forth to overwhelm him. My relative was not alive to meet *his* accuser. You, my Lord, and I rejoice to know it, are able to confront, if you cannot confute, those "most valuable contemporary "documents," and they have been placed before you, not "when they could no longer "be contradicted," but while *you* are yet alive to impugn them. I then, at least, am free from the charge of concealing the censure *till* the party censured was no more. I would that this "course of forbearance" had not been departed from.

If, my Lord, it is, as you say, that "so many "parts of my publication are levelled with a "direct and personal aim against your Lord-"ship,"—against whom, I would ask, were those parts of the publication to which mine was the reply directed? Against whom were they levelled? And, looking at the manifest avowal of an intimate connection between your Lordship and that author,* was I not fully justified in the presumption that, although your Lordship did not direct the pen of that writer, you,

* Note 2, p. 30, Appendix, Further Strictures.

at the least, were a partial participator in his opinions, and a supporter of his facts. If the former does not appear to have been the case, your Lordship's pamphlet has most abundantly established the latter. That you were fully aware of his undertaking during its progress is, I presume, not disputed. You say that "it is "impossible for you not to respect the feelings "that have induced me as a relative to come "forward in defence of General Long's reputa- "tion." I am happy in being honored by approbation for the motives that actuated the attempt—even if I am not so fortunate as to obtain applause for the execution of it. It is much to be lamented that your Lordship did not counsel your less considerate champion to extend this benevolence towards the memory of that relative and the feelings of his friends in the first instance. You say that you are *now* "constrained to lay details before the "public, derogatory to the military character "of a deceased brother officer." You are not singular. The example was already before you. You have followed and improved upon it. Were the Further Strictures, my Lord, barren in "details derogatory to the character "of a deceased brother officer?" Why else did I undertake to reply to them? The reason which has induced you "not to allow my

" publication to pass without observation" is equally applicable to myself and to the work that came under my notice. The corroborating disclosures which your Lordship has produced have been, you say, " forced upon you as an " act of self-vindication." If the consequences of my undertaking were rendered imperative upon you by the nature of it; its causes were at least as strongly urged upon myself. Self-vindication on the part of your Lordship was no more a matter of necessity than the vindication by me of my relative who is no more. That duty which you owed to yourself—that duty I also owed to another; and whether " the zeal " of my undertaking is more to be admired " than its prudence," and whether it will " even- " tually redound to the honour of that party " whose cause I have undertaken to advocate," is for others, not for me, to decide. In their hands, therefore, I leave it, though without any such prefatory prediction of my success as that which your Lordship has so positively pronounced with respect to your own.

You have, I am ready to admit, exhibited both in the tone and temper of your letter, as far as regards myself, a courteous abstinence from censure, which I had, perhaps, no great right or reason to expect. But, coupled as that courtesy is, (not merely with attacks

upon the professional performances of my relative, for they were to be anticipated,) but insinuations levelled, I may say, against his *personal honor*—against the honor of one who is *not living* to repel the indignities thus cast upon his name,—*the all but direct assertions* that he was in the daily habit of forwarding to his family and friends *deliberate misrepresentations of fact*, for the express purpose of injuring the credit of his commander, relieve me at once from the ceremonious necessity of repaying that courtesy even with the barren compliment of my thanks. I am considered as having written my Reply to the Further Strictures with an "asperity" admitted to be "natural" because I "yielded an implicit confidence to the accuracy "of my relative's representations." Am I likely, on reading your Lordship's insinuations, as to the *objects* and *motives* of that relative, to abate the feeling? Am I the more likely so to do when I the *more confidently* credit the general accuracy of his narrative? I think not. It shall, however, be my endeavour to control this "na-"tural asperity," and, when I may "occasionally "find myself compelled to doubt the perfect "accuracy" of your Lordship's statements, to emulate in the correction of them, a far greater delicacy of dissent than that which has been exhibited towards my deceased relation.

You would appear to consider *me* as the aggressor. I beg on the other hand to claim the privilege of being deemed the party acting on the defensive. My object was a vindication of my relative against the charges of an author writing in your Lordship's defence, and, as it certainly appeared, under your Lordship's sanction. He it was (whatever may have been his sources of information, however, he may have been provided with the poison in which his arrows have been steeped,) he it was who first essayed to wound the reputation of a brother officer, by heaping on his grave those accusations which when living it was not even ventured to insinuate. Will your Lordship then still affix the term of "*gross impro-*" "*priety*" on the conduct of my relative alone? It is necessary, therefore, however tediously tautological may be the undertaking, both to the reader and to myself, to revert to the several points of that attack which your Lordship's anonymous advocate, in the first instance, made upon the reputation of that brother officer, in corroboration of many of which points it has given your Lordship such "pain to afford the record." It may be some consolation to your Lordship to know that the "distress" and the "pain" which the publication of such matter has caused you, does not

meet with corresponding sympathy on my part. I am no sufferer in such sorrows. I shall seek out no parallel to the "tone of affected "candour," the "unmeaning pretensions of "zeal," &c. &c., as set forth by your Lordship in accusation against my relative; neither shall I trifle with the time of my readers by throwing away the tithe of my sensibility in such lugubrious phraseology as that in which your Lordship's feelings have been so mournfully paraded. It is, however, not a little singular that the "distress" and the "pain" which it must have been expected would be caused to the relatives of General Long by the "mischiefs" and "follies"—the "incidental" illustrations of your masked auxiliary were not thought of previous to the publication of that work, when a fiftieth fraction of your Lordship's "accustomed for- "bearance" would have spared them no little pain, and me no inconsiderable trouble.

"It appears," you observe in the first page of your pamphlet, "that the conduct of that "officer," viz. General Long, "never entered "into the author's," viz. the author of the Further Strictures, "contemplation, as an object "either of censure or praise; and that it is "never alluded to by him except *incidentally*, "and when from its immediate connection with

" the facts under review, there was no possibi-
" lity of leaving it unnoticed." Whether your Lordship is of opinion that any author who should affirm that you had on any occasion " alleged some *foolish reasons*" * to your commanding officer for doing, or for not doing, any particular act, and that that commanding officer had subsequently " come up in time to prevent " the occurrence of still greater *mischief and* " *folly*;"† whether you feel that such remarks (not being drawn forth by any attack upon that commanding officer, in which you were personally implicated,) would only be " incident-
" ally illustrative" of the events to be recorded, I cannot pretend to determine. Your Lordship's more indulgent disposition might possibly lead you to that very charitable conclusion. My own feelings would, I confess, conduct me to a far different one. And yet if your Lordship's endurance is so continual, the efforts to resist the " incidental " illustrations of the author of the Peninsular War, and the language used to repel them, would seem utterly uncalled for; inasmuch as I venture to assert, that in no one instance has your Lordship's mysterious advocate had to combat expressions similarly offensive either as to their tone or their ap-

* p. 38, F. S. † p. 47, F. S.

plication. Your Lordship has observed, (in page 4,) that "the power of exercising any "delicacy in discussing the military conduct "of General Long has been taken from you," and that your "accustomed forbearance" has finally given way; you are "forced to depart from it!" There can be no doubt of it. The fact is amply attested by the personal insinuations with which your pamphlet abounds, and sufficiently exemplified by the publication (not of your own opinions as the *per contra* to General Long's), but of the letter of a third party, viz. of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and which "private despatch," I shall hereafter have full occasion to notice. It is not, my Lord, my intention to ransack the "family archives," as your Lordship has been pleased to term them, "voluminous" as they are, in search of the private opinions of General Long's military correspondents respecting your Lordship or any other person. I have no desire to embroil other professional parties in this controversy. There is no occasion to obtrude private opinions in a case where public opinions are already so numerous. Your Lordship is considerate enough to lament that I did not "seek the aid of some candid "and experienced military friend," and that owing to this my neglect "great and manifold "are the mistakes into which I have fallen."

It is true, that those great and manifold errors have not been distinctly made known to me; but as they appear to have originated from my own inexperience, and not from my relative's mis-statements, I am but little concerned at the consequences, excepting as far as they may have affected his reputation. I have endeavoured, however, to correct the effect of this indiscretion by much additional testimony, which I shall have the honor of successively submitting to your Lordship's notice, and for which I need hardly entreat your indulgent attention.

Your Lordship, in your exordium, has, with a diligence that would have been highly meritorious, if it did not appear to be wholly unnecessary, devoted no less than three pages to a discussion respecting the word "differences"* stated by me in my "Reply," as having existed between yourself and General Long. Your Lordship affirms the contrary to be the fact, and Sir Henry Hardinge deposes to the effect, that he "knew of no dispute or misunderstanding" having taken place.† You argue first, as if I had alluded to some *early* differences antecedent to the affair of Campo Mayor; secondly, as if I spoke of some *particular quarrel* subsequent. You mistake me in both cases. Your

* p. 6, 7, 8. † p. 7.

Lordship is perfectly correct in saying, that you were not acquainted with General Long previous to the meeting at Thomar. I will go further. I will shew from the "secret archives of the family," that General Long's first impressions were very greatly in your Lordship's favor. In a letter dated Portalegre, March 21st, my relative writes thus: "From the three "days' intercourse I have had with the Mar- "shal, I am disposed to like him exceedingly. "I find him unreserved, affable, open, sociable, "and obliging, and the revolution he has effected "here" (alluding to the disciplining of the Portuguese infantry) "bespeaks his ability." It must, however, be admitted, that these terms may be "unmeaning," it may be "General "Long's epistolary mode of relating" his feelings as he was wont to do his "facts." The tone may be one of "affected candour," and so forth, consequently it may be the safer course to dismiss this eulogy. I only refer to it to meet any possible charge of early *prejudice* on the part of General Long. Your Lordship goes on to say, that "after your command had ceased, you "never, to the best of your recollection, came in "contact with that officer again."* On this point I must beg to differ; and your Lordship may

* p. 6.

possibly, on appealing to your memory, recollect a certain controversy respecting two Portuguese aide-de-camps, not entirely exemplifying that imperturbable clemency, or that "disposi-"tion not inclined to censure," which we might have been led to expect. As a sample of the style of your Lordship's letter of complaint to the Duke of Wellington on that occasion, I shall simply notice its very "forbearing" and conciliatory conclusion.

"A conduct," meaning that of General Long, "which to your Lordship I need only report"!!!!*

The correspondence between all the parties is to be met with in the "secret archives of the family," and I only allude to the subject in order to correct the trivial error that you *never* came in contact with that officer again, and have only recently, and by compulsion as it were, emerged from the "course of forbearance hitherto maintained." You may perhaps aver, that this was not strictly speaking a "contact," I shall not stop to raise a disquisition on that point, I now, however, repeat without hesitation, and without cavilling about the phrase "differences," that your Lordship and General Long were *not on good terms,* if that expression is more accurate and intelligible. And I leave the public to

* Letter, dated Nov. 1811.

judge, whether it is likely that good terms *could* exist, when in the short period of *less than three months* General Long was first found fault with at Campo Mayor, and told on March 25th that "he had made a bad business of it;" "blamed for doing *too much;*" secondly, on the 16th of April, at Los Santos, that he had been backward in allowing the enemy to escape, "blamed for doing *too little;*" and, thirdly, on the 16th of May, that he was considered, after being superseded in the hour of action, as having done little or nothing; these three being the *only* occasions on which General Long was ever acting immediately in your Lordship's presence. Your Lordship observes, (p. 9,) "Unhappily his conduct upon that occasion, viz. Campo Mayor, "did not inspire me with a "sufficient general distrust of his military quali- "fications." Unquestionably. The fact is fully corroborated in your despatch upon that occasion, when you state that he "manœuvred with great ability." The inspiration of distrust is palpably incompatible with that affirmation, and had you not exercised the "forbearance" you speak of, by not mentioning the "grievous disadvantages" of the detour, this manœuvring with "ability," must necessarily have been expunged. You continue to say that you "told him at the time," that you "attributed the

" *errors of the day* to his want of practical expe-
" rience in the field." * This paternal reproof could not of course have caused any annoyance to General Long. It was kind and conciliatory, what is termed at public schools, a " first " fault," and by no means calculated to lay the foundation of any " differences," although it might possibly, and very naturally, have surprised an officer who had commenced his career by serving under the Duke of York during the whole of the campaign of 1794, and where the action at Cateau, was, if I am rightly informed, a tolerable initiation to the mysteries of cavalry movements. Your Lordship says, in page 10, " It must be evident that " I had no disagreeable remembrances to bury " in oblivion." Possibly not. The schoolmaster does not suffer from the effect of his own lecture or his own rod. The scholar does, and perhaps profits by them. General Long appears, as we shall see hereafter, to have done both. You are " most confidently persuaded, that had General " Long been still alive, they," the letters, &c. " would not have been produced on the present " occasion," and that " they would still have re-" tained their place among the secret archives of " the family." † With no better reason, and on

* p. 9. † p. 10.

no stronger authority, I shall presume to pair off with this *dictum*, by expressing a somewhat similar belief, that had General Long been alive we should never have heard of the "mischiefs" and "follies" of the Further Strictures. Your Lordship, in pages 10 and 11, indulges in bitter complaint against my relative for writing his sentiments to his friends in England, and "leaving" you in total ignorance of the "wrongs" that he was subjected to, "instead of complaining on the spot, when the truth of every fact "could have been easily ascertained, and when "it could not be concealed." * I confess I know not where to look for that immaculate correspondence, that confines itself to barren statements of operations, and never hazards an opinion or a remark as to the manner in which they were carried into effect. I know not (saving one solitary instance) where to find that "iron sleep," that mental constipation, that paralysis of the powers of speech, of which the prudence is only exceeded by the peculiarity. Are the bureaus of your Lordship's correspondents, the "secret archives of the family," so utterly destitute of all private comment? Were the thoughts of your Lordship's friends on *all* occasions hermetically sealed? One of them would indeed ap-

* p. 10.

pear to have preserved this purity of communication in a very remarkable degree, he (Sir William Lumley) "never," as we shall see, up to the summer of the last year, had "entered upon those occurrences in writing even with his oldest friends." Another, (Sir Benjamin D'Urban,) on the contrary, less circumspect in his details, bears very decisive testimony the other way. He would appear to have entertained no scruples on the subject of "private charges." I know not from what "archives" your Lordship has obtained the letter printed in page 45. In it, however, you will find the refutation of your own remarks upon the "private despatches" transmitted by my relative.

One word more, my Lord, before I close this introductory portion of my letter. Your Lordship has made an observation which has impressed itself upon me rather forcibly. Its truth has been powerfully manifested in your Lordship's publication. "After such a lapse "of time the memory," you say, "may, and "very often does, prove treacherous, even "with regard to the most material points of "fact." I am quite of that opinion, I most cordially concur in it; and would further express my confident assurance (also in your Lordship's words,) that neither your Lordship, nor your friends, will "feel hurt, if I should

" occasionally find myself compelled to doubt " the perfect accuracy of your recollections." At the same time, however, I shall not be prepared to do so " unless," to continue the quotation, " I am supported by the corroborating " evidence of some admitted fact, or of some " officer who was personally engaged in the " affair under consideration."*

I now proceed to notice, first of all, the charges brought by the author of the Strictures, and for the reintroduction of which, owing to the sort of Siamese similitude between your respective statements, I deem it unnecessary to offer any apology. I shall number these charges, subjoining a short notice of your Lordship's confirmation of them, or, through their abandonment, of your virtual contradiction of them.

First, p. 38, 39, *Further Strictures.*

That General Long made an extraordinary detour, alleging " some foolish reasons for thus " obstinately persisting" in it, and that the enemy, " perceiving the movement " that " was made, began to retire to Badajos," by which means your Lordship's intentions of surprising and capturing the whole were frustrated.

* p. 12.

This charge your Lordship has supported to the fullest extent, coupling it, however, with two other causes of failure, viz. the supposed bodily capture of the 13th, and the fatigue of the artillery horses.

Second, p. 39, *Further Strictures.*

That General Long "having been expressly "ordered not to charge the enemy's infantry, "nevertheless did so."

This accusation your Lordship has very unceremoniously abandoned as untenable, although it is positively asserted by the author of the Strictures, that "when" your Lordship "first got "sight of the allied cavalry they were already "in contact with the enemy," and that "the "*first thing*" you "could discern was *a charge* "*of the Portuguese cavalry against a column of* "*French infantry.*"* Where was the writer, being one of your Lordship's Staff, when *he* saw this occurrence? And if he did not see it, from *whom* did he *hear* it?

Third, p. 40, *Further Strictures.*

That your Lordship "heard from General "Long, whose report was confirmed by Baron "Tripp, that the 13th had in the strangest "manner been taken prisoners bodily."

* p. 39, F. S.

This report is attributed by your Lordship solely to General Long, and fastened only in retail upon the Baron, whom your Lordship describes as the narrator, to those whose curiosity and love of the marvellous was sufficiently excited to induce them to attend to him.

Fourth, p. 40, *Further Strictures.*

That the cavalry was " brought into action " in direct opposition to your orders."

This charge your Lordship *seems* to confirm, maintaining your object to have been to threaten rather than attack with the cavalry until the infantry could arrive; in fact, till, to use the words of the author of the Further Strictures, " the whole army was close up, as the occasion required."*

Fifth, p. 44, 45, *Further Strictures.*

That General Long charged the enemy " in " flank, and not in front."

This accusation appears to have passed *sub silentio;* how, indeed, could it be otherwise, since, notwithstanding so capital an error, Sir Benjamin D'Urban has pronounced that charge to have been " admirably executed," and the " success complete!!"?

Such, then, is the treatment that this por-

* p. 46, F. S.

tion of the work has experienced at your Lordship's hands. Though still fatherless in its affliction you have indulgently accepted and adopted it. Some of its assertions are, indeed, scattered to the winds, but whether with the carelessness of indifference, or the conscipusness of inaccuracy, I know not. If the former, it is but an ill requital of the chivalrous efforts of that volunteer defender, in whom your Lordship is at a loss to discover "the slightest trace of "prejudice and hostility against General Long," who wrote, as it seems, "with no other view "than that of correcting certain erroneous ac-"counts of your Lorship's exertions in the "Peninsula,"—whose abuse was amicable, and whose invectives were "incidental." If the latter, a direct disavowal of his facts would have been more satisfactory than a silent surrender of them.

CAMPO MAYOR.

I shall not, my Lord, devote much of my own time, or petition for any great portion of your Lordship's attention to a tedious and unprofitable discussion on the "ravine," the "ditch," the "ridges," the "undulations," and the nature, extent, and effects of the detour, that rock (saving always the bodily capture of

the 13th, and the fatigued artillery horses) upon which all your anticipations of success would appear to have made such miserable shipwreck. I am willing to give your Lordship the benefit of the detour to the fullest extent of Colonel Doyle's evidence, and of which evidence you seem to approve, viz. that it was "*at first rather* wider than was *perhaps absolutely* requisite;" "that however," he adds, "is *matter of opinion*," although he "inclines to it," and "nothing," you say, "can be more fair than "the manner in which that officer's statements "are made."* If this wording is sufficient to weigh down the scale in your Lordship's favor, and to affix the escape of Latour Maubourg, his infantry and fifteen pieces of artillery, on General Long, who "manœuvred" with such "ability," and on Colonel Head and the 13th, who "entirely routed" the enemy, "and "pursued them into the town of Badajos, *two leagues* distant," as stated in your despatch, well and good. The "disadvantages that had "resulted from this extraordinary movement," might have been great and manifold, but I contend that your Lordship is not warranted in making out a tripartite cause of failure, and fastening the aggregate on my relative. Moreover, we must never forget that *by this very detour*, ac-

* p. 30.

cording to your Lordship's own showing in your despatch, "the *enemy were more effectually flanked*, "and obliged to retreat hastily, and, indeed, with "*extraordinary rapidity*." Their danger, in point of fact, was rendered *more imminent!*

Your Lordship states, (p. 16,) that you gave, "if your memory is correct," your *first* orders in person. You probably did so, and you have quoted them; but you have omitted to notice General Long's question respecting any attack, and when you are reported by him to have said, "do not commit yourself against a very superior "force, but if the opportunity to strike a blow "occurs, avail yourself of it."* It is possible that this question may, "after such a lapse of "time," have escaped your memory. You say, (p. 17,) that Sir Henry Hardinge "has informed me" that "he carried no such instructions as to "keep two or three gun-shots from the works." If you will refer to my Reply, at the page you have quoted, (viz. p. 8,) you will find that you are in error. Sir Henry merely answers my question respecting *one* particular message, subsequent to this order, viz. the one to which the author of the Strictures says, "some foolish "answer" was returned. My question related only to the second message stated by that author to have been sent.

* p. 75, Reply, Letter to General Le Marchant.

The ravine, the ditch, the ridges, and the undulations, might perhaps be better disposed of by a tacit reference to the parties competent to speak upon these subjects. Nevertheless, to disperse, if it be possible, a little of the mystification which overshadows this portion of the subject, I am induced (although it is after all but the chaff of the controversy, which is worthy only of being winnowed away) to offer a few observations.

First, then of the "Ravine."

It is as obvious as words can make it, from General Long's journal given, in p. 41, and his letter to General Le Marchant, (p. 75,) that the "ravine" was met with, as I had myself stated in page 9 of my Reply, in approaching Campo Mayor.

"I followed," says General Long, "implicitly the instructions I received as far as the "ground permitted, and when I could find a passage across the ravine, I filed my column over, "drove the enemy's pickets from the opposite "heights back upon Campo Mayor, towards "which I proceeded across a considerable plain, "and halted about a mile from the town."* No ravine was met with just previous to the attack. That one existed in the earlier part

* p. 76, Letter to General Le Marchant.

of the day, will not I apprehend, be disputed by your Lordship or by any one to whom you may apply.

Secondly, of the "Ditch" or "Rivulet."

You have quoted a passage from the Journal of General Long, in which you state, that "having forgotten his impassable ravine, he says, "it is necessary to observe that I led the light "division over a ridge of heights and broken "ground."* I could certainly have wished your Lordship to have continued this quotation. It was but fair, there being no full stop. It is as follows: "which overlooked the valley in which "the enemy were formed, and through which "ran a nasty, boggy, and almost impassable "ditch." † That such ditch or rivulet existed, though not such as to be an insuperable impediment to General Long's movements, nor does he say so, I refer your Lordship to what Colonel Macalister remembers to have observed.

"Having gone over the ground after the affair," (this officer was attached to Sir John Colborne on the occasion in question,) "I observed a portion of *swampy ground* with *an "ugly gully or ditch*, part of which appeared to "have been passed."

The "ridges of heights," "undulations,"

* p. 19. † p. 44, Reply.

" broken ground," and " light-horse volun-
" teers on Finchley Common," are really too contemptible to require much notice. Opinions may differ as to the precise denomination of these varieties of surface or other geological peculiarities. *No one*, however, denies that the country was " perfectly open and every where " favorable to the operations of cavalry."* These are in fact General Long's own words, when he speaks of the nature of the ground near the spot where the attack took place. I cannot, however, allow one part of this critique to pass unnoticed. You " find" you say, " in a MS. note to Sir William Lumley's copy of my Reply,"† this observation about the " light-horse volunteers on Finchley Common." You have then been fellow-labourers, and Sir William Lumley, instead of being a mere witness whose evidence has been sought out to corroborate and to contradict certain facts, appears to be an active and valuable accessary, *reviewing my publication in your Lordship's behalf.* The seal of his habitual taciturnity has indeed been effectually broken. You have informed me that Sir Henry Hardinge was the only officer sent to General Long throughout the whole day. I have no reason to doubt the perfect

* p. 80, Reply. † p. 19.

accuracy of your Lordship's recollection, at least on this point. I have had, since the publication of my Reply, an opportunity of referring to a more detailed account of the operations than that given in General Long's Journal, and I find that in it the name of "Colonel Hardinge" appears as the bearer of the order to him to turn the town. He may not certainly remember having made use of the term, "two or three gun shots;" he may indeed never have used it, and General Long may have mistaken his meaning. I further find the name of "Colonel Hardinge" used to designate the Aide-de-Camp who appears to have flattered General Long with the prospect of meriting your Lordship's approbation by "attempting something" against the enemy. This also it is quite possible, "after "such a lapse of time," that Sir Henry may not exactly remember; and yet when he shall have been convinced, as he doubtless will be, of one or two errors into which he has unfortunately fallen, he may possibly "find cause to distrust "the fidelity of his memory" on other points which came under his observation.

The next question to be attended to is that of the attack, which, however "favorable the "opportunity," as your Lordship's despatch informs us, "however "admirably executed," as General D'Urban affirms, is now declared

to have been directly contrary to every sound military principle. "General Long," (which it may seem surprising your Lordship was not before aware of, although it will hereafter appear that you are "indebted to my "publication" for very many other details,) "so "developed the five troops of the 13th Light "Dragoons from the rear of his column, as to "expose their flank in *threes* to the fire of a "whole force of a square of infantry."* With the military part of this question I have nothing to do, neither would I presume to discuss with so high an authority the necessity that may sometimes exist, owing to the nature of the ground, for approaching an enemy in that manner. For the fact, I beg to refer your Lordship to my question to Colonel Doyle and his answer.

Q. When in column of threes were the 13th Dragoons fired upon by the French Infantry. If so, with what effect?

A. *No.* The 13th Dragoons received the fire of the enemy's Infantry *while passing to the charge* of the French Cavalry. Lieutenant Smith was wounded by it, but I do not recollect how many men were disabled.

We come now, in the order of events, to

* p. 22.

the miraculous misadventure of the bodily capture of the 13th, the "one fell swoop" by which that victorious regiment was caught, as it were like a shoal of herrings, in the moment of its triumph, and carried captive at a hand-gallop to Badajos. The fact affirmed by the author of the Strictures, viz. that the report had originated with General Long, obliged me, at the time, to adopt the conclusion that your Lordship had held no intercourse with that writer on the point in question. I am now disabused of my error. The writer must unquestionably have written from authority, in that instance, since no one, excepting your Lordship, the Count de Villa Real, and that author, appears to have been in the secret, and it has lain "forbearingly" dormant during a period of *two-and-twenty years.* Your Lordship, after quoting a passage from my Reply, in which General Lumley's name is mentioned, adds, of course I conclude by his authority, "Sir William Lumley has no "recollection of the conversation mentioned "in the above extract."* "The memory," we must bear in mind, "may and very often does, "prove treacherous even with regard to the "most material points of fact." It is much to

* p. 23.

be regretted that Sir William's imperfection of reminiscence was not earlier expressed. I had the honor to receive three letters from him, not one of which contained any such distinct disavowal as that which your Lordship has now quoted. You have, in all probability, (being the personal friend of that officer, and one to whom he has now "for the first time" laid bare the penetralia of his mind,) seen my part of the correspondence, more especially as I made no parade of secrecy on the subject. But, to prevent mistakes, I shall take the liberty first of quoting the *whole* of the passage from General Long's letter, (printing in italics the parts that were omitted in the Reply,) and secondly, the two first of Sir William's letters, bearing immediately upon the point at issue.

"Things," says General Long, when writing to his father on the 29th of May, 1811, "come "out by degrees. General Lumley has just "told me a fact I was never before acquainted "with, and which accounts for the Marshal's "feelings and conduct at the time. After the "charge of the 13th Dragoons, an officer (*Ba-*"*ron Tripp*) rode up to the Marshal and as-"sured him that the whole of that regiment "had been surrounded by the enemy and car-"ried off. *He declared he saw it with his own* "*eyes, and explained the manner in which it had*

" *occurred. So positive was his testimony, that* " *the Marshal rebuked General Lumley for ex-* " *pressing his doubts about the fact, stated upon* " *such incontrovertible evidence, and the news came* " *like a thunder-clap upon him and disconcerted all* " *his ideas. General Lumley declares he is ready* " *to swear to the truth of the above circumstance.*"

On the 9th of June last, I communicated this passage, and to the best of my belief, verbatim, to Sir William Lumley. The following was his reply:—

" *June* 11, 1832.

" Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge " the receipt of your letter of June 9th.

" As you seem to intimate your intention of " a publication, or answer in some shape to the " work entitled, ' Further Strictures on Colo- " nel Napier's History of the Peninsular " War,' to which you refer; and as you appear, " out of courtesy to me, simply to notify by " letter such your intention, and not to ask my " opinion upon any particular point, it is not " for me to advise how far it may be well " judged to answer an anonymous publication " by the information drawn from the letters of " your own deceased relative, a great part of " which information must clearly have been, " not upon personal knowledge, but from casual " conversations and hear-say evidence, and

" much of which may have been misunderstood,
" or might originally have been erroneous; and
" although upon mature consideration my re-
" collections might be correct, even at this
" distant period of twenty-one years, of any
" particular occurrences, and subsequent con-
" versation which took place thereon, yet I do
" not deem it wise that I should enter into a
" public discussion of affairs which, by length
" of time, have become of minor consideration
" to most of those who might feel an interest
" therein.

" But in acknowledging the receipt of your
" letter I must notice two decided errors into
" which you appear to have fallen. In the
" first place, I feel satisfied that I never gave
" Lord Beresford cause to 'rebuke' me. I had
" ever too much respect for my superiors in
" command so to do; and I am equally certain
" that the kind-hearted Marshal never did
" 'rebuke' me.

" And in the second place, in the last few
" words of quotation from your late uncle's
" letter of May, 1811, there must have been
" some great error or misconception of my
" words; for although I have known Lord Be-
" resford upwards of thirty years, and have
" always been upon the most friendly terms
" with him, whether under his command or

" not, yet not having been his confidential ad-
" viser, it was impossible for me to say or to
" know that the reported capture of the 13th
" Dragoons had disconcerted all his *ideas*.'

" I might indeed have said that the reports
" of such a loss, and the disappearance of that
" corps, had disconcerted the *ostensible plan* of
" overtaking, bringing to action, or capturing
" the enemy's force then retreating from Campo
" Mayor upon Badajos.

" I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) " WM. LUMLEY."

" *C. E. Long, Esq.*"

On the receipt of this letter I wrote to express my concern that Sir William seemed to have misunderstood the meaning of General Long. I ventured to point out that the word " rebuke" did not imply " rebuke of conduct," but a mere " expression of surprise at an indi-
" vidual doubting the possibility of a particu-
" lar occurrence." In the second place, that the term " disconcerted his ideas," was intended to bear the exact construction that he, Sir William, had put upon it, viz. " had dis-
" concerted the ostensible plan," &c., whatever it might be. I then received this second epistle from Sir William:—

" *June* 17, 1832.

" Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt " of your second letter, dated June 14th.

" If you are decided upon publishing any " comments in answer to the work entitled, " ' Further Strictures,' &c. I certainly think it " well that you should avoid specifying names, " as far as may be."

I must here observe that this alluded to my declaration that I did not design to print the whole verbatim.

" As to the reported capture of the 13th " Light Dragoons, on the plains of Campo " Mayor, it will afford you but little informa- " tion or satisfaction to know, that I was not " present when the report was made. The " fact as regards myself was, that being at the " head of the column of infantry forming the " advance, and moving on as rapidly as cir- " cumstances would permit, I observed Lord " Beresford (who had previously been in va- " rious parts of the plain), dismounted for the " moment and surrounded by a group of of- " ficers, amongst whom M. General (the late " Sir William Stewart) was. I galloped " up, and was then informed that a Staff Offi- " cer had just reported the 13th Dragoons to " have been all taken prisoners. I have stated " thus much for your satisfaction, but you will

" observe that this to me was hearsay informa-
" tion; and I must beg to decline further dis-
" cussion upon occurrences of so distant a pe-
" riod, and which I have avoided entering upon
" hitherto in writing, even with my oldest
" friends.

" I have the honour to be, &c.
(Signed) " WM. LUMLEY."

" *C. E. Long, Esq.*"

Your Lordship observes that " Brigadier " General Long represents himself as never " having received the slightest hint of such a " *report* till nearly two months after the affair,"* and that he then " *thought fit privately to assert,* " that he never heard of this rumour till it was " mentioned to him by Sir William Lumley " more than two months after the circumstance " occurred."† On the imputation conveyed in this sentence I shall offer no comment, but your Lordship will permit me to suggest that I consider your interpretation of my relative's meaning to be erroneous. It was the *fact* that such a report had been made direct to your Lordship, that it had influenced your proceedings, and not the circumstance that such a *report* had prevailed, that was new to General Long. On referring to my

* p. 22. † p. 25.

Reply, (p. 15,) you will observe that I particularly noticed the before-mentioned passage in General Long's letter, not as showing that he *then first* became acquainted with the report that such an idea had existed in the minds of some persons, but that he then *first* heard that Baron Tripp had stated it *as a fact* "*direct*" (I expressly printed the word in italics,) to your Lordship; when you had, as you yourself state, "implicitly believed" it. I never supposed for an instant that General Long only heard of the *report* that had existed on the 29th of May; I knew, and could have shown in evidence, that he was aware of it, and that it was a subject of conversation, and indeed of derision, on the evening of the very day on which it occurred. I confess I can see no possible object in suppressing the story. If, having been himself the author, he wished to conceal it, *why state it at all?* The later the period of disclosure, the greater the folly in disclosing. He had escaped the imputation "on the spot," "when it could not have been concealed," and he volunteered a penitential confession for the private ear of his parent! The reason of its appearance in that form can be easily traced. On the 24th and 25th of May, General Long was thrown into immediate intercourse with

General Lumley, (with whom, according to that officer's own statement, he was unacquainted till the day of the Battle of Albuera,) when the conversation (of which you state that Sir William says he has no recollection) must have occurred. To continue. You say that "It was known to Colonel Doyle, of his "own Staff; Sir Charles Dalbiac, and Sir William Lumley, when General Long was cer- "tainly present, heard it from the Staff of Head "Quarters."* In the first place, it is not clear that General Long was present when Sir Charles Dalbiac says he heard it at Head Quarters; and if he was, I beg to draw your attention to Sir Charles's answer. "I heard a conversa- "tion," he says, "from some of the Staff to the "effect that Baron Tripp had so expressed him- "self. I *never* understood that *any* such report "or supposition *had emanated from General* "*Long*."† The mixing up of the *fact*, stated in the letter of the 29th May, with the *rumour*, has led your Lordship into this error. "Colonel "Doyle," you say, "returned and acquainted "him," viz. General Long, "of what he had "been told." To render that point clearer, here is that officer's answer to my question.

Q. Did you on your return to B. General

* p. 23. † Reply, p. 62.

Long from Head Quarters inform him that Baron Tripp had reported to Marshal Beresford the capture of the 13th Dragoons, or only that such a rumour had been circulated?

A. I only reported that such an impression existed at Head Quarters.

We have now to proceed to your Lordship's corroboration of the fact first stated by the author of the Further Strictures. "The truth "is," your Lordship says, "that General Long "was himself the person from whom the "capture of the 13th Regiment was reported "to me."* "*From whom it was reported!*" *By* whom then, may I ask, was it conveyed? By Baron Tripp? Assuredly not. In the following page you say, the Baron "most cer- "tainly was *not* my informant." Who then? To continue, "Little as I could comprehend the "case as *he* stated it." Who stated it? General Long? If General Long, what is the meaning of the phrase, "*from* whom *it was reported* "to me?" "Whether," your Lordship says "it *originated* with him," viz. Baron Tripp, "or your relative, is *immaterial.*" Indeed! "*Any* report made to me *through him* would "have been equivalent to a report from General "Long." Unquestionably, if he rode up and said,

* Page 23.

" Sir, I am desired *by General Long* to report the " capture of the 13th." Did he say so to your Lordship? Did he say so in the presence of any one? " Baron Tripp," you say, " is no longer alive." I too, my Lord, was well aware of that fact, and my Reply to the author of the Strictures will show that I, at least, cannot be accused of inflicting even an " incidental" wound on the memory of that officer, or the feelings of his friends. Your Lordship observes that your " present purpose would be fully answered " by allowing the military discredit that at- " taches to the author of this report to rest " with him. But I cannot," you continue, " acquiesce in such injustice."* Is there then no blame attaching to the *belief* of such a " wild and unfounded story," for so you have designated it? Does the whole of the culpability centre in the narrator? It is not for me to decide. But you " cannot acquiesce in such " injustice." You write as if I had set about this story against the Baron. In the History of the Peninsular War, you must have read as follows: " Baron Tripp, a Staff officer, deceived " by appearances, informed him," meaning your Lordship, " that the 13th had been cut off."† Am I then the cause of the circulation of such

* Page 24. † p. 496, vol. 3.

a statement? And did your Lordship slumber in "acquiescence of the injustice" on reading *that* publication, and when a plain and simple declaration of the real fact would have done honor to your Lordship's feelings, so liable to be pained at the record of a brother officer's misconduct? But you were, perhaps, aware that the author of the Strictures was meditating a partial correction, and that he, at any rate, would not "acquiesce in such injustice." Was *he* then more alive to this aspersion on the Baron's memory when he wrote of him, (not as the accredited agent despatched with the tidings,) but as a second witness of the transaction, anxious to corroborate the fact, and reporting, as if only from himself, to all whose credulity was capacious enough to swallow the tale?

"Baron Tripp, no doubt," you, in like manner, say, "contributed to extend the belief of "it, by confirming General Long's account, and "narrating the story after the halt to all among "the surrounding group, who were willing to "receive his intelligence."* Was your Lordship, then, an *unwilling* hearer? Did your exclamation, "the loss of one regiment is "enough!" (than which observation *publickly*

* Page 24.

made, you say, and most truly say, "*nothing* "*could be stronger*,"*) contribute to *check* the belief?

We are now to consider the evidence by which the fact, that General Long made this report of the bodily capture, is supported. It is made to depend upon the memories of your Lordship and a solitary Aide-de-Camp, and that Aide-de-Camp, from being a foreigner, liable to have misunderstood the meaning of a hurried statement in another language—the Count de Villa Real. No other persons were, I presume, present, or they would have been brought forward. The interview then between your Lordship, the Count de Villa Real, and General Long, must have taken place between the time when you passed the Heavy Brigade and the time when it formed line on the right of the Badajos road, in which case you must have found General Long in advance of the enemy's column.

You say, that not wishing "to depend upon "the accuracy of your own memory," you "adduce for my satisfaction the testimony of "the Count de Villa Real." "We proceeded," says the Count, "immediately to General "Long, who reported that the 13th Light Dra- "goons had charged the French Cavalry and

" broken it; but that they had *gone off after* " *them*, with part of the Portuguese Cavalry, " which supported them, and he *thought* the " whole *had been* taken prisoners, as the French " Cavalry reformed in their rear, and the in- " fantry kept together."*

One of the reasons, then, *why* General Long thought (for, after all, it appears that he only " *thought*" what your Lordship was " compelled " to yield your belief to,"† and act upon as if it was a *fact*,) that the whole, British as well as Portuguese, had been taken prisoners, was *because* the " infantry kept together." What General Long may have meant—what the Count means—or what your Lordship may have understood by the infantry " keeping together," that infantry which you must have passed in order to reach General Long, and " which it required," as says the author of the Strictures, " no extent of vision to see," I am utterly at a loss to conjecture. Your Lordship " implicitly " believed" that the 13th " *had been* taken pri- " soners," although it is stated that at the same moment you were informed that " they," the 13th, " had gone off after the enemy." A curious method of caption this certainly. But not only the 13th, " the *whole* had been taken

* Page 25. † Page 23.

" prisoners." "The French Cavalry having re-" formed in their rear!!" The first flight of Frenchmen " entirely routed" the 13th close at their heels, " going off after them;" the Portuguese sent to support and rally the 13th, swept into the current, and the whole closed in, so that no loop-hole was left, by the remaining troops of the enemy, who hurried their captives, even to the trumpeter sent forward to call them back, helter-skelter to the dungeons of Badajos. But the infantry? Oh! they " kept together" in their chivalry! or rather, to be more matter of fact, without their chivalry! It was, indeed, a " wild and " unfounded story," as your Lordship very justly observes; but to be " compelled to yield " a belief to it,"—and that, too, when it was not stated as a fact, but only the *supposition of a fact!!* This I confess does strike me as somewhat strange.

Having so recently attempted an analysis of the evidence of the Count de Villa Real on this subject of the interview with General Long, his relation of the fate of the 13th, and of Colonel Otway's Portuguese, (for we must not forget that the Count has augmented the original calamity by sacrificing the whole party,) I must pass over a few pages of your Lordship's pamphlet, in order to bring a second portion of

the Count's testimony more immediately in contact with the passage quoted from the first. It is at p. 30, and as follows: "We rode on quickly, "and coming up with the heavy brigade," (that heavy brigade which had never, as it appears, trespassed beyond the prescribed bounds,) "the Marshal inquired what was going on in "front. He was told that there had been some "charges, in which it appeared that the French "cavalry had been broken, but *having seen only* "*part of the light cavalry, and learning that the* "13*th Light Dragoons had been taken prisoners*, "the Marshal expecting the infantry to be up "soon," (it is satisfactory to hear that your Lordship did expect them to arrive *soon*,) "desired "the Honourable Colonel de Grey to take post "on the *left* of the road, *until he could know* "*what had occurred in front*"!!* This, indeed, throws a new light, I ought rather, perhaps, to say an additional obscurity, on the subject. Your Lordship, according to this second statement of the Count, would seem to have heard of the capture *before* you had ascertained "what "had occurred in front," and *before* the heavy brigade was ordered to take post on the "rising "ground," to the "left" of the road. The author of the Strictures, on the other hand,

* Page 30.

affirms, in page 40, that your Lordship heard this account from General Long and Baron Tripp, *after* Colonel de Grey had received orders to cross the road, and the artillery had begun to fire. Nothing, however, can be plainer than the Count's statement. He distinctly assures us that your Lordship heard of the capture when you was with the heavy brigade; at which period General Long was, beyond a doubt, considerably *in advance*. I confess myself bewildered in this maze of contrarieties and relinquish the task of unravelling them; and "I am "sure" that both your Lordship and the Count "will not feel hurt if I find myself compelled to "doubt the perfect accuracy of your recollec- "tions on matters of such distant date." With regard to the simple fact of General Long having stated his "*thoughts*," (for we must bear in mind that they are after all, according to the Count's evidence, only his *thoughts*,) that the regiment "*had been* captured." I am of opinion that both your Lordship and the Count appear to have laboured under an utter misapprehension of my relative's meaning. He may have said (I do not state that he did say even that,) that the regiment, *if not supported, might be* taken prisoners or cut to pieces. I merely offer this in solution of the mystery. For is it likely, is it credible, that Sir Charles

Dalbiac, living on terms of intimacy with General Long, should "*never* have understood "that *any* such report had emanated from that "officer," as he says in his fifth answer, if such had really been the fact? Is it to be believed that the other officers, (one, Colonel Leighton, living also on terms of intimacy with General Long,) whose testimony I subjoin, should *never* have heard until this hour of such a charge against their commanding officer? The thing is utterly incredible. But you quote Sir Henry Hardinge in page 25. That officer appears to have returned you an answer "to "some questions that you addressed to him," but which are not given, as follows:—"When "Colonel Head rejoined the head quarters "and heard the report, he expressed himself "warmly against General Long and Baron "Tripp." "The *natural inference*," you then go on to say, "is, that General Long was one of the authors." May I ask, my Lord, who *told* Colonel Head of the report as applied to General Long? May I further ask why (Sir Henry Hardinge being your personal friend) it was necessary for you to have an answer which *only involved an inference*,—and why you did not ask a *direct* question,—"Did he, Sir Henry "Hardinge, or did he not *know* General Long to "have *stated the fact*?" Most sincerely do I

regret that Colonel Head is not living to add his evidence, as I am convinced he would, to that which has been given by his surviving brother officers. That hiatus is, however, supplied by the testimony of his nephew. Is then this suppression of such an accusation for *two-and-twenty years*, instead of *openly stating it "on the spot, when "the truth of every fact could have been easily as- "certained, and when it could not have been con- "cealed,"* a part and parcel only of that "ac- "customed forbearance" towards my relative, which we are informed, in page 56, was the invariable rule of your Lordship's conduct towards him. Your Lordship has asked me whether I am "incapable of perceiving the *gross* "impropriety" of my relative's conduct. My Lord, I will, while I retort the question, suppress the epithet.

I now beg to submit to your Lordship's attention the statements of several of the officers present on the occasion in question, respecting this report of the bodily capture of the 13th Dragoons, now, after a lapse of two-and-twenty years, attributed by your Lordship and an unknown author to General Long.

Colonel Leighton, late 4th Dragoons:—

"I certainly did not understand that the re- "port of the bodily capture of the whole of the "13th Dragoons, in the affair of Campo Mayor,

" originated with General Long, but with ano-
" ther person."

Colonel Doherty, late 13th Dragoons:—

" I certainly never did."

Major Doherty, 27th Foot, late 13th Dragoons:—

" I can most conscientiously assert, that
" until I saw it in the ' Further Strictures on
" Colonel Napier's History,' I never heard the
" accusation made against General Long; but
" on the contrary I have always understood
" that it was Baron Tripp who made the re-
" port to Lord Beresford."

J. H. Drought, Esq., late 13th Dragoons, and *the nephew of Colonel Head:*—

" I never heard or understood that General
" Long reported to Lord Beresford that the
" 13th Dragoons were made prisoners."

Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister, late 13th Dragoons:—

" It is the first time I ever heard General
" Long's name coupled with the report to
" which you allude. Indeed I remember to
" have heard him frequently express himself
" in the most unqualified terms of indignation
" against the author of what he termed a wicked
" and scandalous report."

Captain S. Holmes, late 13th Dragoons:—

" I can assure you I never believed, nor did

" any officer in the regiment ever suspect that " General Long made it. I never heard any " one of them mention such a thing while I " remained in the regiment, which was for six " years and a half afterwards."

George Chantrey, Esq. late 4th Dragoons:—

" I never understood that the report origi- " nated with General Long."

J. L. Phillipps, Esq. late 4th Dragoons:—

" I certainly never heard such a report."

Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman, commanding 6th Dragoon Guards, late 4th Dragoons:—

" I perfectly recollect the report of the cap- " ture of the entire of the 13th Dragoons, but " I never had the slightest knowledge how that " report originated."

A. F. Gregory, Esq. late 4th Dragoons:—

" I remember perfectly the report of the " capture of the 13th Light Dragoons at Campo " Mayor, on the 25th March, 1811. I never " heard that it originated with General Long. " It was said to have come from Baron Tripp, " then on the staff attached to the cavalry. " Whether correct or not, it was the general " impression at the time that he was the author."

Colonel Light, late 4th Dragoons:—

" I never heard that the report of the capture " of the 13th Dragoons at Campo Mayor origi- " nated with General Long."

Ralph Heathcote, Esq. then on the staff of the Quarter-Master-General:—

"I never heard that it had originated with "General Long. Indeed a great part of Marshal "Beresford's corps having witnessed the 13th "Light Dragoons galloping off in pursuit of the "enemy's cavalry towards Badajos, when they "were lost sight of, owing to the inequality of "the ground, I cannot see how it could have "originated with him, as many others had the "same means of forming an opinion upon the "subject that he had himself."

Though last, not least, on this list of witnesses, I shall take the liberty of citing the authority of Sir William Lumley, whose letter most clearly indicates *his* entire ignorance that any such report had originated with my relative.

That there may be a vagueness in General Long's distances I readily admit. He certainly says that the Heavy Brigade was halted "a "mile and a half off;" and again, that they were "*about* two miles." If, however, General Long is to be deemed a fallible guide to distance in the case of the Heavy Brigade, I do not see why he is not to be admitted as an equally fallible guide in the case of the proximity of the infantry, of which I shall hereafter have occasion to speak. But is General Long the

only uncertain guide on record? Let us take the case of the captured artillery. The author of the Strictures says, that the French artillery was "*two leagues* off."* Your Lordship says that it was "full *a league*."† Colonel Doyle says, "*short of a league.*" But the real truth is, that whether the Heavy Brigade was removed "about two miles," or "a mile and a "half," or a mile, or even less, does not materially affect the main question at issue. It was first *halted*, and then removed in a direction *away from* General Long, and as General Long had advanced in one direction, and the heavy cavalry had advanced obliquely in another, it had, *quoad* General Long, receded from him, and was not, as he had a right to expect, supporting him in his operations.

I shall leave Colonel Doyle to explain, correct, or defend his own particular statements, which your Lordship has noticed, and I subjoin them in the note below.‡ I must however make a few additional observations on one or two points connected with your ac-

* p. 42, F. S.

† p. 29.

‡ "6, *Green Street, Grosvenor Square, June 2d*, 1833.

"DEAR LONG,

Annexed are the answers to your two questions, and likewise a few remarks having reference to my notes

count of the Campo Mayor affair, and more particularly relating to the support alleged

published in your reply to the Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's Peninsular War. I am,

very truly your's,

C. J. Doyle.

In p. 27, Lord Beresford says, "Colonel Doyle, in his note, appears to confirm this statement," viz. that Lord Beresford not "only sent the Heavy Brigade two miles across the plain, "but accompanied it in person." I mention no distance in my note, which refers solely to the movement of the Heavy Brigade from the left to the right of the Badajoz road, instead of direct to the front; neither do I mention here any thing regarding Marshal Beresford's person.

P. 29. In my note I state, that I went to the spot where the guns were captured, that I returned and found B. General Long with some Portuguese cavalry endeavouring to explain his orders to a Portuguese officer, which I interpreted for him, and that I afterwards succeeded in rallying the Portuguese cavalry when they had turned from the French hussars. It was subsequent to this, that I was sent by B. General Long to bring up the Heavy Brigade, in order to support him and the Portuguese; on my way I passed the column of French infantry, and I certainly then found Marshal Beresford and his staff, with two of Major Hartmann's guns, contiguous to the Badajoz road, and not above three hundred yards from the enemy. All this however was not accomplished certainly in a quarter of an hour, nor is there any mention of time in my notes; how long I may have been in effecting what I have stated, I cannot recollect with any precision, but my movements occupied whatever time was necessary for the purpose; nor do I speak decidedly as to distance, but to the best of my recollection the captured guns were short

to have been withheld from General Long. I shall not recapitulate the evidence of Sir C.

of a league from the spot where I first found B. General Long on my return. Be this as it may, I was only sent once during the day to Marshal Beresford, and that was nearly at the close of the affair.

P. 31. Lord Beresford states that " Colonel Doyle reports that " the Heavy Brigade had orders to support the 13th Dra- " goons." My note, p. 52, Mr. Long's Reply, says, " Colonel " Head had every right to suppose that he was supported by " the Heavy Brigade, for he was told so." I cannot assert that Brigadier General Long positively gave orders to the Heavy Brigade to support the charge of the 13th. I certainly was not employed to convey such orders to Colonel de Grey; but I distinctly recollect at the moment when the 13th Dragoons were disengaged from the rear of the column of Light Cavalry, that B. General Long said, addressing himself to Colonel Head, " Now, Colonel, the Heavy Brigade are coming " up in your rear, and if you have an opportunity, give a " good account of those fellows," (meaning the enemy,) to which Colonel Head replied, " By gad, Sir! I will." Colonel Head then asked me to accompany him, adding, that I was better acquainted with the country than he was. B. General Long did not object, and I rode on with Colonel Head. From this conversation, and my observing from the rising ground, over which we passed, that the Heavy Brigade was advancing in our rear just before the charge, I certainly was under the impression that orders had been given to that Brigade to follow in support of the Light Cavalry, and I have no doubt Colonel Head acted under the same impression. That some such order was given, or understood, would also appear from Sir Charles Dalbiac's answer to question 1, p. 59, of Mr Long's Reply.

C. J. D."

Dalbiac, or the statement of General Long, where the word "support" is applied to the Heavy Brigade in terms that cannot well be misunderstood. I shall content myself with quoting a few words from your Lordship's own despatch.

"This charge, followed by Colonel Otway, "with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese, "and *supported* by General Long with the re- "mainder of that regiment, the 1st Portuguese, "*and the brigade of Colonel De Grey,* was made "with the most determined courage, &c. &c." It appears then, after all, that your Lordship, in 1811, when writing your despatch, really thought that the Heavy Brigade did actually *support* somebody or something, and were not so entirely, as you now say, "left "to themselves." Now, however, in page 32, you observe, after detailing the charge of the 13th, the support of them by Colonel Otway, and of him by General Long, as follows: "But "it does not appear that Colonel De Grey, who "commanded the latter corps, *had any orders* "whatever respecting the 13th Light Dragoons." Did your Lordship read Sir C. Dalbiac's first answer, that his "impression was that the "allied cavalry were to attack that of the "enemy, if a favorable opportunity offered?" *

* p. 59, Reply.

—that he "judged from the orders of Brigadier "General Long" that these orders were that the "Heavy Brigade was to *support* at a proper "distance"!! Again you say, "If not entirely "forgotten, till long after the 13th were out of "sight, we find from your relative's account, as "was actually the case, that Colonel De Grey was "*left altogether in the same position.*" * But, my Lord, he was *moving*, he was *advancing*, in the same direction, and was *halted* by your Lordship's orders, when you came up in your "pursuit," preparatory to obtaining a knowledge of "what was going on in front." Who then "left" Colonel De Grey's brigade, "altogether "in the same position," and overruled his orders to "support," which orders Sir C. Dalbiac "heard"? There can be but one answer. I must therefore leave my military readers to estimate the value of the support mentioned in the despatch, though contradicted in the pamphlet; and with the "total ignorance" of an unprofessional inquirer, I must confess in diffidence that I see symptoms of anything rather than *support*.

The next point is that relating to the general order of reprimand, issued by your Lordship. I am not at all surprised at the endeavour to divert the feeling of annoyance, if any such can

* p. 32.

now exist in the minds of the survivors of that regiment, upon my relative. "I would observe," you say, "that not having been present at the "commencement of the transaction, *all* the in- "formation that I received with regard to the "troops under Colonels Head and Otway was "delivered to me by your relative himself."* The Count de Villa Real has acquainted us with the nature of the information conveyed to your Lordship by General Long. The author of the Strictures affords us, in addition, the following particulars:

"The Marshal, some time after the halt, was "the first to perceive a column of troops ad- "vancing towards them from the direction of "Badajos. On looking through the glass, he "discovered it to be the 13th returning. Its "commanding officer, on arriving, immediately "rode up to Lord Beresford; but, though a "particular friend, he was coldly and formally "received. The Marshal dryly inquired whe- "ther he thought he had proceeded in a mili- "tary manner, in this mode of pursuing the "enemy? and expressed his hope, that, for the "future, he would recollect that courage was "not the only requisite either for troops or "officers."†

"*All* the information" came from my relative;

* p. 34. † p. 42, F. S.

and your Lordship says, that you are "*now* "disabused of your error."* Notwithstanding which, your Lordship was the first to discover the regiment when on its return, and to reprimand its Colonel, who, although a particular friend, did not disabuse you of your error on the spot, but tacitly admitted the justice of the reproof.

You observe in p. 37 that "It is mentioned, "as *General Long's opinion*, that if two guns "could have been brought forward, the rest "might have followed." Your Lordship mistakes. It was I, and not General Long, who hazarded that opinion, and Colonel Doyle, who was present and saw and heard what was going on, would seem to confirm it. Whether that surmise was correct will shortly appear. Sir Henry Hardinge has now offered, he will allow me to say, a much too positive corroboration of the statement made, viz. that the horses were too tired to proceed in the pursuit of a column of infantry, pressed by an enemy's cavalry, which would have obliged it to retire leisurely to avoid the danger of confusion, and to enable it to preserve its close order, and having full seven miles to go before it could reach a place of safety.

"The artillery horses," says Sir Henry, "were

p. 34.

" so blown and fatigued by the rapid movement " they had made in advance of our infantry, that, " after firing a few shots, it was found impos- " sible to urge them forward and overtake an " enemy, who had undergone no previous fa- " tigue."*

Your Lordship will remember that Colonel Doyle affirmed it to have been " currently " stated, that the officer commanding the artil- " lery (Major Hartmann) had been anxious to " bring up the entire brigade."†

You have spoken in praise of the fairness of that officer's statements. You have further expressed your " admiration of the candour with " which I have laid his evidence before the " public, telling, as it most frequently does, " so much against the representations of my " relative."†

Your Lordship will now have an opportunity of judging how far it is confirmed by the evidence of others.

M. General Sir Julius Hartmann's statement, in answer to my enquiry:

" The statement of Colonel Doyle to you is " perfectly correct. It was most assuredly my " wish, and my proposal on that occasion, to " bring forward the whole brigade of artillery,

* p. 38. † p. 50, Reply.

" then immediately in the rear of the advanced " guard, *which, however, was not granted.*"

But " the horses," says Sir Henry Hardinge, " were blown and fatigued, and it was found " impossible to urge them forward."

" The horses of the artillery," continues Sir Julius, " were *not by any means fatigued or dis-* " *tressed.* The officer commanding the two guns " brought up, Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) " De Rettberg, of the Royal Hanoverian Artil- " lery at Stade, and myself, present on the " spot, were *only prevented, by an express order* " *from Lord Beresford to halt*, from advancing, " after having fired a few rounds at too long a " range, as close on the French column as the " undulating feature of the plain between Campo " Mayor and Badajoz did require it to bring the " enemy under a more effectual range for case " shot."

Your Lordship will clearly perceive that this exposition requires no further comment on my part. It is quite obvious that Sir Henry Hardinge's informant was most egregiously in error. I might here, perhaps, even at this early period of my labours, be justified in adopting your Lordship's language and " consider myself " most fully relieved from the necessity of no- " ticing" the remainder of the pamphlet, being totally unable " to account for such mis-

" statements of fact,"—but my object is the vindication of my relative, and I proceed.

The Count de Villa Real appears again in the field at p. 39. " We had already," he speaks rather positively, " lost one British regiment " of cavalry." The corps of his own countrymen whom, as he states, General Long "thought" also to have been made prisoners, are here, it seems, entirely forgotten in the day's disaster. " We could not help," he says, " regretting " the bad effect of our guns, of which *not a* " *single shot* struck the French column."*

" Hartmann's guns," I find from Colonel Doyle, in page 54 of my Reply, " killed a few men."

The Count continues to state " how *well they*," viz. the enemy, " *kept together*."*

Your Lordship's despatch informs us that they were, on the contrary, " *in much confusion*."

The Count says, that he " accompanied Co- " lonel De Grey *more than a mile*."*

Sir C. Dalbiac affirms the Heavy Brigade to have followed the enemy " for several hundred " yards, or somewhat *less than a mile*." †

Your Lordship has, in your despatch, pronounced the distance to have been " *a league*."

The Count proceeds to confirm us in the

* p. 39. † p. 64, Reply.

assurance, that the orders to halt took place "*in consequence of the artillery not being able to* "*move any further.*"*

Your Lordship corroborates this assertion by saying, that "it was *only when the guns could* "*no longer be kept up with the troops, that you* "*commanded the whole to halt.*"†

We must not however forget that the officer who commanded those guns has just informed us, that he was "*only prevented from advancing* "*within the range for case shot by an express* "*order from your Lordship to halt!!*"

If we refer to your Lordship's despatch in 1811, we read your reasons for the final halt as follows:

"Not knowing what had been done by the "cavalry that had made the charge, and con- "tinuing to pursue the infantry with the re- "maining cavalry and artillery for the space of "a league, to support the detached body which "had advanced, and not having received any "notice from it, nor knowing what new force "the enemy might send from Badajos, *prudence* "obliged me to halt with my cavalry till the "infantry could come up." Here then, in 1811, it appears to have been "*prudence,*" arising from a want of accurate information, and not the

* p. 39. † p. 38.

" blown artillery horses," which produced the cessation of hostilities. Looking therefore simply at your Lordship's despatch, I should really be disposed, without being captious, to question the validity of a reason so conflicting in its consequences, and *ex post facto* in its application.

We are informed by the author of the Strictures that your Lordship was " with the ad- " vanced guard, or rather at the head of the " column on its appearance over Campo Mayor. " *The whole army was close up* as the circum- " stance required."*

If " the whole army was close up," was it halted, as Sir John Colborne is affirmed to have been, (and which fact, as stated in my Reply, your Lordship, I may observe, has never contradicted,) and how was it that the enemy gained so prodigiously, and contrived to knock up the artillery horses, which I presume were also " close up" ?

As this offer of Sir John Colborne, given in p. 70 of my Reply, has unfortunately escaped your Lordship's notice, I am tempted to relieve it from its obscurity by the evidence of Colonel Macalister of the 13th, who was attached to that officer on the occasion in question. His reply

* p. 46, F. S.

to my inquiry respecting the baggage before the attack, and the guns after the attack, is as follows:

" I always understood that Sir John Colborne " had made an offer to cut off the baggage. " With respect to the guns I am positive, as " I volunteered the service myself, and I under- " stood from Sir John that the Marshal would " not allow it, saying that *too much had been* " *done already,* or words to that effect."

The Count de Villa Real states, in the conclusion of his evidence, that " the allied infantry " was then"—viz. at the time of the final halt— " very far in the rear, and not much *in advance* " of the town of Campo Mayor."

Your Lordship says, that when you came up to the heavy brigade they were only " five hun- " dred yards in the rear of General Long," * (who, be it observed, was at that period *in advance of the enemy*), and *they* are not accused of having deviated from the original orders by excursing in any eccentric orbit. The town of Campo Mayor was about *two* miles from the spot where the attack took place, (according to Sir C. Dalbiac's answer,) and about *ten* from Badajos. At the time of the final halt, the enemy's column had marched from that spot

* p. 27.

about *a mile*, according to the same authority. Now, if the author of the Strictures is correct in saying, that the "whole army was close up," when the enemy commenced his retreat; and if it continued to pursue,—and that it was, according to the Count de Villa Real, although "not much," still "*in advance* of Campo Mayor," it may fairly be presumed that the head of the column was considerably *within* two miles of the enemy at the time of the final halt, when that enemy was *full seven miles* from Badajos; and that if General Stewart's proposal had been acted upon, and Sir John Colborne's wishes had been attended to, the blame of allowing the enemy to escape would not have been attributed to General Long, while the credit of the capture would have devolved, as of right, upon your Lordship.

You say, in p. 20, that General Long was "acting under the immediate personal direction "of his superior." Either General Long was intrusted with the direction of the cavalry operations, or he was not. If he *was*, your Lordship should, I submit, have allowed him to carry his intentions into effect. If he was *not*, your Lordship should have been at hand to have directed him, as you say, *immediately* and *personally*.

"To profit from sudden opportunities," says

Colonel Napier, quoting a received maxim in the art of war, "a General must constantly "be with his advanced guard in an offensive "movement."

The author of the Strictures endeavours, in p. 46, to show that your Lordship was in advance. He had previously clearly established, in p. 39, that you were not, and in the latter fact he is fully borne out by your Lordship and the Count de Villa Real. You complain of the extent of General Long's detour. You "rode on "quickly in pursuit" of him. You "came up "to the heavy brigade."* You "proceeded on" towards General Long and the enemy. You, in fact, kept along the chord of this extended arc, and yet you were "with the advanced guard "over Campo Mayor,"† waiting "to discover "the intentions of the enemy," which enemy, it appears, ultimately got completely out of sight, as much so as General Long himself. The maxim above quoted has, I believe, been doubted in the case of a General commanding in chief; but it must be evident, I imagine, to any reader, civil or military, that if the Commander-in-Chief assumes the direction of an offensive operation, he ought to be sufficiently in advance *to see the effect of the movement upon the*

* p. 30. † p. 46, Further Strictures.

enemy, and at hand to give to the officer acting under him those orders and that *support* for which there may be occasion. If he does *not* direct in person, then I would submit that the officer so sent forward should be allowed to exercise that discretion which is palpably essential to an effective attack. I shall, therefore, conclude my notice of Campo Mayor by bowing again to the superior judgment of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, where he says, that "the "attack was admirably executed, and the suc- "cess complete!!*

LOS SANTOS.

Of this affair your Lordship has had the candor to admit that "General Long's memoranda afford rather a good and accurate description."† That such is the fact, I have been well assured

* I must here remark on the extraordinary and unaccountable similarity between the Journal of General Long and the statement given in Mr. Southey's History, both with respect to Campo Mayor and Los Santos. I know not from what source Mr. Southey may have derived his information, but with the exception of one or two minor points they are precisely similar. If Mr. Southey saw a copy of General Long's Journal, it is clear that your Lordship's accusation about "private despatches" is unfounded. If the information was derived from any other source, it is a confirmation of General Long's accuracy.

† p. 40.

by others; and had your Lordship not taken this opportunity of diluting your remarks with an infusion of disapprobation, I should have preserved a respectful and approving silence. You begin by saying, that I have "raised a charge "of injustice against you for omitting to men- "tion General Long's name in your report of "the transaction." If you will have the kindness to refer to page 83 of my Reply, I venture to assert that no such charge will be found. My remarks were directed against the *author of the Strictures*, and unless your Lordship is the author, or has any share in the authorship, my observations cannot apply to you; indeed, I have never yet had an opportunity of reading your Lordship's report of that affair.

"It was in the course of this affair" (when, as the author of the Strictures says, you "de- "feated and cut to pieces two regiments of "French cavalry,") that you "*first began to* "*suspect* the military qualifications of General "Long." What more that officer might have enabled you to effect, it is impossible for me to say; but as an unprofessional reader of the account put forth by the abovementioned author, I can form no estimate of the magnitude of a success which should have extended beyond the "cutting to pieces of two regiments of "cavalry," there being only two engaged, on

that occasion. My relative again errs in his arithmetic, as he is stated to have done in his long measure; but it is on the side of humility at any rate, and is but a feeble exhibition of that "insatiable thirst of fame" of which your Lordship has accused him. He estimates the loss of the enemy at "about one hundred-and-fifty men "and horses." Sir Benjamin D'Urban, more inflated with success, pronounces it to have been a loss of "nearly three hundred men and horses," and adds, "this affair did not cost the allied "cavalry a man!!!" * But your Lordship here "*first* began to suspect General Long's abilities." It appears then that you had not even a *suspicion* of them at Campo Mayor. "His services" at Los Santos "did not in your opinion entitle "him to praise; and your disposition did not "incline you to censure." With respect to the praise, I leave that to be estimated and determined by the success: "It did not cost the allied cavalry a man!!!" With regard to the censure, I have merely to lament that your Lordship should so far have forgotten the fact; it being distinctly declared by General Long in his correspondence that you expressed displeasure at his conduct. "At Campo Mayor," he says in one of his letters, "we were

* p. 16, App., F. S.

" blamed for doing too much—here we are " blamed for doing too little—so between too " much and too little—we never contrive to " please."

ALBUERA.

Before I proceed to notice the extracts which your Lordship has made from General Long's Journal of the operations relative to the advance of the enemy, and the battle consequent to it, I shall again recall your attention to the charges brought forward in the first instance against that officer by the author of the Further Strictures.

First,

That General Long arrived from Santa Martha " in great confusion," having " made no men- " tion" in his despatches " of the necessity of " an immediate retreat." *

To support the first part of this charge, your Lordship brings, it must be admitted, powerful testimony as to names, and very plausible evidence as to facts. It will be my endeavour to show that the former are of no value where the latter are defective. The second statement is, unfortunately, not noticed at all. I shall hope to elucidate the one point and correct the other.

* p. 116, 117, F. S.

Second,

That the cavalry were still in "considerable "confusion"* when your Lordship arrived, you having thereupon "formed them and placed "them in their position," and that General Long had, as you then discovered, "most unac- "countably abandoned the great height beyond "the Faria stream."†

This accusation, as far as your Lordship's personal observation of the confusion is concerned, is *wholly lost sight of.* The fault of the abandonment of the heights and of the ground on the right of the Albuera, is supported by the letter of Sir Benjamin D'Urban; how successfully will appear hereafter.

Some of the principal points of my last publication, as connected with this portion of the transactions of that period, and contrasted with the representations in the Further Strictures, are *totally abandoned.* Your Lordship has fastened upon five passages (only *three* of which relate immediately to General Long's operations), which you conceive to have been most triumphantly refuted; and because you are of opinion that *one* of Colonel Pitt's answers has been successfully controverted, you proceed, with a passing suspicion of the general fidelity of

* p. 117, F. S. † p. 119, F. S.

his memory, to close your notes, and inform the jury that they may consider of their verdict! So far however from this resolution being adhered to, your Lordship has, *in the very same page*, quoted and drawn an inference from another of that officer's answers to my questions. That I may in no way, however, be amenable to the accusation of evasion, I shall rigidly adhere to the arrangement of your letter, and notice, seriatim, the five extracts—the choice blocks, which have been cut out to form the key-stones, as it were, of your triumphal arch.

The *first* extract quoted from General Long's Journal is to the effect that he "had repeatedly applied for instructions, but could obtain "none, being only desired not to commit his "troops against a superior force, and not to "lose ground unnecessarily." *

To prove that General Long had received instructions, and that those instructions were ample, and extended to a retirement upon Albuera, your Lordship has quoted the printed statement of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, where he says that the "cavalry had orders to fall back "leisurely upon the enemy's advance by Santa "Martha *upon Albuera.*" † Sir Benjamin

* p. 40. † p. 41.

D'Urban, then, is to be our authority; and to that proposal I cannot, in common courtesy, advance any objection. He was your Quarter-master-general, and the organ of your wishes. He shall be; and I shall therefore have the honor of submitting to your attentive consideration the official correspondence of that officer, in which even the "most microscopic eye" would find difficulty in detecting *even the word Albuera* until the final order of the 15th instant, and which order was *received when the enemy were already at Santa Martha!* With respect to the second portion of the extract given; if the force was superior, the necessity to retire existed. It will be hardly necessary for me to show that the force was superior—greatly superior, because every individual notoriously concurs in the fact, and your Lordship and your Lordship's apologist are the *loudest in proclaiming it!* and with respect to the term "lose ground," as indicative of the direction in which to retreat, the extent of that direction will appear in the papers which I have now the honor of re-introducing to your notice.

On the 11th of May, General Long forwarded from Villa Franca three letters to Head-Quarters, reporting the advance of the enemy.

In one, apparently sent at 8, a. m., he writes

that he had received no directions as to the point of retreat, in case of necessity, "*since* "*Head-Quarters quitted Almendralejo;*" and desires a clear understanding as to whether, if the Spanish force in front should be attacked, he is to support them, as it may be impossible so to do without in some degree risking the cavalry against a superior force, and which he was ordered not to do.

In another (written supposed about noon), he states that he forwards a despatch pointing out the state of things in his front, and the necessity of receiving your Lordship's further instructions without loss of time.

In a third, he reports the arrival of the Count de Penne Ville-Mur, with his cavalry, at Usagre; that the Count had informed him that his light infantry brigade would be at Villa Franca in the evening, and that his cavalry would arrive on the following day.* He again desires your Lordship's commands, and states that the sick, &c. had been sent away to Santa Martha, to proceed to Elvas.

On the 12th of May (supp. written about 2,

* The Count's letter is written by Lieut. (now Colonel) Light, and dated ½ past 1, p. m. The Count had (according to Lieut. Light, in a second letter, dated 4, p. m. same day,) only got intelligence of Soult's march at an early hour that morning, on the alarm post.

a. m.), General Long writes again from Villa Franca, stating that he had received no answer to his letters which he had sent for your Lordship's information, for several days past. "I "have," says General Long, "regularly for- "warded all the despatches which have arrived "from the advanced posts, and which have "announced the retreat of the whole Spanish "force from the frontier; also of Count de "Penne Ville-Mur's evacuation of Llerena, and "falling back upon this town, where his light "infantry arrived last night, and he himself, "with his cavalry, are expected at about 6 "o'clock this morning." He again intreats the favor of your Lordship's orders, declaring at the same time that in the event of being obliged, he should retire on Santa Martha.

On the same day he forwarded (supp. in the morning) a report "just," as he says, "received "from Los Santos, that the enemy was within "two leagues of that place, appearing to "threaten it with an attack."

On the same day (supp. late in the evening) he sent another letter, in which he mentions that the officer whom, for security, he had charged with his last letter, had returned, bringing him information that a letter had been forwarded to him that morning (viz. the 12th), conveying the instructions he had solicited.

"That letter," says General Long, "I have "never received. A Portuguese indeed brought "a letter addressed to me, but it only con- "tained one from Major Hartmann (I think) to "Capt. Lefebvre." "The enemy has shown "himself," he goes on to state, "close to Zafra "this day, and I find that Col. Otway at Los "Santos has been under arms all the evening."

The letter from Sir B. D'Urban appears to have arrived late in the course of the evening or night. The following is a copy of it:

"*Talavera Real, 12th May,* 1811.

"SIR,—I have been favoured with your let- "ter of yesterday, which I have laid before "Marshal Beresford; and I am commanded "by him to refer you to his instructions of the "21st April, from Almendral, for your general "guidance under the present circumstances.*

"The point of retreat will be Santa Martha,

"Memorandum,

For Brigadier General Long.

21st April.

1. In remaining in his present cantonments with the cavalry, B. General Long will be in constant communication with the Count de Penne Ville-Mur, commanding the Spanish cavalry at and about Llerena.
2. He will, besides, establish a correspondence with the Magistrates at Hinojosa, Usagre, Bienvenida, Fuente de Cantos, and Valençia del Ventoso, in order to ensure the

" and Colonel de Grey's brigade will not, as " directed in the latter part of the 6th para- " graph of those directions, fall back in the " first instance upon Almendralejo, but upon " Santa Martha.

having early intelligence of any movement on the part of the enemy.

3. The B. General will open any letters arriving at his post from Captain Burrows or Lieut. Hillier, who are stationed in the direction of Guadalcanal and Monasterio, and whose letters will be addressed to the Quarter Master General.
4. These he will afterwards forward to Head Quarters, as well as whatever intelligence he may from time to time receive, and that may appear to him necessary to lay before the Commander-in-chief.
5. He will use every possible means to rest and re-establish the cavalry.
6. In case of its being necessary to retire (which is not however a probable event), the Brigade of Otway at Los Santos, and the 13th Light Dragoons at Zafra, will fall back upon Santa Martha, where they will find Major General Hamilton's Division of Infantry, and receive further orders.

The Brigade of Colonel de Grey with the Spanish guns at Villa Franca, will, under similar circumstances, retire upon Almendralejo, where he will find the Division of Major General Stewart, and accompany its movements.

7. The B. General will let it be understood among the people, that having cleared Estremadura, the army is now gone to besiege Badajoz, and will return when that shall be taken.

(Signed) B. D'URBAN,
Q. M. G. P. A."

Almendral, 21st April, 1811.

" The squadrons at Usagre will fall back
" upon you at Villa Franca, if necessary, having
" previously acted according to the instructions
" of the 29th April;* and the Colonels Otway
" and Head will retire upon Santa Martha, as
" directed in the instructions of the 21st April.

" I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) " B. D'URBAN,
" *Q.M.G. P.A.*"

The duplicate of this has the following post-script:

" Memorandum.—½ after 10, p. m.
" The Head-Quarters will be to-morrow at
" Valverde, or at Albuera. H. H."

On the 13th May, General Long wrote from Santa Martha at midnight, stating that in consequence of Colonel Head having reported the necessity of his retiring from Los Santos, and which he should do at 12 o'clock on that day (viz. the 13th, but which he was compelled to do two hours earlier), he had made a corresponding movement. He then begged to know your Lordship's further orders, and mentioned the circumstance of difficulty respecting the command, there being two Spanish Brigadier Generals present senior to himself. He farther reported that the enemy had entered

* Vide the papers in the Appendix.

Ribeira, that afternoon; and that Capt. Hillier narrowly escaped being taken.

On the 14th, General Long forwarded a report from the Alcalde of Los Santos, and adds, "as far as my private opinion goes, I have no "reason to expect that I shall be forced from "this position *to-day* nor *perhaps to-morrow.*" He expresses his readiness to dispute every inch of ground between Santa Martha and Valverde; but repeats that it will be impossible to contend, under his orders not to commit his cavalry with the enemy, if infantry and artillery should advance; and suggests that it will be desirable to bring the cavalry to the point where the army was to be assembled, leaving only a Spanish corps for observation. He then begs to have your Lordship's final determination.

In answer to this letter, Sir B. D'Urban writes as follows:

"*Valverde,* 14*th May,* 1811.

"Sir,—I have had the honor to receive, "and have laid before Marshal Beresford your "letters of last night and of this day.

"The Marshal is not aware that in any of "the instructions hitherto transmitted for your "guidance, it has been prescribed that you "should 'dispute every inch of ground,' main-"tain your post 'against infantry and artillery,'

" or even that it has been required of you
" 'to delay the march of the enemy.'

" He does not see how he can well add any-
" thing to the instructions already given to
" you. Something must always be left to the
" discretion of any officer commanding an ad-
" vanced corps, and to a general officer this
" sort of power is commonly accorded in as
" full a degree as possible; perhaps it is even
" considered desirable. However, the Mar-
" shal certainly does not wish to leave upon
" you any degree of responsibility beyond
" what must attach to all officers in your posi-
" tion. He begs therefore (in addition to the
" instructions already transmitted) to say, that
" he does not expect you to remain in the event
" of infantry and artillery advancing against
" you, that he does not wish you to commit
" your corps to risk, and that although he does
" not anticipate your falling back before an
" inferior force of cavalry, yet it must rest with
" your own judgment to determine what may
" be a superior one.

" The Marshal further begs me to acquaint
" you that, to obviate the evil of undefined
" ranks and claims of command adverted to in
" your letter of last night, he has directed
" Major General Lumley to assume the com-
" mand of the cavalry of this army, and he will

" probably arrive at the advanced posts to-
" morrow accordingly.

" I have the honor, &c.
(Signed) " B. D'URBAN,
" *Q. M. G. P. A.*"

" On the road," says General Long in his Journal, " I received a despatch, ordering me " to retire upon Albuera." *

It will be observed that not a syllable had General Long heard of the conference at Valverde and the determination to give battle at Albuera. The following is the order—that order which was meant, I presume, to signify a defence of the wooded height which your Lordship, as appears from the Further Strictures, intended to have occupied with infantry:

" *Valverde de Leganes.*

" 15th May, ½ past 7, a. m. 1811.

" B. General Long *will march immediately to Albuera, where he will receive further orders.*

" The Brigadier will look well out to his " right flank, but he needs not leave any part " of his force at Santa Martha, because the " Count de Penne Ville-Mur will have received

* p. 112, Reply.

" orders to keep a squadron still there as a " poste d'avertissement.

(Signed) " B. D'URBAN,
" *Q.M.G. P.A.*

" P.S.—An intelligent British officer, perhaps " Mr. Light,* will remain with the Spanish " squadron left by the Count de Penne Ville- " Mur, to report direct to the B. General, in " order that he may be sure of the reliance to " be placed upon the intelligence transmitted " from time to time. B. D."

Are we then to understand that General Long did *not* " repeatedly apply" for orders?—that the orders of the 21st of April (when the *ne plus ultra* of retreat, then " not a probable " event," and on the 27th " not upon the " cards,"† was simply Santa Martha,) were sufficient for all contingencies, and when your Lordship's Head-Quarters had moved from Almendralejo to Talavera, and from Talavera to Valverde? Are we to arrive at this decisive conclusion when the orders were *first* to fall back on Santa Martha, " where General Hamilton's infantry would be found;"‡ *secondly,*

It will be seen from this officer's testimony that he remained with the Count.

† Vide Letter, App. 27th April.

‡ Vide Orders, 21st April.

on Almendralejo "because *no* infantry would be found at Santa Martha,"* where none were eventually found, and when none were found *even at Albuera itself?* Are we to infer from this last—this sudden—this peremptory—this hurried—this ½ past 7 a. m. order, of the 15th instant, that the "*to*" and the "*where*" were intended to signify a stoppage at the wood on the height beyond the Faria, and there to keep this "overwhelming cavalry," "*at bay*"? Are we to infer again from the order of the Adjutant General (as affirmed by General Long, confirmed by Colonel Pitt, *not contradicted* by your Lordship, and hereafter to be corroborated by others,) that the crossing the river was an error applicable only to my relative? Are we finally to be conducted to this conclusion by the author of the Strictures, where he asserts that your Lordship in person "marked out the "ground" that each party should take up *on its arrival, cavalry* and all? Can this be the case, when we are again told that you "*left staff-*" "*officers*"† (the Adjutant General, I may presume, being one,) "*to put the troops in the posi-*" "*tions*" you "*had assigned them?*" Is your Lordship's letter of the 14th instant, distinctly declaring that you did "not require General Long to

* Vide Letter, App. 27th April. † p. 116, F. S.

" delay the march of the enemy"—that you did " not expect him to remain in the event of in- " fantry and artillery advancing"—that you did " not wish him to commit his corps to risk," indicative of a desire that he should keep Marshal Soult "*at bay*" in the wood of Albuera!!? Do all these inferences follow as indisputable corollaries to the facts on which they are founded? In *five* hours from the *date* of Sir B. D'Urban's order, the French were in force at Santa Martha. In *five* hours after they were present, with 4000 cavalry *close to Albuera*, and shortly after the Duke of Dalmatia was making his observations from a distance of one or two miles! So says Sir B. D'Urban, and who shall gainsay it.*

The *second* extract quoted by your Lordship is as follows:

" The enemy's nearer approach having fully " established their strength, I fell back at a " walk to Albuera, detaching the Portuguese " squadron in advance to cover the passage of " the bridge at that place."†

I must here admit that your Lordship has mustered a galaxy of witnesses to endeavour to prove that the pace of the retreat was a " flight" and the state of it a " confusion."

* p. 27, App. F. S. † p. 42.

That they are "men of undoubted honour" is unquestionable; that they are "good and sufficient witnesses" must depend upon their testimony, and whether the fidelity of *their* memories is to be distrusted will remain to be seen. Two speak from ocular observation, and three from hearsay; and they are, very naturally perhaps, deemed weighty enough to weigh down the solitary statement of Colonel Pitt (although he spoke also from ocular observation), and to "relieve your Lordship from the "necessity of noticing his further answers to "my inquiries."*

An author is, perhaps, justified in making the most of his adversary's admissions, in order to give a stronger colouring to the interpreta-

* "The following is a letter which I have received from Colonel Pitt, and which I think it my duty to insert:

"*Belfast Barracks, 28th May*, 1833.

My dear Sir,—In consequence of the manner in which my statement, in your reply to a book entitled "Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History of the Peninsular War," has been met in a recent publication, I feel it incumbent on me to say, with the greatest deference, that in giving those statements the most attentive reconsideration, I cannot accuse myself of having been guilty of any inaccuracy. There is one observation affecting me, which I must take the liberty of correcting, viz.—"that General Long and his Aide-de-camp were heading the retreat" on the 15th. We might have been at one time with the leading squadron, when near

tion desired. I must first observe that the terms "*performed* at a walk" and "*effected* at a "walk," are made use of. If the fact of my relative having used the expression "*fell back* "*at a walk* to Albuera," is to be received as positive proof that he meant it to be inferred that he went *at a foot's pace* the *whole* of the way, I have no hesitation in averring that he did not, any more than I should venture to fasten a literal construction on the fact of the 13th Dragoons having "cut to pieces two regi- "ments of cavalry" at Los Santos, as stated by the author of the Strictures. But your Lordship has omitted the sentence immediately following. "The enemy's advance," says General Long, "soon came up with our rear, and "they *skirmished* with us all the way to Al- "buera." * Is this sufficient to show General Long's *meaning*? But your Lordship says, grounding the observation on Sir Loftus Otway's testimony, that *no* skirmishing took place.

*Albuera, is true; but I can say distinctly that General Long moved about in various parts of the column, and that his attention was, from first to last, by no means confined to one point.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours very truly,
G. D. Pitt,
Lt. Col. 80th Reg."

"Chas. Long, Esq.

* p. 112, Reply.

I must venture to differ with Sir Loftus on this point: my reasons for so doing will be manifest hereafter. In the mean time we will undertake the witnesses in the order of their array.

The Count de Villa Real commences by saying that "it *was reported* that the cavalry had "retired in too great a hurry;" but by whom it was so reported, we are not informed. "It "*being doubtful*"—he surmises—"whether the "whole strength of their army was up."* By whom was it doubted? By your Lordship?—by your Staff? It was. A few short hours however removed those doubts, and the *fact* was fully before you. Are we then to admit these "its" that "were reported" and "its" that were "doubtful" as *evidence?*—that this cantering over the ground by the Count, and the collection of reports and doubts thereon arising, is to be matched for accuracy with the testimony of those who *performed a part in that retreat?* I think not.

The next witness is M. General Sir Henry Hardinge. "The horses," he says, "on the "*evening* of the 15th May, 1811, were, *from* "*hard riding, greatly distressed,* and the retreat "*was condemned,* as having been made with a

"rapidity not usual or necessary."* It is satisfactory to hear that the arrival took place in the "*evening*," since, according to Sir B. D'Urban, "Marshal Soult reconnoitred the "position of the Allies on the *evening* of the "15th." *His* proximity is by that means clearly established. But what horses were distressed? and from hard riding? Those of the 13th?—those of the heavy brigade?—or only those of the Portuguese? The evidence that I shall take the liberty of presenting will inform your Lordship with reference to the British troops: what may have been the state of the Portuguese, I shall leave Sir Loftus Otway to determine. I must presume that Sir Henry Hardinge alludes, if he ever *saw* any distressed horses, to that force. Indeed I can in no other way venture to account for the error into which he has fallen. The "retreat," he further observes, "was condemned." By whom?* and on whose information? It was made, continues Sir Henry, "with a rapidity not usual or neces-"sary." With regard to the latter, the proximity of Soult's cavalry and its out-numbering power being beyond all question, the necessity of retreat was obvious, or the committal against a superior force inevitable. With regard to the

* p. 43.

former, there is evidence to show that the cavalry quitted Santa Martha at about ½ past 11. Sir B. D'Urban says that they arrived at Albuera at about ½ past 3. Santa Martha is about twelve miles from Albuera. I therefore leave Sir Henry Hardinge, with or without the aid of Cocker, to determine the pace at which they went per hour, and deliver to your Lordship the quotient, when you will have that opportunity, which arithmetical accuracy affords, of correcting General D'Urban's statement as to his application of the term "flight." Cocker, however, although all-powerful, is not my sole reliance. Sir Henry Hardinge unquestionably speaks from hearsay, and his evidence therefore, by the side of that which I shall shortly have the honor of submitting, is of small value.

We have now to consider Sir Loftus Otway's report of operations. "The march," he says, "was *hurried* and *harassing*. The rear of the "column being *obliged to gallop most of the* "*route*, and *in this manner we* took up our "ground at Albuera."* I shall not, as far as Sir Loftus and his rear guard of Portuguese are concerned, dispute either the "hurry," or the "harassing," or the "gallop," into the village of Albuera, or any thing that he may have affirmed,

* p. 44.

or may yet affirm in evidence of the rapidity, the "flight," as Sir B. D'Urban calls it, of his own movements. Having quite sufficient evidence to adduce against the flight general, I am perfectly indifferent as to the flight particular. But Sir Loftus says, he "begged of General "Long to moderate the pace," and what was this pace so indicative of "flight?" "He," General Long, "then *trotted* rather slower;" so that a *trot* was, after all, the extremity of this killing pace; though when commenced, or how long continued, Sir Loftus has not been so obliging as to inform us. I shall endeavour to fill up the vacuity by the addition of some important evidence on that point. Sir Loftus next assures us that he was apprehensive that if he executed General Long's orders (viz. to cover his flanks), "the brigade could never reach Albuera, and "that it could not keep up on the high road "at the pace he was then marching." The reader will hereafter find out what the pace of the *British* cavalry was, and then be left to draw his conclusions as to the accuracy of Sir Loftus Otway's testimony, as affecting them, and the condition of his horses.

Of the "covering of General Long's flanks," the "dispersion of the Portuguese brigade for "that purpose," General Long's position "with

" the leading division," &c., I shall take no further notice, than to refer your Lordship to General Long's last order and to the evidence which will hereafter be placed before you. But " Colonel Otway," you say, " *who was in the* " *rear the whole time,*" (although, according to his own statement, he found General Long at one period with the leading division,) " *knew* " *nothing of an enemy!!*"* " Our cavalry," says Sir Benjamin D'Urban, " instead of retiring " leisurely, had fallen back, (*indeed I may say* " *fled,*) rapidly *before the advanced guard of the* " *enemy!!*"† This is admirable: " When they " *do* agree, their unanimity is wonderful!!" Well may I quote your Lordship, when you observe of my own witnesses, that " They generally " unite their forces to overthrow the position " you would establish on their authority." " It " is," indeed, as you say, passing " strange, " that Colonel Otway, who was in the rear the " whole of the time, should have known *nothing* " of this enemy!!" I may safely, therefore, leave Sir Loftus and Sir Benjamin for the present, to pair off in this dilemma, and settle their differences amicably between themselves.

The succeeding testimony is of a posthumous

* p. 46. † p. 45

nature founded on a letter from Colonel De Grey (the late Lord Walsingham), and affording an additional proof that private despatches were not confined to my relative. The answer to that officer's opinion of the "*most unaccountable*" order to retire from Santa Martha is so clearly set forth by the *fact* of the enemy's force and proximity as established in evidence on all sides, that it is not deserving of further notice on my part.

The retreat being perfectly accounted for, and indeed the order for it *having emanated from your Lordship*, it will remain to prove the pace of it. But Lord Walsingham writes that General Long "perpetually" sent to him to alter his pace, or, as he expresses it "to "hasten the pace, or again to be slower, but "he still continued it."* What is "it"? the pace? How could he continue in one pace and that a rapid one, "*a flight*," when he is said to have varied from rapidity to slowness? And he "*sent*" to Lord Walsingham. Now Lord Walsingham's brigade headed the column in the retreat. Is it therefore the fact that General Long was "with the leading division head-"ing the retreat," and as you would have it believed, the *whole of the way*? He "*never*

* p. 44.

" *rested,*" continues that officer, " until *he* " ordered us across the bridge at Albuera." Did his Lordship expect General Long to bivouac in broad day, and in the presence of 4000 cavalry, moreover did he expect him to " rest" when he had received a positive order from your Lordship to " march immediately " to Albuera?" But there *was a halt,* and *a regiment in my Lord Walsingham's own brigade was halted* twice during the retreat. Where was Lord Walsingham at this moment, and who gave the order? With respect to the order to cross the bridge, I must refer your Lordship to the journal of General Long, and the evidence of Colonel Pitt as given in my Reply to the Strictures.—The order was issued by *your Adjutant General,* Colonel Rooke.

The last on this list of witnesses is Sir Benjamin D'Urban—that is not a statement made at the present time—but one, not likely of course to be so much affected by indistinct recollections, having been written in August 1811, soon after the events in question. I shall shortly place in juxta-position that officer's printed Report and the reproaches applied to my relative in this his " private despatch." Your Lordship cannot but deplore, in justice to a " brother officer," and in conformity with your

expressed abhorrence of "*private despatches,*" that these censures were not passed "at the "moment and on the spot, when the truth of "every fact could have been easily ascertained, "and when it could not be concealed." You must, there can be no doubt, feel "pain" and "distress" that an officer should thus "des- "patch to some chosen friend or relative in "England, a collection of private charges, to "which, in all human probability, no oppor- "tunity of making a reply would ever be "afforded, or," as it would appear, "was ever "intended to be afforded."* Your Lordship must (or your printed sentiments are not the image of your private thoughts) most poignantly lament all this. I do not. It enables me, in the first place, to form a correct estimate of the force of that charge of private defamation brought forward against my relation. In the second, not looking for that immaculate purity or that inflexible prudence, in epistolary communications, which Sir William Lumley describes as having so invariably characterized his correspondence, my surprise is not great, my "honest feeling of indignation" trifling. But let us hear Sir Benjamin himself.—

* p. 10, 11.

Private Letter, p. 45.

"Our cavalry, which, instead of retiring "leisurely, had fallen back, (*indeed, I may say* "*fled,*) rapidly before the advanced guard of "the enemy, abandoned precipitately the right "bank of the Albuera, and crossing the ri- "vulet, was there found by Sir William Beres- "ford at 4 o'clock, on his return from *posting* "*the left of the line,** having thus given up, "without the slightest dispute, the whole of "the opposite ground to the enemy's pickets "of cavalry, which immediately occupied it to "the banks of the stream."

Printed Memoir, p. 27, *App. F. S.*

"The allied army was thus united upon "the Albuera, having regulated all its succes- "sive movements by the progressive advance "of the enemy, equally avoiding a late or "premature assembly."

The value of Sir Benjamin's testimony, as regards the "flight" and the "crossing the

* This is what the author of the Strictures calls "recon- "noitring the country in the direction of Talavera," and "the refreshing" of your Lordship's "memory with its fea- "tures !!!"

"Albuera" will be best appreciated when your Lordship shall hereafter read the statement of Mr. Gregory. This conduct of General Long was, continues General D'Urban in his private despatch, "so completely of a "piece with his previous conduct upon more "than one occasion," (your Lordship thinks you may affirm Campo Mayor and Los Santos to have been alluded to,) "that it became "imperatively necessary to relieve him, (how-"ever harsh the appearance of the thing,) as "soon as General Lumley arrived on the morn-"ing of the 16th."*

Your Lordship is safe in one respect, in surmising the two places meant to have been Campo Mayor and Los Santos, and for this simple reason, that those were the only two preceding affairs. If however such was the case, Sir Benjamin's discernment was greater than your Lordship's, since at *Los Santos only* you "*first* began to *suspect* General Long's "military qualifications." The cause of General Lumley's appointment has already appeared in the official letter of General D'Urban: viz. "to obviate the evil of undefined "ranks and claims of command." The private reason for that appointment is now first made

known to us. "It *became* imperatively neces-
" sary to relieve him!!"

Your Lordship has, on the foregoing authorities, very naturally pronounced this retreat to have been "made, in a manner the most "confused, unconsidered, harassing, and unne-" cessarily hasty."* It will shortly, I trust, be shown, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that your Lordship's information was and is most astoundingly erroneous, that there was *no* confusion, that there *was* consideration, that there was *nothing harassing*, and, so far from there being any *unnecessary haste*, that there was *no haste at all.*

But supposing the contrary to be the fact, and that there was haste. What are the reasons given by your Lordship (it is unnecessary to quote Sir Benjamin D'Urban's reasons,† or the assenting echo of the author of the Strictures,‡ since they are precisely similar,) for not pursuing your *defeated* enemy? "He was pursued," says your Lordship, "by the allies to a *consi-*" *derable distance*, and as far as I thought it "*prudent*, with his *immense superiority of cavalry*, "and *I contented myself with seeing him driven* "*across the Albuera!!!*"§ You pursued, it would appear, to "a considerable distance," and this

* p. 43.
† p. 37, App. F. S.
‡ p. 191, F. S.
§ p. 44. App. F. S.

distance extended to—seeing the enemy safe over the Albuera!! This formidable cavalry then, which your Lordship and Sir William Lumley *did not deem it prudent to face*, when the epidemic consequences of *defeat* were among them, when the flower of their infantry was annihilated, and their *morale* effectually shaken; nay, more, when you had an accession of Spanish cavalry under General Blake, and, as I am informed, equal in force to that under the Count De Penne; General Long is blamed for not keeping "at bay"! with three British regiments, Colonel Otway's Portuguese, and the Count De Penne's corps, (over which latter he had no control,) and when that enemy came forth in the certainty of assured strength, and the confidence of anticipated victory. At this most critical time, moreover, a part of your Lordship's army was at Badajos, another part near Valverde, and your Lordship in person reconnoitring the country in the direction of Talavera.

Having collected the statements of some of the fugitives in this retreat, I have now the honor of presenting them for your perusal, when I doubt not but your Lordship will "find cause "to distrust the fidelity," not merely "of your "own memory," but of others, to whose accuracy you appear "to have yielded implicit

"confidence," and at which I cannot be less surprised than your Lordship is with me, when you say that "I have relied on an "authority which ought not to have deceived "me."*

4th Dragoons.

Colonel Leighton, then commanding officer:—

"To the best of my recollection, the enemy "did appear in force near Santa Martha, on "the 15th of May, before we retreated from "that place to Albuera. The cavalry cannot "be said to have fled before the enemy, nor "did any thing like it take place during the "retreat. *The pace was not rapid.* I am sure "there was *no confusion* in the 4th, nor did I per-"ceive any in either of the other regiments. To "the best of my recollection, skirmishing did "take place with the enemy's advance and our "rear guard. General Long did not march at "the head of the column, but moved from "one place to another. I cannot remember "the order we crossed the stream, but *I saw "no confusion, nor do I believe that there was "any.* We were ordered to cross the bridge "at Albuera by a staff officer, but I cannot "recollect in what department he was."

* p. 55.

Major Spedding:—

"I have not the slightest recollection of the "retreat being either *hurried, confused* or *dis-* "*ordered;* if such had been the case, I have not "the least doubt but that I must have remem- "bered it."

J. L. Philips, Esq., commanding a squadron:—

"The retreat from near Santa Martha on the "15th of May, 1811, to the ground we occupied "that night at Albuera, was, to the best of my "recollection, *quite slow,* and *no confusion occur-* "*red.* I speak of our brigade, the 3d Dragoon "Guards and 4th Dragoons. I believe some "skirmishing took place on the 15th with the "rear guard. As I have before stated, and to "the best of my recollection, we were not "pressed by the enemy on the march, but "they appeared in force in their position for the "night soon after we arrived on our ground."

George Chantry, Esq., Adjutant:—

"The enemy's cavalry appeared in force "before Santa Martha on the 15th of May, "1811, prior to our retreat to Albuera, which "was *not hurried.*"

Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman:—

"I have but a very indistinct recollection "of the circumstances attending the actual de- "parture of the cavalry from the town of Santa

" Martha, but, to the best of my recollection,
" the enemy did appear in considerable force
" on the other side of the town as we were retir-
" ing from it. We retired quietly, for I think,
" about one third, or one half of the way, when
" we halted for a short time, after which the
" brigade to which I belonged was ordered to
" the rear at a trot. I think we trotted on that
" occasion for about two miles, and subse-
" quently we were again desired to trot for a
" short distance through the wood. The horses
" of the 4th Dragoons, the regiment to which
" I belonged, *were neither heated nor distressed.*
" I had no knowledge of the manner in which
" the 13th Light Dragoons or the Portuguese
" cavalry were employed from the time of our
" trotting to the rear until after the wood was
" passed, except some confusion in some part
" of the latter in passing the wood. I do not
" recollect seeing General Long from the time
" of our commencing the first trot until we
" were in the wood, when I recollect seeing
" him applied to by an officer from the front,
" but did not hear distinctly the purport of
" the communication. After passing the wood,
" the Heavy Brigade were formed in line, and
" *halted* facing the wood, when the Light Ca-
" valry went to the rear, the 3d Dragoons then
" retired, and the 4th followed soon after, re-

" treating in line, covered by skirmishers, to the " bridge, over which the regiment was hurried, " but by whose orders, or for what reason, I " never knew, as I was with the skirmishers, " but had seen no enemy to skirmish with."

Major Norcliffe:—

" I can only answer for my own brigade, " which retreated *in admirable order*, and took up " its ground on the field of Albuhera, *without* " *hurry, confusion, or disorder of any kind.*"

3d Dragoon Guards.

Lieutenant Colonel Story, now commanding officer:—

" I recollect well that the retreat from Santa " Martha on the 15th May, 1811, to the position " at Albuera, was conducted *without the least* " *confusion or hurry.*"

Major Maunsell:—

" The enemy appeared in such force as to " oblige us to retire from Santa Martha. The " retreat to Albuera *was conducted in a proper* " *military manner.*"

Lawford Burne, Esq.:—

" As regards the retreat, my impression is, " that there was *no confusion* or *disorder* in the " manner of it, and if there had been in the " 3d Dragoon Guards, I think I must remem- " ber it."

13th Light Dragoons.

Major Doherty:—

"The enemy did appear in force before we "commenced our retreat to Albuera, and we "retired in a *soldierlike, orderly, and regular* "*manner, without hurry or confusion,* the rear-"guard skirmishing with the enemy; and cer-"tainly our pace was *not rapid* the whole or "any part of the way. General Long did not "head the retreat, but moved about to give his "directions in different parts of the column."

J. H. Drought, Esq.:—

"I am *very* confident that the pace at which "we retired was *not hurried,* and that the regi-"ment was *not in confusion* on the retreat from "Santa Martha."

Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister:—

"We commenced our retreat *leisurely* from "Santa Martha to Albuera on the 15th, as near "as I can recollect, about noon. The enemy "was clearly developed to us in what appeared "to be vastly superior numbers a considerable "time before we broke up. The 13th Dragoons "were in rear of the Heavy Brigade. The "enemy began to press us very closely, just "before entering the wood, driving back the "rear-guard. To the best of my recollection "a half squadron of the 13th was sent to their

" assistance, commenced a very spirited skir-
" mish, and for a time checked the advance of
" the enemy.

" General Long certainly was not at the head
" of the column during the whole of the retreat,
" as I repeatedly saw him, and never left my
" own station, which was near the rear. *I never*
" *heard of a single horse of the* 13*th being either*
" *blown or distressed, and can affirm that there*
" *was not one in the troop under my own command;*
" and the horse I rode was as fresh as at starting,
" and I rode him the whole of the following
" day, although my servant was up with a led-
" horse in case of need. I observed *nothing*
" either *confused or harassing* in that portion of
" the cavalry to which I belonged."

Ralph Heathcote, Esq., then in the Quarter Master General's department:—

" I hardly quitted General Long's person
" during the whole of the 15th of May, 1811.

" But before entering on any detail, I beg
" leave to premise, what I consider as most
" essentially necessary to be fully understood,
" viz. that (as General Long repeatedly told
" me) he did not consider the Count de Penne's
" corps of Spanish cavalry as being under his
" orders, that General's commission from the
" Spanish Cortes bearing a date antecedent to
" his own in his Majesty's service.

" On the morning of that day General Long's " division of cavalry, to which I was then at- " tached as Deputy Assistant Quarter Master " General, was posted about a mile in rear of " Santa Martha on the road towards Albuera, " Count de Penne's Spanish corps of cavalry " being in or about the village of Santa Martha, " with an advance on the road by which the " enemy was expected. General Long, having " left General De Grey (the late Lord Walsing- " ham) in charge of his division, joined Count " de Penne near the church of Santa Martha, " situated on an eminence commanding an ex- " tensive prospect, where we remained several " hours. When the enemy's advance-guard " appeared driving in the Spanish outposts, " General Long sent off orders to General De " Grey to commence his retreat towards Al- " buera. He himself and the officers of his " staff remained, however, for a considerable " time longer, till we had distinctly seen that a " strong force of cavalry as well as infantry " was advancing in several columns, and till " the enemy's skirmishers were on the point of " entering and passing the village below. Ge- " neral Long then rode off leisurely to overtake " his division. When from Santa Martha he sent " orders to General De Grey to commence his " retreat, he had ordered the Portuguese to take

" up a position covering the bridge over the
" little brook that crosses the road between
" Santa Martha and Albuera; about half way
" between these two places, and six English
" miles from either place. On the ground
" where we had left our troops we found the
" Spaniards drawn up, and just commencing
" their retreat over an open heath, which extends
" for about four to five miles, on to the wood of
" Albuera. Passing the Spaniards, we found
" our division had got some distance ahead of
" us, and were just entering the wood of Al-
" buera. We therefore mended our pace, and
" commenced trotting to overtake them. About
" this time, when about half-way between the
" two corps, we heard the French charge, and on
" turning round, observed the Spaniards making
" a hurried retreat, though they occasionally
" faced about again. It was, however, evident
" what the result would be if the enemy were
" to push on vigorously, and it became neces-
" sary, therefore, to hasten on as fast as pos-
" sible to join our men and give the necessary
" directions. So much time had, however, been
" taken up in making the necessary observations,
" that we did not overtake General De Grey
" till we had passed the wood, and had reached
" the plain open heath between it and Albuera,
" and about one or two miles from that place;

" where we found that officer retiring by alter-
" nate regiments towards the bridge of Albuera.
" General Long had ordered me to proceed on
" to General De Grey whilst he remained with
" the 13th, or Portuguese, I cannot say which,
" but he overtook me again before I joined the
" Heavy Brigade.

" After we had crossed the stream at Albuera,
" General Long rode to report to Lord Beres-
" ford, whom we met near the ruins of the
" village. Having accompanied him, I remem-
" ber part of the conversation that past relative
" to the enemy's force, which Lord Beresford
" was unwilling to believe so considerable as
" was stated. Having received the Marshal's
" directions, General Long now proceeded
" to form his division on the ground it was to
" occupy for the night."

Colonel Light, late 4th Dragoons, but attached at that time to the Spanish cavalry under the Count de Penne Ville-Mur :—

" On the morning of the 15th of May the
" Spanish cavalry, under the command of the
" Count De Penne Ville-Mur, remained on the
" ground near Santa Martha until they were
" obliged to retire by the advance of the
" enemy's cavalry, which were approaching in
" great force. I remember General Long being
" with the Count De Penne Ville-Mur some

" time after the British had commenced their " retreat. The Spanish cavalry covered the " retreat of the British, and their skirmishers " were several times charged by those of the " enemy, but the retreat was notwithstanding " made in good order, and we had not more than " a dozen men wounded by carabines. None " were killed.

" I was so much occupied with the Spanish " skirmishers that I did not notice any thing " regarding the retreat of the British and Por- " tuguese cavalry, but I know no reason why " it should be disorderly or confused, for there " was no confusion with the Spaniards, who " were between them and the enemy, nor *did I* " *ever to my recollection hear of any having existed* " *during the retreat of the British cavalry.*"

Your Lordship will now clearly perceive, from the above evidence, that the retreat, as far as the British cavalry was concerned, was not conducted, as you imagined, " in a manner " the most confused, unconsidered, harassing, " and unnecessarily hasty ! "

I shall therefore proceed to other matters.

Questions submitted to A. F. Gregory, Esq.; late 4th Dragoons, together with the answers:

Q. Having understood that you acted, on the 15th of May, 1811, as Assistant Aide-de-Camp to General Long, and that you were on

that day sent with a message to Head Quarters, have the goodness to state, as well as you can recollect, the time of your departure from Santa Martha,—whether before you went the enemy had appeared in force,—where you met Head Quarters,—to whom you made your report, and what orders you brought back;—also, where you found the cavalry on your return, and whether you understood from your brother officers that the retreat had been hurried and confused? I will further beg you to inform me, whether the cavalry was, to your knowledge, in any confusion at any subsequent part of the evening of the 15th?"

A. "I was orderly officer to General Long "on the 15th May, 1811, and remained on that "duty with him until Sir William Lumley took "the command of the cavalry on the morning of "the 16th. On the morning of the 15th the ca- "valry halted for three or four hours in the plain "between the woods in front of Albuera and the "town of Santa Martha. I cannot speak with "certainty as to the time of the enemy's ad- "vance; but to the best of my recollection, "between 10 and 11 A.M., their cavalry were "seen entering Santa Martha, and soon after, "made their appearance in great force at the "opposite end of the plain in our front. I was "ordered to go off to Head Quarters, which I

" was informed I should find at or near Val-
" verde, and report the advance of the enemy.
" A few miles beyond Albuera, on the Valverde
" road, I met Sir William Stewart at the head
" of the infantry; he was accompanied by Co-
" lonel D'Urban. When I had communicated
" to them the intelligence I brought, Colonel
" D'Urban desired me to go back immediately,
" and tell General Long, if pressed, to re-
" tire across the Albuera, *but to maintain his*
" *ground on the left bank to the last extremity,*
" as he would soon be relieved. On my return
" I found that the greater part of the cavalry
" had retired across the Albuera. The skir-
" mishers and support, forming the rear-guard,
" were recalled very soon after. *I neve runder-*
" *stood, either at the time or afterwards, from any*
" *one, that the retreat had been hurried, confused,*
" *or disorderly.* There did not exist the slightest
" confusion when I arrived with Colonel D'Ur-
" ban's orders. As to any confusion at any
" subsequent period of the evening none oc-
" curred."*

* We must not forget the details of the author of the Strictures (p. 116, 117). The report that "General Long had "arrived at Albuera in great confusion, and that the enemy's "light cavalry were close upon him;" nor that your Lordship "hastened back, found the cavalry still in considerable con-"fusion,—formed them, and placed them in their position!!!"

I proceed to the *third* extract:

"At this time," says General Long, that is, immediately on his arrival at Albuera, "I heard "that our infantry were also advancing upon "Albuera, the position selected for the inevit- "able conflict that was approaching. None "of them, however, made their appearance for "several hours."*

Your Lordship quotes Sir Benjamin D'Urban's private letter, to show that the infantry "took "up their ground between 1 and 2 o'clock, "p.m."† The assembly of the army then," says Sir Benjamin in his printed narrative, "having "been determined at Albuera on or before *noon* "of the 15th," &c. &c.‡

"Upon the *morning* of the 15th," continues the same author, "the troops in the camp at "Valverde advanced to the Albuera, and were "placed in position about *noon*."§

I shall endeavour, however, to show that this accuracy as to time existed only on paper. The author of the Strictures affirms that the infantry arrived between 2 and 4, and goes on, in page 127, to say, that "as yet," "not *one half* "of the Marshal's troops *were yet arrived!!*"—at which time, according to his own admission, Soult examined the ground near Al-

* p. 46. † p. 45. ‡ p. 24, App., F. S.
§ p. 24, App., F. S.

buera. But had *any* of the infantry arrived when General Long had crossed to the left bank of the Albuera? Mr. Gregory will have informed your Lordship as to General Stewart's division. Still General Long only says, he "*heard*" the fact,—and that "*none made their* "*appearance;*" and we are informed by the writer of the Strictures that the portion of infantry, which he reports to have arrived, were posted in rear of a ridge of heights and "entirely concealed from the view of the ene- "my." But are the public even now without evidence on this point? I quote from the "Re- "collections of the Peninsula:" "On the 14th "we broke up, and marched upon Valverde, "halted for the night, and moved forwards at "mid-day, on the 15th, to Albuera, *which place* "*we reached about five in the evening.*" (The author was, I understand, in the 34th, in General Stewart's division.) He continues:* "Our cavalry had *already* retired upon this "point, the enemy's horse, who were vastly "superior in number, having pushed them from "Santa Martha in the morning." Here, then, is this solitary fact, which has only been quoted in order to throw a general discredit on my relative's testimony, and which in no way affected his movements, proved to be true almost

* p. 209.

to the letter. Well, indeed, may I echo your Lordship's exclamation of amazement: "I "know not in what manner to account for "such misstatements of fact!!"

The cavalry appear to have arrived at about three; General Stewart's infantry, with whom was Sir Benjamin D'Urban, not until after the cavalry; General Cole's division not until six in the morning of the following day; and General Madden and General Kemmis never arrived at all!! In short, the "army was thus united," as Sir Benjamin D'Urban informs us, "equally "avoiding a late or a premature assembly!!!"

"Soult," says Lord Londonderry, "was be-"forehand with him,"* meaning your Lordship. I must confess, although not a military man, and with the greatest deference, that such appears to have been the case.

We come now to the *fourth* extract.

"I proceeded to reconnoitre the ground, and "to my utter astonishment found that the "heights which formed the key of the position, "were not intended to be occupied; but that "the lines were drawn up parallel to the Bada-"joz road."†

It is not for me, who am unlearned in the lore of tactics, to determine what was or was not the *key* of the position. Your Lordship has,

* p. 129, vol. ii. † p. 47.

however, affirmed, that "*every one*, except Ge "neral Long, who has either spoken or written "on the subject of this ground, has considered "the conical hill in rear of the village as the "key." Has Colonel Napier? Has the author of the Annals of the Peninsular War? In the second place, if such was the fact, what will the author of the Strictures pronounce to have been the key, when he says, "This part," meaning the heights on the right, "afterwards "became *the real front*." "This butt of the "original position, as has been observed, be- "came finally the battle ground."* The whole of the original position was changed; it was *forced to be changed*. How then could the conical hill be regarded as the key to it? I will further observe, that in a memoir of your Lordship's campaign, published in the Hanoverian Military Journal, by Sir Julius Hartmann, I find the term "key" expressly applied to the heights on the right; accompanied by an intimation that the Duke of Wellington, on reconnoitring the ground subsequent to the battle, expressed a similar opinion.

In contradiction of General Long's second assertion your Lordship says, that "the Bada- "joz road crossed your lines to the left, and "almost cut them at right angles." The author of the Strictures (p. 115) tells us, that the

* p. 114, F. S.

troops were on a parallel with the ridge of the conical hill,—which conical hill was, he says, crossed by the Valverde road "at right angles," and by the Badajoz road "more obliquely." On referring to the map (and I will take the one given by that writer), you will find the angle at the point of union between the Valverde and Badajoz roads to be one of about seventy-five degrees, and consequently, though not positively parallel, the lines (being at right angles to the Valverde road) were not far removed from being parallel to the Badajoz road, looking to the village of Albuera as a centre.

Continuation of Mr. Heathcote's statement:

"While posting our pickets for the night, General Long repeatedly expressed his surprise "at the manner in which the army was drawn "up: but when making a reconnoissance about "sun-rise the day following, he was so much "annoyed at the disposition of the respective "corps on the ground they occupied, that he "ordered me on the spot to make a sketch of "the position of Albuera. Whilst employed "on this work, I was interrupted by the enemy's "attack on the *very heights which he had pointed* "*out as the position that should have been occupied* "*by the infantry the night before, but which, ex-* "*cept by some cavalry pickets, had not been guarded* "*at all.*"

The *fifth* extract is as follows:—

"The morning of the 16th arrived, but no "Spaniards appeared."*

By separating this from the context, your Lordship has endeavoured to fasten a misstatement on General Long, for the sake, I presume, of shaking his testimony on all the other and very numerous points in his details *left totally untouched.* What possible object General Long could have had in making this misstatement does not distinctly appear. It neither affects your Lordship nor my relative. But the antecedent sentence in General Long's Journal may elucidate the error. "We remained "quiet," he says, "during the night, my orders "being to maintain that ground *till relieved by* "*the Spaniards.*" † Now the Spaniards under Blake came from Almendral, due south of Albuera, and consequently did not pass near the spot where General Long was stationed. Moreover, these very Spaniards had, so your Lordship informs us, taken up, on their arrival, an erroneous position in the dark.‡ No Spaniards, in fact, *appeared* to *relieve* General Long.

These are the extracts with which your Lordship has favored the public for the purpose of imputing *deliberate* misrepresentation to my relative. I have met the accusation on his

* p. 47. † p. 113, Reply. ‡ p. 47.

behalf, I think I may say, fairly and openly: I have no hesitation in saying, successfully.

Your Lordship, in pages 48 and 49, would seem to deny that any attempt had been made by the enemy in the early part of the morning near the village. If they did make the attempt, the artillery and cavalry, acting under the orders of General Long, and before the arrival of General Lumley, prevented the execution of it. If they did not make the attempt, what is the meaning of the passage in the Further Strictures, p. 138, "Some guns were immediately brought to "bear upon them, and *with considerable effect*"?

Your Lordship writes, in page 48, as follows: "I shall offer no observation on the account "which General Long has given of General "D'Urban's marching off with the 4th Dragoons, "nor on the description he has given of his own "conduct in the following page. I was not "fortunate enough to have any of these matters "reported to me at the moment; neither did I "ever receive the slightest hint of any such "occurrences, till I read of them in your pub-"lication."

You will "offer no observation" on General Long's statement. On that resolution I have no comment to make. But you were "not for-"tunate enough to have any of these matters "reported." The matters in question will be

found at p. 114 of my Reply, and I have the honor of submitting the testimony of some of the officers of the 4th Dragoons, as also of the officer who remembers having carried a report of these matters to your Lordship, and having brought your orders, at the time mentioned.

Colonel Leighton, then commanding the 4th Dragoons:—

"I perfectly recollect the 4th being ordered "to the rear to cut forage for our horses on the "16th, and being ordered up again before we "had time to cut any."

J. L. Philipps, Esq.:—

"Our brigade did forage on the morning of "the 16th, and I perfectly recollect a very sud-"den order to mount and take ground to the "right."

George Chantry, Esq.:—

"I recollect receiving an order for a foraging "party to proceed a short distance on the 16th "of May, 1811, but they were called in by "the bugles prior to obtaining any forage. I "remember an officer arriving with orders from "Marshal Beresford to mount the whole ca-"valry: of course, I believe the order to forage "was a general order for the cavalry."

Lieutenant Colonel Wildman:—

"We had as usual been under arms from a "very early period of the morning, and about

" 8 o'clock, as well as I can recollect, the re-
" giment I belonged to received orders to forage.
" The regiment was on the road to the rear for
" that purpose when it was recalled. The
" enemy must have been advancing at this time,
" as I hardly think it could have been more
" than twenty minutes, but at most, did not
" exceed half an hour from the period of the
" arrival of the regiment on the first ground it
" was halted on after the recall, until the com-
" mencement of the action."

Questions submitted to A. F. Gregory, Esq., and the answers:—

Q. Have you any recollection of a message being brought to General Long on the morning of the 16th, stating that the enemy were crossing the Albuera to the right? Did you carry the report to Lord Beresford, and where did you find him?

A. " About 8 o'clock on the morning of the
" 16th, one of the 13th Light Dragoons came
" in from a picket on the right, with the intel-
" ligence that the enemy were crossing the
" Albuera. General Long immediately galloped
" off to the spot, when he found that a very
" heavy column of infantry had already passed
" over. I was sent to report it to Marshal
" Beresford, whose Head Quarters were in the
" village of Albuera. I first made my report

" to one of his Staff. Afterwards the Marshal " himself came out to speak to me."

Q. Did you on this occasion inform Lord Beresford that the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and that one regiment had already gone? Did he express any surprise, or displeasure, at this statement, and did he give you any order respecting that portion of the cavalry that had been sent to the rear?

A. " After the Marshal had heard General " Long's message, and asked me some questions " as to the enemy's force that had crossed, he " was turning back to enter the house, when " I begged his pardon for stopping him, and " told him, that the cavalry had been ordered " to the rear, and that one regiment had already " gone off, and requested to know if he had any " orders for them. He did not express any dis- " pleasure or surprise, and desired me to bring " up all that might have gone to the rear, and " take them more to the right than where the " cavalry were before posted."

Q. Where, and in what state, did you find the 4th Dragoons on your arrival with the Marshal's orders to them.

A. " Instead of returning to General Long I " went direct to the 4th Dragoons, which regi- " ment I found in a hollow spot some distance " in rear of the position. The men were going

" out to forage. Some either had foraged, or " were preparing to do so, and those who were " out were recalled by the bugle. As soon as " the regiment had been collected and mounted, " Colonel Leighton took them in the direction " the Marshal had pointed out, and the battle " had already commenced."

With your Lordship's doubts as to the propriety of allowing to the 3d Dragoon Guards the credit of opposing the passage of the rivulet, and driving back a corps of lancers, it might be superfluous for me to interfere, excepting for the purpose of showing that General Long's account is correct. Whether your Lordship might eventually have discovered, by the exposure of any " secret archives," as has been the case with regard to the 13th at Campo Mayor, that by the condemnation of the one, and the omission of the other, both these corps had been " most unjustly treated," I cannot pretend to foresee. At all events the surviving officers of that regiment will not be much offended with my relative, for presenting them with this leaf in their laurels, to which your Lordship conceives that they are in no way entitled. To my Reply, then, you are " indebted " for the first intelligence of an exploit achieved " by the 3d Dragoon Guards."

In noticing this " first intelligence " of the

"exploit" in question, your Lordship says, that "it was reported to you that a small corps of "French light cavalry had thrown themselves "across there, and after receiving some shots "from our infantry, had galloped along the left "bank of the Albuera, &c."

Now I am confidently assured that not an infantry soldier was within musket shot at the time. As the fact was only *reported* to your Lordship, I venture, therefore, to pronounce your informant to have been egregiously in error. It further shows, that at all events your Lordship was *not present at the period in question.*

To put the facts of the correctness of General Long's statements, and the incorrectness of your Lordship's information, beyond all dispute, I beg to submit the following statements of three of the officers present.

Lieut. Colonel Story, 3d Dragoon Guards:—

"I recollect that the regiment did charge a "body of Polish lancers, not far from the bridge "of Albuera, at the commencement of the "battle on the morning of the 16th, and drove "them back over the river."

Major Maunsell, 3d Dragoon Guards:—

"I have a perfect recollection of the 3d Dra-"goon Guards charging the Polish lancers near "the bridge of Albuera on the morning of the "16th of May, 1811."

Lawford Burne, Esq., late 3d Dragoon Guards:—

"With regard to the charge of the 3d Dra-
"goon Guards on the body of Polish lancers,
"I recollect when they crossed the river near
"the bridge of Albuera, we drove them back."

The foregoing evidence will, or I am much mistaken, not only have exhibited to your Lordship the insufficiency of your own information; it will have afforded a satisfactory confirmation of the accuracy of my relative's details, and a justification of his judgment in retaining the 3d Dragoon Guards.

I am now, my Lord, arrived at that portion of your Lordship's pamphlet, and of my own reply, with which I am (individually speaking) more immediately connected. The preceding portions have been devoted to comments on the statements of my relative. I am now put upon my own defence.

That I accused your Lordship, in my Reply to the author of the Strictures, of not acting with justice towards General Long, as regards the recommendation for the Albuera medal, is most true. You have met that accusation by a declaration, that you acted not only according to justice, but according to precedent. I shall endeavour to demonstrate, that you did not act according to the latter; I would therefore sub-

mit that you could not have acted according to the former. You begin, in page 50, by adverting to the parallel which I presumed to draw between the cases of Lord Collingwood and of my relative, and you "scarcely know" which is the "most destitute of foundation," the "charge of injustice" against yourself, or the "accuracy of the parallel." In nothing but the particular case, as regarding the medal, could I, or did I, attempt to compare the individuals in question. On the contrary, your Lordship must have remarked that I declared such comparison would be "the height of arro-"gance and presumption."* You say, in continuation, that I "might have compared "him with the greatest heroes and generals of "ancient and modern times," provided I had not "sought to exalt his fame by casting an "imputation of injustice upon yourself." In the first place I am not aware that I have endeavoured to raise the reputation of my relative by any such means. In the second I can assure your Lordship that I have no desire to class him with the heroes and generals of antiquity, or to administer to the vanity of his surviving relatives, by exhibiting him, either with regard to his acts or his pretensions, as assimi-

lated in any way to such exalted prototypes. A false praise of the dead is but little removed from a fulsome adulation of the living. I leave all such extravagant panegyrics to others.

Your Lordship states, in order to demonstrate my "ignorance," with regard to the distribution of medals, that the very first of the three rules which I quoted contradicts my conclusions, that rule being as follows:—

"No General officer shall be considered en-
"titled to receive medals, unless he has been
"*personally* and *particularly* engaged upon oc-
"casions of great public importance."

Your Lordship has further, with the aid of a multitudinous assemblage of synonymes, extracted an answer from Sir Henry Hardinge to the effect that he "was not aware of any *particu-*
"*lar* services rendered by General Long during
"the action."* The vagueness of the word "particular" in this answer, is nearly on a par with that of the word "differences" in the early part of the pamphlet. In further explanation of the term, I shall here quote a passage from your Lordship's G. O. of the 21st May, 1811.

"The Marshal feels that *every* officer and
"every soldier deserve *particular* mention.
"The conduct of all was noble."† A few

* p. 53 † p. 50, App. F. S.

lines previous to this well-merited eulogium on the exertions of a gallant army, (of whom Lord Londonderry says, in like manner, "there was not an officer or soldier in any "department of the army, who failed this day "in doing more than his duty,") I find that your Lordship could not "omit also mentioning "with praise Brigadier General Long and the "Honorable Colonel De Grey for the part "they had in conducting the cavalry." Here then we see General Long and Colonel De Grey going *pari passu* in your Lordship's praises. *Let the reader bear this in mind for a few pages.*

To contravene any lingering suspicion that General Long gave even the *slightest* assistance at Albuera, although your Lordship could not "omit" to mention him "with praise" for the part he had in conducting the cavalry, when the general note of thanksgiving was to be sounded; in order to exhibit him, not simply as a cipher on that occasion, but as being rather in the way; the recollections of Sir William Lumley, (who, now for the first time, has ventured to discuss these matters with one of his oldest friends,) have been ransacked, in order to show (as that officer has informed us,) that my relative "was at the time very impor-"tunate in offering his advice, which he," General Lumley, "was obliged abruptly to

" decline."* I shall take no further notice of Sir William's statement, than by placing beside it, as a parallel passage, an extract from his despatch to your Lordship, dated " Usagre, " May 25th," just *nine days only subsequent to this very battle of Albuera.*

" A charge," says that officer, " of the 3d " Dragoon Guards was at this moment ordered " on the right, and a simultaneous movement of " the 4th Dragoons, directed *most judiciously* by " Brigadier General Long, at the same time on " the left, where I had requested him to remain, " decided the point."

Again, " I feel myself," says Sir William, " under the *highest obligation* to Brigadier Gene- " ral Long for his *zealous, well-timed* and *active* " *exertions* during the day, as well as for his " assistance *at all times.*" Albuera was of course not included in the " all times!!"

That your Lordship must have been greatly gratified, and no less astonished, at this miraculous metamorphosis; that you must have ceased to " suspect the military qualifications of Ge- " neral Long;" that the " able manœuvring" at Campo Mayor in March, and the " zealous, well- " timed and active exertions" at Usagre in May; that these instances in the Alpha and Omega of your Lordship's brief campaign, must have

* p. 54.

softened still more a "disposition" that "did "not incline to censure," might in truth and in candor be anticipated. But alas! not so. We shall see hereafter that, although your Lordship still indulgently withheld the "ex- "pression of the real opinion you entertained "of my relative," the commendations of General Lumley (and which was no compliment to that officer) did not conduce at the moment to remove that opinion; nor has time, if I may judge from the tone of your Lordship's pamphlet, tended in any way to mitigate it.

With respect to Sir William Lumley's recollections, and the first portion of his statement to your Lordship, I shall content myself with submitting them for comparison with those of the author of the Strictures.

Sir William Lumley, p. 54.

"I joined you on the height above the vil- "lage and bridge of Albuera, about eight in the "morning, just as the attack commenced. The "first cannon-shot fired, I believe, on the left; "you sent me *at once to General Blake,* and I "was in full command of the allied cavalry "on the right, *where I found them posted,* in less "than a quarter of an hour."

Further Strictures.

"On arriving nearly in front of his right,

where General Long was posted, he," your Lordship, "discerned what he supposed the "principal part of the enemy's army advancing "along the plain from the wood towards the "bridge. Some guns were immediately brought "to bear upon them, and with considerable ef- "fect."* The author then goes on to mention the halt of these columns—your Lordship's "observ- "ing them awhile"—your sudden exclamation, "they attack our right! call General Blake"—the arrival in consequence of General Blake—your instructions to him—his withdrawal to carry them into effect, and *after all this,* we are told that "General Long was *then* directed to "send the 13th Dragoons to assist the defence "of the bridge, and to *station the remainder of "the cavalry to the rear."*† I offer no comment on these details. I only ask—Where was Sir William Lumley in the interim?

I come now to your Lordship's letter to Sir Henry Torrens, dated July 1, 1814, relative to the omission of General Long's name in your list of officers recommended for the Albuera medal. On this occasion you say, that "strict "justice would almost have demanded from "you an expression of the real opinion which "you entertained of General Long's military

* p. 138. † p. 139.

" qualifications and conduct; but that you ex-
" ercised your accustomed forbearance towards
" him."* In it I find the following passage:

" In fact, 'on the occasion alluded to," viz. at Albuera, " *no officer, if my recollection serves* " *me, commanding a brigade of cavalry, was re-* " *commended for a medal.*" In the Army List of 1816, I find Colonel De Grey in full possession and enjoyment of a medal for Albuera. At that battle Colonel De Grey commanded a brigade of cavalry, which brigade of cavalry was itself commanded, (as Sir Benjamin D'Urban informs us,) † in conjunction with the rest of the British and Portuguese, by General Long.

Your Lordship continues to state, that you were " not singular, at the battle of Albuera, " in withholding medals from general officers, " who had received thanks from their country " and Parliament." Whether the Duke of Wellington was in the habit of withholding such honors will appear hereafter.

In the mean time, I must observe, with reference to the letter in question, that your Lordship begins, by stating General Long to "labour under the malady of a high opinion of " his own talents, and therefore will write;"

† p. 52, App. F. S. * p. 55.

you continue this course of forbearance by saying that you had "a much higher opinion of "Colonel Otway as a practical cavalry officer;" and you conclude by declaring, that you give "no opinion for or against General Long," having previously introduced the letter itself, by an announcement that you still "exercised" while writing it "your accustomed forbearance "towards him!"* I put it to your Lordship's candor—Am I required to make any additional comments on this very "forbearing" epistle?

In the succeeding pages, 57 and 58, your Lordship has been so obliging as to advance an accusation against me, of having made "a "most important alteration in the sense" of Sir Henry Torrens's answer to General Long, "by substituting the word *consideration* for "*circumstances*," thereby, as you say, casting "the *onus* of my relative's having been refused "the medal entirely upon your Lordship." With respect to the imputation upon me, of having garbled the extract to suit my purposes, I shall not only repel it by an indignant denial, but I trust by, what is more to the purpose, a triumphant refutation. I own I was somewhat surprised at your Lordship's statement,

* p. 56.

inasmuch as a mere walk to the Horse Guards would have put you at once in full possession of the real facts of the case. A copy of Sir Henry Torrens's Letter, dated July 2d, 1814, (*the original being in my possession,*) is doubtless to be found at that office. The inverted commas that flank the quotation which your Lordship has given, would lead me to suppose that you had seen this copy; but that is impossible; you must have been misinformed. I shall give your Lordship's version, subjoining the real one as I find it under the sign manual of Sir Henry Torrens.

Your Lordship's Copy.

"Your name was omitted in the return of "those officers recommended for medals at Al- "buera, because the *circumstances* of your case "did not come within the rules and regula- "tions."

The Original.

"Your name was merely omitted in the "return of those officers, who were recom- "mended for medals at the battle of Albuera, "because the *consideration* of your case did not "come within the rules and regulations."

This is indeed, "the counterfeit presentment "of two brothers!!" and again, I protest, "I "know not how to account for such mis-state- "ments of fact!!"

In p. 59 you revert again to the parallel of Lord Collingwood, and you assert that I "did "not think it expedient to produce" "the sub- "sequent circumstances" in that case:—another suppression of the truth, of which I am not very courteously accused. But is it the fact? On the contrary, the last few lines of my Reply will show that it is not. Your Lordship should refer to the Life of Lord Collingwood. It is clear that you cannot have read it. There is a half sort of endeavour, on the part of your Lordship, to fasten the "onus" of omitting General Long's name upon the Horse Guards. "His superiors decided that he was not enti- "tled to the medal for Albuera."* *Why* was he not entitled, and *why* did they so decide? Sir Henry Torrens informs us that "the *consi- deration* of his case did not come "within the rules and regulations." But the word "con- "sideration" leaves (so at least your Lordship says) the "onus of the refusal *entirely* upon you." Be it so. You were then limited by your "*in- "structions*,"† and *therefore* did not recommend him. If "limited by your instructions," why did you recommend Colonel De Grey? You did *not* recommend Colonel De Grey. Then the Horse Guards violated one of its own enact-

* p. 59. † p. 52.

ments. You *did* recommend Colonel De Grey, in conformity with your "instructions," as having been "personally and particularly en- "gaged." I refer your Lordship to your General Order, where you will find a record of the services of General Long and Colonel de Grey, whom you could not "omit to mention for the "part which they had in conducting the ca- "valry"!!

Your Lordship is pleased to affirm that the acceptance by General Long of the Vittoria medal, was "an acknowledgment of the justice "of his having been refused the medal of Albu- "era."* That "most microscopic eye," of which your Lordship speaks, would, I conceive, find difficulty in detecting any such acknowledgment in General Long's letter, Having referred to the 2d and 3d rules, he says "I am content, "therefore, that the injury intended me should "rest *where I shall not fail to place it*"†—(very like an acknowledgment of justice this, certainly). "I accept with pleasure the distinc- "tion conferred at the recommendation of his "Grace the Duke of Wellington; and I leave "Marshal Beresford to reconcile as he can, *to* "*his own sense of justice*"—(this is all an acknowledgment of your Lordship's justice)—

* p. 59 † p. 141, 2, Reply.

" and consistency, the fact of having trans-
" mitted to me a public vote of thanks, with
" the annexed and expressed assurance that it
" was for my 'distinguished conduct and exer-
" 'tions in the memorable battle of Albuera,'
" and in the very teeth of this assurance to feel
" himself justified in excluding my name from
" the list of officers who were actually recom-
" mended by him for those marks of his Ma-
" jesty's gracious approbation, which are the
" allotted rewards of distinguished conduct
" and exertion in the field.

" I, Sir, did not presume thus to describe
" any services of mine, but his H. R. Highness
" is now in possession of the high authority
" that did so describe them to me."

The above is, it must be admitted, conspicuously analogous to an "*acknowledgment of the* "*justice* of being refused the medal for Albu-
" era" ! !

In conclusion: your Lordship writes thus:
" The thanks of Parliament are invariably given
" to all Generals present in an engagement,
" against whom there exists no actual cause of
" complaint. The medals are *expressly designed*
" for and *only conferred* on those officers who
" have *personally* and *particularly* distinguished
" themselves in an engagement, at least of a
" defensive battle.

" Vittoria was, I believe, *one of the few in-*
" *stances,* throughout the whole of the war in
" the Peninsula and France, *in which all the*
" *General Officers present were recommended for*
" *medals;* but I am not aware of any occasion
" on which they were not all included in the
" thanks of Parliament." *

Not being a military man, I perhaps ought, with becoming deference, to apologize for presuming to dissent from your Lordship on these *dicta.* The Army List is, however, open and intelligible to all inquirers; and an application at the Horse Guards, in cases of uncertainty, is the ultimate resource. I have availed myself of the assistance of both. Sir Charles Colville and Sir James Lyon † are in full possession of the medal for Waterloo, neither of whom was, if I am correctly informed, on the actual field on the 18th, both being stationed at Braine-le-leud, and consequently could not have been, strictly speaking, either "personally" or "particularly" engaged on that day. I am also further assured that they were not upon the field at Quatre Bras, nor on the road by which the main body fell back upon Waterloo.

* p. 60.

† These distinguished officers will, I am confident, feel no displeasure at the introduction of their names, when it is obvious that the motive is simply one of mere illustration.

The battle of Corunna was (if I read history aright) most essentially a defensive battle. *Every General Officer who received the thanks of Parliament on that occasion (and your Lordship was among the number) received likewise a medal;* and in the case of Sir John Slade, (at that time only a colonel commanding a brigade,) it is the more remarkable, as the cavalry were embarked. If this fact should not immediately present itself to your Lordship's recollection, it may be proved by a reference to Lord Hopetoun's despatch.

We will proceed to other instances. At Vimiero, at Talavera (another defensive battle), at Barrosa, and at Salamanca, (where your Lordship was present,) *every General Officer who received the thanks of Parliament received likewise a medal.* The Parliamentary Debates, the Army List, and the Horse Guards, are my authorities.

In the case of Salamanca, there was even a *posthumous* honour conferred, and Mr. Le Marchant is now in possession of a medal, his father having fallen in that action. This was quite in conformity with the rules, but it only shows that in this case even the death of the party created no exception. I cannot indeed discover one occasion of a battle during the war (Albuera excepted) in which an officer thanked by Parliament did *not* receive a medal.

It may not be altogether irrelevant to add (and I have the highest authority for the assertion), that at the Nile and at Trafalgar every captain (even those only partially engaged) received a medal. I may be told that this does not bear upon the point at issue. I may be asked—What does this prove in *your* case? My Lord, it proves this, and which to me is "abundant cause for consolation," that a Wellington and a Nelson found no exceptions in the ranks of the brave men by whose assistance their laurels had been won.

The preceding statements will have shown your Lordship (or I am much mistaken) that it is not yet that I am reduced to shelter my relative by the feeble succour of mere depositions to character. There are, however, not wanting, in the "secret archives of the family," records, by some of the brightest names in the service, that might testify to the high and honorable character of that relative, were it necessary now to produce them. But, my Lord, I shall content myself by selecting one solitary instance; and I am the more encouraged to do so, because the terms "unmeaning "pretensions of *zeal*," and "instances of unfor-"tunate conduct," are made the ground of your accusations, and the subject of your sarcasm.

I have now before me a letter from Lord Hill, written on the occasion of General Long's leaving the Peninsula, from which I extract the following passage; and be it remarked, that General Long had the pleasure of serving under that officer's command for as many years as he did months under that of your Lordship. On reading it, your Lordship may perhaps "find cause to distrust" the soundness of your "judgment of his efforts," whether at Los Santos or elsewhere; and I may now hope that you will at length be disabused of your very unfavourable and erroneous impressions.

"I now request," says Lord Hill, "you will "accept my best thanks for the readiness and "punctuality, with which you at all times at- "tended to my wishes; and I beg to assure "you, my dear General, of the sense I entertain "of your *zeal* and good conduct on all occa- "sions."

This honorable testimony, my Lord, will remain with others in the "secret archives "of the family," and I might here, perhaps, consider myself most fully relieved from the necessity of protracting my remarks. But before, however, I can consent to close this reply to your Lordship's letter, I desire to make one or two observations on the situation in which I have been placed. Precluded, in

some instances, by what is due to professional delicacy, from seeking out the testimony of many who might have lent me their assistance; fearful on my own part of entangling others as well as myself in this disagreeable controversy; exposing them, by possibility, to a misconstruction of motives, and apprehensive that they might be considered as partisans, should their testimony, however honorably given, be misrepresented as the means of disparaging a superior officer; I have had no ordinary difficulties to contend with. It is but an act of justice on my part thus openly to state, that every individual officer from whom I have derived fresh evidence on this occasion, is unknown to me even by sight.

You have said, my Lord, and most truly, that "the omitting to recommend General "Long for the Albuera medal is one of the "strong grounds"* on which I challenge your Lordship's treatment of that officer.

It is a fact which no questions as to "ser-"vices signal or particular"—no elaborate inquiries as to "especial mention, recommenda-"tion or commendation"†—can controvert, that on this occasion when, as Lord Londonderry says, every one did even "*more* than his

* p. 55.

† Question to Sir H. Hardinge, p. 53.

"duty," and when, as your Lordship affirms, you "knew not an individual who did *not* "do his duty,"—that on this occasion your Lordship considered it an act of justice to make *one* marked exception—to blot out *one* name from the list of those officers who had been thanked by the Parliament of their country "for their distinguished exertions in the "glorious battle of Albuera,"* because you "did not conceive that *he* came within the "scope of the regulations by which such dis-"tinctions are granted,"† but which regulations had fortunately reached *every individual officer, thanked by his country, in every battle in the Peninsula excepting the one in question.*

These, my Lord, are my facts. In placing them before your Lordship, I have endeavoured to moderate that "asperity" which you consider "natural" to my position. If I am pronounced by the calm and impartial reader to have exhibited any unwarrantable acrimony towards your Lordship in my Reply to the Author of the Further Strictures, I shall much regret it; and could I have distinctly understood that your Lordship's opinions of my relative's conduct were not in accordance with those of that writer, I should have been ready

* Parl. Thanks. † p. 51.

and anxious to have expressed my most sincere concern. The renewal of that attack upon my relative, with a ten-fold personality on the part of your Lordship, might, perhaps, cancel the necessity for even this acknowledgment. I have now been called upon not merely to vindicate his professional qualifications, but to combat, in addition, the unjustifiable imputation that the motives of his private conduct were as degrading as the performance of his public duty was discreditable. That I should be betrayed into any asperity on this occasion might, to those who have perused your Lordship's pamphlet, appear to be even more natural now than you have admitted it to have been in the first instance. That your Lordship must regret that the author of the Strictures did not confine himself to simple details, instead of unnecessarily wounding the feelings of the relatives of a deceased brother officer by expressions injurious, if not insulting, to his memory, I have no doubt.

I am not aware that I have ventured to dispute your Lordship's statements, excepting when (to adopt your language) I have been "supported "by the corroborating evidence of some ad- "mitted fact, or of some officer who was per- "sonally engaged in the affair under considera- "tion." The testimony on which my opinions

are founded is now before you. On reading it, your Lordship "will, I am satisfied, find cause "to distrust" not less "the fidelity of your "memory" than the accuracy of your information; and "consider me" (to use your Lordship's words) "most fully relieved from the "necessity of noticing" any additional observations, or continuing this most unpleasant controversy.

I have the honor to be,
&c. &c.
C. E. LONG.

APPENDIX.

Olivença, 23d April, 1811.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have been favored with your letter of yesterday and its inclosures. Those for England shall go by the first courier.

With regard to the Count de Penne's proposal, unless the enemy makes his inroads very far, and so as to become an actual insult upon your posts, which is not likely, it will probably be better not to engage in anything of the sort, as it will militate against the rest and renovation of the cavalry, which is the primary object at present.

The Marshal would suggest the expediency of your having an officer resident at the Count de Penne's Head-Quarters. To this you can give the air of a compliment, while it will ensure your not being deceived by any exaggerated or hasty report. It is not probable that the Count would deceive you, but it is good to be certain.

Let me beg of you to send the inclosed packet to Mr. Hillier, according to whatever may be the place from which he shall have dated the last letter you may have received.

Be good enough to send the inclosed note to Colonel Head.

Very truly yours,
My dear General,
(Signed) B. D'URBAN.

B. GEN. LONG, &c. &c.

Olivença, 24th April, 1811.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

With regard to the support you are to afford to the Count de Penne, the Marshal begs you will be guided as follows.

It is not the intention that the cavalry should at present be committed for any operation that may either place it in a situation of risk, or militate against its rest and renovation; yet if by a forward movement, not so far continued as to cause much fatigue to the horses, you can by a show of English dragoons give confidence to the Spanish troops, and operate a contrary effect upon the enemy, at the same time perhaps checking the impudence of his foraging and pillaging parties, without compromising your people or exposing them to the danger of an affair with a superior force, then, and only then, such a forward movement is to be considered desirable.

Otherwise you will bound yourself to watching your own neighbourhood, and abide by the tenor of my letters of the 21st and 23d of April.

Always, my dear General,

Most truly yours,

(Signed) B. D'URBAN.

I could not earlier reply to your last letters, as the Marshal was at Elvas, and the swelling of the Guadiana, to a height far beyond anything we have ever seen it at, prevented either of the messengers that I successively despatched to him with your letters, as they reached me, from getting to him.

He has returned within the hour, and I have lost no time in talking to him and in writing you the result.

Pray send the inclosed to Colonel Head.

B. D.

B. GEN. LONG, &c. &c.

Almendralejo,
27th April, ½ past 1, p. m. 1811.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have been favoured with both your dispatches of this morning; that with the inclosures from the Count de Penne Ville-Mur and Lieutenant Hillier, as well as the subsequent one, in which you report the countermand of the heavy cavalry.

I have laid them both before Marshal Beresford.

All is right; and your next communication will probably enable us to judge with more certainty of what the Count de Penne Ville-Mur is about, and what and where is the force before which he appears to be retiring.

Adverting to the 6th paragraph of the provisional instructions transmitted to you upon the 21st April, it may, perhaps, be as well to observe, that, in case of the advanced cavalry retiring, the Brigade of Otway and the 13th Light Dragoons will no longer, as therein directed, fall back upon Santa Martha, but in the first instance upon Villa Franca, and afterwards upon Almendralejo.

This however is not at all likely to be upon the cards, but it is the secure way to mention the change, because there is now no infantry at Santa Martha, the whole being concentrated upon the line between Merida and Almendralejo.

The infantry is all well closed up and we hold Merida sure.

Very truly and faithfully yours,

(Signed) B. D'URBAN.

B. GEN. LONG, &c. &c.

Almendralejo,
28th April, 12, *m. d.* 1811.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have been favored with your despatch of 6 o'clock this morning, and have laid it before the Marshal.

He approves of your suggestion, as to the posting a part of the cavalry at Usagre, and you will have the goodness to send there two squadrons of Colonel De Grey's Brigade, and two squadrons of Portuguese.

The British Part of this detachment is, of course, to be particularly spared on all common duties, but it will have a very good effect to let some of them be occasionally shown in patrols to the front, both with regard to our friends and our enemies.

You will have the goodness, to inform the Count de Penne Ville-Mur of this movement, which you will state to him is to afford him something of a more permanent support than he has heretofore had; and in the making this communication, you will signify to him the Marshal's desire that the Spanish infantry, which has fallen back to Villa Franca, and which can be of no earthly use there, should again advance, if not to Villa Garcia, where I believe it was before, at least to Usagre.

Ever truly yours,
(Signed) B. D'URBAN.

P. S.—You do not mention the having received my letter of half past one p. m. yesterday, but I hope that

you have done so; it was sent by a returning orderly of the 4th Dragoons, who had brought me a despatch from you at Los Santos.

B. D.

Will you be so good as to forward the accompanying packet to Mr. Hillier.

B. Gen. Long, &c. &c.

Almendralejo,

29th April, 1811, ½ *past* 1, *p. m.*

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of this day's date, which I have laid before the Marshal.

He desires me to refer you to his Instructions, contained in my letters of the 24th and 28th April, and to observe to you, that he considers those instructions sufficiently explicit for the cavalry detached at Usagre, more particularly as it was in consequence of your suggestions that the cavalry was detached there.

The Marshal, however, cannot admit, under any circumstances, of the British and Portuguese cavalry being placed at the discretion of any Spanish officer, and the officer commanding the detached squadrons at Usagre will be directed in his instructions to support the Count de Penne Ville-Mur, in the event of his being obliged to fall back, on the principle of your instructions above alluded to, and conformably to the Count's wishes, so far as they are not in contradiction to his instructions, and it must be left to the officer's discretion, to the nature of the

ground, and other circumstances not to be foreseen, to what distance in front of Usagre, and in what manner the support is to be given.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) B. D'URBAN,

Q.M.G. P.A.

B. GEN. LONG,

Commanding the Cavalry.

THE END.

London: Printed by C. Roworth and Sons, Bell Yard, Temple-Bar.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

A REPLY to the Misrepresentations contained in the "*Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's 3d Vol. of the Peninsular War,*" and affecting the military reputation of the late LIEUT. GENERAL LONG.

ERRATA.

p. 46, 8th line from the top—*for* "was," *read* "were."
p. 73, 8th line from the top—*dele* "even."
p. 78, 6th line from the bottom—*for* "begged," *read* "begs."
p. 78, 4th line from the bottom—*for* "mentioned," *read* "mentions."
p. 78, last line—*for* "reported," *read* "reports."
p. 111, 4th line from the bottom—*dele* "as yet."
p. 136, 9th line from the bottom—*for* "was," *read* "were."



A LETTER

TO

GENERAL

LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD,

BEING AN ANSWER TO HIS LORDSHIP'S

ASSUMED REFUTATION

OF

COLONEL NAPIER'S

JUSTIFICATION OF HIS THIRD VOLUME.

BY

W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT.

. LONDON:

THOMAS & WILLIAM BOONE, NEW BOND-STREET.

MDCCCXXXIV.

MARCHANT, PRINTER, INGRAM-COURT.

A LETTER,

&c.

My Lord,

You have at last appeared in print, without any disguise. Had you done so at first it might have spared us both some trouble; I should have paid more deference to your argument and I would willingly have corrected any error fairly pointed out. But now, my lord, you have virtually acknowledged yourself to be the author of the two publications entitled "*Strictures*" and "*Further Strictures*," *&c.* and I will not suffer you to have the advantage of using two kinds of weapons, without making you also feel their inconvenience. I will therefore treat your present publication as a mere continuation of your former two, and then, my lord, how will you stand in this controversy?

Starting anonymously, you wrote with all the scurrility that bad taste and mortified vanity could suggest, to damage an opponent, because in the fair exercise of his judgement he had ventured to deny your claim to the title of a great commander; and you coupled this with such fulsome adulation of yourself, that even in a dependent's mouth it would have been sickening. Now when you have suffered defeat, when all the errors, misquotations, and misrepresentation of your anonymous publications have been detected and exposed, you come forward in your own name as if a new and unexceptionable party had appeared, and you expect to be allowed all the advantage of fresh statements and arguments, and fresh assertions, without the least reference to your former damaged evidence. You expect that I should have that deference for you, which your age, your rank, your services, and your authority under other circumstances might have fairly claimed at my hands; that I should acknowledge by my silence how much I was in error, or that I should defend myself by another tedious dissection and exposition of your production. My lord, you will be disappointed.

I have neither time nor inclination to enter for the third time upon such a task; and yet I will not suffer you to claim a victory which you have not gained. I deny the strength of your arguments, I will expose some prominent inconsistencies, and as an answer to those which I do not notice, I will refer to your former publications to show that in this controversy, I am now entitled to disregard any thing you may choose to advance, and that I am in justice exonerated from the necessity of producing any more proofs.

You have published above six hundred pages, at three different periods, and you have taken above a year to digest and arrange the arguments and evidence contained in your present work; a few lines will suffice for the answer. The object of your literary labours is to convince the world that at Campo Mayor you proved yourself an excellent general, and that at Albuera you were superlatively great! Greater even than Cæsar! My lord, the duke of Wellington did not take a much longer time to establish his reputation, by driving the French out of the Peninsula; and methinks that if your exploits do not vouch for themselves your writings will scarcely do it for them. At all events, my lord, a plain simple statement at first, having your name affixed, would have been more effectual with the public, and would certainly have been more dignified, than the anonymous publications with which you endeavoured to feel your way. Why should not all the main points contained in the laboured pleadings of your Further Strictures, and the still more laboured pleadings of your present work have been condensed, and published at once with your name? if indeed it was necessary to publish at all! Was it that by anonymous abuse of your opponent, and anonymous praise of yourself, you hoped to create a favourable impression on the public before you appeared in person? This, my lord, seems very like a consciousness of weakness. And then how is it that so few of the arguments and evidences now adduced, should have been thought of before? It is a strange thing that in the first defence of your generalship for one short campaign, you should have neglected proofs and arguments sufficient to form a second defence of two hundred pages.

You tell us, that you disdained to notice my "*Reply to*

various Opponents," because you knew the good sense of the public would never be misled by a production containing such numerous contradictions, and palpable inconsistencies, and that your friends' advice confirmed you in this view of the matter. There were some things in that work which required an answer, my lord, even though the greatest part of it had been weak, and it is a pity your friends did not tell you that an affected contempt for an adversary who has hit hard only makes the bystanders laugh. Having condescended to an anonymous attack it would have been wiser to refute the proofs offered of your own inaccuracy than to shrink with mock grandeur from a contest, which you had yourself provoked. My friends, my lord, gave me the same advice with respect to your anonymous publications, and with more reason, because they were anonymous; but I had the proofs of your weakness in my hands, I preferred writing an answer; and if you, my lord, had been provided in the same manner you would like me have neglected your friends' advice.

My lord, I shall now proceed with my task in the manner I have before alluded to. You have indeed left me no room for that refined courtesy with which I could have wished to soften the asperities of this controversy, but I must request of you to be assured, and I say it in all sincerity, that I attribute the errors, to which I must revert, not to any wilful perversion or wilful suppression of facts, but entirely to a natural weakness of memory, and the irritation of a mind confused by the working of wounded vanity. I acknowledge, my lord, that it is a hard trial to have long-settled habits of self satisfaction suddenly disturbed,—

> " Cursed be my harp and broke be every chord,
> If I forget thy worth, *victorious Beresford.*"

It was thus the flattering muse of poetry lulled you with her sweet strains into a happy dream of glory, and none can wonder at your irritation when the muse of history, awakened you with the solemn clangour of her trumpet, to the painful reality that you were only an ordinary person. But, my

lord, it would have been wiser to have preserved your equanimity, there would have been some greatness in that.

In your first Strictures you began by asserting that I knew nothing whatever of you or your services; and that I was actuated entirely by vulgar political rancour, when I denied your talents as a general. To this I replied that I was not ignorant of your exploits. That I knew something of your proceedings at Buenos Ayres, at Madeira, and at Coruña; and in proof thereof I offered to enter into the details of the first, if you desired it. To this I have received no answer.

You affirmed that your perfect knowledge of the Portuguese language was one of your principal claims to be commander of the Portuguese army. In reply I quoted from your own letter to lord Wellington, a declaration that, such was your ignorance of that language at the time, you could not even read the communication, from the regency, relative to your own appointment.

You asserted that no officer, save sir John Murray, objected, at the first moment, to your sudden elevation of rank. In answer I published sir John Sherbroke's letter to sir J. Cradock complaining of it.

You said the stores (which the Cabildo of Ciudad Rodrigo refused to let you have in 1809) had not been formed by lord Wellington. In reply I published lord Wellington's declaration that they had been formed by him.

You denied that you had ever written a letter to the junta of Badajos, and this not doubtfully or hastily, but positively, and accompanied with much scorn and ridicule of my assertion to that effect. You harped upon the new and surprising information I had obtained relative to your actions, and were, in truth, very facetious upon the subject. In answer I published your own letter to that junta! So much for your first Strictures.

In your second publication (page 42) you asserted that colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action at Campo Mayor; and now in your third publication (page 48) you show very clearly that he took an active part in those operations.

You called the distance from Campo Mayor to Merida *two marches*, and now you say it is *four marches*.

Again, in your first "*Strictures*," you declared that the extent of the intrigues against you in Portugal were exaggerated by me; and you were very indignant that I should have supposed you either needed, or had the support and protection of the duke of Wellington while in command of the Portuguese army. In my third and fourth volumes, published since, I have shown what the extent of those intrigues were: and I have still something in reserve to add, when time shall be fitting. Meanwhile I will stay your lordship's appetite by two extracts, bearing upon this subject, and upon the support which you derived from the duke of Wellington.

1°. Mr. Stuart, writing to Lord Wellesley, in 1810, after noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to the fall of Almeida, says,—"I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports should quit the Tagus; and that the regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary; followed by reflections on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purport respecting the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington."

2°. Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beira by marshal Beresford, and dated 6th September, 1810.—"However, as I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold my situation beyond the period lord Wellington retains his situation; or after active operations have ceased in this country, even should things turn out favourably, of which I really at this instant have better hopes, than I ever had, though I have been usually sanguine. But in regard to myself, though I do not pretend to say the situation I hold is not at all times desirable to hold, yet I am fully persuaded that if tranquillity is ever restored to this country under its legal government, that I should be too much vexed and thwarted by intrigues of all sorts, to reconcile either my temper or my conscience to what would then be my situation."

For the further exposition of the other numerous errors and failures of your two first publications, I must refer the

reader to my "*Reply*" and "*Justification*," but the points above noticed it was necessary to fix attention upon, because they give me the right to call upon the public to disregard your present work. And this right I cannot relinquish. I happened fortunately to have the means of repelling your reckless assaults in the instances above mentioned, but I cannot always be provided with your own letters to disprove your own assertions. The combat is not equal, my lord, I cannot contend with such odds, and I must therefore, although reluctantly, use the advantages which by the detection of such errors I have already obtained.

These then are strong proofs of an unsound memory upon essential points, and they deprive your present work of all weight as an authority in this controversy. But the strangest part of your new book (see page 135) is, that you avow an admiration for what you call the *generous principle* which leads French authors to *mistate facts for the honour of their country;* and not only do you do this, you sneer at me very openly for not doing the same! you sneer at me, my lord, for not falsifying facts to pander to the morbid vanity of my countrymen, and at the same time, with a preposterous inconsistency, you condemn me for being an inaccurate historian! My lord, I have indeed yet to learn that the *honour* of my country either requires to be or can be supported by deliberate historical falsehoods. Your lordship's personal experience in the field may perhaps have led you to a different conclusion, but I will not be your historian: and coupling this, your expressed sentiment, with your forgetfulness on the point which I have before noticed, I am undoubtedly entitled to laugh at your mode of attacking others. What, my lord? like Banquo's ghost you rise, "with twenty mortal murthers on your crown to push us from our stools." You have indeed a most awful and ghost-like way of arguing: all your oracular sentences are to be implicitly believed, and all my witnesses to facts, being sound and substantial, are to be discarded for your airy nothings.

Captain Squire! heed him not, he was a dissatisfied, talking, self-sufficient, ignorant officer.

The officer of dragoons who charged at Campo Mayor!

He is nameless, his narrative teems with misrepresentations, he cannot tell whether he charged or not.

Colonel Light! spunge him out, he was only a subaltern.

Captain Gregory! believe him not, his statement cannot be correct, he is too minute, and has no diffidence.

Sir Julius Hartman, Colonel Wildman, Colonel Leighton! Oh! very honourable men, but they know nothing of the fact they speak of, all their evidence put together is worth nothing! But, my lord, it is very exactly corroborated by additional evidence contained in Mr. Long's publication. Aye! aye! but all are wrong; their eyes, their ears, their recollections, all deceived them. They were not competent to judge. But they speak to single facts! no matter!

Well, then, my lord, I push to you your own despatch! Away with it! It is worthless, bad evidence, not to be trusted! Nothing more likely, my lord! but what then, and who is to be trusted? Nobody who contradicts me: every body who coincides with me, nay, the same person is to be believed or disbelieved exactly as he supports or opposes my assertion. Even those French authors, whose generous principles lead them to write falsehoods for the *honour of their country.* Such, my lord, after a year's labour of cogitation, is nearly the extent of your "*Refutation.*"

My lord, in your first publication you said that I should have excluded all hearsay evidence, and have confined myself to what could be proved in a court of justice; and now, when I bring you testimony which no court of justice could refuse, with a true lawyer's coolness you tell the jury that none of it is worthy of credit; that my witnesses, being generally of a low rank in the army, are not to be regarded, that they were not competent to judge. My lord, this is a little too much: there would be some shew of reason if these subalterns' opinions had been given upon the general dispositions of the campaign; but they are all witnesses to facts which came under their personal observation. What! hath not a subaltern eyes? Hath he not ears? Hath he not understanding? My lord, you were once a subaltern yourself, and you cannot blind the world by such arrogant pride of station, such over-

weening contempt for men's capacity because they happen to be of lower rank than yourself. Long habits of imperious command may have so vitiated your mind that you cannot dispossess yourself of such injurious feelings, yet, believe me it would be much more dignified to avoid this indecent display of them.

I shall now, my lord, proceed to remark upon such parts of your new publication as I think necessary for the further support of my history, that is, where new proofs, or apparent proofs, are brought forward, for I am, as I have already shewn, exonerated, by your former inaccuracies, from noticing any part of your "*Refutation*," save where new evidence is brought forward; and that only in deference to those gentlemen who, being unmixed with your former works, have a right either to my acquiescence in the weight of their testimony, or my reasons for declining to accept it. I have however on my hands a much more important labour than contending with your lordship, and I shall therefore leave the greatest part of your book to those, who choose to take the trouble to compare your pretended Refutation with my original Justification in combination with this letter, being satisfied that in so doing I shall suffer nothing by their award.

1st. With respect to the death of the lieutenant-governor of Almeida, you still harp upon my phrase that it was the *only* evidence. The expression is common amongst persons when speaking of trials; it is said the prisoner was condemned by such or such a person's evidence, never meaning that there was no other testimony, but that in default of that particular evidence he would not have been condemned. Now you say that there was other evidence, but you do not venture to affirm that Cox's letter was not *the testimony* upon which the lieutenant-governor was condemned; and the extract from lord Stuart's letter, quoted by me, says it was. And, my lord, his lordship's letter to you, in answer to your enquiry, neither contradicts, nor is intended to contradict my statement; nor yet does it in any manner deny the authenticity of my extracts, which indeed were copied verbatim from his letter to lord Castlereagh.

Lord Stuart says, that extract is the only thing bearing on the question *which he can find*, were there nothing

more it would be quite sufficient, but his papers are very voluminous, more than fifty large volumes, and he would naturally only have looked for his letter of the 25th July, 1812, to which you drew his attention. However, in my notes and extracts taken from his documents, I find, under the date of August, 1812, the following passage:—

"The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was executed by "Beresford's order, he, Beresford, having full powers, and "the government none, to interfere. Great interest was "made to save him, but in vain. The sentence and trial "were published before being carried into execution, and "were much criticized. Both the evidence and the choice "of officers were blamed; and moreover the time chosen "was one of triumph, just after the battle of Salamanca; "and the place Lisbon."

This passage I have not marked in my book of notes as being lord Stuart's words; it must therefore be only taken as an abstract of the contents of one of his papers; but comparing it with the former passage, and with the facts that your lordship's words are still very vague and uncertain as to the main point in question, namely, the evidence on which this man was really condemned, I see no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of the statement in my first edition, nor the perfect accuracy of it as amended in the second edition of my third volume, published many months ago. You will find that I have there expunged the word "*only*," and made the sentence exactly to accord with the extract from lord Stuart's letter. You will also observe, my lord, that I never did do more than mention the simple fact, for which I had such good authority; and that so far from imputing blame to you for the execution of the sentence, I expressly stated that the man richly deserved death.

Passing now to the subject of the eighth Portuguese regiment, I will first observe, that when I said the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, I imputed no blame to it. No regiment in the world could have stemmed the first fury of that French column which attacked the mountain where the eighth was posted. If the eighth was not broken by it, as sir James Douglas's letter would seem to imply, what was it doing while the enemy by their flank movement gained the crest of their position, in such

numbers as to make it a most daring exploit of the ninth British regiment to attack them there. It is a strange thing that a heavy column of French, who were resolute to gain the crest of such a position, should have made "*a flank movement*" to avoid one wing of a regiment of Portuguese conscripts. I should rather imagine, with all deference, that it was the conscripts who made the flank movement, and that some optical deception had taken place, like that which induces children while travelling in a carriage to think the trees and rocks are moving instead of themselves. However, with this I have nothing to do; I have given my authority, namely, the statement of major Waller, a staff officer present, and the statement of colonel Taylor (for he is my nameless eye-witness) of the ninth, the very regiment to which sir James Douglas appeals for support of his account. These are my authorities, and if their recollections are irreconcilable with that of sir James Douglas, it only shows how vain it is to expect perfect accuracy of detail. I knew not of sir James Douglas's negative testimony, but I had two positive testimonies to my statement, and as I have still two to one, I am within the rules of the courts of justice to which your lordship would refer all matter of history. Moreover, some grains of allowance must be made for the natural partiality of every officer for his own regiment; and the following extract from sir James Leith's report on the occasion is good circumstantial evidence in favour of my side of the question.

"The face of affairs in this quarter now wore a different aspect, for the enemy who had been the assailant, *having dispersed or driven every thing there opposed to him,* was in possession of the rocky eminence of the sierra at this part of major-general Picton's position *without a shot being fired at him.* Not a moment was to be lost. Major-general Leith resolved instantly to attack the enemy with the bayonet. He therefore ordered the ninth British regiment, which had been hitherto moving rapidly by its left in columns in order to gain the most advantageous ground for checking the enemy, to form the line, which they did with the greatest promptitude, accuracy, and coolness under the fire of the enemy who had just appeared, formed on that part of the rocky eminence which overlooks the

back of the ridge, and who had then for the first time also perceived the British brigade under him. Major general Leith had intended that the thirty-eighth, second battalion, should have moved on in the rear and to the left of the ninth regiment, to have turned the enemy beyond the rocky eminence which was quite inaccessible towards the rear of the sierra, while the ninth should have gained the ridge on the right of the rocky height, the royals to have been posted (as they were) in reserve; but the enemy *having driven every thing before them in that quarter*, afforded him the advantage of gaining the top of the rocky ridge, which is accessible in front, before it was possible for the British brigade to have reached that position, although not a moment had been lost in marching to support the point attacked, and for that purpose it had made a rapid movement of more than two miles without halting and frequently in double quick time."

Here we have nothing of flank movements to avoid a wing of Portuguese conscripts, but the plain and distinct assertion twice over, that *every thing in front was dispersed or driven away*—and that not even a shot was fired at the enemy. Where then was the eighth Portuguese? Did the French column turn aside merely at the menacing looks of these conscripts? If so, what a pity the latter had not been placed to keep the crest of the position. There is also another difficulty. Sir James Douglas says he was with the royals in the attack, and sir James Leith says that the royals were held in reserve while the ninth drove away the enemy; besides which the eighth Portuguese might have been broke by the enemy when the latter were mounting the hill, and yet have rallied and joined in the pursuit when the ninth had broken the French. Moreover, my lord, as you affirm that both yourself and the duke of Wellington saw all the operations of the eighth Portuguese on this occasion, I will extend my former extract from colonel Taylor's letter, wherein you will perceive something which may perhaps lead you to doubt the accuracy of your recollection on that head.

" No doubt general Leith's letter to the duke was intended to describe the aspect of affairs in so critical a

situation, and where the duke himself could not *possibly* have made his obervations; and also Leith wished to have due credit given to his brigade, which was not done in the despatches. On the contrary, their exertions were made light of, and the eighth Portuguese regiment was extolled, which I know gave way to a man, save their commanding officer and ten or a dozen men at the outside; but he and they were amongst the very foremost ranks of the ninth British."—"General Leith's correspondence would be an interesting document to colonel Napier, as throwing considerable light upon the operations at Busaco, between Picton and Hill's corps, a very considerable extent of position *which could not of possibility be overlooked from any other part of the field.*"

Charge of the nineteenth Portuguese. Your lordship has here gained an advantage; I cannot indeed understand some of general M'Bean's expressions, but it is impossible for me to doubt his positive statement; I believe therefore that he was in front of the convent wall, and that he charged some body of the enemy. It is however necessary to restore the question at issue between your lordship and myself to its true bearing. You accused me of a desire to damage the reputation of the Portuguese army, and you asked why I did not speak of a particular charge made by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment at Busaco. This charge you described as being against one of *Ney's attacking columns*, which had, you said, *gained the ascent of the position, and then forming, advanced on the plain above* before it was charged by the nineteenth regiment. As this description was certainly wrong I treated the whole as a magniloquent allusion to an advance which I had observed to have been made by a Portuguese regiment posted on the mountain to the right. (General M'Bean is mistaken when he quotes me as saying that his line was never nearer to the enemy's lines than a hundred yards. I spoke of *a Portuguese regiment, which might possibly be the nineteenth*) I never denied that any charge had been made, but that a charge such as described by you had taken place, and in fact general M'Bean's letter does only confirm the truth of your general descrip-

tion, and by implication denies the accuracy of the particulars. Certainly Ney's columns never passed the front of the light division, nor advanced on the plain behind it.

The difficulty I have to reconcile general M'Bean's statement with my own recollections and with the ground and position of the light division, may perhaps arise from the general's meaning to use certain terms in a less precise sense than I take them. Thus he says he was posted in front of the convent-wall and also on the right of the light division; but the light division was half a mile in front of the convent-wall, and hence I suppose he does not mean, as his words might imply, immediately under the wall. He speaks also of the light division as being to his left, but unless he speaks of the line of battle with reference to the sinuosities of the ground, the light division was, with respect to the enemy and the convent, in his front; and if he does speak with regard to those sinuosities, his front would have been nearly at right angles to the front of the fifty-second and forty-third, which I suppose to be really the case. Again he says that he charged and drove the French from *their position* down to the bottom of the ravine; but the enemy's position, properly so called, was on the opposite side of the great ravine, and as all his artillery and cavalry, all the eighth corps, and the reserves of the sixth corps were in order of battle there, ten regiments, much less one, dared not have crossed the ravine, which was of such depth that it was difficult to distinguish troops at the bottom. I conclude, therefore, that here the general means by the word position, some accidental ground on which the enemy had formed. Taking this to be so, I will now endeavour to reconcile general M'Bean's statement with my own recollection; because certainly I do still hold my description of the action at that part to be accurate as to all the main points.

The edge of the table-land, or tongue, on which the light division stood, was very abrupt, and formed a salient angle, behind the apex of which, the forty-third and fifty-second were drawn up in a line, the right of the one and the left of the other resting on the very edges; the artillery was at the apex looking down the descent, and far below, the Caçadores and the ninety-fifth were spread on

the mountain side as skirmishers. Ney employed only two columns of attack. The one came straight against the light division, and the head of it struck the right company of the fifty-second and the left company of the forty-third by which it was broken as against a wall; and at the same time the wings of those regiments and the skirmishers of the ninety-fifth, who had retired on the right of the forty-third, advanced and lapped over the broken column on both sides, and no other troops fought with them at that point. In this I cannot be mistaken, because my company was in the right wing of the forty-third, we followed the enemy down to the first village, which was several hundred yards below the edge, and we returned leisurely; the ground was open to the view on the right and on the left. We saw no other column, and heard of none save that which we were pursuing.

When we returned from this pursuit the light division had been reformed on the little plain above, and some time after several German battalions, coming from under the convent wall, passed through our ranks and commenced skirmishing with Ney's reserve in the woods below.

General M'Bean says he saw no German infantry; and hence it is clear that it was not at this point his charge had place. But it is also certain Ney had only two columns of attack. Now his second, under the command of general Marchand, moved up the hollow curve of the great mountain to the right of the light division, and having reached a pine-wood, which however was far below the height on which the light division stood, he sent skirmishers out against Pack's brigade, which was in his front. A part of Ross's troops of artillery under the direction of lieutenant, now colonel M'Donald, played very sharply upon this column in the pine-wood. I was standing in company with captain Loyd of my own regiment, close to the guns watching their effect, and it was then I saw the advance of the Portuguese regiment to which I have alluded; but general M'Bean again assures me that the nineteenth regiment was not there. Two suppositions therefore present themselves. The enemy's skirmishers from this column were very numerous. Some

of them might have passed the left flank of Pack's skirmishers, and gathering in a body have reached the dip of the hill on which the light division were posted and rising behind them have been attacked by general M'Bean; or, what is more likely, the skirmishers, or a small flanking detachment from the column which attacked the light division, might have passed under the edge of the descent on the right of the light division, and, gathering in a like manner, have risen under general M'Bean's line.

Either of these suppositions, and especially the last, would render the matter clear to me in all points, save that of attacking the enemy's position, which, as I have before observed, may be only a loose expression of the general's to denote the ground which the French opposed to him had attained on our position. This second supposition seems also to be confirmed by a fact mentioned by general Macbean, namely, that the enemy's guns opened on him immediately after his charge. The French guns did open also on that part of the light division which followed the enemy down the hill to the first village, thus the time that the nineteenth charged seems marked, and as I was one of those who went to the village, it also accounts for my not seeing that charge. However considering all things, I must admit that I was so far in error that I really did not, nor do I now possess any clear recollection of this exploit of the nineteenth regiment; and, in proof of the difficulty of attaining strict accuracy on such occasions, I can here adduce the observation of general M'Bean viz. that he saw no Germans save the artillery; and yet there was a whole brigade of that nation near the convent wall, and they advanced and skirmished sharply with the enemy soon after the charge of the nineteenth would appear to have taken place. Very often also, things appear greater to those who perform them, than to the bye-standers, and I would therefore ask how many men the nineteenth lost in the charge, how many prisoners it took, and how many French were opposed to it? for I still maintain that neither by the nineteenth Portuguese, nor any other regiment, save those of the British light division, was any charge made, which called for particular notice on my part as a general historian. I am not

bound to relate all the minor occurrences of a great battle; "those things belong to the history of regiments," is the observation of Napoleon. Yet general M'Bean may be assured that no desire to under-rate either his services or the gallantry of the Portuguese soldiers ever actuated me, and to prove it, if my third volume should ever come to a third edition, I will take his letter as my ground for noticing this charge, although I will not promise to make it appear so prominent as your lordship would have me to do.

Your lordship closes this subject by the following observation. "As colonel Napier represents himself as having been an eye-witness of a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment,—which regiment he does not profess to know,—but which movement took place a mile distant from the position given to the nineteenth regiment, it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to his left. Nor can he therefore negative what is said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not have perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself." Your lordship does not say that the two events occurred at the same time, wherefore your conclusion is what the renowned Partridge calls a "*non sequitur*;" and as general M'Bean expressly affirms his charge to have taken place on the *right* of the light division, it was not absolutely necessary that I should look to the *left* in order to see the said charge. Hence the predicament in which I am placed, is that of being obliged to remark your lordship's inability to reason upon your own materials.

Your next subject is captain Squire, but I will pass over that matter as having been I think sufficiently discussed before, and I am well assured that the memory of that most gallant and able officer will never suffer from your lordship's angry epithets. Campo Mayor follows. In your "*Further Strictures*" you said that colonel Colborne was not near the scene of action; you now show in detail that he was actively engaged in it. You denied also that he was in support of the advanced guard, and quote his own report explaining how he happened to be separated from the advanced guard just before the action, thereby

proving that he was marching in support of it. You refuse any credit to the statements of captain Gregory and colonel Light, and you endeavour to discredit and trample upon the evidence of the officer of the thirteenth dragoons, who was an actor in the charge of that regiment. With respect to this last a few remarks are necessary, and but very few. 1°. The accuracy of that gentleman's narrative concerns my Justification very little, except in one part. I published it whole as he gave it to me, because I thought it threw light upon the subject. I think so still; and I see nothing in your lordship's observation to make me doubt his general correctness. But it was only the part which I printed in italics that concerned me. I had described a remarkable combat of cavalry, wherein the hostile squadrons *had twice passed through each other*, and then the British put the French to flight. Your lordship ridiculed this as a nursery tale; you called my description of it a *"country dance,"* and you still call it *"my scenic effect."* Did the bodies shock together twice, and did the British then put their opponents to flight? This was the question. The unusual fact of two cavalry bodies charging through each other; this was the point in dispute; it is scenic, but is it true? Now my first authority, whom I have designated as an *"eye-witness,"* was colonel Colborne; my second authority is the officer of the thirteenth dragoons, who was an actor; and when your lordship so coolly says the latter's statement does not afford "the slightest support to my scenic description," I must take the liberty of laughing at you. Why, my lord, you really seem disposed to treat common sense as if it were a subaltern. The officer's account bears me out even to the letter; for as the second charge took place with the same violence that the third did, if the hostile bodies had not passed through to their original position, the French must have fled towards the allied army; but they fled towards Badajos. The English must therefore have passed through and turned, and it was then that in the personal conflict with the sabre, which followed the second charge, the thirteenth dragoons defeated the French.

My lord, you will never by such special pleading, (I know of no other term by which I can properly designate

your argument,) you will never, I say, by such special pleading, hide your bad generalship at Campo Mayor. The proofs of your errors there, are too many and too clear; the errors themselves too glaring, too gross, to leave you the least hope; and the same confusion of head which prevented you from seizing the advantages, then offered to you, seems to prevail in your writing; and while impeaching every person's credit, where their statements militate against your object, you demand the most implicit confidence in your own contradictory assertions and preposterous arguments. My lord, you only fatigue yourself and your readers by your unwieldy floundering; you are heavy, my lord, and throw much mud about; like one of those fine Andalusian horses so much admired in the Peninsula, you prance and curvet and foam and labour in your paces, but you never get on. At Campo Mayor you had an enormous superiority of troops, the enemy were taken by surprize, they were in a plain, their cavalry were beaten, their artillery-drivers cut down, their infantry hemmed in by your horsemen and under the play of your guns, were ready to surrender; yet you suffered them to escape and to carry off their captured artillery, and then you blamed your gallant troops. The enemy escaped from you, my lord, but you cannot escape from the opinion of the world by denying the truth of all statements which militate against you.

The march by Merida. If you had said at once that the Duke of Wellington forbade you to go by Merida, there would have been an end of all my arguments against your skill; but it by no means follows that these arguments would be futile in themselves, though not applicable to you personally. New combinations were presented, and the Duke of Wellington might, very probably, have changed his instructions had he been present on the spot. But, my lord, why was this your justification withheld until now? why was so plain, so clear, so decisive a defence of yourself never thought of before? and why is it now smothered with such a heap of arguments as you have added, to prove that you ought not to have gone by Merida? Have you found out that I am not such a bad reasoner upon military affairs as you were pleased to style

me in your former publication? Have you found out that pleading high rank is not a sufficient answer to plain and well supported statements? It is good however that you have at last condescended to adopt a different mode of proceeding. I applaud you for it, and with the exception of two points, I will leave you in the full enjoyment of any triumph which the force of your arguments may procure you; always, however, retaining my right to assume that your lordship's memory, with respect to the Duke of Wellington's negative, may have been as treacherous as it was about your own letter to the junta of Badajos.

I have therefore nothing to add to the arguments I have already used in my Justification and in my History, in favour of the march to Merida; if I am wrong, the world will so judge me. But, the two points I have reserved are, 1°. That you assert now, in direct contradiction to your former avowal, that the march to Merida would have been one of *four* days instead of *two;* and that the road by Albuquerque was the only one which you could use. In answer to this last part, I observe that the French before, and the Spaniards then, marched by the road of Montijo; and that a year after, when lord Hill's expedition against Almaraz took place, the whole of his battering and pontoon train, with all the ammunition belonging to it, moved with great facility in three days, from Elvas, by this very road of Montijo, to Merida, and Elvas, as your lordship knows, is rather further than Campo Mayor from Merida.

The second point is, that mode of conducting a controversy which I have so often had occasion to expose in your former publications, viz. mis-stating my arguments to suit your own reasoning. I never said that you should have attempted, or could have succeeded in a "*coup de main*" against Badajos; I never even said you should have commenced the siege immediately; what I did say was, that by the march through Merida you could have placed your army at once between Badajos and the French army, and so have thrown the former upon its own resources at a most inconvenient time; that in this situation you could have more readily thrown your bridge at Jerumenha, and proceeded at your convenience.

Further than this I do not think it necessary to dissect

and expose your new fallacies and contradictions; it requires too much time. You have, my lord, written upwards of six hundred pages, four hundred of them I have before demolished; but my own volumes are rather thick, and, to me at least, much more important than yours; your lordship must therefore spare me the other two hundred, or at least permit me to treat them lightly. I will leave the whole siege of Badajos to you, it is matter of opinion, and I will not follow your lordship's example, in overloading what is already clear, by superfluity of argument. I will only expose one error into which you have been led by colonel La Marre's work. On his authority you say the garrison on the 10th of April had three months' provisions; but the following extract from a letter of marshal Soult's to the prince of Wagram will prove that La Marre is wrong:—

"*Seville*, 18*th April.*

"From the 11th of this month the place was provisioned, according to the report of general Phillipon, for *two months and some days* as to subsistence; and there are 100 milliers of powder," &c. &c.

Let us now come to the *battle of Albuera.*

You still doubt that the position as I explained it, is four miles long, and you rest upon the superior accuracy of major Mitchell's plan, on which you have measured the distance with your compasses. I also, my lord, am in possession of one of major Mitchell's plans, and I find by the aid of my pair of compasses, that even from the left of the Portuguese *infantry* (without noticing Otway's squadron of cavalry) to the right of the Spanish line, as placed at the termination of the battle, is exactly four miles; and every body knows that a line over the actual ground will from the latter's rises and falls, exceed the line on paper. Wherefore as my measurement does not coincide with your lordship's, and as we are both Irishmen, I conclude that either your compasses are too short, or that mine are too long.

Your grand cheval de bataille is, however, the numbers of the armies on each side. Thirty-eight long pages you give us, my lord, to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that my estimate is wrong and yours right; and at the end you are just where you began. All is uncertain, there are

no returns, no proof! the whole matter is one of guess upon probabilities as to the allies, and until lately was so also with respect to the French.

My lord, mine was a very plain statement. I named a certain number as the nearest approximation I could make, and when my estimate was questioned by you, I explained as briefly as possible the foundation of that estimate. You, my lord, give, in refutation, thirty-eight pages of most confused calculations, and what is the result? why that the numbers of the allies, on your own shewing, still remain uncertain; and your estimate of the French, as I will shew by the bye, is quite erroneous.

I said in my History, that more than two thousand cavalry were in the field, and in my Justification I gave reasons for believing it to be near three thousand; you now acknowledge two thousand; my History then is not far wrong. But your lordship does not seem to know the composition of your own divisions. General Long's morning states, now before me, do not include general Madden's cavalry. That officer's regiments were the fifth and eighth, and, if I mistake not, the sixth and ninth also were under him; those in general Long's division are the first and seventh. I find, from general Madden's own account of his services, given in the Military Calendar, that a part of his brigade, namely, the eighth regiment, under colonel Windham, was in the battle of Albuera. Now taking the eighth to be between two hundred and seventy and two hundred and eighty-one troopers, which were the respective strengths of the first and seventh regiments in Long's division on the 29th of May, I have above eighteen hundred troopers, namely, fifteen hundred and eighty-seven in Long's division, and two hundred and seventy-five in the eighth regiment, and to these I add about two hundred and fifty officers and sergeants, making, in all, more than two thousand sabres. In general Long's states of the 8th of May, those two Portuguese regiments had indeed fewer under arms than on the 29th, but then six hundred and eighty-nine men and forty-four serjeants and trumpeters were on command, of which more than four hundred belonged to those two Portuguese regiments. Many of these men must surely have joined before the battle, because such an unusual number on command

could only be temporary. Again I find in the state of the 29th of May, one hundred and fifteen serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers returned as prisoners of war; and when the killed and wounded in the battle are added, we may fairly call the British and Portuguese cavalry above two thousand, and your lordship admits the Spaniards to have had seven hundred and fifty. I will, for clearness, place this in a tabular form:

GENERAL LONG'S STATES.

8th May.

Serjeants, trumpeters, and troopers.

Present under arms.....	1576
On command	733
Prisoners of war	115
	2424

29th May.

Present.....	1739
Command	522
Prisoners of war.....	127
	2388

Medium estimate for the 16th of May.

Present 8th May.....	1576	
Ditto 29th May.....	1739	
	2)3315	
	1657½	
	270	8th Portuguese regt.
	1927	
	127	Prisoners of war.
	2054	
	750	Spaniards.
	2804	
Deduct prisoners on the 8th ..	115	
Total.....	2689	

To which are to be added the killed and wounded of the Anglo-Portuguese and the men rejoined from command.

Thus, the statements in my History and in my Justification are both borne out; for the numbers are above two thousand, as set down in the first, and nearly three thousand, as stated in the last. Moreover, my lord, a general historian is not blamable for small inaccuracies. If he has reasonably good authority for any fact, he cannot be justly censured for stating that fact, and you should make a distinction between that which is stated in my History and that which is stated in my controversial writings. All mistakes in the latter, however trifling, are fair; but to cavil at trifles in the former rather hurts yourself. Now, with respect to the artillery, there is an example of this cavilling, and also an illustration of your lordship's mode of raising a very confused argument on a very plain fact. I said there were so many guns in the field, and that so many were nine-pounders; you accused me of arbitrarily deciding upon their calibre. In reply I shewed you that I took the *number* on the report of colonel Dickson, the commanding officer of artillery, the *calibre* upon the authority of your own witness and quarter-master-general, sir Benjamin D'Urban. The latter was wrong, and there the matter should have ended. Your lordship, however, requires me, as a mark of ingenuousness, to acknowledge, as my mistake, that which is the mistake of sir Benjamin D'Urban, and you give a grand table, with the gross number of pounds of iron, as if the affair had been between two ships. You set down in your columns the statements of the writer of a note upon your Strictures, the statement of the Strictures themselves, and my statement; and then come on with your own observations as if there were three witnesses on your side. But the author of the note is again your witness D'Urban, who thus shews himself incorrect, both as to number and weight; and the author of the Strictures is yourself. This is not an *ingenuous*, though it is an *ingenious*, mode of multiplying testimony. In your Further Strictures also you first called in sir B. D'Urban in person, you then used his original memoir, you also caused him to write, anonymously, a running commentary upon yours and his own statements; and now you comment in your own name

upon your own anonymous statements; thus making five testimonies out of two.

The answer is simple and plain. When I took sir Benjamin D'Urban as a guide, he led me wrong; and you, instead of visiting his error upon his own head, visit it upon mine, and require me and your readers, to follow him implicitly upon all points, while to do so avails for your defence, but not when they contradict it. From sir B. D'Urban I took the *calibre* of the allies' guns employed in the battle of Albuera; and he was wrong! From him, if I had not possessed sir A. Dickson's official return, I should also have taken the *number* of guns, and I should have been wrong, because he calls them thirty-four instead of thirty-eight. He also (see page 26 of the Appendix to your Further Strictures) says that the Spaniards had six guns, whereas Dickson says, they had but four; and if his six guns were reckoned there would have been forty pieces of artillery, which he however reduced to thirty-four by another error, namely, leaving out a whole brigade of German artillery. On sir Benjamin's authority I called major Dickson the commander of the artillery, and this also was wrong. From sir Benjamin D'Urban's Memoir, I took the statement that the fourth division arrived on the field of battle at *six o'clock in the morning*, and yet I am assured that they did not arrive until nine o'clock, and after the action had commenced. And this last is a very serious error because it gives the appearance of skill to your lordship's combinations for battle, and to sir Benjamin's own arrangements in the execution, which they do not merit, if, as I believe, that division arrived at nine o'clock. But the latter hour would be quite in keeping with the story of the cavalry going to forage, and both together would confirm another report very current, namely, that your lordship did not anticipate any battle on the 16th of May. Setting this however aside, I know not why, in the face of all these glaring errors, and a multitude of smaller ones, I am to take sir Benjamin D'Urban's authority upon any disputed point.

I will now, my lord, admit one complete triumph which you have attained in your dissertation upon the numbers of the troops. I did say that from the 20th of March to the 16th of May, was only twenty days, and

though the oversight is so palpably one that could not be meant to deceive, I will not deny your right to ridicule and to laugh at it. I have laughed at so many of your lordship's oversights, that it would be unfair to deny you this opportunity for retaliation, which I also admit you have used moderately.

I have since I wrote my Justification procured some proofs about the French numbers, you will find them in the following extracts from the duke of Dalmatia's correspondence of that time. They are worth your attention. They throw some light upon the numbers of the allies, and one of them shews unquestionably, that my estimate of the French numbers was, as I have before said, too high instead of too low. I give the translations to avoid the trouble and expence of printing in two languages, and I beg your lordship to observe that these extracts are not liable to the praise of that generous patriotism which you alluded to in speaking of French authors, because they were written before the action and for the emperor's information, and because it was the then interest of the writer, rather to exaggerate than to lessen his own numbers, in order to give his sovereign an idea of his activity and zeal.

Extract of a letter from MARSHAL SOULT to the PRINCE of WAGRAM.

Seville, 22d April, 1811.

"General Latour Maubourg announces to me that general Beresford commanding the Anglo-Portuguese army, and the Spanish generals Castaños and Ballesteros, with the remains of the corps of their nation are united at Zafra, and I am assured that the whole of their forces is twenty-five thousand men, of which three thousand are cavalry."

"Colonel Quennot of the ninth regiment of dragoons, who commands upon the line of the Tinto, and observes the movements on that side as far as Ayamonte, informs me that on the 18th and 19th, general Blake disembarked ten thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry, between the mouths of the Piedra and the Guadiana. These troops come from Cadiz, they have cannon, and Blake can unite in that part fifteen thousand men."

Ditto to Ditto.

" *May 4th,* 1811.

" Cordova is menaced by a corps of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, many troops are concentrated in Estremadura; Badajos is invested, Blake *has* united on the Odiel an army of fifteen to sixteen thousand men." " I depart in four days with *twenty thousand men, three thousand horses, and thirty pieces of cannon* to drive across the Guadiana the enemy's corps which are spread in Estremadura, to disengage Badajos and to facilitate the arrival of count D'Erlon. If the troops which that general brings can unite with mine, and if the troops coming from the armies of the north and centre, and which I have already in part arranged, arrive in time, I shall have in Estremadura, thirty-five thousand men, five thousand horses, and forty pieces of artillery."

Now, my lord, I find by the imperial returns that count D'Erlon marched towards Andalusia with twelve thousand men present under arms, and that he did not arrive until the 14th June. There remain three thousand men as coming from the armies of the north and centre, to make up the thirty-five thousand men, mentioned by Soult, and I find the following passage in his letter to the prince of Wagram, dated the 9th of May.

" The 12th, I shall be at Fuente Cantos, general Bron commands there, he brings with him the first reinforcement coming from the armies of the north and centre, and I shall employ him in the expedition."

Hence, if we take the first reinforcement, at half of the whole number expected, we add one thousand five hundred men and five guns, to the twenty thousand, making a total for the battle of Albuera of twenty-one thousand five hundred men of all arms, and thirty-five guns, from which must be deducted the detachments left at Villalba, the stragglers on the march and the hussars sent to scout on the flanks, for I find in general Madden's narrative of his services, that he was watched by some of the enemy's cavalry on the day of the battle.

I have now, my lord, given you positive and undeniable testimony that the French numbers were over-rated in-

stead of being under-rated by me, and I have given you corroborative evidence, that the number of the allies was as great as I have stated it to be; for we find in the above extracts Soult giving Blake fifteen thousand men, of which, at least, seven hundred are cavalry, *before* the battle, and twenty-five thousand, of which three thousand are cavalry, to your lordship, Castaños, &c. We find the French general's information, taking into consideration the troops which joined Blake in the Niebla, not differing essentially from Mr. Henry Wellesley's report of the numbers of Blake's army, namely twelve thousand, of which one thousand one hundred were cavalry; and we find both in some manner confirmed by lord Wellington's repeated statements of the forces of Blake's army after the battle, that is to say, making a reasonable allowance for the numbers lost in the action. Then Soult and Mr. Wellesley agree in making out the Spanish cavalry more numerous than your lordship will admit of. Blake alone had from seven to eleven hundred cavalry, following the statement of these persons, and there was in addition the corps of Penne Villemur, which, as I have said in my Justification, was not less than five hundred.

In closing your calculation of numbers you exultingly observe that it is the first time you ever heard of a general's being censured for keeping one-third of his force in reserve and *beating the enemy with the other two.* Aye—but this involves the very pith of the question. At Albuera the *general* did not beat the enemy. My lord, you have bestowed great pains on your argument about the battle of Albuera, and far be it from me to endeavour to deprive you of any addition to your reputation which you may thus obtain. I have no desire to rob you of any well earned laurels; my observations were directed against what appeared to me your bad generalship; and if I have not succeeded in pointing that out to the satisfaction of the public, I have nothing further to offer in fairness; and certainly I will not by any sophistry endeavour to damage your fame. But do not think, my lord, that I acknowledge the force of your present arguments. If I do not take the trouble to dissect them for reasons before mentioned, be assured it is not from any want of points to fasten upon; indeed, my lord, your book is very weak,

there are many failures in it, and a few more I will touch upon that you may estimate my forbearance at its proper value. I will begin with your observations on captain Gregory's testimony, not in defence of that gentleman's credit, for in truth, my lord, as his and the other officers' evidence are given to facts of which they were personally cognizant, I cannot pay the slightest regard to your confused arguments in opposition to their honour. I am aware that you do not mean to impeach anything but their memory; but if I were to attempt to defend them from your observations it would appear as if I thought otherwise. My lord, you have missed captain Gregory, but you have hit yourself very hard.

Behold the proof.

At page 167 you say, "I will now point out the gross and palpable errors of captain Gregory's narrative."—"He says, that on receiving the intelligence from an orderly of the thirteenth dragoons who came in from a picquet on the right with intelligence that the enemy was crossing the river, general Long galloped off. I conclude to the right, and found half the army across, and to the right. *Why, every other authority has stated that the enemy's first movement was from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera upon our left*; and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above our right and there make their attack, till after their first movement was considerably advanced and the action had actually commenced with Godinot's corps on the opposite side of the river to our left. It is quite surprising that colonel Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend's testimony."

Now, my lord, compare the passage marked by italics (pardon me the italics) in the above, with the following extract from your own despatch.

"The enemy on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at eight o'clock" (the very time mentioned by captain Gregory,) "he was observed to be in movement, *and his cavalry were seen passing the rivulet of Albuera considerably above our right, and shortly after*, he marched out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry and two heavy columns of infantry, posting them to our front, *as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera.*

During this time he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river *beyond our right*, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank." Your lordship has, indeed, in another part discarded the authority of your dispatch, as appears most necessary in treating of this battle, but is rather hard measure to attack me so fiercely for having had some faith in it.

With respect to sir Wm. Lumley's letter I cannot but admire his remembrance of the exact numbers of the British calvalry; a recollection of twenty-three years, founded on a few hasty words spoken on a field of battle, is certainly a rare thing; yet I was not quite unprepared for such precision; for, if I do not greatly mistake, sir William was the general, who, at Santarem, edified the head-quarters by a report, that the enemy were certainly going to move either to their right or to their left, to their front or to their rear. One would suppose that so exact a person could never be in error; and yet the following extract from general Harvey's journal would lead me to suppose that his memory was not quite so clear and powerful as he imagines. Sir William Lumley says, that to the best of his recollection he was not aware of the advance of the fuzileers and Harvey's brigade until they had passed his left flank; that they then came under his eye, and, as the rain and smoke cleared away, he saw them as one body moving to engage, and although they had become so oblique, relative to the point where he stood, that he could not well speak as to their actual distance from one another, there did not appear any improper interval between them.

Now hear general Harvey!

"The twenty-third and one battalion of the seventh fuzileers were in line. The other battalion at quarter distance, forming square, at every halt to cover the right which the cavalry continued to menace. *Major-general Lumley, with the British cavalry, was also in column of half squadrons in rear of our right and moved with us, being too weak to advance against the enemy's cavalry.*"

There, my lord, you see that generals as well as doctors differ. Sir W. Lumley, twenty-three years after the event,

recollects seeing the fuzileers and Harvey's brigade, at such a distance and so obliquely, that he could not speak to their actual distance from one another. General Harvey writing the day after the event, says, sir Wm. Lumley had his cavalry in half squadrons close in rear of these very brigades, and was moving with them!

This should convince your lordship that it is not wise to cry out and cavil at every step in the detail of a battle.

As to the term gap, I used the word without the mark of quotation, it was my own, and it expressed mine and your meaning very well. You feared that the cavalry of the French would overpower ours, and break in on your rear and flank, when the support of the fuzileers was taken away. I told you that general Cole had placed Harvey's brigade in the gap, that is, in such a situation that the French could not break in. I knew very well that Harvey's brigade followed in support of the attack of the fuzileers, because he says so in his journal; but he also said, that both ours and the enemy's cavalry made a corresponding movement, and thus the fear of the latter breaking in was chimerical, especially as during the march Harvey halted, formed, and received and beat off a charge of the French horsemen.

My lord, I have not yet done with sir W. Lumley's numbers. How curious it is that brigade-major Holmes's verbal report on the field of battle, as recollected by sir William, should give the third dragoon guards and the fourth dragoons, forming the heavy brigade, the exact number of five hundred and sixty men, when the same brigade-major Holmes, in his written morning state of the 8th of May, one week before the battle, gives to those regiments, seven hundred and fifty-two troopers present under arms, and one hundred and eighty-three on command. What became of the others in the interval? Again, on the 29th of May, thirteen days after the battle, he writes down these regiments six hundred and ninety-five troopers present under arms, one hundred and eighty-two on command, and thirty-two prisoners of war. In both cases also the sergeants, trumpeters, &c. are to be added; and I mark this circumstance, because in the French return all persons, even to the conductors of carriages, are included

in the strength of men. I imagine neither of the distinguished regiments alluded to will be willing to admit that their ranks were full before and after, but empty on the day of battle. It is contrary to the English custom. Your lordship, also, in a parenthesis (page 125) says, that the thirteenth dragoons had not three hundred men at this time to produce; but this perverse brigade-major Holmes writes that regiment also down on the 8th of May, at three hundred and fifty-seven troopers present under arms and sixty-three on command; and on the 29th of May, three hundred and forty-one present, seventy-nine on command, and eighty-two prisoners-of-war. Staff-officers are notoriously troublesome people.

One point more, my lord, and I have done.

You accuse me of having placed sir A. Dickson in a position where he never was, and you give a letter from that officer to prove the fact. You also deny the correctness of sir Julius Hartman's statement, and you observe that even were it accurate, he does not speak of an order to retreat, but an order to cover a retreat. Now, to say that I place Dickson in a wrong position is scarcely fair, because I only use sir Julius Hartman's words, and that in my Justification; whereas in my History, I have placed colonel Dickson's guns exactly in the position where he himself says they were. If your lordship refers to my work you will see that it is so; and surely it is something akin to quibbling, to deny, that artillery, posted to defend a bridge, was not at the bridge because its long range enabled it to effect its object from a distance.

You tell me also that I had your quarter-master general's evidence to counteract sir Julius Hartman's relative to this retreat. But, my lord, sir Benjamin D'Urban had already misled me more than once; and why, my lord, did you garble sir A. Dickson's communication? I will answer for you. It contained positive evidence that *a retreat was ordered.* Your lordship may ask how I know this. I will tell you that also. Sir Alexander Dickson not choosing to be a partizan in the controversy, very handsomely sent me the substance of his communication to you at the same time; and you are now I hope, my lord, convinced that it is not weakness which induces me to

neglect a complete analysis of your work. I do assure you it is very weak in every part. My lord, you have mentioned several other letters which you have received from different officers, colonel Arbuthnot, colonel Colborne, &c. as confirming your statements, but you have not, as in the cases of sir James Douglas and general M'Bean, where they were wholly on your own side, given these letters in full; wherefore, seeing the gloss you have put upon lord Stuart's communication, and this garbling of sir A. Dickson's letter, I have a right to suppose that the others do not bear up your case very strongly—probably they contradict it on some points as sir Alexander Dickson's does. I shall now give the latter entire.

"The Portuguese artillery under my command (twelve guns) attached to general Hamilton's division was posted on favourable ground about 750 or 800 yards from the bridge, and at least 700 yards S. W. of the village of Albuera, their fire bore effectually upon the bridge and the road from it to the bridge and I received my orders to take this position from lord Beresford when the enemy threatened their main attack at the bridge.

"At a certain period of the day, I should judge it to have been about the time the fourth division moved to attack, *I received a verbal order in English from Don Jose Luiz de Souza* (now Conde de Villa Real, an aid-de-camp of lord Beresford) *to retire by the Valverde road, or upon the Valverde road, I am not sure which;* to this I strongly expressed words of doubt, and he then rode off towards Albuera; as, however, I could see no reason for falling back, and the infantry my guns belonged to, being at hand, I continued in action, and though I believe I limbered up once or twice previous to the receipt of this message, and moved a little to improve my position, I never did so to retire.

"Soon after Don Jose left me, seeing lord Beresford and some of his staff to my right, I rode across to satisfy myself that I was acting correctly, but perceiving that the French were giving way I did not mention the order I had received, and as soon as lord Beresford saw me, he asked what state my guns were in, and then ordered me to proceed as quickly as I could with my nine pounders to the

right, which I did in time to bring them into action against the retiring masses of the enemy. The foregoing is the substance of an explanation given to lord Beresford which he lately requested."

Thus you have the whole of what sir Alexander Dickson (as he tells me) wrote to you; and here therefore I might stop, my lord, to enjoy your confusion. I might harp upon this fact, as being so formidable a bar to your lordship's argument, that rather than give it publicity, you garbled your own correspondent's letter. But my object is not to gain a triumph over you, it is to establish the truth, and I will not follow your example by suppressing what may tend to serve your argument and weaken mine. It is of no consequence to me whether you gave orders for a retreat or not. I said in my History that you did not do so, thinking the weight of testimony to be on that side, and it was only when your anonymous publications called forth new evidence that I began to doubt the correctness of my first statement. But if the following observations in sir Alexander Dickson's letter can serve your argument, you are, my lord, welcome to them, although they are not contained in the substance of what he wrote to you; and here also I beg of you to remember that this letter of sir Alexander's was written to me *after my Justification* was printed.

"I had never mentioned the matter to any one, except to Hartman, with whom I was on the greatest habits of intimacy, and indeed I was from the first induced to attribute Souza's message to some mistake, as neither in my conversation with lord Beresford was there any allusion to it, nor did any thing occur to indicate to me that he was aware of my having received such an order."

Your lordship will no doubt deny that the Count of Villa Real had any authority from you to order this retreat, so be it; but then, my lord, you call upon me and others to accept this Count of Villa Real's evidence upon other points, and you attempt to discredit some of my witnesses, because their testimony is opposed to the testimony of the Count of Villa Real; if you deny him at Albuera, you cannot have him at Campo Mayor; and behold, my lord, another difficulty you thus fall into. Your publications

are intended to prove your talent as a general, and yet we find you acknowledging, that in the most critical period of this great and awful battle of Albuera, your own staff had so little confidence in your ability, that Sir Henry Hardinge took upon himself to win it for you, while the Conde de Villa Real took upon himself to lose it; the one ordering an advance, which gained the day; the other ordering a retreat, which would have ruined all. My lord, be assured that such liberties are never taken by the staff of great commanders.

In ancient times it was reckoned a worthy action to hold the mirror of truth up to men placed in high stations, when the partiality of friends, the flattery of dependents, and their own human vanity had given them too exalted notions of their importance. You, my lord, are a man in a high station, and you have evidently made a false estimate of your importance, or you would not treat men of inferior rank with so much disdain as you have expressed in these your publications; wherefore it may be useful, and certainly will be just, to let you know the judgement which others have formed of your talents. The following character was sketched about two months after the battle of Albuera; the author was a man of great ability, used to public affairs, experienced in the study of mankind, opposed to you by no personal interest, and withal had excellent opportunities of observing your disposition; and surely his acuteness will not be denied by those who have read your three publications in this controversy.

"Marshal Beresford appears to possess a great deal of information upon all subjects connected with the military establishments of the kingdom, the departments attached to the army, and the resources of the country. But nothing appears to be well arranged and digested in his head; he never fixes upon a point, but deviates from his subject, and overwhelms a very slender thread of argument by a profusion of illustrations, stories, and anecdotes, most of which relate to himself. He is captious and obstinate, and difficult to be pleased. He appears to grasp at every thing for his own party, without considering what it would be fair, and reasonable, and decent to expect from the other party."

I now take leave of you, my lord, and notwithstanding all that has passed, I take leave of you with respect, because I think you to be a brave soldier, and even an able organizer of an army; I know that you have served your country long, I firmly believe to the utmost of your ability, and I admit that ability to have been very considerable; but history, my lord, deals with very great men, and you sink in the comparison. She will speak of you as a general far above mediocrity, as one who has done much and a great deal of it well, yet when she looks at Campo Mayor and Albuera, she will not rank you amongst great commanders, and if she should ever cast her penetrating eyes upon this your present publication, she will not class you amongst great writers.

THE END

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
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OF

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OF

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BY

GENERAL LORD VISCOUNT BERESFORD, G.C.B.

LONDON:

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REFUTATION

OF

COLONEL NAPIER'S JUSTIFICATION.

COLONEL NAPIER'S "*Justification,*" although ostensibly designed as an answer to "*Further "Strictures on his History of the Peninsular War,*" abounds in passages which are addressed to me so pointedly, and in which my military views and conduct are so harshly animadverted upon, that I cannot in common justice to myself allow it to pass without observation. In entering on the exposure of its errors and misrepresentations, I undertake a task which nothing but my high respect for public opinion could induce me to attempt. The same motive which now leads me to discuss the contents of Colonel Napier's "*Justification*" induced me to remain silent with regard to his former pamphlet, entitled "*Reply to "various Opponents;*" for, though animated by a similar spirit and treating of subjects with which I was equally concerned, I felt that the good sense of the public could never be misled by a production of which the contradictions were so palpable; that no better refutation of it could be offered than that which was contained in its own pages. I did not however rest satisfied with my own opinion on this

occasion, but consulted some friends of high military rank, who not only confirmed my view of the merits of the publication; but approved the course that I had determined to adopt respecting it. With regard to the author's more recent pamphlet I have thought it expedient to pursue a different line of conduct. The statements contained in it are to the full as erroneous as those of the "*Reply*;" but they are supported by a plausibility of argument and a shew of authority that might deceive the general reader; and my leaving them unnoticed might be construed into a tacit admission of their truth.

In this answer to Colonel Napier, I shall endeavour to confine myself to the discussion and elucidation of those matters of fact which are referred to, and, as I conceive, misrepresented, in his "*Justification*." My only object is to set him and the public right upon the points in which I am personally interested, and on which he appears to me to have written on very erroneous information.

Twenty-three years have elapsed since the transactions of which he speaks occurred; and it may, perhaps, be considered somewhat hard to be compelled to seek for positive evidence—and nothing short of positive evidence would be sufficient—in refutation of charges now made for the first time, when, after such an interval, I might have expected to find, that many matters of consequence to my case were but imperfectly remembered by the officers principally concerned in them, and that many a very important witness had ceased to exist. I

consider myself most fortunate in having been enabled, notwithstanding these adverse circumstances, to collect such a body of evidence respecting the transactions in question as is not only far more ample and particular than I could reasonably have hoped for, but as will, I apprehend, be found fully sufficient to establish my views and statements, and to overthrow those of the historian.

It will be naturally presumed from the tenor of my former life, that I cannot enter willingly into discussions of this kind. The task is not only irksome in itself, but is altogether foreign to my habits and pursuits; and having in the following pages laid my statements and authorities, in refutation of the statements and authorities of Colonel Napier, before the reader, I shall henceforth decline all further controversy upon the subject of my past military life. If the ingenuity and minute researches of Colonel Napier, or of any other author, should supply him with any more "*new and curious facts*," or lead him to suppose that he had found fresh grounds of censure against me, I shall leave my cause in the hands of the public. And I am well satisfied that after perceiving, as I have no doubt they will, how fully those charges which have been so confidently and so pertinaciously urged against me, are refuted in the present instance, they will consider me most fairly excused, if, at my time of life, I should be anxious for quiet and repose, and but little inclined to engage in a literary contest with an adversary who, in this mode of warfare, is so very much more

able and experienced than myself, that whatever advantages I may gain must be altogether owing to the goodness of my cause, and not to the skill of the advocate. I do not, indeed, consider it quite impossible, that, after the perusal of this publication, my opponent himself may be convinced of his having written on false information; and if he be not, I must abandon all hope of his ever being so, or, at least, of my ability of convincing him.

Almeida.

The first point which Colonel Napier notices is the case of Da Costa, the Lieutenant-Governor of Almeida. In his History he affirms, "that the *only* evidence" against this officer, who was tried and shot, "was an explanatory letter written to Lord Liverpool by Colonel Cox, when a prisoner at Verdun." This statement involves an accusation of the deepest die against the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army, and all the officers who sat on the Court-Martial of Da Costa. The authority on which Colonel Napier justifies so injurious a representation is the following extract from a letter of Mr. Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, dated Lisbon, July 25th, 1812. "It may not be irrelevant to mention to your Lordship that, upon the evidence of a despatch which General Cox, the late Governor of Almeida, while a prisoner in France, addressed to Lord Liverpool, relating the circumstances which led to the fall of that fortress in 1810, *the person who exercised the functions of Lieutenant-Governor at the time of*

the capture, has been condemned to death by a Court-Martial."

Such is the meagre evidence which the author of the History of the Peninsular War considers as sufficient to substantiate so grave a charge. It is difficult to comprehend how a soldier, of so long standing, and such good service, according to the rank he has held, as I understand Colonel Napier to be, should for a moment have believed that an officer could be condemned by a Court-Martial to the most extreme punishment, upon the evidence of an explanatory letter from an absent person. But is such a supposition authorized by the passage above quoted from the correspondence of Mr. Stuart? His allusion to the circumstance is brief and almost parenthetical. "*It may not be,*" he writes, "*irrelevant to mention, &c.*" He does not at all enter into the merits of the question, or enlarge on the proceedings of the Court-Martial; he simply relates the fact, that Da Costa had been condemned to be shot; and that the documentary deposition of General Cox had been received in evidence against him. Few persons, I imagine, would have affirmed, because Mr. Stuart, a diplomatist and civilian, in speaking incidentally of the trial, had only thought fit to mention this written testimony, that therefore no other testimony had been produced. Such most certainly was not the sense in which Mr. Stuart, now Lord Stuart de Rothsay, intended the words of his despatch to be received. In reply to my inquiry on this subject he writes,—"after receiving "your note I turned to my papers; and the only

"reference to the trial of the Teniente Rey of "Almeida is contained in a short paragraph at the "end of a letter of the 25th of July, 1812, saying, in "very concise terms, that he had been tried by a "Court-Martial, and sentenced to be shot; and that "a letter from General Cox to Lord Liverpool had "been received in evidence; but *not stating that it* "*was the only evidence against him*, or *expressing* "*any opinion on the proceedings*."

The solitary authority, then, on which Colonel Napier grounds his statement of Da Costa's having been condemned to death on the single evidence of General Cox's letter, is at once annihilated. Lord Stuart de Rothsay himself assures us, that he never meant his words to bear the construction they have received. But, on this head, another question arises. Was this slight incidental notice, at the end of one of Mr. Stuart's despatches, the *only* account of Da Costa's trial and execution which lay within the reach of the historian? Were there not other ample, precise, public, and *published* documents upon this subject within his reach and open to his inspection, if he would have taken the trouble of seeking for and perusing them? Most undoubtedly there were. Colonel Napier's attention has before been directed to "the orders of the day of the Portuguese "army." These orders were annually collected, and published by authority. The work consists of as many volumes as the war continued years. In the volume for 1812, pages 132, 135, a full account is to be found of the several charges against Da Costa,

and of the testimony by which they were supported: and that the public may be enabled to judge of the fairness of the historian's representation I shall lay before them a translation of the entire passage :—

"His Excellency Marshal Beresford, Count of "Trancoso, directs the following observations to be "made known to the army, upon the trial of the "Lieutenant-Governor of Almeida, Bernardo da "Costa de Almeida :—

"*Observations.*

"The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the army, "Count of Trancoso, having given his best consi- "deration to the charges exhibited against Colonel "Francisco Bernardo da Costa de Almeida, Lieu- "tenant-Governor of the place of Almeida; having "examined the evidence adduced against him before "the Court-Martial; having maturely weighed it in "all its bearings; and having entirely approved the "resolutions of the said Court, both with regard to "those points on which they acquit, as well as those "on which they condemn, the prisoner, can only "come to the determination of confirming the sen- "tence in the name of His Royal Highness.

"In consideration of the nature of this officer's "crime, the fatal results that might ensue if it were "allowed to escape the penalty of the law, and the "unfortunate consequences that have actually fol- "lowed it, *the Marshal orders that for the infor- "mation of the whole army, the trial shall be pub- "lished with the proofs on either side.*

"It will there be distinctly seen, that, notwithstanding the unfortunate explosion of the powder-magazine, Governor Cox had no intention of surrendering the place; that he had even written to Marshal Massena a positive refusal on that head; but that he was obliged to adopt a contrary line of conduct, from perceiving that the example, and the illegally-expressed opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor, had drawn away all those on whom the defence of the garrison depended, and who, as might be presumed from their previous conduct, would have thought and acted in a different manner had the Lieutenant-Governor supported, instead of opposing, the intentions of the Governor, and shewn, in such a crisis, the firmness which was requisite, and which was to have been expected from an officer of his standing and experience.

"The Lieutenant-Governor is accused of having written a letter to the Governor, urging him to ask for a capitulation. This charge is proved by the colonel of the regiment of Guarda, to whom the Governor had shewn it, and is admitted by the Lieutenant-Governor himself. He, however, attempts to give another construction to the letter; and also declares that he did not exactly know what he was doing, or what he had written: but from the remainder of the evidence, it cannot be doubted that the object of the letter was to insist upon the Governor's capitulating.

"The Lieutenant-Governor is also charged with assembling, illegally, and for an illegal object,

"various officers, commanders of the corps in gar-
"rison; and the assembling those officers is proved
"by the colonel of the regiment of Argouil, by the
"then lieutenant-colonel of the 24th regiment, and
"by the captain who commanded the cavalry. The
"colonel of the regiment of Guarda states, moreover,
"that, when the officers were thus assembled, on the
"Governor's desiring to speak separately with each
"of them, they were prevented attending him by the
"Lieutenant-Governor, who, with the design, as it
"would seem, of withdrawing them from the in-
"fluence of the Governor's opinion, insisted on their
"being heard united, in a Council of War.

"With regard to that part of the prisoner's con-
"duct, in which the Court-Martial condemns him as
"guilty, it appears to the Commander-in-Chief that
"nothing can be stronger, or more clear, than the
"testimony against him is; although something
"might still have been added by the presence of
"the Governor.

"When the Marshal reflects that at this very
"time the allied army was assembled in the
"neighbourhood of Alverche by his Excellency
"the Marshal-General (Lord Wellington); but,
"through the misconduct of the Lieutenant-Gover-
"nor, there was not even time allowed for the
"latter to be informed of the misfortune which had
"happened to the place, he would call attention
"to this circumstance, not only for the sake of
"pointing out the positive evil which the Lieutenant-
"Governor occasioned to the cause of the allied

" army, and of his own country in particular, but
" also that every officer of the army may appreciate
" the advantages that result from acting as his
" honour requires, and defending every position to
" the last moment. The Marshal observes that
" Almeida was by no means reduced to the last ex-
" tremity; nor, as its brave Governor was well
" aware, would it have been so reduced for several
" days. Although the powder-magazine had ex-
" ploded, the garrison, with their arms, still re-
" mained: the walls had received no injury; and
" the enemy would still have been compelled to make
" his approaches, and effect his breaches, in the same
" manner as if the place still possessed its comple-
" ment of powder. Thus the Lieutenant-Governor,
" by his actual conduct—by his example—by the
" influence which he is proved to have exercised over
" the officers of the garrison—by refusing to support
" the authority, and the opinion of the Governor, as
" was his duty, but on the contrary, withdrawing
" from the Governor his legitimate influence, and
" consequently the assistance of the officers under
" the critical circumstances to which the garrison
" was reduced—succeeded in obliging the Governor
" to capitulate, and surrender one of the fortresses of
" the kingdom into the hands of the enemies of His
" Royal Highness.

" The Marshal acknowledges the pain and repug-
" nance which he feels in confirming the sentence that
" has been passed upon an officer of such rank, and
" of whom he had previously entertained the highest

" opinion; but he is compelled thus to act by a sense " of the duty which he owes to His Royal Highness " and to Portugal—by the justice of the case—by " the necessity of having that part of the law " which His Royal Highness has entrusted to his " administration executed equally, and without dis- " tinction of persons—and by the consideration that " the misconduct of every man is more prejudicial in " proportion to the elevation of his rank, as the " present case evinces, in which a whole garrison, " of unquestionable courage, was brought over to an " opinion fatal to themselves and the cause of their " country, by a single individual having an influence " which his high station alone could have afforded " him. The Marshal consequently feels that, as he " would have confirmed a similar sentence against a " private or a subaltern, he should be undeserving " the confidence of His Royal Highness, or the honour " of commanding the Portuguese army, if he here " failed in his duty, and allowed the guilty to escape " unpunished on account of his superior rank.

" The sentence of the Court-Martial is therefore " confirmed, and directed to be executed in con- " formity to the law.

" *Head Quarters, Salamanca,*
12th August, 1812."

It thus appears that Da Costa was tried and found guilty on *five* distinct counts; that General Cox's letter was so far from being " the *only* evidence " against him," that all these counts were supported

by *viva voce* testimony; and that the above-mentioned letter was only produced in corroboration of other testimony upon *one* of those counts. This affair was not transacted in secret—it was a matter of public notoriety. An abstract of the proceedings of the Court-Martial was given in the general orders of the day, which are above laid before the reader; and the whole body of evidence was published in full, for the better information of the army and the nation at large. Colonel Napier, as an honest historian and a diligent inquirer after truth, ought to have been acquainted with these particulars. It should also be mentioned that, as Mr. Stuart's letter was written on the 25th of July, and the public promulgation of the Court-Martial did not take place till the 12th of August, an accurate observer of dates would have conceived it highly probable that that gentleman, at the date of his letter to Lord Castlereagh, was not in possession of very full or accurate information on the subject; that he knew, in short, no more than he briefly related—the condemnation of Da Costa, and the admission of General Cox's letter in evidence against him. How Colonel Napier can persist in asserting, as he does, that this letter was "the *only* "*evidence* against him," in the face of the clearest, most ample, and most decisive public documents, is altogether unaccountable. If he erred from ignorance at first, he is no longer excusable on that ground. In composing the third volume of his History, the existence of such a publication as "*The Orders of the Day of the Portuguese Army*" might

have been unknown to him; but, as his attention had subsequently been called to it by the author of the "*Strictures on his History*," such could not have been the case when employed in writing his "*Justification*."

The account which has been given of Da Costa's trial and condemnation in the "*History of the Peninsular War*" is thus proved to be totally erroneous; and, consequently, the charge which it intimates against myself, the officers of the Court-Martial, and every other person concerned with the transaction, is equally without foundation.

BUSACO.

To Colonel Napier's account of the Battle of Busaco has been censured by the author of "*Further Strictures*," as being unjust to the merits of two regiments of the allied army. The historian has asserted that "the 8th Portuguese regiment was broken in pieces," which is absolutely denied; and he has omitted to notice a most gallant charge which was made by the 19th regiment of the same nation. The evidence and arguments by which the author of the "*Strictures*" supports his allegations on these points, are of such a nature as might at least have induced Colonel Napier to make some farther inquiries respecting the conduct of the men and officers of the two regiments in question. But he appears much more interested in maintaining the credit of his own narrative than desirous of repairing any injury that he may have inflicted on the reputation of others. Better sources of intelli-

gence were open to him than those to which he has applied, but he has declined taking advantage of them; and, on authority very insufficient to the occasion, instead of retracting his injustice, he has heightened the terms of his censure against one of the regiments, and has refused to acknowledge the merits of the other. To prove that "the 8th Portu-" guese regiment was broken in pieces," the historian produces an extract from a memoir drawn up by Colonel Waller, and a passage from the letter of an officer of the 9th British regiment. Both these gentlemen are said to have been "eye-witnesses." The former, who was, I believe, Captain Waller at the time in question, I know well, and have a high opinion of; nor do I in the least doubt the honour and veracity of the author of Colonel Napier's other extract, whoever that gentleman may be. But though fully confident that neither of them advances any thing which he does not believe to be strictly consonant with fact, I cannot help objecting to their testimony. I know, and I believe every officer of rank will agree with me, that it is scarcely possible for a regimental officer to form a correct idea, or give an accurate account of those circumstances of an engagement, which occur at any distance from his own position. This may be exemplified, as I shall presently shew, by the instance of Colonel Napier himself. But to return to the authorities by which he would prop up his statement respecting the rout of the 8th Portuguese regiment. The distance at which Colonel Waller, then a staff officer, witnessed the event he speaks of, is not

named: but what is the purport of his evidence? "A regiment of Portuguese, either the 8th or 16th," he says, "was quickly driven into the position." The sum of this officer's testimony, then, amounts to this, and to no more; that he saw *a regiment* of Portuguese infantry driven back into the position; but he has never inquired what regiment it was, and very candidly acknowledges that he does not know. This evidence then cannot be considered as affording much support to Colonel Napier's representation. Colonel Waller conjectures, indeed, that the regiment which he saw driven back, was "either the "8th or the 16th." With regard to the 16th, I do not undertake to speak; but I can assure him, "*as an* "*eye-witness*," that it was *not* the 8th which he saw. On this occasion I was with the Duke of Wellington, a spectator of the conduct of the left wing of the 8th regiment of Portuguese, and can most distinctly testify to the gallantry which it exhibited. The other wing of the regiment I did not so clearly see; but, if either the Portuguese, or the British had given way and fled from that part of the position, they must necessarily have retreated down the rear slope of the hill, which lay immediately under our view. Had there been any fugitives, they must have been seen not only by myself and staff, but by the Duke of Wellington and his staff, who were all present. But no such fugitives were perceived by any of us. According to my personal observation of the scene, I should say that the account given in the "*Strictures on Colonel Napier's History*" is

altogether as consistent with fact as the report of the historian is opposed to it. The balance of evidence for and against Colonel Napier's statement stands thus:—"*The 8th regiment,*" says Colonel Napier, "*was broken to pieces:*" and Colonel Waller's testimony being put aside as merely conjectural, his authority for this assertion is reduced to an extract from the letter of an anonymous officer of the 9th British. „*The 8th regiment,*" says the author of Further Strictures, "*instead of acting as Colonel Napier*
"*states, charged under the command of Lieutenant-*
"*Colonel Douglas, with the 45th and 88th British;*
"*and so far were they from having been driven back,*
"*that the complaint against them was their having*
"*pursued the flying enemy too far and too close**."
And the authorities for this counter-statement are the public despatches of the Duke of Wellington, "an eye-witness," in which the 8th regiment is praised for this very charge; and the orders of the day of the Portuguese army, given by myself, who was also "an eye-witness" of the transaction. This I have no doubt would be sufficient to vindicate the reputation of the 8th regiment of Portuguese from the unjust aspersion of Colonel Napier; but, to confirm the truth of that favourable judgment on their conduct, which was formed by the Duke of Wellington and myself upon the spot, and for the more complete satisfaction of Colonel Napier, I shall here introduce a letter of Major-General Sir James Douglas, by whom that regiment was commanded,

* Further Strictures on Colonel Napier's History, p. 25.

and which must, I conceive, be considered as altogether conclusive upon the subject.

Limerick, July 22, 1833.

"My Lord,

"I lose not a moment in replying to your "letter; and I believe that a brief statement of the "proceedings of the 8th Portuguese regiment during "the battle of Busaco will best meet your Lord"ship's object in writing to me.

"On the morning of that affair, the regiment under "my command, composed of young Portuguese con"scripts, and not more than three months arrived, "was posted between Sir Thomas Picton's and Sir "James Leith's divisions. There was a consider"able interval (not less than two hundred yards) on "each of our flanks, unoccupied by any troops; and "the 8th regiment was, I believe, placed at the dis"posal of either of the above-named general officers, "in support of him who might be first attacked. "At the dawn of day, about the time that the first "shots were firing, Sir Thomas Picton rode up to "me, ordering one wing of the regiment to move "to the left in support of the 88th and 45th regi"ments; and the other wing, with which I myself "remained, to advance in front. We had not moved "fifty paces, before we found ourselves engaged "with a French column moving up the hill, who, "finding themselves opposed in front, and seeing an "unoccupied interval on our left, discontinued their "attack on us, and by a flank movement, gained

" the crest of the position on the left. Here they " had not time to dress their platoons before they " were charged by Sir James Leith at the head of a " British brigade (of which I think the Royal Scots, " and certainly the 9th, were the regiments nearest " to me), *in this charge we joined by an oblique move-* " *ment, and with such good will, that the command-* " *ing officer of the Royal Scots, Colonel Barnes, may* " *remember riding up to me, and requesting I would* " *keep back the Portuguese, or they would get into a* " *scrape.* One wing of the regiment was, at this " time, fighting under Major Birmingham in a dis- " tant part of the line, where they attracted the " notice of the Duke of Wellington in the manner " so handsomely expressed in his despatch. With " regard to the wing under my command, if our " English neighbours supposed that we represented " the whole regiment, they might reasonably be sur- " prised at seeing so few; but no candid man among " them will deny that half the regiment was sup- " porting the 9th and Royal Scots, and in a way " which drew from themselves encomiums. I was " in communication with the commanding officer of " the Royal Scots during our advance; let him say " if he saw a single Portuguese hang back. If the " line was not very well dressed, it was from too " eager a pursuit of the enemy: if we were, at any " time, *broken*, it was from the too ardent wish of " a corps of boy recruits to close with him. But " the Duke of Wellington himself, whose eyes best " served him on that day, rode up, as we were re-

" turning from the charge, did me the honour to " shake hands with me, and did more than justice " to the conduct of the regiment.

" I have the honour to be, My Lord,
" Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
" J. D. DOUGLAS,
" *Major-General.*

" The Lord Viscount Beresford.

" P. S. I have said that Colonel Barnes com- " manding the Royal Scots spoke to me; but " whether he was only commanding his regiment or " the brigade I cannot now say."

From the refutation of Colonel Napier's unjust imputation of demerit against one regiment, I proceed to remark upon his positive denial of the actual merit of another, the 19th Portuguese. " I will " notice," says Colonel Napier in his " *Justification*," " a foolish accusation made by the author of 'Fur- " ther Strictures,' namely, that I have, from partial " motives, been silent upon a gallant charge made " by the 19th Portuguese regiment. To which I " answer, on my own authority, *as an eye-witness*, " *that no such charge as this writer has described* " *took place.* The 19th Portuguese regiment was " not posted in front of the convent; that ground " was occupied by the light division in the first line, " and the Germans in the second line. There was, " indeed, a Portuguese regiment (possibly the 19th) " which was posted on the mountain, nearly a mile

to the right of the convent, and in front of the ‘ brigade of guards; and when the skirmishers of “ Marchand's division pushed back their opponents, “ this regiment made an advance in support of the “ covering light troops. It was a handsome demon- “ stration of vigour and courage; but it is an absurd “ exaggeration to call it a fine charge.” I have not the slightest doubt but Colonel Napier saw the movement which he has here described; but it will be, I think, in my power to prove to him, as I certainly shall to every body else, that the regiment of which he speaks, not only *possibly*, but *positively*, was not the 19th Portuguese. On this head the testimony of Sir W. Macbean, who was not only an “ eye-witness,” but a principal actor in the gallant charge in question, must be considered as decisive. He could not have been ignorant of the position which he held in the battle of Busaco. It will be seen that he confirms the account of the “ *Further* “ *Strictures*,” and contradicts the statement of Colonel Napier in every particular.

“ *United Service Club, 23d July*, 1833.

“ My Lord,

“ I have the honour to acknowledge your Lord- “ ship's letter of the 20th instant.

“ With regard to the fact stated in ‘ *Further* “ *Strictures*,’ in reference to the charge made by the “ 19th regiment of Portuguese infantry at the battle “ of Busaco, I affirm as follows:—

“ I confirm the general truth of the description in

"'*Further Strictures,*' respecting the 19th regi-
"ment at the battle of Busaco, both as to locality
"and circumstances.

"I say, without any reservation, that the 19th
"regiment *was posted in front of the convent wall,*
"and that I had orders to confer with the officer of
"engineers upon the best means of defence, in case
"any formidable attack should be made by the
"enemy on that point. I did accordingly go over
"the ground, and arranged measures with him for
"that object.

"The light division was to our left; the only
"Germans I observed, were Major Hartman's brigade
"of artillery.

"The 19th regiment was *never* posted on the
"mountain, nor were we near the brigade of guards
"until the night of the 28th, when we left the posi-
"tion. Neither was any part of the regiment em-
"ployed, at any time, in supporting skirmishers, or
"light troops.

"The fire of the artillery was not directed against
"the body of the enemy charged by the 19th regi-
"ment, but upon the main body of the enemy on the
"opposite side of the ravine; this I had from the
"officers of artillery themselves, as well as from my
"own observation.

"It is stated by Colonel Napier that, in our ad-
"vance, the line was never nearer to the enemy's
"skirmishers than an hundred yards. To this I say,
"that we never saw these skirmishers.

"The enemy had just commenced to advance,

" but, seeing us press through the picquets, retired " to his position: there he attempted to maintain " himself; but the 19th continuing to move on, " gave him a volley and charged; when the lines be- " came mixed: the result was soon decided. The " enemy being driven, with considerable loss in " killed and wounded, to the bottom of the ravine.'

" Being beyond the position, I was reforming the " battalion, in order to return to our place in the line, " when a battery opened upon us with considerable " effect from the opposite side of the ravine. I then " faced the battalion about, and proceeded to join the " the other wing of the regiment in front of the " wall.

" On my return to the regiment I experienced " the most flattering reception from General Cole- " man and others. The cheers of those who wit- " nessed this affair were bestowed upon us as we " rejoined them.

" The Duke of Wellington mentioned with ap- " probation, in his despatches, the conduct of the " regiment on this occasion. The same notice is " taken in Marshal Beresford's orders of the day " respecting the battle of Busaco.

" I have the honour to be, my Lord,
" Your Lordship's most obedient, faithful Servant,
" WILLIAM MACBEAN,
" *Major-General,*
Late Lieut.-Colonel, 19*th Regiment Portuguese Infantry.*

" To Marshal, Viscount Lord Beresford, G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c."

This clear and decisive letter of Sir W. Macbean is confirmed by the Duke of Wellington's despatch, and by the "*Orders of the day of the Portuguese* "*army.*" Though any further evidence on this point may be considered as unnecessary, I shall here add the corroborative testimony of Sir Benjamin D'Urban. The accumulation of such weighty and unobjectionable authorities against the unqualified assertions of Colonel Napier may, perhaps, have the effect of disabusing the public mind with regard to the value of his History, and instruct the reader, that the truth of his statements are not always to be estimated by the confidence with which they are delivered. Sir B. D'Urban's testimony is as follows:—

"Sir W. Macbean's letter of the 23d of July, "1833, with its inclosed memoranda are conclu- "sive. The statement accords with my recollec- "tion. I have not been able to have access to my "journal for reference; but, from consulting the "plan of the battle-ground and distribution at "Busaco, in the archives of the Quarter-Master "General's office, and the Duke of Wellington's "despatch, I find Sir W. Macbean's statement cor- "roborated. General Coleman's brigade, in fact, "was originally formed a little to the right of the "light division, and was afterwards moved further "to the right into the front (relatively with the "enemy's line) of the convent garden wall, which "was prepared under the engineer's direction to "render its defence more powerful. That brigade "was thus brought into connection with the left of

" General Pack's brigade of Portuguese infantry, " whose skirmishers, thrown out on that flank of the " brigade, the 19th regiment would have naturally " passed through in its advance, as described by Sir " William Macbean. This charge was matter of " notoriety at the time; nor have I ever before heard " it questioned."

After the evidence adduced upon these points it will, I presume, be admitted that Colonel Napier is wrong in describing the 8th Portuguese regiment as having been "*broken to pieces*," and in denying that the gallant charge of the 19th regiment "*ever took place*." But I would take this opportunity of calling the reader's attention, once for all, to the sort of testimony that Colonel Napier seems habitually to seek out, and adopt, with eager confidence, as the grounds of his injurious imputations against myself and the troops under my command. His authorities, generally, if not always, consist of the reports of officers, who, at the time in question, were only of regimental, and, most frequently, of subaltern rank; who speak of occurrences that happened upwards of twenty years ago, from the faded and ever-fading impressions of the memory, and when even the facts which they actually witnessed have become confounded with the tales of their comrades and the conjectural gossip of the camp. But even if the subaltern retained the most perfect recollection of every event that passed before his eyes in the field of battle, I deny that his evidence is of any value with regard either to the distant operations or the general

scope of the action. His personal view is confined within a very restricted space; his opportunities of becoming acquainted with the remote transactions of the field are necessarily limited; his own duties have an engrossing claim upon his attention; and his desultory remarks upon the scene around him are to be made in a moment of such extreme excitement and confusion as is very little favourable to accuracy of observation. Under such circumstances a regimental officer, although present in an engagement, is a very insufficient authority for any of the details of it, except those in which he was immediately and actively concerned. What reliance, indeed, can we place on the reports of others, when we find Colonel Napier himself, an officer of unquestionable talent and observation, speaking "from his own know-"ledge, as an eye-witness," of events that occurred at the battle of Busaco, and proved to be in error with regard to every particular of his statement?

I cannot quit this subject without observing that, as Colonel Napier represents himself as having been an "eye-witness" of a gallant movement made by a certain Portuguese regiment—what regiment he does not profess to know—but which movement took place a mile distant from the position given to the 19th Portuguese, it is evident he could not also have been an eye-witness of what was passing a mile to his left; nor can he, therefore, on his own authority negative what is said to have occurred there. It is extraordinary that the historian should not have

perceived the predicament in which he has placed himself.

Captain Squires.

"It is scarcely necessary," says Colonel Napier, "to notice the silly special pleading of the author of "'*Further Strictures*' relative to Captain Squires, "and the batteries constructed on the left of the "Tagus, during Massena's stay at Santarem. Both "that officer and Colonel Jones say the batteries "were meant *to command the mouth of the Zezere.* "It is ridiculous to suppose that Captain Squires, "who constructed them, did not know what their "object was, or whether they were fitted to obtain "it!" Nothing is more convenient than to condemn those arguments as *silly* which we are unable to grapple with. In the third volume of his History Colonel Napier quoted, and, as it appeared to me, approved the aspersions cast by Captain Squires on the batteries which were erected under my orders on the left bank of the Tagus. The author of "*Further* "*Strictures*" endeavoured to shew that both Colonel Napier and Captain Squires were wrong in their condemnation of these works, and supported his opinion in their favour by such arguments and testimonies as, I presume, have proved to be unanswerable, since the historian has not attempted to offer any reply to them. Colonel Napier now affirms that "both Captain Squires and Colonel Jones say the "batteries were meant to command the mouth of the

" Zezere." I know they were designed to command the mouth of the Zezere, *and the navigation of the Tagus at that point;* and I am aware that Colonel Jones perceived the purpose, and approved the mode of their construction. But where has Captain Squires given any intimation that he comprehended the object for which they were erected? His ignorance of the end for which they were designed, as expressed in the letter cited by Colonel Napier, is the only excuse that can be offered for the censure which he has lavished on them.

" I have been employed," he writes, " in construct-
" ing batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere for
" twenty-five guns, though we have only one brigade
" of nine-pounders to arm them.

" Thank God, for my own credit, I protested
" against these batteries from the first in my reports
" which were sent to the Duke of Wellington; and
" now, I verily believe that the Marshal himself is
" ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know,
" is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere
" with the Tagus; the enemy's bridge is about half
" a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile,
" by measurement, from the nearest of our heights,
" which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery."

I cannot trace, in the above extract, the slightest hint that Captain Squires thought these batteries were intended " *to command the mouth of the Zezere;*" he, on the contrary, seems to consider the enemy's bridge as their object. This, however, is a point which the reader must settle for himself. But whe-

ther the engineer did or did not divine the real intention of these works, it is certain that he condemned them as ill adapted to the object for which *he* considered them designed; and, on his authority, Colonel Napier has described them in his History as having been erected "against the advice of the engineers*; placed at too great a distance from the river; and in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the enemy." Their fitness or unfitness is the only question respecting them on which I am at issue with Colonel Napier. This is the question which the author of "*Further Strictures*" has discussed, and on which Colonel Napier has declined meeting him. The best proof that these batteries were well fitted to produce their object is to be found in their effects. By their means Massena was baffled in his first and favourite design of crossing the Tagus and uniting himself with Soult. That such was the consequence of these works is declared by the Duke of Wellington, who writes, in a letter to Lord Liverpool, dated 12th November, 1811,—"the enemy continue to construct boats on the Zezere, *and have shewn much jealousy of the means adopted by our troops on the left bank of the Tagus, to command, by their fire, the communication between the Zezere and the Tagus.*" Colonel Napier, while he echoes the censures of his friend, Cap-

* "This is an ingenious multiplication of his authority, and is intended to give a weight and consequence to the single and unsupported opinion of Captain Squires, which, but for this artifice, it might chance to want."—*Further Strictures*, p. 27.

tain Squires, acknowledges that the batteries achieved the end for which they were constructed, when he says*,—"Massena could only choose then to force the "passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult "appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For some "time he seemed inclined to the former, *shewing "great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of "the Zezere, and carrying his boats* on wheel car- "riages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm "Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left; "yet that General relaxed nothing of his vigilance; "neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observa- "tion; and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was "before Badajoz, but nothing more."

Colonel Napier also cites Colonel Jones, to assure us of a fact, which has never been denied, and which no one but Captain Squires ever seemed to doubt, that the works in discussion were meant to command the mouth of the Zezere. But his introduction of this authority, if adduced in defence of his friend's opinion respecting their inefficiency, is peculiarly unfortunate. Colonel Jones's view of them is diametrically opposed to those of Captain Squires. Colonel Napier produces a note from his brother historian's volume, in which the object of the batteries is stated, but omits all mention of the passage in the text to which the note refers. That the reader may be enabled to form some judgment of the credit that is due to the censure of Captain Squires, and the candour of Colonel Napier, I shall submit the passage

* History of the Peninsular War, vol. iii. p. 452, 453.

from Jones's "*History of the Peninsular War*" to his inspection:—"The enemy's hopes of ultimate "success in the operations against Lisbon, which "could alone justify their long state of wasting in- "activity, were founded on a calculation that the "army in the south of Spain would be able to form "a junction with that of Portugal, previously to the "country being exhausted. All Massena's move- "ments were directed to that object. Punhete was "carefully intrenched, to protect an establishment "founded at the mouth of the Zezere, for building "boats and making cordage. Arbrantes was re- "connoitred, to ascertain if liable to be carried by a "*coup de main*; and every other undertaking equally "shewed an anxiety to establish a communication "across the Tagus. *The judicious counter-efforts of "the allies, however, prevented the army on the "northern bank (the French) effecting it of itself**."

To the last sentence, printed in italics, is appended the note referred to by Colonel Napier, and which Colonel Jones appears to have inserted, lest a misconstruction should be given to his meaning. The note is as follows:—

"Numerous batteries were thrown up on the left "bank of the river, *to command the mouth of the "Zezere.* Pickets and posts of observation were "pushed every night to the edge of the water, and a "garrison was put into the Castle of Trancost.

This note informs the reader that the "counter-

* Jones's History of the Peninsular War, p. 132.

† Appendix to Jones's History of the Peninsular War, p. 132.

"efforts" which Colonel Jones approved as "judicious," and by which the passage of the Tagus was so completely closed as to prevent the junction of Soult and Massena, were the identical batteries which Captain Squires "protested against for his own credit's sake," which he "believed me to be ashamed of myself;" and which Colonel Napier has condemned as "being placed at too great a distance from the river, "and in *other respects unsuitable*, and *offering* "*nothing threatening to the enemy!*" Notwithstanding the censures of these gentlemen, the result proved that they were constructed in such a manner as to secure their object, and so far am I from being "*ashamed* of them," that I am proud to acknowledge them as my measures.

Colonel Napier contradicts the account given in "*Further Strictures*" of the number of troops which I had under my command in 1811, on entering upon the campaign in the Alemtejo. He says, in the fifth page of his Justification,—"Beresford arrived at "Portalegre with 20,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and "18 guns." His authority for this statement is the following passage from a letter of the Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool, dated Louzao, March 16, 1811:—"I heard of the fall of Badajoz on the night "of the 13th and 14th; and Major-General Cole's "division was moved on Espinhal on the 14th, in "order afterwards to continue its route into the "Alemtejo, and it marched in that direction yester-"day. *We shall have in that province* 22,000 *men*, "*of which nearly* 2200 *will be cavalry.*" The last

sentence in italics is so given by Colonel Napier. I need not point out to the reader that there is an immense difference between the assertion of the historian and the expression of the Duke of Wellington. Two-and-twenty thousand men might really have been in the extensive "*province*" of the Alemtejo, and yet they might not all have been with me at Portalegre! It is also evident that the expression "we shall have" is, at least, equivocal with regard to time. The Duke of Wellington meant that when all the troops were concentrated, they would amount to the number which he had stated. That such was his meaning is manifest from the circumstances of the time; for on the 16th, the date of his letter, Sir Lowry Cole's division could scarcely have entered the Alemtejo; Brigadier-General Madden's brigade of cavalry had not yet joined me at Portalegre; and Baron Alten's Hanoverian brigade had not yet left Lisbon.

I will not discuss with Colonel Napier what would be the real strength in the field of a nominal army of 22,000 men. Every officer is aware of the deductions which must necessarily be made. Another authority, adduced to substantiate his position that I had 22,000 men with me "*at Portalegre,*" is that of Sir B. D'Urban, who states that I had 21,400 with me "*after the passage of the Guadiana.*" Such may have been the case; but still the force was not necessarily with me at *Portalegre,* as the historian has affirmed.

The case is of little moment. The original state-

ment of Colonel Napier is not very incorrect. The principal error lies in the inconclusive process by which he endeavours to support his calculation.

Combat of Campo Mayor.

The historian, in defence of his erroneous and imaginative description of this affair, "again" brings forward the evidence of "an eye-witness," a nameless officer of the 13th Dragoons, whose account of the transaction teems with misrepresentations, and is, in almost every particular, contradicted by testimony which is already before the public, and which Colonel Napier must have read.

Misrepresentation the First.

"General Long, having found a fit opportunity, "ordered *a line to be formed,* which moved on, and "gained the top of the rising ground, when the "enemy were perceived on the plain below, formed "up and presenting three strong bodies of cavalry."

It is here affirmed by Colonel Napier's "eye-wit-"ness," that the cavalry "formed and marched *in* "*line*" before they saw the enemy: an original military idea!—In contradiction to this account General Long informs us* that "he kept two squadrons *in* "*line* under Colonel Otway, on the *left of his column,* "and directed Colonel Head to disengage from the "rear *of the column,* to march in parallel line with "him, and when he should have gained the flank of

* Charles E. Long's Reply, p. 33.

"the corps B. to attack them whilst he disposed of "the corps A. They proceeded accordingly; but as "soon as the enemy B. saw the light dragoons *ad-* "*vancing in column*, left in front, &c."

Colonel Doyle says*: "The light cavalry were "*in column* of ranks by threes, left in front, and ad- "vancing at a brisk trot."

Thus this officer, who has undertaken to give a description of the general movements of the corps, starts by evincing his utter ignorance of the movement of his own regiment.

Misrepresentation the Second.

The officer of the 13th Light Dragoons, after giving an account of the numbers of the enemy's force, adds: "The Portuguese regiments formed on the left of "the 13th, and received orders to support." This is contradicted by General Long, who distinctly states† that "only *two* squadrons of Portuguese "formed in line, and only those two had orders to "support."—It is quite unintelligible by what means every regimental officer becomes so minutely acquainted with the orders that are given by Generals to corps with which they have no connection.

Misrepresentation the Third.

"The heavy brigade," says Colonel Napier's friend, "formed at some distance in the rear of the 13th, "and outflanked it on the right, and *the British* and "Portuguese infantry and artillery were *forming as*

* Charles E. Long's Reply, p. 43. † Reply, p. 33, 34.

"*fast as they arrived on the ground, coming up in* "*double quick time.*"

One would really imagine that no officer of the 13th Light Dragoons, who was actually "an eye-wit-"ness" of the affair at Campo Mayor, could have been deceived with regard to the transactions detailed in the above extract. The writer describes large bodies of infantry and artillery as "arriving on the "ground," and "forming" under his view "in double "quick time." Nothing can be more particular than his account, and yet the whole narration is merely imaginative. I take it for granted that this officer accompanied his regiment in their pursuit of the enemy towards Badajoz. If such was the case, the circumstances he has detailed, and which he describes himself as having been "an eye-witness" of, must be referred to a time previous to the charge of the 13th. Now it has been distinctly proved, as Colonel Napier is well aware, by the testimony of Sir William Lumley, who commanded the leading brigade of the infantry; of Sir B. D'Urban, Quarter-Master-General; of Sir Henry Hardinge, Deputy Quarter-Master-General; of the Count de Villa Real, and of Brigadier-General Long himself, that, not only when the charge was made, but some time after that occurrence, when the 13th Light Dragoons must have been more than two leagues in advance, and at the very gates of Badajoz, the allied infantry and artillery had not only not *formed*, but had not arrived on the ground; and that, even at the moment of the halt of the whole corps, half an hour

after this officer saw them coming up and so forming, they were still two miles in the rear!!

Misrepresentation the Fourth.

With regard to the charge of the 13th, Colonel Napier's authority writes:—

"The enemy came on in a gallant and determined "style, and, on the word charge being given, *every* "*horse was let out and the men cheered; the enemy* "*did the same—the crash was tremendous; both* "*parties passed each other;* and, at *some short dis-* "*tance in the rear of the enemy, the 13th came* "*about; the enemy did the same, and a second* "*charge took place with equal violence, when the* "*conflict became personal with the sabre.*"

The latter part of this extract Colonel Napier has printed in italics, as evidence corroborative of the account of this charge given in the third volume of his History. What countenance or support he derives from it, I own myself unable to discover. Colonel Napier, in describing this very gallant transaction, distinctly states, that the 13th charged their opponents *thrice*. His words are—"Head's troopers "rallied quicker than the French, and, *riding a* "*third time closely in upon them*, overthrew horse "and man." It is denied that these *three* charges took place:—and what is Colonel Napier's reply? He brings forward an anonymous witness, who affirms that there were *two* charges, but does not say a word about a *third*. By this halting testimony the historian expects to persuade the reader that his own

account has been confirmed, and that of his adversary refuted. It is quite manifest, that the officer of the 13th, instead of supporting Colonel Napier's representation, has given evidence against it.—But is it certain that even the *two* charges to which the anonymous officer of the 13th has reduced the exploit, were ever made?—The *second* charge is contradicted by General Long and by Colonel Doyle. Both these officers were certainly "eye-witnesses;" and the latter appears to have joined in the only charge that took place, and to have accompanied the 13th Light Dragoons a considerable distance in their subsequent pursuit of the enemy.—I could adduce other direct evidence to the same effect; but it is unnecessary.

I have distinctly proved that the author of the statement, which Colonel Napier has eulogized as "*clear, modest,* and *authentic,*" is guilty of flagrant misrepresentation, even with regard to the transactions at which he is said to have been present; that he is produced as an "eye-witness" of circumstances which we cannot believe to have occurred, unless his single testimony is to be preferred to every other account of the engagement; and that, even if the details of his narrative were correct, his evidence would not afford the slightest support to Colonel Napier's scenic description of the attack of the 13th Light Dragoons.

After the letter of the officer, whose evidence I have just considered, Colonel Napier produces Captain Gregory of the 4th Dragoons, as asserting, that "the

" heavy brigade were bringing up their right shoul-
" ders to charge, *when the Marshal himself rode up*
" *and stopped them.*" Had such an event taken place, or been attempted whilst the enemy kept in order, it is highly probable that I should have acted, as Captain Gregory describes. I most assuredly had no desire to risk the whole of my cavalry in this one adventure. But with all due deference to the memory of this officer, I feel myself justified by my own recollections and those of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in saying that he is altogether mistaken on this point. Captain Gregory has not told us who ordered this movement of the whole brigade. I could not have ordered it, for he says, I stopped it. Brigadier-General Long, who, as his narrative declares, was at this moment with the Portuguese cavalry, and on the other flank of the enemy, could not have ordered the charge; neither is any such order alluded to in any part of his published correspondence. Sir Charles Dalbiac does not even hint at the existence of such an order in his statement. The order could not have proceeded from Colonel de Grey who commanded the brigade; for the Count de Villa Real has informed us, in an account which was laid before the public on a former occasion, that he was the bearer of discretionary instructions on this head to that officer, which the Count says, " Colonel de Grey
" did not see the opportunity to put in execution."—
Again I ask who could have ordered this charge?—
I never heard, nor, I believe, till the present statement of Captain Gregory, did any body else ever hear of

this attempted charge of the heavy dragoons.—With regard to the two guns of the German artillery I fully confirm the account of the "*Further Strictures,*" and repeat what is said upon that subject in my letter to Mr. Long. In opposition to what has been said by the Lieutenant who had charge of the guns, and by Sir Julius Hartman, who only speaks negatively of what passed between myself and the subaltern officer commanding them, but did not hear the report made me by the latter, I am quite content to place the decisive testimony of Sir Henry Hardinge, Count de Villa Real, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who were all officers of my staff, and actually present. The evidence of the two first-mentioned officers has been given in my letter to Mr. Long; and in addition to what Sir Benjamin D'Urban has stated in the eighth page of his "*Report,*" I shall presently insert his observations on the statements of Captain Gregory, and of Colonel, then, I believe, Lieutenant Light, as well as on the subject of the two guns.

It is asserted by Captain Gregory, that "the "surprise of the French troops at Campo Mayor "was so complete, that when the *cavalry* had got "abreast of the fortress, the enemy's infantry were "only just turning out on their alarm-post outside, "arriving by twos and threes." It would really appear that Captain Gregory was constantly at my elbow, and was, on all occasions, in possession of the fullest and most accurate information. But I am again compelled to call the correctness of his recol-

lections in question. He speaks, no doubt, according to his belief; but it would, perhaps, have evinced a better judgment if his report of such distant transactions had been given with more diffidence and with less minuteness of detail. I do not know what he means by "the cavalry getting abreast of the "fortress." It is clear, not only from General Long's account, but from every other evidence that has been brought forward in the discussion of this subject, that, with the exception of some light cavalry, sent to reconnoitre, the whole of that force was halted about a mile short of Campo Mayor, and was never advanced from this spot within ordinary gun-shot of the town. I will not remark upon Captain Gregory's very novel mode of placing the alarm-posts of the infantry of a garrison "*outside* of its walls;" but I shall shew, from the joint testimony of General Long and Sir John Colborne, that the *surprise*, which that officer ascribes to the enemy, could not have had any existence in fact.

General Long—speaking of the 24th of March," the day before we reached Campo Mayor, and when we were halted seven miles from it—writes, "Whilst "reconnoitring the position, Colonel D'Urban had "been discovered and pursued by the enemy's pa-"trol." Major-General Sir J. Colborne, in a letter of May last, says, "I had patrolled up this hill a few "hours before day-light, and alarmed a piquet of "the enemy, and was therefore persuaded (on his "advancing in the morning) that the town was "evacuated." Again we read in General Long's

statement—"The enemy was reconnoitred early the "next morning;" and in the same page—"having "left our bivouac about ten o'clock, A. M." Thus it would appear that Colonel D'Urban alarmed them on the evening of the 24th of March; Colonel Colborne *during the night*, and Brigadier General Long early on the following morning; and yet we are told that they were "*surprised*" at mid-day of the 25th. Colonel Napier, I fancy, has too good an opinion of the vigilance of the French officers and troops, to suppose it possible that they should be taken by "*surprise*," after such strong and repeated intimations of the approach of an enemy. But the fact is, as might have been expected, after the alarm experienced on the preceding evening and during the night, that the enemy were fully aware of our presence, and had actually reconnoitred us at day-break on the 25th. Under all these circumstances, with what degree of propriety can the enemy be described as "so surprised, as to be turning out at mid-day by "twos and threes on the outside of the town?" I myself, on our arrival, saw most of their troops already formed and halted on the glacis. The remainder were marching regularly out of the fortress, and forming in succession; and the regular assembly had, no doubt, been made, as is usual in such cases, on their parades or alarm-posts *within* the town.

I consider it altogether unnecessary to notice the statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Light. Until I went to the guns, on perceiving that they were doing little or no execution, I was continually with my staff.

between the heavy cavalry and the French, as may be seen from Sir Benjamin D'Urban's evidence; and we were thus more likely to be acquainted with what was going on in the latter than any officer with the former could be.

"This testimony (of Light and Gregory), joined "to the acknowledged fact that the French did "triumphantly carry off their recovered guns to "Badajoz, verifies," says Colonel Napier, "the main "points in my account of the affair of Campo "Mayor."

I do not doubt but Colonel Napier believes the representations of his History to be correct; but I do not think that the evidence of subaltern and regimental officers, on which they are founded, would, under any circumstances, have been satisfactory, and is, I hope, in the present instance disproved. With regard to the enemy's "carrying off triumphantly their re-"covered guns," it is evident that Colonel Napier has written upon this subject, under the influence of the most erroneous information. It is said, in his History, that the French "went back" for these guns, which were at least a league in advance, and had only been come up with by the light cavalry in their pursuit of the enemy. And so far were they from being "carried off triumphantly," that they are proved to have been come up with by our own light cavalry in their pursuit of the enemy, and again left by them on their retreat; while I was ignorant of every thing connected with them, till long after they had been thus left by us a second time. I greatly doubt whether

Colonel Napier even knows when, after the retreat of the 13th Dragoons, the enemy returned for them.

To confirm my observations on the foregoing points, I will here add a note of Major-General Sir B. D'Urban, which I received in October last: "With "reference to the affair of Campo Mayor, page 8 of "Colonel Napier's Justification, and Lord Beres-"ford's Letter to C. E. Long, Esq., page 26 and fol-"lowing pages."

"Of this affair the essential circumstances are "briefly and, I believe, correctly stated in page 8 "of my Report, printed in Appendix to '*Further* "*Strictures.*' The details of the pursuit of the "French column, given by Lord Beresford in a "letter to C. E. Long, Esq., appear to me correct; "and the answers of Sir Charles Dalbiac, cited in "pages 27 and 28, and of Sir Henry Hardinge and "the Count de Villa Real, in the 38th and 39th pages "of the letter, accord with my recollections of what "ultimately took place with regard to the heavy "brigade, the guns of the German artillery, and the "position of Lord Beresford and his staff. I was "then with his Lordship, Sir Henry Hardinge, and "some few other officers, between the cavalry and "the enemy, and near to the latter; and I do not "comprehend how, in the circumstances, the heavy "brigade can have been ordered to bring up its right "shoulders *for the purpose of charging the enemy's* "*columns of infantry;* nor do I recollect these troops "having cheered when they finally marched off on "that occasion. If it was so, however, it will be in

" the recollection of the Marshal and the other officers " above-mentioned."

The author of "*Further Strictures*," says Colonel Napier, "also, though equivocally, denies that the " 13th Dragoons were reprimanded by Marshal " Beresford for pursuing the French; yet the fact " was notorious at the time, and the actual re- " primand, a very severe one, as given in general " orders, has since been published by Mr. C. E. " Long, in his reply to the writer's aspersions of the " late Lieutenant-General Long."

The passage of the "*Further Strictures*" here referred to, is as follows:—

" The commanding officer of the 13th, on return- " ing, after the pursuit of the French, immediately " rode up to Lord Beresford; but, though a particu- " lar friend, he was coldly and formally received. " The Marshal drily inquired whether he thought " he had proceeded in a military manner in the mode " of pursuing the enemy? and expressed his hope " that, for the future, he would recollect, that " courage was not the only requisite either for " troops, or officers."

I am really incapable of discovering any thing "equivocal" in the language of the above passage: it simply recites what passed between myself and Colonel Head on his return, and asserts that *by me* no other reprimand whatever was given to the 13th Light Dragoons—a statement which I can most distinctly confirm. In my brief observations to Colonel Head, the points mentioned with disapprobation

were, the thoughtlessness evinced in the pursuit, and, as I then understood to be the case, the unmilitary and irregular manner in which it had been conducted. The courage of the troops was admitted, and most assuredly was not censured. But Colonel Napier affirms that the fact of my reprimanding them was notorious, and that "the actual reprimand, "as given in general orders, is published in Mr. C. "E. Long's Reply." I cannot read, or understand, that order as Colonel Napier seems to do. He asserts it to have been *mine*. Now this it most certainly was not; it was not even published by me. The words of that order are:—

"Brigadier-General Long has it in command from "His Excellency, Marshal Beresford, to signify to the "officers of the light cavalry portions of the divisions "under his command, that *His Excellency, the Com-* "*mander of the Forces, Lord Wellington, has ex-* "*pressed his* very great displeasure at the report he "has received of their conduct in the affair of the "25th ult. His Excellency (Lord Wellington) "*never doubted the spirit and gallantry* of any part "of his army, consequently required no proof to for-"tify his opinion in these particulars."

The remainder of the order points out the irregularity of the proceeding, and contains a caution against the repetition of it.

How then can Colonel Napier make out this reprimand to have been *mine?*—It was issued by General Long, and, as is expressly stated, proceeded from the Commander of the Forces, Lord Wellington. I had

no more concern with it than, as was required by my military position, the directing my inferior to fulfil the commands of my superior. It may be said, perhaps, that the report on which Lord Wellington's reprimand was founded emanated from me. But, in this case again, I was only the intermediate channel through whom the report of General Long passed to Lord Wellington; as in the other, I was no more than the channel by which Lord Wellington's censure on the charge of the 13th was conveyed to General Long: it is not pretended that I was present as an eye-witness of the transaction: my view of it could only have been formed from the account delivered me by the commander of the cavalry; and it is manifest, from the letters cited by Mr. C. E. Long, that I could not have exaggerated the highly unfavourable opinions which General Long entertained of that particular part of the affair. After reading the evidence of Colonel Doyle, Sir L. Otway and Sir Henry Watson, on the pursuit of the 13th Light Dragoons, I am convinced that I was misinformed by General Long with respect to the disorder and irregularity that were said to have attended it. In my letter to Mr. C. E. Long, which Colonel Napier has probably seen, I took occasion to acknowledge the error into which I had been led, and to do justice to the regiment in those particulars. But, as I still consider the pursuit, however gallant in itself or orderly in its conduct, to have been rash and unadvised in its continuance and distance, I cannot coincide in the unqualified admiration which

it has drawn forth from the historian. I need not add any thing further on this subject: I entertain no apprehension with regard to the judgment of the public respecting it.

Before quitting this affair of Campo Mayor, I must still offer a remark or two on another passage of Colonel Napier's Justification:—"With respect," he says, "to the presence of Colonel Colborne, which "the author of the '*Strictures*' so flippantly denies, "I repeat the fact upon the authority of Colonel "Colborne himself."

There must exist some very singular misapprehension here. Colonel Napier states, in his History, that, "on the morning on the 25th the advanced "guard of cavalry, supported by a detachment of "infantry under Colonel Colborne, came suddenly "upon Campo Mayor."

And again, in the same page, but speaking of a later part of the day, at the time of the charge of the 13th Light Dragoons, he says, "Colonel Colborne was "on the right, and *at a considerable distance from* "*the enemy*."

If I understand the historian's meaning here, Colonel Colborne must, in this last sentence, be supposed to be accompanied by the infantry, which has been given him in the former extract.

The author of the "*Strictures*" receiving this impression, I presume, from Colonel Napier's words, indeed I do not see how he should receive any other, says, "neither Colonel Colborne, nor any infantry "were near the scene of action." And so far is this

from being a "*flippant* assertion," as the historian asserts, that it can be *proved* to be perfectly consistent with fact. Colonel Colborne did *not* support the advanced guard. He had, on the contrary, been detached, by Sir William Stewart, round the town, in a different direction from the advanced guard. Colonel Napier has not specified in what manner his representation has been authorized by Colonel Colborne. He does not cite any document on the subject. I shall proceed in a different manner; and overturn his statement, in the words of Colonel Colborne himself. The latter officer's account of his position and movements during the affair in question, is now lying before me. In that paper it is stated "that he was separated from the advanced guard "previously to ascending the hill *before coming to* "*Campo Mayor;* that he was then ordered by Sir "William Stewart, with a squadron, or troop *of* "*cavalry,* and the 66th regiment, to the southward "of the town; that, *with the cavalry,* he hastened "up the hill ordering the 66th to follow; that, on "reaching the summit of the hill *with the cavalry* "*only,* he perceived the enemy's column of cavalry "and infantry marching rapidly towards Badajoz, "the head of the column a very little distance from "Campo Mayor; that he moved through some in"closures on that side of the town *with his cavalry,* "as rapidly as he could; that he received by an "aide-de-camp of his General of Brigade, a message, "saying he was separating himself too far from him; "that he hastily replied he could see best from the

"ground he was on, and proceeded through a small "ravine or valley at a gallop, till he found himself "on the flank of the enemy's column, and, perhaps, "about six or seven hundred yards from it; and "that at this time, the charge of the 13th Light "Dragoons took place when Colonel Colborne "halted."

Thus then it appears that this officer, with a troop, or squadron of *cavalry*, was at the distance of six or seven hundred yards when he halted; but had *no infantry* with him. In continuation, he proceeds to say, "I did not see the 66th regiment till the even-"ing; they had been halted, twice or three times, "during their march, and were consequently use-"less."

After the perusal of this statement, it remains with the reader to decide to which of the parties the charge of "*flippancy*" may be most justly imputed: whether to the historian of the Peninsular War, or to the author of "*Further Strictures*."

Badajoz.

Colonel Napier next proceeds to defend the proposition maintained in his History, that, after the affair of the 25th of March, at Campo Mayor, I ought to have marched upon Merida, and secured, at once, the recapture of Badajoz. He here again follows his accustomed and very novel mode of controversy.

Instead of offering a single observation upon the arguments, adduced by the author of "*Further Stric-*

tures," in support of the course which I adopted, he contents himself with repeating his original opinions, and publishing what he considers as corroborative authorities. In taking up Colonel Napier's "*Justification*," the reader finds himself in possession of an *exparte* statement, in which he is presented with all the evidence and arguments on one side, but is never allowed a glimpse of the evidence and arguments by which the objections of the other are sustained. It appears to me that the facts, and the reasonings upon them, as given in "*Further Strictures*," are in general both correct and military. They are, I think, particularly so with respect to my proceedings immediately after the recapture of Campo Mayor; nor has Colonel Napier advanced a single syllable in refutation of them.

The new grounds on which Colonel Napier defends his opinion respecting the route that ought to have been taken, and the probable success of it, I cannot consider as very sound. Many have thought that the author of "*Further Strictures*" has here completely succeeded in exposing the fallacy of Colonel Napier's military opinions: but, while I refer the impartial reader to that publication for the refutation of the historian's views, I shall produce some confirmatory evidence to the same effect. Colonel Napier, at the time a Captain of a regiment, conceives that, if I had marched by Merida, we might immediately have secured the fall of Badajoz; and, in asserting the propriety of such a movement, says, "it is foolish to *plead in bar*, Lord Wellington's

"Instructions to pass at Jerumenha." Such is the decisive sentence pronounced by a military man on the obligation by which a general, commanding a detached part of an army, is bound to conform to the instructions of his Commander-in-Chief. Had Colonel Napier held a station, similar to that which I had the honour of holding, and had he deemed it expedient to treat the orders he received thus cavalierly, he might have chanced to find himself called upon to "*plead at the bar*" of a military tribunal, and somewhat at a loss for arguments to justify his conduct. I can hardly think it necessary to controvert so preposterous a position. Colonel Napier affirms that "these orders were given under the "notion that all things for an immediate passage "were in readiness." This is a bold assertion, and one for which no authority is offered. How does the historian know that such was the case? The fact is, that, when I received my instructions, no doubt existed respecting the readiness of the material for effecting the passage of the Guadiana, and consequently no alternative, in case of their failure, was taken into consideration. What opportunities of becoming acquainted with the localities Colonel Napier may have had, I am altogether ignorant; but the Duke of Wellington, on whose instructions I acted, and, according to my old-fashioned notions of military duty, conceived myself bound to act, had a most perfect knowledge of them. It will be remembered that, after the battle of Talavera in 1809, the Commander-in-Chief had retreated from the Tagus to

Badajoz, where his head quarters were fixed, by Truxillo, Madellin, Merida, &c. and had his army quartered in those parts for some months. He was, therefore, personally and most intimately acquainted with the whole of the country. His instructions to me were grounded on that knowledge, and on the information which he had obtained of the state and numbers of the enemy. And they did not simply direct me to pass the Guadiana at Jerumenha, but, after that operation, first, to make myself master of Olivença; then to drive the French corps out of Estremadura; and, last of all, to besiege Badajoz. It still appears to me that there was nothing discretionary in these commands; and I, most assuredly, should not have been justified in acting in direct opposition to them. It will hereafter be seen that his Grace was in the habit of making a very marked distinction between such of his instructions as were, and such as were not, of a discretionary nature. But, whether his commands on this occasion were discretionary or not, the reasons on which they were given, will, I apprehend, be sufficient to convince every military man of their wisdom.

The *first* reason was, that if Colonel Napier's proposed route by Merida had been followed, we should have left Portugal perfectly unprotected and exposed to the attack of the enemy, along its whole southern and south-eastern frontier. The *second* reason for directing the course pursued was its having been calculated, as proved to be the case, that my *corps d'armée* would have sufficient time for effecting its

first operations, and thus clearing the way for the siege of Badajoz as much as possible, before the matériel necessary for the conduct of that siege could be prepared. Now, as far as I am concerned in these transactions, notwithstanding Colonel Napier's assertions to the contrary, I need but state the simple fact, that *I acted in accordance with my instructions, and was governed by them alone.* Such is the head and front of my offending. But I shall, by a comparison of dates and facts, and the introduction of such evidence as lies immediately at hand, be able to shew pretty plainly that, even had such an idea ever entered my mind, I should not have been justified at Campo Mayor, on the 25th or 26th March, in departing from the letter of my instructions and entirely changing the order of my proceedings. In the first place, I was not only directed to pass the Guadiana at Jerumenha, but, in the discussion of the subject at Lauzaõ, when the Duke of Wellington had first heard of the capture of Badajoz by the enemy, and my return to the command of the *corps d'armée* in the Alemtejo was determined on, the passage by Merida was mooted, and *negatived* by the Commander of the Forces. I thus regarded myself as not only under instructions to go by Jerumenha, but also *not* to go by Merida; and, even had I possessed a discretionary power on this occasion, has Colonel Napier ever inquired whether I was or was not aware at the time when he thinks this route ought to have been adopted, that those means of passing the river at Jerumenha were to fail me which I had been informed were at

my disposal, and which he has given an account of in his own history? Let us hear Colonel Napier:—

"The Portuguese Government had undertaken not "only to provide the means for these operations, but "had actually reported that they were collected at "Elvas and Jerumenha—that is to say, that pro- "visions, shoes, battering-guns, ammunition, and "transports were there; that the Guadiana abounded "in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, for- "merly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought "away from Badajoz before the siege, were at Elvas; "and that all other necessaries would be sent from "Lisbon. It now appeared that magazines of pro- "visions or stores had not been formed; that very "little transport had been provided; that only five "of Cuester's boats had been brought from Badajoz; "that there was no serviceable craft on the river; "and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, "were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to "sustain the passage of guns. The country also was "so deficient in provisions, that the garrison stores "of Elvas were taken to feed the army." To this the historian immediately adds:—"All these circum- "stances combined to point out Merida as the true "line of operations."

Most certain it is that I had been led to expect the supplies and means detailed in the above passage; most certain it is also, that I was disappointed in obtaining them; but was I, when at Campo Mayor, aware that the promised means for carrying my orders into execution were to fail? Was I to suppose

that, because the right bank of the Guadiana was destitute of provisions, an abundant supply was to be found on the left, when both had equally and for so long a time been subsisted on by the hostile armies? Colonel Napier should have asked himself these questions before he censured me for acting in conformity with my instructions.

I neither had nor could have had any such information. I therefore proceeded from Campo Mayor to Elvas in the execution of my orders; and it was not till after my arrival there that I became acquainted with the real state of affairs. I was now, on the 26th, an additional day's march from Merida, and, having still to supply the troops with provisions from Elvas for at least five days' march, it would not have been possible to leave till the 28th.

Even Colonel Napier, I presume, would not, in my situation, have started for Merida in disregard of his Commander's instructions, until he was fully assured that the supplies and other resources which he had expected to enable him to fulfil his orders were not forthcoming; and, if I am correct in entertaining such a supposition, the whole of the historian's scheme falls to the ground. It will not, I should imagine, be asserted that there could have remained much chance of attaining the result so confidently predicted by Colonel Napier, if we had gone back to Campo Mayor, and thence proceeded to Merida, after a loss of three days in going to and returning from Elvas; while the marching condition of my troops, who were in want both of rest and of supplies, would

hardly have been improved by such an increase of distance. To substantiate his view, Colonel Napier refers to some reports of my own. By these papers he proceeds to shew, *first*, that my information respecting the state of the enemy was bad; and, *secondly*, that my belief of this information, which ascribed but a small force to the enemy, should have induced me to take the route of which he has asserted the propriety.

How that information, of which the date is "*Elvas, April the 1st*," could have had any effect on my decision as to the march from Campo Mayor to Merida, which, if adopted at all, must have been commenced on *the 26th or 27th of March*, I am unable to explain. It will be borne in mind that I had expected to pass the river at Jerumenha on the 4th of April, and was only prevented by the sudden increase of its waters. Colonel Jones is again cited in confirmation of the historian's opinion, but with as little success, I think, as on the former occasion. I understand the quotation from that officer's publication in a sense diametrically opposite to that in which it is received by Colonel Napier; and I have little doubt but the reader, whether a military man or a civilian, will coincide in my opinion respecting it. "At this time," (says Colonel Jones,) "the 26th of "March, the French had been in possession of "Badajoz only a fortnight, and the works and bat-"teries of their recent siege still afforded considera-"ble cover. *The breach was open*, and the garrison "ill supplied with provisions, ammunition, stores;

"the recapture, therefore, not only seemed inevita-
"ble, but easy if *speedily invested*; but the river
"Guadiana interposed, and there was neither a pon-
"toon train, nor other means with the army for cross-
"ing the river."

When Colonel Jones states that the "works of the "late siege still afforded considerable cover*," it is quite evident that he refers to the demolition of those works which was rapidly proceeding, and, unless speedily interrupted, would soon destroy them altogether. But how was this interruption to be secured? Colonel Jones shews that, when he wrote the above passage, he did not believe such a check to the enemy's operations at Badajoz to be practicable. He says, "*But the Guadiana River inter-*
"*posed,* and there was neither a pontoon train nor
"other means with the army for crossing the river."
The only question then is, was Colonel Jones aware that there was, and had been for centuries, a stone bridge over the Guadiana at Merida? This must necessarily be answered in the affirmative; and it is consequently clear that that highly talented officer did not consider the route by Merida as advisable to be pursued. Had he agreed with Colonel Napier, and supposed that the object might have been obtained by following that route, he could not, and

* I argue at present on the supposition that Colonel Jones was well-informed on these points. I do not admit that he was, and shall presently give my reasons for calling the accuracy of his information in question.

would not have said that "the army had no means for crossing the river."

The next evidence brought forward by Colonel Napier is that of Colonel Lamarre, a very able officer, I believe, who commanded the French engineers in Badajoz, and whose opinion deserves every respect. He says that the "English committed a "great fault in wasting eight days before Olivenza, "which must have fallen after the taking of Bada- "joz, *and with a little more boldness and penetration, "Badajoz might have been attacked with success in "the beginning of April.*"

In addition to this extract, as cited by Colonel Napier, I shall add another from the same work, on the same subject, and nearly to the same effect; but by which it will be plainly seen that Colonel Lamarre, in writing the above passage, had a siege in contemplation. "If," he says, "instead of losing "eight days at the siege of Olivenza, General Cole, "with five or six thousand men, had appeared at the "end of March before Badajoz, it cannot be doubted "that the place, which was then far from being in a "state of defence, and which had but a weak gar- "rison, *would have fallen in a short time.*"

It is a very common thing for an officer of one army to animadvert upon the conduct, and condemn the operations of his enemy; but such censures must most frequently, if not always, be founded on an unsubstantial basis. No officer can be sufficiently acquainted with all the circumstances of the case to form a correct opinion respecting it. However accu-

rate may be his knowledge of the state and circumstances of his own troops, he must be, in a great degree, ignorant of the condition of his adversary. He may know where his own side is weak and incapable of resisting an attack, but he must be very much in the dark with regard to his enemy's means of making one. Such appears to be the case with Colonel Lamarre. What five or six thousand men, with all appliances and means to boot, could effect against the strong fortress of Badajoz and a garrison of three thousand men, I cannot myself perceive. Without all the usual and necessary means of attack, I am sure neither they nor any force could have produced any effect at all. Colonel Lamarre has shewn that the town had, from the beginning, nothing to apprehend from an immediate assault; he must therefore have meant that the troops he speaks of should have entered on a siege, and been fully provided with all that was essential to such an undertaking. That he never supposed the possibility of the place being taken by a *coup de main* is evident from his expressly stating that it would have "fallen "in a short time." And he moreover informs us that, from the moment the French obtained possession, "the Governor had neglected nothing that could "tend to the good of the service, and had made the "distribution of the troops on the ramparts, to place "them out of danger from any assault." But did Colonel Lamarre consider whether the allied army were, at that time, provided with the materials for a siege; or, if we were so provided, whether we had

transport for them? This officer feels very sensibly the difficulties that his own party had to contend with, but never seems to imagine that any could have existed on the side of his adversary.

To have secured the fall of Badajoz, therefore, it would not only have been necessary for the army to have marched by Merida, but for them to have conveyed their battering train, ammunition, and stores by the same route. Will Colonel Napier affirm that, with the means of transport which we then possessed, or had the power of procuring, such a measure was practicable? I am certain neither he nor any one else will venture to say it was. The ensuing extracts may convey to the reader some idea of the difficulty we suffered with regard to transport. Colonel Jones, speaking of this period, says*, "In contemplation of this siege, Lord Wellington had directed an "ample proportion of engineers' stores to be forwarded from Lisbon to Elvas; but, in the exhausted state of the country, *carriage could not be procured for them.*" In a note to the next page, he adds—"An abundant provision both of fascines and gabions had been made in the woods in the neighbourhood of Badajoz; but means of carriage could "*not be procured to bring them to the depôts* before the commencement of the attack." The inability we laboured under of transporting heavy guns, ammunition, and stores from Elvas, may be estimated from the difficulty we found in conveying the lighter

* Journal of Sieges, p. 24.

materials above-mentioned by Colonel Jones, a distance of only two or three miles. The fact is that, after having forced the enemy out of Estremadura, I was obliged to wait in cantonments till the heads of departments, who were preparing the essentials for carrying on the siege, should report them in a state of readiness. These preparations could not be completed sooner; and had I proceeded to Badajoz by the route of Merida without the means of attack, I should only have harassed my troops unnecessarily, and have set myself down before the fortress, in a position equally dangerous and ridiculous, without the power of attacking it.

I greatly doubt whether Colonel Jones is correct in stating that, "on the 26th March, there yet remained considerable cover from the works erected "by the French in their attack on Badajoz." The place was taken by the enemy on the 10th March; and Colonel La Marre informs us* "they had worked "from the 12th to raze the works of attack." In the course of thirteen days, if not destroyed altogether, they must surely have been so far demolished as to render them incapable of affording any shelter to an enemy, of whose intention to relieve the place information had been received on the 10th; indeed the passage quoted from Colonel La Marre in a former page, may be taken as a confirmation of this opinion. That officer, in giving his reasons for thinking that the appearance of five or six thousand men before Badajoz towards the end of March would have con-

siderably hastened its fall, says, "there is no doubt "but the place, which was then far from being in a "state for defence, and which had but a very weak "garrison, would have fallen in a short time." In this passage two reasons are specified, which would have militated against the defence of the place; but though Colonel La Marre had just mentioned that the French had been engaged from the 12th in destroying their approaches, he does not intimate that any cover from those works were still existing. It would be unjust to the reputation both of General Phillippon and Colonel La Marre, to imagine that, after being fifteen days in possession of Badajoz, and knowing the allies intended to proceed against it, they would have allowed any shelter for the enemy's troops to remain standing in the front of the place. But, at all events, no one will doubt but that, before our troops could have marched round by Merida, the whole of those works would have been demolished; and it would, I believe, have taken more time to reach Badajoz by that route, than is calculated by the historian, or even supposed by the author of the "*Strictures.*"

To substantiate his account of the want of timber and provisions in the fortress, Colonel Napier produces some extracts from the Governor's directions to the Royal Commissary of the province. These orders are dated the 10th, 12th, 14th, and 26th April. I do not pretend to assert that Badajoz was as well furnished with every thing requisite for a defence, as its Governor could desire; but I do

affirm, that the place was too well supplied for its Governor to be induced to surrender it, because some twelve or thirteen thousand men, unprovided with entrenching tools or stores of any kind to commence a siege, presented themselves with their field guns before it. How unsound this opinion is, will be perceived by the reader, when he is made acquainted with the actual condition of the place at the time. It is stated by Colonel La Marre, as Colonel Napier's diligent perusal of that author must have informed him, that, with the exception of the convoy of timber on the 22d of April, no supplies of any description ever entered Badajoz after the first of those orders was issued, viz., the 10th of April. At the very commencement of Colonel La Marre's account of the first defence of Badajoz, he says*, "Whilst the greater part of Beresford's forces followed the 5th corps, and undertook the siege of "Olivença, some detachments observed Badajoz; "without, however, undertaking its investment, they "encircled it at a distance so strictly as to pre"vent all communication between it and the French "army, and to deprive it of the advantage of pro"curing provisions from the neighbouring villages." Now, as the allied army set down before Olivença on the 9th, the efforts above-stated must have commenced on that day: and such was really the case. Colonel Napier must certainly have read the above passage: he must, moreover, have also read the passage which follows, and which I shall extract, as it

* La Marre, page 139.

will render all further conjecture and discussion respecting the manner in which Badajoz was provisioned, perfectly unnecessary. Speaking of the care and exertions of the Governor, Colonel La Marre says: "Nevertheless he found himself under the "necessity, on the 10th April, of reducing by a "fourth the ration of bread; and, notwithstanding "that economy, the magazines, which were only "provisioned for three months, would soon be ex-"hausted." It is, therefore, certain that Badajoz was provided for *three* months; and yet the want of supplies is adduced by Colonel Napier as his principal ground for supposing its speedy fall inevitable if I had marched on it by the way of Merida.

To shew that Badajoz was well provided in every respect when surrendered by Imas, the Spanish General, Colonel Napier quotes a despatch from Lord Wellington of the 16th March, in which it is said, "the "Spanish garrison neither wanted ammunition, nor "provisions." I perfectly coincide in that account. But with a view of reconciling the plenty, enjoyed by a garrison of eight thousand men on the 10th of March, with the scarcity which three thousand are represented as labouring under on the 25th of the same month, or 1st of April; Colonel Napier asserts that, "after Imas had surrendered, not only the gar-"rison, but the other prisoners and the French army, "were principally fed from the resources of Bada-"joz; and that the French garrison had been living "also for a fortnight in that town."

To this gratuitous assertion I reply,—though, in-

deed, after Colonel La Marre's description of the real state of the magazine, any reply is unnecessary, —that the Spanish garrison, and of course all other prisoners if there were any other, were sent away on the 11th, the day after the surrender. Their presence, therefore, could not have deducted much from the resources of Badajoz. Colonel Napier *may know* that the French army was principally fed from the stores left by the Spaniards, but he has not given us the authority from which his knowledge was derived; and it is difficult, without very strong and conclusive evidence, to adopt so highly improbable a supposition. The French commissariat had provided for the supply of their army when besieging Badajoz; why is it presumed that this supply ceased the moment the town was captured? What was the reason of such a sudden cessation? If the French general had failed in gaining possession of the town on the 10th, as he ought to have done, would he have been compelled to raise the siege from want of provisions? The readers of Colonel Napier's volumes have never heard that the French army were exposed to any difficulties of the kind. Indeed, the historian has himself informed us that "plenty of food was to be "had on the left bank of the Guadiana*:" and is it to be believed that the French generals and commanders, in secure possession of a source from which their supplies might be drawn, and perfectly well aware of, at least, the probable approach of an enemy, would desert the ordinary and organized channels"

* Vol. iii. p. 498.

for provisioning their troops, for no other purpose, as it would seem, than to endanger the loss of a fortress, which they had purchased at the expense of so much blood and toil, by unnecessarily emptying its magazines?

But I have, perhaps, enlarged more upon this point than the occasion needed. Colonel Napier proceeds in his "*Justification*" to say,—"I now come "to the other four facts, namely, the practicability of "the road to Merida, the impression of terror made "upon the French, the false notions of Beresford "relative to the enemy, and Lord Wellington's "opinion of the operations."

For the proof of the three first of these facts an extract from one of my own letters to the Plenipotentiary, Mr. C. Stewart, is adduced: and the historian affirms in a parenthesis, that the "writer of the "'*Strictures*' pretends to have direct authority from "myself to contradict his statement." I would ask, in what part of the "*Strictures*" Colonel Napier discovered its author advancing any such pretension? No passage to that effect is quoted. This, however, is a matter of inferior moment; and I should think that my opinions respecting the state and position of the enemy, apart from the conduct they might have originated, could hardly merit a greater degree of consideration.

I have already referred to the impossibility of my being able to act at Campo Mayor, on the 25th or 26th March, on information which did not reach me till the 1st of April, six days afterwards, at Elvas.

Having but just arrived in that part of the country, I had not had time to open any regular, organized, and sure channels of intelligence. And, at the time of writing the letter cited by Colonel Napier, the 1st of April, I was only intent upon one object, which was to execute my instructions exactly, and to the best of my ability. I may therefore, perhaps, have been more quick in adopting, and less deliberate in promulgating, my opinions, than if I had held myself at liberty to act upon the information on which they were conceived. I, at the time, supposed that the report communicated to me might probably be true, and as such transmitted it, with my opinion upon it, to Mr. Stuart; but I did not allow myself, with a blind and implicit confidence, to be led away by it. I did not, on account of that information, alter my line of conduct, or deviate from the commands I had received. And, if every general is to be blamed for giving credit to reports relating to the condition of the enemy which may eventually prove incorrect, I am not acquainted with a single individual who could hope to escape the censure of our great military critic. It is highly probable that I had no other intelligence at the time than that declared in my letter; and it is now too late for me to entertain a hope of recalling the circumstances by which it was accompanied and appeared to be confirmed. I certainly do not feel it necessary to defend myself against the historian's charge of having received false information. If it be a ground of cen-

sure, I am content to plead guilty. But after all, what degree of credit did I give to this report? My letter to Mr. Stuart, dated April 1, and written within a week after my arrival in that part of the country, begins, "I *scarce think* the French will "remain in Badajoz." This does not sound like the language of one, who placed implicit reliance upon the accounts he had received. The opinion intimated is evidently conditional on the accuracy of the intelligence. My second letter to Mr. Stuart, dated April 27, which Colonel Napier has quoted, states, "It is said, Soult is assembling in force on our side "of Seville. His number is, I think, much exag- "gerated; but I cannot speak certain about it." No one will doubt why the former part of this extract, as given in Colonel Napier's "*Justification*" is printed in italics, and the latter words printed in the common character. But I am incapable of discovering how any part of it can serve to confirm the historian's account, or shew that I entertained any false notions of the real condition of the enemy. The passage which he has quoted begins with—"it "is said," and concludes with, "I cannot speak cer- "tain about it." For the rest I state, on information of no great weight, a rumour of Soult's assembling an army on our side of Seville, with my opinion that the numbers were exaggerated. Has Colonel Napier shewn that no such army was assembling, or that the numbers, as I then heard them reported, were not exaggerated? But, whatever might be my opinion,

I did not allow it to mislead me *. My instructions

* It is extraordinary that the historian who is so severe on the circumstance of my having received false intelligence, though I did not act upon it, and no evil results ensued, should never have noticed the circumstance that Marshal Soult received false information, and fought the battle of Albuera upon the strength of it, to the grievous loss of the army under his command. As the passage from Lapène, in which the fact is stated, not only bears upon the point in discussion, but is historically curious, I shall lay it before the reader:—"Le 15me, au soir, le Maréchal "Soult était à la St. Martha, incertain, du reste, une partie de la "journée, si Beresford a pris position, *le Général-en-Chef est "même porté à croire que l'ennemi s'empressera d'eviter une "bataille décisive et de repasser la Guadiana.* Ses idées sur les "véritables intentions des coalisés ne tardent pas à être fixées "par le Général Briche, commandant à l'avant-garde notre "cavalrie légère: Celui-ci venait de rencontrer des postes ennemis *à deux lieues de Santa Martha*, sur la route de Badajoz, et "les avait fait replier devant lui. Prévenu de cette découverte, le "Général-en-Chef accourt lui-même sur les lieux, et s'assure que "l'armée Anglo-Portuguaise est en position sur le plateau d'Albuhera, à moitié distance de Santa Martha à Badajoz.

"De retour à Santa Martha, le Maréchal reçoit de ses émissaires des avis importants sur la situation de l'armée ennemie, "*tous* s'accordent à faire entendre que celle-ci déjà grossie des "troupes du Général Castaños, qui portent ses forces à 30,000 "combattants, sera renforcée le surlendemain 17, par un corps "de 10,000 Espagnols, amenés par Blacke des frontières de "Murcie, et débarqués depuis peu à l'embouchure de la Guadiana; l'ennemi nous opposera ainsi 40,000 hommes après "cette réunion. Sur cet avis, le projet du Général-en-Chef est "de prévenir l'arrivée de Blacke et sa jonction avec Beresford; "de livrer en conséquence bataille le lendemain, et de tenter à "un prix quelconque de dégager Badajoz." *La Conquête de L'Andalusie, etc. etc. Par le Capitaine Lapène, R. A., attaché à la 2e Division du 5e corps.*

From this passage we find that the opinion entertained by

directed me to go by Jerumenha, and not by Merida; and therefore by Jerumenha I determined to go. And the fact of my having received such false intelligence of the enemy's strength may serve as a warning to all future commanders not to deviate from their orders without the most imperious necessity; for had I acted on that information—the only information that I could obtain of the state of the enemy—I should certainly have placed my corps in a most perilous situation. But this is a matter of no importance to Colonel Napier, who insists on my marching by Merida without any knowledge whatever of the condition, number, or position of the French force, which was then collected to the south of the Guadiana, in Estremadura, or which might in a short time be sent into that province. But, surely, Colonel Napier

Marshal Soult, at a distance of only three leagues from the field, and within twelve hours of the commencement of the battle, was erroneous in every particular. He thought first, that we should not give battle at all, but retire behind the Guadiana. When he found that was not the case, he determined on attacking the allies under the most false impressions of their strength. The allied army amounted to about 20,000, and the augmentation from Castaños, which was no more than the cavalry of Penne-Villamur, of less than 500 men, is swoln by Lapène to nearly 10,000. General Blake, who, as Soult supposed, was not to arrive till the 17th, came up on the night of the 15th and 16th, and, according to his agreement, ought to have joined me sooner on the former day.—If the receiving false intelligence be a just cause of reproach to a general, the sin of Marshal Soult on this occasion was far greater than mine with regard to the garrison of Badajoz: it was also immeasurably more injurious in its consequences;—why it has not been equally visited by the censure of the historian I do not pretend to guess.

himself will scarcely continue to urge the propriety of the route by Merida, when he must see from the very letter he has quoted, though he has not deemed it expedient to put the words in italics as he has those which preceded them, that I hoped to pass the Guadiana at all events on the 4th. It is then plain, that on the 1st of April, I expected, within four days, to effect the passage of the river; and, as will be presently shewn, Badajoz, by way of Merida, could not have been reached in less than double the time. It must not be forgotten also, that, on leaving Campo Mayor, there was every reason to suppose that I should reach Badajoz sooner by the way of Jerumenha, as desired by my instructions, than by the route advised by Colonel Napier.

This officer informs us, that "*he* makes little account of the army of the centre advancing, and of "the danger of the position beyond the Guadiana." Great generals will occasionally differ; and Colonel Napier is here at issue with Marshal Soult, whose letter, urging King Joseph to take this step, is given in the "*Strictures*." On this point the reader may perhaps be inclined to consider the opinion of the French marshal at least as valuable, as that of the English historian. Soult made the request with a perfect knowledge of the position of the French corps and armies; and he could not therefore have thought the movement either impossible or improper.

Colonel Napier proceeds to say that "the danger "of the position of our army beyond the Guadiana "would have been in no manner different from what

"it was after passing at Jerumenha." This is a position quite new, and must, I should conceive, be perfectly incomprehensible to every military reader. It is plain, from the Duke of Wellington's instructions, that *he* was not of the same opinion. I have already shewn that the Commander-in-Chief was not only perfectly aware of the stone bridge at Merida, but thoroughly well acquainted with the whole country between Campo Mayor and Badajoz, by that route; and yet he expressly commanded that the route of Merida should not be taken. For the complete exposure of the historian's suggestions, I must refer the reader to the "*Further Strictures*," merely observing that, if the account of distances which I have received be correct, the reasons for not marching by Merida are really much stronger than they appear to be in that publication; and Colonel Napier's proposition must consequently prove still more futile than is there represented.

It is said in the "*Further Strictures*," that, including the time necessary for provisioning the troops and making the march, I could not have reached Badajoz from Campo Mayor in less than six days, or till the 31st of March. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, my then Quarter-Master-General, was lately in England: I applied to him for the distances which had escaped my own recollection. The information which he afforded me is as follows: From Campo Mayor to Merida, by the road mentioned in Colonel Napier's "*Justification*," and which was the only one that could have been taken, the road by Albuquerque, is

eighteen Spanish leagues, or about seventy English miles; from Merida to Badajoz eight Spanish leagues, about thirty English miles; making a total of one hundred miles. The state of exhaustion and want to which my troops were reduced may be seen in the "*History of the Peninsular War*." One division was absolutely incapacitated from proceeding. Would any officer in his senses, under such circumstances, have attempted such a march, which, instead of two days to Merida, as stated in the "*Strictures*," could not, even without allowing a day's halt, have been accomplished in less than five, and would have still required two days more to complete the distance from Merida to Badajoz, besides the two days necessary for provisioning them from Elvas.

I should thus, with such men as could have sustained the fatigue of the march, have arrived at Badajoz on the 3d of April, when, by leaving Campo Mayor for Elvas on the 26th of March, I had every reason to suppose that the Guadiana would be crossed at Jerumenha, according to my instructions, during the month of March; and it is shewn in the "*History of the Peninsular War*" that, even when disappointed of my means and supplies at Elvas, I had still every prospect of being able to pass the river on the 4th of April, and was only prevented by the sudden flooding of its waters*, an event which, I apprehend, Colonel Napier will allow to have been beyond any general's control.

* The flooding of the Guadiana as often occurs from the melting of the snow in very fine and sunny weather, as from rains in very bad.

I would here call the reader's attention to the sort of candour which is exhibited in the historian's criticisms. In commenting on my letter of the 1st April to Mr. Stuart, he observes* :—"How the 13th light "dragoons, by beating the cavalry, taking the convoy, and interposing between the infantry and "Badajoz, while the heavy dragoons, the artillery, "and infantry of the allies were on the flank and "rear of the French infantry—how this prevented "the latter from being surrounded does not, I say, "very clearly appear." A general officer has written, on the margin of Colonel Napier's "*Justification*," opposite the above passage, the following remark: "The Marshal, so far from supposing that the 13th "dragoons were interposing between the enemy and "Badajoz, had received a report from the principal "staff officer of the corps to which the 13th dragoons "belonged, that *they had been taken prisoners and* "*carried off bodily*, and this Colonel Napier knew "when he penned the above." My friend's statement is established beyond the possibility of doubt by Colonel Napier's own words, which I here transcribe as they stand in p. 496, vol. iii. of the History of the Peninsular War:—"When that combat com-"menced Beresford was with the main body; and "Baron Trip, a staff officer, deceived by appearances, "informed him that the 13th had been cut off: hence "the Marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he "knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up "the first blow, *truly* observing that the loss of one

* Justification, p. 14.

"regiment was enough." Such is Colonel Napier's first account, which is fair and correct in every respect but one, viz., the person from whom I derived my information. But could any one suppose that the above passage from the "*History*," and the previously-cited passage from the "*Justification*," had proceeded from the same pen? Colonel Napier sees nothing to object to in my conduct on this point, while composing his History; but, because his work has been hit rather hard by the writer of certain "*Strictures*," he, in his "*Justification*," turns round upon his own evidence, for the object of hitting me in return.

The "*Further Strictures*" completely proved that Colonel Napier had mistaken my views with regard to the line of conduct which Marshal Soult was likely to pursue. He does not attempt to answer the reasoning there advanced, but contents himself, according to custom, with repeating his refuted statement, and endeavouring to prop it up by extracts from any such public or private documents as can be strained into an application to the case.

The next document produced by Colonel Napier is the following extract from a letter of Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool:—

"On the night of the 15th instant I received from "Marshal Sir William Beresford letters of the 12th "and 13th instant, which reported that Marshal "Soult had broken up from Seville about the 10th, "and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwith-"standing the reports which had been previously "received that he was busily employed in strength-

"ening Seville and the approaches to that city by "works, and that all his measures indicated an "intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia. "I therefore set out on the following morning."

"The last paragraph indicates," says Colonel Napier, "pretty broadly, that Lord Wellington had "not much confidence in the talents of Marshal "Beresford when opposed to Soult; but the follow- "ing extract from another letter more fully discloses "the cause of his repairing in person to Estre- "madura:—

"*Lord Wellington to Mr. C. Stuart.*

"*Elvas, the 21st April,*

"I am afraid we have lost some valuable time "here, and I am come to put matters in the right "road, and to come to an understanding with Cas- "taños, and, if possible, with Blake, respecting our "future operations."

I have here laid the whole passage, as it stands in Colonel Napier's pamphlet, before the reader, that he may observe the peculiar character of his mode of reasoning. It is observed, in a marginal note to this place, by the general officer whose remarks on another passage have been already quoted,—"Surely "this is not a *just* conclusion from the premises. "Lord Wellington gives us his reasons for going to "Elvas; *first*, the breaking up of Soult, and his "advance towards Estremadura; and, *secondly*, his "desire of coming to an understanding with Castaños "and Blake."

It must be remarked, that to attract, or rather, perhaps, to distract the reader's attention, the historian has here had recourse to his usual practice of printing the whole of his extracts from Lord Wellington's two letters in italics, except the parts in which the reasons for his joining me at Elvas are positively stated.

Colonel Napier assumes, from Lord Wellington's coming in person, that "he had not much confidence in the talents of Marshal Beresford." How far my talents rendered me deserving the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief is a subject which I, of course, am altogether incapable of discussing; but I am very far too proud of having possessed his confidence, to allow Colonel Napier's insinuations to the contrary to remain unanswered. But how loosely has the historian drawn his inferences from the passages he has quoted. Even on his own view of them, they imply no more than that Lord Wellington had a better opinion of his own judgment than of mine; and to whom was he not superior in judgment?—But I should be ashamed of ascribing to such a man any thought or comparison of the kind.—The Duke of Wellington, in discharge of his duty to his country and himself, came to Elvas, that he might be as much as possible on the spot, which was at that moment the chief point of interest: but to prove the injustice of the inference which Colonel Napier has drawn from his journey thither, I shall quote below a part of his instructions to me on the very case now under our review. After

considering the probability of Marshal Soult's advancing from Andalusia, the points at which he might pass the Albuera, and the movements that might be made by both armies, the Duke of Wellington's instructions proceed:—"All this must, of "course, be left to the decision of Sir William "Beresford. I authorize him to fight the action, if "he should think proper, or to retire, if he should "not."

The above passage was written on the 23d of April, when the Duke of Wellington was at Elvas. It was, consequently, of a later date by two days, and by two days only, than his letter to Mr. Stuart, of the 21st of April, in which the words "I am afraid we "have lost some valuable time here" are found; and it therefore does not appear probable, that the author of that letter ascribed the loss of time which had occurred to myself. I most certainly never heard the slightest intimation to that effect, till, after a lapse of twenty years, I found it laid to my charge by Colonel Napier. But whatever opinion the Commander-in-Chief may have entertained of my conduct and ability when absent from the scene on the 21st, it is clearly shewn, by the passage quoted above, that his opinion was very different from that attributed to him by the historian, when he was present at Elvas on the 23d, and had seen the circumstances in which the army under my command was placed.

I must here remark upon another of Colonel Napier's arguments, in support of the propriety of

marching by Merida. It is the last that I shall notice, and it is well worthy of observation:—"That "there was little danger in having the communication "by Merida is still better proved," he argues, "by "the fact, that Lord Wellington did order Beresford, "when the bridge at Jerumenha was swept away, to "occupy Merida, to establish his communications by "that very line, and to alter his cantonments accord-"ingly." Colonel Napier has seen these instructions, and, as far as suited his purpose, he has accurately transcribed them; but it is quite monstrous that any military man should have drawn a conclusion from them so diametrically opposite to the intention of the Commander-in-Chief. But, perchance, the historian overlooked a passage which he has omitted to add, and which may have no inconsiderable influence on the minds and judgments of military men. It is expressly directed in those instructions, "that, during the interruption of our "communication *viâ* Jerumenha, and the fords "below Badajoz, all operations against that place "are to be suspended." Colonel Napier's proposition has always been that I ought at once to have marched by Merida, and invested Badajoz; and he asserts, that such was the spirit of Lord Wellington's directions. But how is this representation of the historian borne out by facts? On the 23d I received orders from the Commander-in-Chief for the investment and siege of Badajoz, as the preparations for that object were then complete. On the night of the same day our communication by Jerumenha

was interrupted by the sudden flooding of the river, and the destruction of the bridge; and the next morning, notwithstanding the communication by Merida was still open to us, the Commander-in-Chief directs that the attack on Badajoz, which he had ordered only the day before, should be suspended; and that it should so remain, until the communication at Jerumenha was re-established! The case then stands thus:—On the 26th of March, when Colonel Napier thinks his scheme ought to have been acted upon, I had only just arrived in those parts, with specific instructions; and I was, as is acknowledged in the historian's own work, destitute of almost every necessary. One division of my army was unable to proceed. Provisions were wanting for the whole. I knew, but that was all I knew, that the country on the right, or northern bank of the Guadiana, was wholly wasted, and incapable of affording me any supplies. I had neither battering train nor intrenching tools. I was without means of conveyance for even the smallest proportion of guns, stores, and ammunition. The enemy was in possession of all Estremadura south of the Guadiana; and I had no intelligence that could be depended upon of their state, numbers, or position. Such was my condition, when the historian would have had me start from Campo Mayor to Merida, and enter upon the siege of Badajoz. One month later, on the 24th of April, when the Commander-in-Chief considered it expedient to countermand the attack which he had ordered on the 23d, all the

foregoing difficulties had ceased to exist. We were in possession of the whole of Estremadura south of the Tagus to Andalusia; the enemy had been pushed beyond the Sierra Morena; we were abundantly supplied with provisions, and were assured of an abundant supply whenever the siege should be undertaken. Even our preparations on the left bank of the river were at this time in a considerable state of forwardness, and much of our material had been transported to it. My troops, provided with every requisite, were in the highest order and spirits: and yet, notwithstanding this extraordinary change of circumstances in our favour, it was ordered by Lord Wellington that we should postpone our operations against Badajoz, though the road by Merida was at least as open as it was on the 26th March, until our communication by Jerumenha should be again practicable. But what was the reason of this change of orders?—The attack was deferred simply and solely because that communication by Jerumenha was interrupted; and yet this order of the Commander-in-Chief is referred to by Colonel Napier, as affording proof that, according to the spirit of the Duke of Wellington's original instructions, I ought to have marched by Merida, to attack Badajoz. It appears to me to afford the most unanswerable proof that I both understood and executed my instructions, not only according to the *letter*, but in the very *spirit* of them. The historian informs us, that there was "little danger in having the communication by "Merida; and that this is proved by the fact, that

" Lord Wellington ordered me, when the bridge at " Jerumenha was swept away, to have my commu- " nication by that very line." The historian's proposition was, that on the 26th of March I should have proceeded by Merida to attack Badajoz. It is said by the Great Captain, although your position is incalculably more favourable than it was on the 26th of March, do not attempt to attack Badajoz, whilst you have only that communication open. So far then was the Commander-in-Chief from entertaining the historian's views, that his instructions prove him to have held a directly contrary opinion; and, in consequence of the communication by Jerumenha being destroyed, he writes, " It will be necessary " that you should place the troops under your com- " mand in such a situation, as to keep up *their* com- " munication with the right bank by the bridge of " Merida; and that you should suspend your opera- " tions against Badajoz till you shall have established " a more direct communication across the Guadiana, " either by bridge or ford." At this period we did not want any thing for the troops from Elvas. Individuals and intelligence passed in boats at Jerumenha; but we neither sent for nor obtained any supplies from that place. What then was the object of the communication by Merida? Its object was neither more nor less than this, to secure our troops the means of retreating into Portugal in case of the enemy's advancing in too great force: and with this view alone I consequently did place and canton them. How then does the case stand? Colonel

Napier maintains, "Although you had no prepara-
"tions for the object, you ought to have attacked
"Badajoz, by marching, *viâ* Merida, until you could
"establish a bridge at Jerumenha." Lord Wellington, on the other hand, says, "Although your
"preparations are completed, and I directed you
"yesterday to attack Badajoz; yet, as you have
"since lost your bridge at Jerumenha, and have no
"communication but by Merida remaining, I desire
"that your attack on Badajoz shall be suspended,
"until you re-establish your communication by Jeru-
"menha." Colonel Napier considers these latter instructions as confirmatory of his proposition. With what justice this inference is drawn, I leave the reader to decide.

I will now give the whole of the Commander-in-Chief's instructions of the 24th April:—

"Sir,

"I enclose two memorandums which I had drawn
"for your attention, pointing out the operations
"which I wished you to carry on with a view to
"obtain possession of Badajoz, and in the event of
"the enemy attempting to relieve that place during
"your operations against it.

"The floods of the Guadiana, however, having
"last night carried away the bridge which you had
"constructed under Jerumenha, and as it is pro-
"bable that some time will elapse before you can
"construct another on which you can rely for your
"communication with the right bank of the river,

" and before the river will again be fordable, it will " be necessary that you should place the troops " under your command in such a situation, as to " keep up their communication with the right bank " by the bridge of Merida, and that you should " defer your operations against Badajoz till you " have established a more direct communication " across the Guadiana with Elvas, either by bridge " or ford.

" I request you, in the mean time, to blockade " Badajoz as strictly as may be in your power, con- " sistently with the object of preserving your com- " munication by the bridge of Merida; to continue " all your preparations for the siege; and when the " period comes, when you will have it in your power " to undertake it, to attend to the suggestions on " the enclosed memorandums, as far as the circum- " stances of the moment will agree with those which " exist at present.

" It will be necessary that you should place the " heavy artillery and stores, which are at Olivença, " out of reach of danger from any movement of the " enemy. I have the honour to enclose a letter which " I have written to General Castanos, with a memo- " randum for his consideration, which I beg you to " peruse and forward to him.

" I have, &c.

(Signed) " WELLINGTON."

It would have been better, perhaps, to have given these instructions at first, and spared myself the

trouble of commenting on Colonel Napier's plans and opinions.

"It is clear," the historian goes on to say, "that "the Marshal, by sending the Spaniards from Al- "berquerque to Merida, thought the road practi- "cable." Most assuredly I did, I think so still, and I am quite at a loss to comprehend why the observation is made. The "*Further Strictures*" did not, as far as I can see, intimate that I had ever entertained the slightest doubt upon that head. In page 61 of that publication it is said, "The Marshal's "march for Badajoz, by way of Merida, would "have occupied four days more." Again, page 64, "There would have been no difficulty of levelling "them (the trenches) with a third part of the num- "ber, before Marshal Beresford could have reached "the place, which, by way of Merida, was no less "than four days' march from Campo Mayor." And again, page 65, "The historian moves his forces "with admirable facility; but from Campo Mayor to "Merida is one of the most difficult, as it is one of "the worst roads in the Peninsula. It would have "occupied two days of heavy and most wearisome "marches." The author of "*Further Strictures*," in the passage from which the preceding quotations are taken, discusses the propriety of my marching my corps, as Colonel Napier had proposed; and, while he clearly admits the road to have been practicable, states, that it was not more than *two* days' march from Campo Mayor to Merida. But he has not allowed so much time as would have been actually

required; and, cogent as his arguments against the historian's views appear to me to be, they might have received considerable additional force, had he been more correct in his estimate of the distances.

But we proceed to another subject, "the want of "guns, stores, provisions, and pontoons." It is admitted by Colonel Napier, that "his charge against "the Portuguese Government on these points was "*put too broadly.*" This is a mild periphrasis for "erroneously." After re-perusing the historian's animadversions on this subject*, I cannot detect any inaccuracy or injustice in the observations of the author of the "*Further Strictures;*" nor do I think his observations of so general and sweeping a description as they are stated to be. Colonel Napier in his "*Justification*" represents his opponent as asserting, that "the Government had nothing to do "with these matters;" and, in reply to this position, adds, "they had a great deal to do with them, and "also with the storing of the fortresses, the food "of the Portuguese troops, and with the means of "transport for every thing." He then concludes the paragraph with calling upon me to confirm his account of the negligence evinced by the Portuguese Government on those points, and of the continual and very serious inconvenience which the Duke of Wellington experienced from it.

I most willingly, as I most fully can, confirm what Colonel Napier has stated with regard to the

* Vol. iii. p. 498.

negligence of the Portuguese Government, and their frequent disinclination to render us the assistance which was necessarily expected of them, and which it was their duty to afford. I also distinctly remember the many difficulties to which their backwardness subjected the Commander-in-Chief; but I should apprehend that the author of the "*Strictures*" does not speak of the general conduct of the Portuguese Government during the whole course of the war, but only as it bore upon the operations actually under review; and, except for the supply of transport, I am not aware that they had any concern whatever with those operations. At the moment referred to, there was no question about the "storing of the fortresses, or the feeding the "Portuguese troops;" Elvas was perfectly well supplied; and the author of the "*Strictures*" expressly says, "The Portuguese Government never had any "thing to do with *furnishing the British troops*, "except in transport." Thus then Colonel Napier's observation on the furnishing the Portuguese troops was unnecessary. It is also said in the "*Strictures*," that "the Portuguese arsenals were under "the control of Marshal Beresford; he himself "gave the orders for guns, ammunition, stores, &c.," an account which is in all respects correct.

With regard to the want of various supplies, as ammunition, provisions, &c., which Colonel Napier describes the Portuguese troops as frequently experiencing, from the improvidence, neglect, or some worse cause of their own government, I most readily

confirm his account, because, generally speaking, it is correct; but, with regard to the events immediately in discussion, he is wholly in the wrong: his observations do not bear upon the subject. And I most fully coincide with the account of his opponent, who has assigned the want of provisions to the right cause; and very truly states, that the only question between us and the Government,—a very important one I admit, but still the only question,—regarded the means of transport. To shew the extent of our deficiencies, the historian brings forward two extracts from Colonel Jones's "*Journal of Sieges*." They are as follows:—"The strength "of Badajoz had not been duly appreciated, and "the means prepared for its reduction, in artillery, "ammunition, and stores, were altogether too incon- "siderable."—"It may be considered fortunate, that "the approach of Marshal Soult's army caused the "siege to be raised, as otherwise, after a further "sacrifice of men in other feeble attempts, it would "have brought itself to a conclusion from the ina- "bility to proceed." At the conclusion of this citation Colonel Napier adds, "Were I malicious, I "might here leave Marshal Beresford to his kind "friend." But as, fortunately for myself, he finds it necessary to support his general condemnation of the Portuguese Government, and to refute what he considers the representation of the "*Strictures*" on this point, the historian allows me to pass uncensured; for "although I might," he says, "nominally "have had the control of the arsenals, the Go-

" vernment, through the Junta of the arsenal, had " in reality the charge of supplying the guns, and " ammunition, and provisions."—I confess myself here unable to comprehend the historian's distinction between my nominal command, and the real command of the Government. I was not conscious of any such distinction. The Government had nothing to do with ordering guns and ammunition. If such articles were in the arsenal, they were under my personal control and direction; but to prove that my authority was merely nominal, three letters of the Duke of Wellington are cited. The extracts from the two first only refer to, and complain of the want of transport; for although, in the second, the words, " I trust that the movement of the guns has not been " suspended," occur, it is manifest the want of transport is referred to. The extract from the third letter, from its being a short isolated sentence, is not very comprehensible. All we can learn from it is, that some ammunition which had been forwarded, or reported by General Rosa as forwarded to Coimbra, had not arrived. General Rosa was an officer appointed by myself to the command of the artillery and military arsenal. To him all orders for the supply of stores or ammunition from the arsenal were sent; and the supplies were furnished by him, without any reference to the Government. The passages, therefore, adduced by Colonel Napier from the Duke of Wellington's correspondence, afford no proof of the Government's maintaining any authority over the arsenal, however satisfactorily they may

prove the remissness of the authorities in furnishing the quantity of transport that was required. As a final blow, Colonel Napier adds, "Let me now close "this part of the subject by a conclusive extract "from Marshal Beresford's own correspondence. "In a letter to Lord Wellington, dated January 25, "1811, he says,—That their difficulties are increas- "ing fast; that matters, in his opinion, are coming "to a crisis; that he is in the greatest alarm about "them; and is afraid to look at the state of things, "as far as any Portuguese authority is concerned."

This is, indeed, a most impressive conclusion to the historian's series of authorities. It would, I think, have been more fair to have given my own words. It would have been also no more than fair to state the evils of which I had to complain, and the circumstances to which the extract immediately referred. As the passage stands, this is more than I am able to do; but the reader will perceive by the dates, that this letter cannot by any construction be adduced as evidence upon events which subsequently occurred, and under circumstances which were not only altogether different, but which I could never have contemplated in writing it. The extract bears date January 25, 1811. At that period the Duke of Wellington's head-quarters being at Cartaxo, I was commanding the troops on the south bank of the Tagus, and watching Massena at Santarem, and on the opposite bank; and what connection a letter then written can have with the state of affairs at the end of the following March, when Massena had retired

out of Portugal; the Duke of Wellington was on the Coa and the Aguada, and I, with the command of a *corps d'armée*, was on the Guadiana, watching and in collision with the troops of Marshal Soult, I confess myself altogether at a loss to comprehend. I shall, therefore, with Colonel Napier leave this subject.

Siege of Badajoz.

"On this head," says the historian, "the main "fact disputed is the *want of due concert in the* "*double attack*. In my History I gave ample autho- "rity for asserting it; and this writer's cavils merely "prove that he is angry, and that he does not know "the meaning of the word concert, which he thinks "to be synonymous with simultaneous."

The reader may decide which of the parties in the controversy is the angry one. The "*ample* autho- "rity," given by Colonel Napier, consisted of a letter from Captain Squire. The reader has, on another point, already seen enough of that officer's testimony, to be enabled to estimate its value in the present instance. It is also to be observed, that Captain Squire, in the very letter adduced by the historian, acknowledges that the opinion of Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, was in opposition to his own. He writes*, "I was pressed by Colonel "Fletcher,"—he was, in fact, ordered,—"who was "on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence

* Napier's History of the Peninsular War, vol. iii. p. 638.

" operations that evening." If it was intended to insinuate any blame against Colonel Fletcher, by saying " that he was on the other side of the Gua-" diana," such an insinuation might easily be disposed of. But, admitting the fact, that officer had reconnoitred the ground he was giving directions about, and was to the full as well acquainted with it as Captain Squire could possibly be. Nothing can be more absurd than the latter officer's position, when he asserts, without pretending to assign any reason for his opinion, that we failed " because the battery " was begun on the 12th; and that had it been " begun on the 9th, the place would certainly have " been captured on the 15th."—Why, with Soult advancing upon us, the army could not have remained there till the 15th. The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th, a slight circumstance, by-the-bye, of which Captain Squires appears to have been totally ignorant on the 17th, when this letter, to which the historian attaches so high a value, was written.

Colonel Napier complains of the author of the "*Strictures*" for confounding the expression " in " concert" with " simultaneous." This was a very natural error for him to have fallen into, as the historian, in his account of this short siege, has used both these terms; and the distinction which he would now make between them, appears to me very much like a distinction without a difference.

The author of the "*Further Strictures*" is in the wrong, and Colonel Napier is in the right, with

respect to the date of the investment of Badajoz: it certainly took place on the 5th, and not on the 4th of May. But, with regard to the next charge of inaccuracy alleged against the "*Strictures*," I must consider Colonel Napier in the wrong, and the author of that publication in the right. "This writer, "curiously exact," says the historian, "asserts that "the army was not over the Guadiana until the 8th. "By his Appendix, however, it appears that, on the "7th, only one brigade of guns was left on the other "side." According to my view of the case, Colonel Napier is as curiously incorrect on this point as his opponent is "curiously exact." The historian refers to the Appendix of the "*Strictures*" for his authority; but he has abstained from quoting the passage on which he grounds his contradiction. I shall follow a different course, and lay before the reader, from the above-mentioned Appendix, what Sir Benjamin D'Urban has said upon the subject. After stating that the passage of the river was begun on the 5th, that officer proceeds*:—"The cavalry and "artillery belonging to the division continued to "pass by the two floating bridges. The work of "crossing was not intermitted for a moment, day or "night, from the time it commenced; and yet so "inefficient were the means of passage, that the last "of the fourth division and of the cavalry had not "crossed until eight o'clock of the evening of the "7th, nor the nine-pounders and division baggage "until three in the afternoon of the 8th."

* Further Strictures, Appendix, p. 12.

This account does not appear to bear out Colonel Napier in stating, that "on the 7th only one brigade "of guns was left on the other side." Such a representation neither accords with the letter nor the spirit of the passage; unless, indeed, "the baggage "of the divisions" signified nothing. It is besides expressly mentioned, that "the work of crossing "was not interrupted for a moment day or night." Colonel Napier must have perceived that "the bri-"gade of guns and division baggage" is merely spoken of as having been the last that passed, and not as having occupied the time from the 7th, till three in the afternoon of the 8th. But he must have also read in the same page, that "the army "remained in the position of Villa-Real all the 7th "and 8th, both of which days were not more than "sufficient (so slow was the passage of the river, "notwithstanding every diligence and exertion) to "complete the getting over the nine-pounder bri-"gade, the light reserves of ammunition, the division "baggage, and a small supply of biscuit and rice." Why did Colonel Napier overlook this?—And again, at page 13 of the Appendix to the "*Strictures,*" Sir Benjamin D'Urban says, "Every thing *absolutely* "*necessary* having closed up in the night of the "8th, Sir W. Beresford put the corps in movement "on the 9th." Why did Colonel Napier overlook this?—From this example the reader will perceive how necessary it is, on all occasions, to have the authorities quoted in full, and not to be content with abridgments and paraphrases, and *ex parte* deduc-

tions from them, if he would form a correct judgment upon the points under discussion. The historian produces a most curious reason in support of his statement. "Moreover," he says, "the operations were begun on the 7th, for on that day the "piquet of cavalry was surprised." The question concerns the advance, and the operations of the allied army, and has no reference whatever to the movements of the enemy; and the observation would have been just as applicable to the subject, if a party of the enemy had attacked us on the 5th, the first day of our beginning to pass the river. On the argument deduced from Latour Maubourg not having retired till the 18th, I shall merely observe, that if the "*Strictures*" err, Colonel Napier is not correct. He ought to have omitted the 18th in his reckoning, the day on which he says Latour Maubourg actually retired. There were, consequently, only nine instead of ten days; and though nine and eight most certainly do not make eighteen, they make seventeen, and the seventeenth was the last day on which Latour Maubourg was unmolested.

Colonel Napier maintains, that the Spaniards from Montejo were under my command; but a request to Castanos to place them in any given point, *pro tempore*, was neither having them under my orders, nor any thing equivalent to it. I believe, during the whole of my command in these parts, that I never heard any thing more of Murillo or his troops. On looking back to Colonel Napier's History, I cannot help feeling surprised that, on this

and on other occasions, whenever he thinks the weight of the Spanish force can be cast into the scale, in such a manner as to tell unfavourably to myself, the highest importance is attached to their co-operation; while, on every other occasion, he has undervalued their services, and done them no slight degree of injustice. "Before I refer to the battle "of Albuera," continues the historian, "I will ven- "ture upon another extract from Captain Squires, "who, notwithstanding this writer's displeasure, "I still hold to be good authority for what fell "under his own observation; and not the less so, "that he supports my opinion as to the Marshal's "want of skill at the siege; corroborates the account "of his blunder at Campo Mayor; and attests the "fact, that the army did generally hold his talents "in scorn, and were tired of his command:—

"'*17th May*, 1811.

"'Thank God! they say that Lord Wellington "'or General Hill may soon be expected in the "'neighbourhood; this will be a revival to our "'spirits, for we have lost our character on this "'part of the frontier. On the night of the 12th "'the real attack on the east side of the town was "'begun, but suspended by the Marshal after one "'hour's work; the soil was excellent. Had we "'begun there on the 9th, Badajoz would have been "'our own on the morning of the 15th; but, after "'the affair of Campo Mayor, &c. &c.!!! what can "'be expected?'"

In candour to Colonel Napier, I have on all occasions given his own words, and reasonings, and proofs; and I must add, that in the above passage they all are equally shallow and fallacious. He must have seen, however little he may have heeded them, accounts that entirely overthrew the solitary testimony of Captain Squires, not only as far as I myself am concerned, but upon all the facts to which his correspondence relates. On this occasion, as with regard to the batteries opposite the Zezere, Captain Squires appears to have been little better than one of those dissatisfied, talking, self-sufficient officers, of whom every army, and almost every regiment, can furnish an example; and estimating him by the extracts from his correspondence, which his friend has published, I should conceive him to have been either very ignorant, or not quite candid. Every military man would have been astonished at finding that Colonel Napier, after reading Colonel Jones's account of the siege of Badajoz, should have attached any value to the authority of Captain Squires, if he had not most candidly informed the public of the reasons which prepossessed him in its favour. "I hold Captain Squires," says the historian, "to be good authority for what fell "under his observation; and not the less so, that he "supports my opinion of the Marshal's want of skill "at the siege." Could no authority then be discovered to support such an opinion, but the private letters of Captain Squires?—But what can be more vicious than the circle in which Colonel Napier

argues with regard to the siege of Badajoz? He was not present at the affair; and the account delivered in his History was, of course, received from the information of others. But who was his informant? The only one whom he has named is this Captain Squires. The account of the History is attacked, and whose testimony is adduced in defence of it? The testimony of Captain Squires. He first makes his statements on the evidence of Captain Squires, and then brings forward the evidence of Captain Squires to confirm his statements!

I must, in my own justification, offer a few remarks upon this siege. The whole of its arrangements and preparations are detailed, with some degree of authority, in the first volume of Colonel Jones's publication. That officer is himself an engineer, and was much and confidentially employed at the time. He has stated no more upon the subject than actually fell within his own knowledge. After a page or two of preliminary observations, he says*, "Time "and means thus proving inadequate to the attack "of either of the regular fronts, and it being of the "greatest consequence to the future operations of "the army that Badajoz should be retaken, *Lieute-* "*nant-Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer,* "*submitted the following plan for reducing the* "*castle.*"

This identical plan, which was submitted to and approved by Lord Wellington, was the very plan which drew forth the censure of Captain Squires; a

* Jones's Sieges, vol. i. p. 14.

censure which recommends him to Colonel Napier as "*a good authority,*" because it confirms the historian's opinion of my want of skill at the siege! But let us hear Colonel Jones further. Having described the affair that occurred between the party who had gone out to cut wood and the escort of Lord Wellington, and mentioned the support which the former received from the troops of the garrison, he proceeds to say, "After this brush Lord Wellington "minutely examined the defences of the castle, and "convinced himself of the feasibility of the project "under consideration." Again, after stating the plan of attack, he continues, "In order to conceal "this plan from the garrison, and lest they should "begin to throw up interior defences in the castle, "before the batteries were prepared to disturb them, "it was proposed, on the same night, that ground "should be broken against Christoval; to open false "attacks against the two other detached works of "the place, and to continue them until the breach "in Christoval should become practicable; then to "relinquish these attacks, as concealment would be "no longer possible, and the workmen would be "required for the parallel in the plain."

It then appears from Colonel Jones's account, that no exertion was omitted on either side the river for carrying the plan formed by Colonel Fletcher, and approved by the Duke of Wellington, into execution; but that the nature of the ground on the St. Christoval side, in conjunction with the badness and paucity of entrenching tools, caused an unavoidable

delay. I was, consequently, strongly urged on the 10th, by Colonel Fletcher, not to wait any longer for the breaching, or reduction of St. Christoval, according to the original design, but to begin the trenches against the castle. Colonel Jones says, "On the 10th Sir William Beresford agreed with "the commanding engineer, on the propriety of "immediately commencing operations against the "castle." So far then was I from occasioning any delay in opening the trenches at that point, that I actually consented to their being opened before the event which the Duke of Wellington had contemplated occurred, and on which, according to the original plan, that operation was to be contingent. This part of Colonel Jones's work, first, affords a satisfactory explanation of the attack on St. Christoval, and of the object for which, on the same night, the two batteries against the detached works on the left bank were erected; and, secondly, accounts for the postponement of the parallel of the real attack. And although I was, with others, most decidedly of opinion that, under the circumstances, the original plan was the most feasible, yet it is plain that the plan adopted, and acted on, was that which had been proposed by the chief engineer of the allied army, an officer of the highest reputation, and approved of by the Duke of Wellington, after they had both made a careful review and examination of the place. I, at all events, was not the butt against whom the shaft of the historian ought to have been aimed on this occasion. He may now,

perhaps, lament its having been shot at all, finding how widely it has passed beyond its mark, and fallen where it must prove absolutely innocuous.

"Had we begun on the 9th," says Captain Squires, "Badajoz would have been ours on the morning of the 15th." This sentence, with a view, I presume, of stamping it with a mark of his own approbation, Colonel Napier has printed in italics. So be it then; and yet this bold assertion carries its own refutation along with it. In consenting to open the trenches for the real attack on the 10th, I had, as has been already shewn, gone beyond my instructions, and allowed an operation to be commenced before the primary measure on which it was to be contingent had been accomplished; and it will be made evident to the reader, that had the trenches been opened on the 9th of May our proceedings must have been suspended on the 10th, for the same cause which induced me to postpone them on the night of the latter day, and, further, to desist from them altogether on the night of the 12th. Had I even begun the attack on the 9th, it would have had no effect, I apprehend, in delaying the advance of Soult. I must necessarily, therefore, have raised the siege on the 12th, just three days before Captain Squires would so certainly have placed the town in our possession. In support, however, of the propriety of my conduct on this occasion, and in opposition to the censures of Colonel Napier's friend, I must be allowed to lay some evidence before the reader. The first is that of Colonel Jones, who says,

" In the course of the day (the 10th) the Marshal " received such information of the movements of a " French corps for the relief of the place, as induced " him to defer it," viz. the opening of the trench. To expose more fully the absurdity of Captain Squires' notion with regard to the capture of the place on the 15th, I will here add the concluding sentence of Colonel Jones's description of this siege:—" It may " be considered," he writes, " as fortunate, that the " approach of Marshal Soult's army caused the siege " to be raised, as otherwise, after a further sacrifice " of men, in other feeble attempts, it would have " brought itself to a conclusion from inability to " proceed." The author of the above extracts had previously accounted for the " inability" here spoken of, and ascribed it to a want of sufficient means for continuing the attack; although, to afford these means, Elvas had been stripped of a great portion of the materials necessary for its own defence. The final evidence that I shall cite against Captain Squires, and in support of my own case, is that of Colonel Napier himself. He has most fully justified me, and refuted his own authority. We read in his History, " Beresford, as I have before " said, remained in a state of uncertainty until " the night of the 12th, when he commenced rais- " ing the siege, contrary to the earnest represen- " tations of the engineers, who promised to put him " in possession of the place *in three days**, if he

* I never heard of such a proposition, and I believe that no one but Captain Squires ever dreamt of such nonsense.

" would persevere. This promise was ill-founded;
" and, if it had been otherwise, *Soult would have*
" *surprised him in the trenches.* His firmness, there-
" fore, saved the army; and his arrangements for
" carrying off the stores were admirably executed."

The above extracts will, I conceive, be considered as conclusive upon this subject. The fact is, that Captain Squires was merely an executive officer of engineers, who was altogether ignorant of the general plan of the siege—of the individuals from whom it emanated, and was approved by—of the reasons and the circumstances which had influence during its several stages—and, in short, of every thing except the part that he was immediately and personally engaged in; but, like too many others, he conceived himself a great military genius, and a better general than his commanding officer, and has presumed to deliver his opinion upon operations which he did not understand, and which no one thought it necessary to explain to him. Such is the good, and only authority, which Colonel Napier has adduced; and on which, though contradicted by Colonel Jones, and inconsistent with the statements of his own History, he holds it in no respect derogatory to his character as an historian, to charge me with " want " of skill" during the siege of Badajoz.—But I have not yet done with Captain Squires.—There is another assertion of his, which I cannot allow to pass unnoticed. He says, in his letter of the 17th May, speaking of the expected arrival of Lord Wellington or General Hill, " This will be a revival to our

" spirits, for *we have lost our character* on this part " of the frontier." It is not stated from what place this letter was written; but, extraordinary as the fact must appear, it is evident that Captain Squires, though he must have been somewhere in the neighbourhood, was ignorant, when he wrote this letter, of what had taken place the preceding day. He was certainly most unfortunate in this respect. Had he known of the battle of Albuera, he could hardly have exposed himself by affirming, that " the *allies* " had lost their character on that frontier." Whatever degree of credit Captain Squires might think due to myself, as the General commanding on the occasion, he could not have entertained any doubt about the credit which had been obtained by the allied armies.—It will strike the reader, I should think, as a little curious, that Colonel Napier must have been acquainted with every circumstance and authority that I have cited, and that he has himself supplied me with the strongest contradiction to the statements of his own witness.

Battle of Albuera.

Colonel Napier commences this part of his " *Jus-* " *tification*" by repeating the assertion of his History, and maintaining that " the youngest officer " commanded, which," he argues, " is true; for " although Blake's appointment, as Captain-General " of Valentia and Murcia, took place after the battle " of Albuera, he had been created Captain-General " of the Coronilla in March, 1809; and, as one of

"the Spanish regents, was also of a higher rank "than Beresford." In this passage a number of matters are confounded together, which have no necessary connection with each other; and the ignorance of Colonel Napier, who might have been presumed to be better informed upon such points, is very clearly discovered. "Blake," he says, "was "Captain-General of the Coronilla in March, 1809." To have shewn Blake's seniority to myself, the historian should have mentioned the day of that month, as he must know, or at least ought to have known, that I was also a marshal in the month of March, 1809. This, however, is of no consequence, as in Spain no military rank is obtained by being appointed captain-general of a province. Those appointments are, I believe, always bestowed on military officers; but such officers gain no precedency, out of their respective provinces, over major or lieutenant-generals, who are senior to them in the army; and, on quitting the government, they even lose the designation of captain-general. As to Blake's claim to command, as one of the regents, I apprehend that the members of the regency, when separated, were little better than the bundle of sticks in the fable. Each individual, apart from his fellows, had no authority or power on that account; and certainly Blake, arrogant as Colonel Napier describes him to have been, must, on this occasion, have been most unusually humble; for he never appears to have considered, that his being the fifth of a regent conferred upon him any right to seniority in the

field. There was a bishop in the regency; would Colonel Napier extend his newly-invented scale of military rank to him, and invest him also with the rank of captain-general of the army? At the time in question, Blake was no more than a lieutenant-general in the Spanish army: he joined the allied forces as such, and with no other pretensions. With Castaños the case was different. He was a captain-general in the Spanish army, and antecedent to my being a marshal; and to avoid placing a captain-general of Spain under a junior Portuguese marshal, the ranks being equivalent, he resigned the command of the few troops of the fifth army that were present to General Blake, and remained, himself, on the field of battle as a private individual. Blake, I apprehend, was in no respect less haughty or intractable than Castaños, and would have been equally unwilling to submit to the command of a Portuguese officer of inferior rank. The facts speak for themselves; and declare, in distinct contradiction to the historian's assertion, that the "youngest "officer did *not* command."

It is affirmed by Colonel Napier in his History, that "the position occupied by the British, was a "ridge about four miles long." This statement the "*Further Strictures*" has contradicted. In vindication of his account, Colonel Napier thus explains himself, "that is to say, from the extreme left, where the "Portugese cavalry were placed, to the extreme right, "where the battle ceased." I would not pretend, upon the mere fallible authority of my memory, to decide

upon this question; but, on reference to the plan of the field of battle, and the scale attached to it, I ascertain, by the aid of a pair of compasses, that from the extreme right of the ridge to the left of the Portuguese infantry is about two miles and a half, and that another quarter of a mile will extend beyond the farthest flank of Otway's cavalry, a force which was not in the line, or intended to be in position, but was stationed on that post, that it might observe the movements of Briche's cavalry on the other side of the Albuera, and which, by passing the river lower down, might have come upon our left, if unprotected. The utmost, therefore, that can be made of the position on the ridge, is two miles and three quarters. Colonel Napier asserts it to have been "about four "miles long." How he obtained his information respecting it is not stated. It will be observed that his own plan, as given in the 540th page of his third volume, does not afford the means of calculating the distances, as there is no scale attached to it. His "*Justification*" contains a defence of this plan of the battle, which, he says, "was only given as an expla- "natory sketch, and was taken from the same source "as that in the *Strictures*."

This sketch appears to me, though on a smaller scale, to be as laboured and as fully finished as the plan published in the "*Strictures;*" and, most assuredly, no two copies from the same original could well differ more from each other than they do. This is a point on which I may fairly claim a right to judge, as the original copper-plate is in my posses-

sion*; and, on comparing the copies with their archi-type, I must say that the one which Colonel Napier has published gives a very erroneous idea of the ground. "His plan," he says, "does not, as the "author of the '*Strictures*' asserts, extend the wood "over the tongue of land to the banks of the Al-"buera." The wood, I perceive, according to his plan, does not actually reach to the top of this height, although extending very considerably up it. And yet this circumstance has very little to do with the matter in dispute.

The author of the "*Strictures*" was criticising that part of Colonel Napier's History, to which the plan was introduced as an adjunct; and, as he could not suppose them to be at variance with each other, he very naturally assumed that the figures of the plan were designed to be in agreement with the text, against which his comment was directed. Now, in the body of "*Colonel Napier's History,*" the tongue of land is distinctly described as "wooded," as may be seen from the following extract:—"The "right of the allies, and the left of the French," says the historian, "approximated to each other, "being only divided by *a wooded hill* about cannon-"shot distance from either, but separated from the "allies by the Albuera, and from the French, by a "rivulet called the Feria." This description is too definite to be mistaken for anything but the tongue

* The plate was given me some years after its publication in D'Urban's Report, by Major Mitchell, who took the plan, and etched it himself.

of land in question; and it is expressly asserted to be a "wooded hill."

Colonel Napier, speaking of the position itself, continues, "Moreover, with reference to his descrip- "tion of the ground, this writer," (the author of *Further Strictures*) "as usual forgets to make his "Appendix agree with his text. At page 113, he "says, 'the rear of the position was only practicable "for infantry.' But General D'Urban's Memoir "says, 'it was easy for cavalry throughout;' which "is right?"

In reply to this question, it must first be said, that the author of the "*Strictures*" has never pretended that the text of his publication agrees, in every respect, with the Memoir of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, which forms the Appendix. On the contrary, in the 5th page of his Preface, he has candidly admonished the reader of the discrepancy that subsists between them. "There are," he says, "a few differences in "our details, but none which can be considered of "any moment, or which may not very easily be ex- "plained. It is evident that two officers, with equal "advantages of observation, may, on some important "occasions, see the same occurrences under a very dif- "ferent light and aspect; but as I write from memory, "and Sir Benjamin D'Urban wrote almost immedi- "ately after the transactions took place, with the "further advantage of documents to guide him, the "reader will necessarily give his view the preference "to mine, unless some confirmatory circumstances "or valid arguments should chance to turn the

" balance in my favour." After so fair and candid an admission, the author of the "*Strictures*" could hardly have expected to find himself censured by Colonel Napier for the want of agreement which existed between his account and that of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and of which he had forewarned the reader.

" This writer," says the historian, " *as usual*, for-" gets to make his Appendix agree with his text." It would have been very easy to make them tally the one with the other, if *plausibility*, and not *truth*, had been the object sought. The " *as usual*" is parenthetically slipt in as a little *ruse de guerre*, which the real differences between the two, with all the imaginary discrepancies alleged by Colonel Napier, are not sufficiently numerous to justify. But what is the fact? It is clear from the description of the ground given in the " *Strictures*," that the author never intended to represent the whole of the rear of the position as steep and abrupt; for he writes, " from " the top of the ridge, the descent to the river, " though about half a mile distant from the rear of " the village, is easy and very practicable for any " arm. The rear of the position was otherwise; " its descent was abrupt and steep, and only practi-" cable for infantry; but towards the left of the line, " this abruptness wore by degrees away, till the " ground came on a level with the ridge." I will not, at this distance of time, and writing from memory, take upon myself to give an absolute opinion upon the subject; but, speaking to the best of my recollection, I should say, that to the rear of that part of

the field on which the Spanish line was posted, the ground was too steep to be attempted by cavalry in the face of an enemy, even if it were practicable at all; but that, a little beyond their left, or towards the centre of Stewart's division, it was as described by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the author of the "*Strictures*." On this head nothing but a little candour is required, to enable the reader to reconcile the two accounts.

But to proceed.—Colonel Napier re-asserts, that "the position was occupied by 30,000 infantry, "above 2,000 cavalry, and 38 guns;" and then adds, "I will expose the disingenuous manner in which "the author of '*Further Strictures*' attempts to "bolster up a bad cause. Having printed a running "commentary on my pages, written by somebody "who is not named,"—(does Colonel Napier then *never* have recourse to this species of evidence?)— "he makes the anonymous critic state, that the "allies had only 34 pieces of artillery, thus leaving "out 4 Spanish guns." Is it generous in Colonel Napier to single out this note, *which*, he admits, *was not written by the author of the* "*Strictures*," which appears to have been inadvertently introduced, and which is actually in contradiction to the statements of that author, while he omits mentioning that his opponent acknowledges, in the text of his work, the accuracy of the account given in the "*History of the Peninsular War*," as far as regards the number of guns, though he shews that that account is wrong with respect to their weight of metal.

On this last head Colonel Napier was manifestly in error; he described the allies as having 18 nine-pounders, whereas it is perfectly certain they had no more than 10. Why has not Colonel Napier, in his *ingenuousness*, acknowledged his mistake? It was an error at least equivalent to the 4 Spanish guns. The state of the controversy on this head is curious. The respective statements stand as follows:—

Note to the Strictures. 34 Guns.			*Napier.* 38 Guns.			*Strictures.* 38 Guns.		
No.		Weight of Metal. lbs.	No.		Weight of Metal. lbs.	No.		Weight of Metal. lbs.
18	9-pounders,	162	18	9-pounders,	162	10	9-pounders,	90
16	6-pounders,	96	20	6-pounders,	120	28	6-pounders,	168
34		258	38		282	38		258

Thus the anonymous author of the note is wrong in numbers, but right in substance; Colonel Napier is correct in numbers, and wrong in substance; and the author of the "*Strictures*" is correct in both particulars. So much for the *ingenuousness* of Colonel Napier, and the disingenuousness of his critic.

In justice to the candour of Sir Benjamin D'Urban I will here insert a note that I lately received from him, with reference to the mistake upon this point which occurred in his Report:—"I readily admit "there was an error where I mention 34 guns "instead of 38. It was an inadvertency."

Colonel Napier next proceeds to defend his account of the numbers of the allied army at the battle of Albuera, which he does, as it would appear to me,

upon very unsound authorities. I will do my best to rectify the errors of his calculations; and though, from the loss of all my own papers, I must labour under a very considerable disadvantage, yet, with the help of Colonel Napier, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and such other sources of information as still remain open, after such a lapse of years, to assist my recollection, I have no doubt of being able to shew that the numbers which, even in his History, he has ascribed to the allied army is greatly exaggerated, and that the increased force attributed to it in his recent publication is perfectly preposterous and absurd. It will not be denied, I presume, that at the time I must have been acquainted with the strength of the British and Portuguese in the field, and have been informed of the number of the Spaniards from the report of their own commanders, corrected or confirmed, as that report was, by our own observations on the field. I have always considered, as I did on the day of the battle, that our united force did not exceed 28,000 men. This account includes the Spaniards, of which the force was reported by Generals Castaños and Blake, when we had our conference at Valverde, to amount to 10,000. At this number they have always been estimated by Sir Benjamin D'Urban. We saw Blake's infantry paraded and manœuvred for a considerable time, on the morning of the 16th May, while placing them in their position; and no person, whom I heard observe upon its force, at a moment when we were all naturally interested on the subject, estimated it more

than 8,000 men. Their cavalry, and the brigade of Don Carlos D'Espagne, would make up the 10,000. But I proceed to consider the details. I do not very materially differ from the estimate of the numbers of the British infantry and cavalry which is given in Colonel Napier's History, and which corresponds pretty well with Lord Londonderry's account of that force. They both, however, disagree with the historian's new statement. With regard to the numbers of the Portuguese, I should have allowed them to pass for 10,000, had not Colonel Napier, by drawing my attention to a passage of Lord Londonderry's work, induced me to enter upon a more particular consideration of the strength and composition of that corps; the result of which is a conviction that, when reckoned at 10,000, its numbers have been greatly exaggerated. It must have fallen very far short of that amount. The historian, in his present statement, calculates the British, Germans, and Portuguese, at no less than 20,000 men. I shall defer my notice of the Spanish force to the last. The British infantry he estimates at 7,500; the Germans at 1,500; the Portuguese infantry at 10,000; the British cavalry at 700; and the Portuguese at 300.

I will first consider the German, and shew, at once, how extraordinarily their strength is overrated. In a letter from Count Alten on this point, dated October 18, 1833, he says,—"The indepen-"dent light brigade under my command, consisting "of the 1st and 2d light battalions K. G. L., and

" numbering 1,100 combatants, arrived on its ground " at Albuera, &c." Now the above number of combatants would give, speaking in round numbers, somewhat more than 1,000 rank and file. We have thus a deduction of nearly 500 men, at once, from Colonel Napier's 1,500.

After recounting the numbers of the British, Germans, and Portuguese, the historian says, " I have " already given authority for a greater number of " men than I allowed in my work; it is therefore " necessary to explain, that, being in doubt whether " Lord Londonderry included Alten's Germans " under the head of British, I deducted the latter " from the gross numbers." If I understand the above, the author means to say, that, having at first supposed the 1,500 Germans were included in the 7,500 British given by Lord Londonderry, he had omitted to set them down as a separate corps, and add them to the gross amount of the army, as he has at present done. To this representation I have no less than three objections to offer. First, it is very clear the author could have had no good authority for rating the Germans at 1,500. Secondly, it does not appear that, when Colonel Napier wrote his History, he included that corps among the number of troops described as British. Thirdly, that Colonel Napier has misunderstood, and consequently mistated the text of Lord Londonderry, with regard to the number of British troops in the battle of Albuera.

The first of the above objections has been already

established by the extract from Count Alten's letter, cited in a former passage. With regard to my second objection, Colonel Napier has himself informed us in his History, that his reasons for reckoning the British at less than 7,000, was the absence of Brigadier-General Kemmis's brigade, of the 4th division. His words are,—" But the brigade of the " 4th division being still absent, the British infan- " try, the pith and strength of the battle, did not " amount to 7,000." Now, if on account of the absence of one brigade the British infantry was under 7,000, in which the Germans, a corps, according to Colonel Napier, 1,500 strong, were included, it would follow that the whole amount of pure British in the battle of Albuera would not have reached 5,500 men. But, with a strange inconsistency, which I am very happily not obliged, for I am perfectly unable to account for, he afterwards says*,— " Hence it is plain with what a resolution the *pure* " British fought, for they had only 1,500 men left " standing out of 6,000." According to this account the killed, wounded, and missing, would appear to be 4,500, which is a sufficiently correct general statement of their numbers; but, had there been 7,500 infantry at the battle, as Colonel Napier now asserts, and only 1,500 of these, as he has specifically stated, were left standing, it would follow that there must have been 6,000 in the casualty return. It is manifest, from the expression " pure British,"

* History, vol. iii. p. 543.

that the author understood these 6,000 men, spoken of in the preceding extract as being all British, and without any mixture of Germans. I now pass to my *third* objection, which will lead to the consideration of the main question—the number of British troops engaged at the battle of Albuera. I must here first draw the reader's attention to a striking instance of the strange manner with which Colonel Napier deals with his authorities. Lord Londonderry gives the strength of the British, Portuguese, and Spanish forces, and the total. The amount of the two first he states with confidence; of the latter he speaks with considerable doubt. Sir Benjamin D'Urban has given the numbers of each nation, and also the total. Colonel Napier selects partially from each of these authorities whatever may happen to suit his purpose, and rejects what is adverse to it. Thus the two battalions of Germans he takes from his own estimation; the force of the Portuguese he takes from D'Urban, who rates them higher than Lord Londonderry; and the force of the British he gives according to what he erroneously conceives to be the account of Lord Londonderry; while he, at the same time, passes over his evidence with regard to the other several corps and the total, though his Lordship is by far the most positive in his account of the total of the allied army; and Colonel Napier has sought to give all due weight to his statement by informing the reader, in a parenthesis, that "he "was Adjutant-General." Very far am I from impugning the authority which is thus given to Lord

Londonderry's testimony on this occasion, and I repeat that he was "Adjutant-General." But, holding that situation, he is not only the best evidence of the strength of the British, but Colonel Napier must allow that he is also likely to have had some knowledge of the strength of the Portuguese, the returns of which force went equally to the Duke of Wellington's head-quarters. But, first, with regard to the numbers of the British troops. Colonel Napier most erroneously describes Lord Londonderry as estimating the British infantry at 7,500; but such is not the case. His Lordship says *, "Out of "7,500 British troops engaged, 4,158 were placed "*hors de combat.*" Every military man is aware, that the word "troops," made use of in this place, means of all arms engaged in the battle. He expresses himself in the very same terms, speaking of the killed and wounded, who, as enumerated by his Lordship, were equally of all arms, cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

In a preceding page of his Narrative, Lord Londonderry is, if possible, more explicit †; and says,— "With respect to the exact numbers of this army it "is not very easy to form a correct judgment, be- "cause the Spaniards are proverbial for the great "inaccuracy of their returns; but, taking these at "12,000, the Portuguese at 8,000, and the British "at 7,500, the total number will reach about 27,000. "*That it could not exceed this is certain, however* "*much it might fall short of it.*"

* Page 538. † Page 532.

It clearly appears from these two quotations, each corroborating the other, that the total force of British, cavalry and infantry, amounted to 7,500 men. But, as Colonel Napier states, the heavy brigade and the 13th light dragoons to have made at least 1000, it follows that there were but 6,500 British infantry at the battle of Albuera. A number that corresponds very well as a medium between his own two contradictory accounts, according to which they are, in one place, described as less than 7,000, and in another, as 6,000. And Lord Londonderry, I repeat, was "Adjutant-General." Here, then, the reduction of 1000 men is to be made from the numbers given by Colonel Napier, in his "*Justi-*" "*fication;*" which, with the 500 that he has added to the real strength of the Germans, reduces his estimate of the allied army by 1,500 men, and those of my choicest troops.

I trust I shall be thought to have established my three objections to the historian's representations on this head. I am very unwilling to compute the number of the Portuguese army, at the battle of Albuera, at less than they have been generally reckoned; but, on considering Lord Londonderry's statement of its force, to which my attention has been directed by Colonel Napier, I feel persuaded that his Lordship's estimate must be very nearly correct; and that the Portuguese force on that occasion has hitherto been generally described as more numerous than it actually was. On looking to the regiments of the line, and battalions of Caçadores,

which formed Hamilton's division, and Hervey's and Collins's brigades, and which were all the Portuguese Infantry present at Albuera, I find there were seven regiments of the line, and two battalions of Caçadores, including in the latter the battalion of the L. L. legion*. The establishment of each regiment of the line was 1,400, and of each battalion of Caçadores 600. Multiply the former by 7, and the latter by 2, and the number of men in the seven regiments will be 9,800, and the number in the battalions of Caçadores will be 1,200, which added give a total of 11,000. But this calculation rests on the supposition that every one of these corps had its full complement to a man, which I should conceive neither Colonel Napier, nor any other officer, would even for a moment imagine to be possible. Allowing, therefore, a deduction of one-seventh, as "wanting to "complete," this, in round numbers, would amount to 1,600; and, if we suppose only one-tenth absent in the hospitals, on command, or under the various heads named in a return, which is less than was ever heard of in campaigning, we shall find it necessary to make a further deduction of 1,100. These together cause a diminution in the whole Portuguese force of 2,700 men. And, if this number be deducted from 11,200, as I will allow 200 men to the Lusitanian legion beyond the ordinary strength of a Caçadore battalion, though I am fully aware that its real excess was not by any means so

* See Appendix to "Further Strictures," p. 53.

great, we have 8,500 men remaining, which pretty well agrees with the computation of Lord Londonderry, who, as "Adjutant-General of the Forces," was likely to have been correct in his information.

Colonel Napier's own History, which however I am not here corroborating, would authorize me in insisting on a greater deduction than I have here made from the strength of the Portuguese forces. He has informed us in that publication, "that 10,000 soldiers "of the Portuguese army of the line deserted between "April and the preceding December," that is of 1810. If that army had ever been complete to its full establishment, it would have reckoned about 50,000 men. The desertions alone would, therefore, have reduced it one-fifth; and we cannot imagine that, between December and May, when we had the enemy in our front before Santarem, or were engaged in still more active operations, it could have been recruited, if at all, more than was necessary to supply the further decrease occasioned by the continual desertions which are mentioned by the historian.

But, upon 10,000 desertions, the average loss to each regiment, still supposing them complete at any one time preceding, would be 280 men; and to a battalion of Caçadores 170, which, for the seven regiments and two battalions, would cause a diminution in their strength of 2,200, to which if 1,100 be added, as absent in hospitals, commands, &c., we have a total of 3,300 to be deducted from the whole Portuguese force of 11,200, and a residue of 7,900 remaining—a calculation which approaches very

near to the statement of Lord Londonderry. Thus, then, if the Portuguese army be taken at its highest possible amount, there would be 1,500 men less than it has been estimated at, and 2,000 men less, according to the account given by Lord Londonderry, and confirmed by Colonel Napier. There would consequently be a deduction of 3,000 men from the numbers of the whole of the allied British, German, and Portuguese army, as given by the historian in his "*Justification.*" But in leaving the Portuguese at 10,000, we suppose that only 1,200 men were wanting of their utmost possible strength; and besides omitting to make any allowance for the usual casualties of war and campaigning, we overlook the desertions mentioned by Colonel Napier, and which he estimates at near double that number. Thus Lord Londonderry's statement is pretty nearly proved to be correct.

I will now turn to the historian's statement respecting the British and Portuguese cavalry. He will here be found to be even more erroneous in his general conclusions than he was in his account of the infantry; nor is he altogether accurate in his details. Colonel Napier reckons the heavy brigade at 700, and describes it, from a journal by Captain Thorne, as having been 752 on the 20th March preceding, "which," he says, "was only 20 days "previous to the 16th May." This is a very original mode of counting time. Had it been the 20th April, it would have been 26 days previous to the battle; but ordinary persons suppose that there are 56 days from the 20th of March to the

16th of May—a period quite long enough in campaigning, as indeed 26 days would have been, to account for any diminution in the numbers of the cavalry. The date of General Hervey's journal, which is also quoted, is not given, so that little can be said upon his calculation. But before we lay any stress upon these documents, even if they intrinsically deserved it, we ought to know on what authority the statements they contain are made by their respective authors. Such journals are generally nothing more than the depositaries of the rumours of the camp. It will be presently seen how very little they are to be relied on. It will be shewn, indeed, that even the returns, made but a few days anterior, or posterior to an engagement, are not to be received as satisfactory authority for the numbers found in the ranks on the field.

I will first, however, advert to a very curious paragraph in page 22 of Colonel Napier's "*Justification*," on the subject of the cavalry. It is as follows:—

"Since writing the above," the passage on which I have just been commenting, "I have obtained the "weekly states of General Long's division of cavalry, "for the 8th and for the 29th of May, that is, one "week before and a little more than a week after the "battle of Albuera; and, unless it can be shewn that "in the day of battle there were fewer men in the "ranks than at other periods, they will be found con-"clusive as to the numbers of cavalry. On the 8th "May the present under arms at Villa Franca, in

" front of Albuera, were, exclusive of 230 officers and " serjeants, 1,429 Portuguese and British troopers, " the latter having 1,109 men, and 1,076 horses; " and, on the 29th May, there were 1,587 men, and " 225 officers and serjeants, and 1,489 horses: the " increase arising from the junction of men who had " been detached. It is clear, therefore, that (the " 13th Dragoons, the Portuguese and Spanish horse " being added), the allied cavalry must have been " near 3,000 men in the field, and that I have " understated their real numbers."

These particulars are very extraordinary, and ought to have been classed by the author with his other " new and curious facts;" but, according to the duplicate mode of calculation adopted in the above extract, Colonel Napier has it in his power to raise the force of the army then under my command to any amount that may seem expedient to him.

I would observe, *en passant*, that, when he speaks of the time from the day of battle to the 29th of May, *thirteen* days, as " being a little more than a " week," his expression would have been more correct if he had said, " almost a fortnight."

From this new account of the numbers of the allied army, it should seem, that, on the 8th of May, there were 1,076 horses, which would constitute the number of the British cavalry in the field on that day; as any excess of men present, beyond the supply of horses, would necessarily be dismounted. But this calculation is greater than that, which Colonel Napier has quoted, either from Colonel

Hervey or Colonel Thorne; the former gives the heavy brigade as 700 strong, and the latter at 752. These numbers, allowing 300 for the 13th Light Dragoons, more by-the-bye then it then had, would make the whole force of our cavalry but 1,000, according to Colonel Hervey, and 1,052, according to Colonel Thorne; both which accounts disagree with the newly-discovered weekly states of General Long's division of cavalry. I do not understand which statement Colonel Napier considers as right, and feels inclined to adhere to. From his "*Justi-*" "*fication*" I cannot discover what he estimated the mounted force of the Portuguese at on the 8th May; but with regard to the force on the 29th May he is more explicit. He tells us that on that day "there "were 1,587 men, and 225 officers and serjeants, "and 1,489 horses." This latter number then must be taken as the strength of General Long's division of cavalry in the field; but, although this is the only direct conclusion to be drawn from Colonel Napier's words, I will add to this number that of the "225 officers and serjeants*," which were previously mentioned, making in all 1,714 swords; and, I believe, that is what Colonel Napier did really mean to say.

Of these weekly records of General Long the historian says,—"Unless it can be shewn that in the "day of battle there were fewer men in the ranks

* I here give an advantage to Colonel Napier by counting the serjeants' horses, though they would have been included in the general return.

" than at other periods, they will be found conclusive " as to the numbers of the cavalry." He thus very ingeniously gets rid of the trouble of supporting his assertion, by casting on another the onus of disproving it; but it is not at all a necessary consequence, that because such was the state of the cavalry on the 8th and 29th of May, such must also have been its state on the 16th, nor, indeed, was it so. And it will be shewn that it was not the same, even on either of the two extreme dates, which Colonel Napier has given as the means of ascertaining the state of the army in the intervening period. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under General Madden, was included in the enumeration of General Long, both on the 8th and 29th of May; and it was not present at the battle of Albuera. Major-General Sir B. D'Urban, in a recent letter, says,—" I still con- " sider the statement made in my report*, wherein " the cavalry is taken at about 2,000 *in the battle*, to " have been very near the true strength." It must be borne in mind, that " General Madden's brigade " was present on the 8th and 29th May (the two " periods cited), but absent from the battle fought " on the 16th." Having thus satisfied the historian's " *unless*," I shall proceed to the examination of his other calculations. After summing up the total strength of General Long's division, *British* and *Portuguese*, man for man, and horse for horse, he says,—" It is clear, therefore, that the 13th Light

* Appendix to " Further Strictures," page 36.

" Dragoons, and the Portuguese and Spanish horse " being added, the allied cavalry must have been " near 3,000 men in the field." No doubt of it, if this computation were just; but, unhappily for its correctness, the 13th and the Portuguese had been already expressly included in the previous account, by which General Long's division appeared to be 1,714 strong. As Colonel Napier has thus counted the 13th Light Dragoons and the whole of the Portuguese cavalry twice over, I must remind him, that, in reckoning the strength of General Long's division at 1,714, he included the 13th Light Dragoons and the Portuguese cavalry, which, as he has himself expressly stated, in giving the strength of that division, belonged to it on the 8th and 29th of May. But it has been shewn that Madden's brigade, forming six squadrons of Long's division, was absent from the battle; and, rating these six squadrons at 350 men, that number must be deducted from the 1,714 present on the 29th May, to give the number present on the 16th. Thus the strength of Long's division, or that of the British and Portuguese, will not amount to 1,400 at Albuera.

I have also promised to convince Colonel Napier that the British cavalry has been over-rated; and here I would first refer to General Long's estimates. He does not pretend to be very precise in his numbers, and I only produce it as a probable approximation to the truth; nor, loosely as I think that officer's statements were often made, would I now avail myself of it, but that I am prepared with posi-

tive evidence as to the strength of the heavy brigade at Albuera, by which his account may be confirmed. It is said in a letter, from General Long to H. H., dated 26th June, 1811*,—"The dispersion of our "cavalry scarcely left us more than 400 or 500 Bri- "tish at any point." Now the whole of the heavy brigade, with one squadron of the 13th Dragoons, was with General Long on the right, and together. Let us then take these at 500. There were only two other squadrons of British cavalry, those of the 13th Light Dragoons, near the bridge of Albuera; and if they are taken at 200 swords, we shall find that the number of British cavalry at Albuera, according to General Long, amounted to 700 men. I will now give the statement of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Sir W. Lumley. In a letter, dated the 9th January, 1834, he says,—"With regard "to the force of the allied cavalry on the right flank "of the army, on the day of Albuera, I can posi- "tively assert it did not amount to 1,500 men; and "I can, with equal decision, say, that of that inade- "quate force the British cavalry was much under "700, because, on my assuming the command, one "of the first questions I put to the Brigade-Major "(Holmes) was, *what the strength of the British "cavalry might be?* His answer was, the heavy "brigade (3d Dragoon Guards and 4th Dragoons) "had only together 560 men in the field, and one "squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons, on that "flank, not exceeding 100 men."

* Reply to C. C. Long, Esq., p. 130.

I have kept my word, I trust, and shewn how very erroneous Colonel Napier's representation of the strength of the cavalry of the allies has been, both with regard to the details, as far as the details can be ascertained, and his report of the total strength of that arm. As the whole of the Spanish cavalry was with Sir W. Lumley, it is evident that its force did not exceed 800 men. According to General Long's account it was considerably less. Besides the cavalry under Lumley, there were only two squadrons of the 13th Light Dragoons, and the Portuguese, under Sir Loftus Otway. The whole force of this arm would stand, I apprehend, nearly as follows:—

The British could not have exceeded . .	850
The Spanish might amount to	750
Leaving for Otway	400
	2,000

I do not pretend to assert that the above is to be taken as a precise and exact account, either of the number of each corps, or of the whole together; but, if any reliance is to be placed in Lumley, Long, and D'Urban, the persons of all others the most likely to be accurately informed upon the subject, the statement I have just given must be correct within 100 men, either more or less. I must next observe on the historian's mode of estimating the strength of the fifth Spanish army; because Sir Benjamin D'Urban in his Memoir states, that about

the 30th of March, Morillo's division of the fifth Spanish army, consisting of a few weak battalions,—very few indeed, General D'Urban expressly says "*two* or *three*,"—Colonel Napier supposes that Castaños must have brought up some of Morillo's people, and has, on the bare authority of this supposition, added 400 men to the 1,600 of Don Carlos D'Espagne. Now, not a single soldier of Morillo's ever joined us; and, if the historian would look at the 52d page of Sir Benjamin D'Urban's Memoir, a work which he has frequently referred to and quoted from, he might see that no infantry of the fifth army are mentioned as being with us, except the four battalions of Don Carlos D'Espagne. The reader may here again learn to appreciate the value of Colonel Napier's calculations, by witnessing the careless manner in which they are made, and the very extraordinary practice which he allows himself, of adopting or rejecting, at pleasure, the authority of the very same individual on the same occasion, and on the same point. Thus he states, on the authority of General D'Urban, that there were 10,000 Portuguese at Albuera. He was informed, on the very same authority, that there were only 10,000 Spaniards there; but, as this account does not suit his views, without any evidence whatever that bears directly upon the account of the Spanish army at Albuera, he arbitrarily raises the strength of that force to 13,500, of which he describes 1,600, more than double their real number, as cavalry! The first authority cited, in proof of this computation, is

a letter from Mr. Wellesley to Lord Wellington, dated Cadiz, April 11, 1811, in which that gentleman says, "I learn that General Blake was about to "come into the Condado de Niebla, to take the "command of General Ballasteros' division, and of "the troops which had been under the command of "General Zayas, and which were to return to that "quarter. The whole corps will amount to 12,000 "men, of which 1,100 are cavalry." The last sentence is printed in italics by Colonel Napier; but he has none, not even the slightest authority, for placing these 12,000 men at the battle of Albuera. The first question that I would ask is, Did the competent number to make up the 12,000 ever leave Cadiz? Mr. Wellesley, who was then British Minister at Cadiz, wrote, I presume, according to the information given him by the Spanish authorities; but would Colonel Napier, whose History overflows with censures on the neglect, imbecility and bad faith of the Spanish Government, assume that, because a certain force is promised at Cadiz on the 11th of April, the whole of it must, therefore, have been at Albuera on the 16th of May? And, secondly, did not a part of this intended 12,000 men suffer defeat and loss, after the date of Mr. Wellesley's letter, and before the arrival of Blake? I read in the "*History of the Peninsular War**," that "General "Maransin defeated Ballasteros on the 12th of "April, at Fregenal, and was following up his vic"tory towards Salvatierra."

* Vol. iii. p. 502.

The second testimony, on which the historian relies to support his representation of the numbers of Blake's corps on the 16th May, is a letter from Lord Wellington, dated 4th July, and in which that force is spoken of as being still from 10 to 12,000 strong. This letter was written, as Colonel Napier very justly observes, "six weeks after the battle." In the course of that time Blake's corps might have been either diminished or augmented to any extent. It might have received reinforcements from Cadiz, which was then a depôt, and in which many of the originally intended 12,000 men might have remained. It might also have been strengthened, after the battle of Albuera, by isolated or disbanded troops; or it might have been increased by the flocking in of bands of peasantry, as recruits. But, indeed, this evidence proves a great deal too much: it shews that Lord Wellington had no returns that he could depend upon, by his giving the wide range of between 10 and 12,000. Again, the historian says, that "in an abstract of the head-quarters' returns, made "1st July, Quinta St. Jaõ, Blake's corps is again "set down at 12,000." These are all his proofs, not one of which even alludes to the 16th of May, or speaks of any time within five weeks of it! Lord Wellington probably received his account of the number of Blake's corps from the Spanish General himself. On the uncertainty of Spanish returns we have already given the opinion of Lord Londonderry; and the justice of this opinion appears confirmed by the present case, in which we have Blake's

army reckoned, on the 1st of July at 12,000, and on the 4th at from 10 to 12,000—no inconsiderable difference in the space of four days. The statement of the number of the Spanish, which I have given in opposition to Colonel Napier's, is that of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, the Quarter-Master-General of the allied army. That officer's intelligence upon the subject was derived from General Blake himself, two or three days before the battle, and corroborated by his own personal scrutiny on the morning of the 16th May, when the whole of Blake's infantry were in line, and manœuvring for a considerable time immediately before us. Colonel Napier adds, "How-" ever, my estimate is thus borne out, as well as the " nature of the case will permit; and what does a " thousand or two, more or less, signify in this mat-" ter, when it is plain that there were already more " than Marshal Beresford was able to handle, seeing " that in so bloody and critical a battle one-third of " his troops never fired a shot." It most certainly appears, that to Colonel Napier one or two thousand *more* do signify very little indeed. But he objects that " one-third of my troops never fired a shot." I could point out other battles in the Peninsula, Busaco for instance, where as great a proportion never fired a shot; besides, Colonel Napier has said in his History that I was actually bringing up those troops.—This, however, is the first time that I ever heard of a general's being censured for keeping one-third of his force in reserve, and beating the enemy with the other two. To enter upon the discussion of this

point, it would be necessary to consider the character of the ground,—the extent of front,—the number of troops that could be placed in it,—the nature of the attack and defence,—the distribution and various positions of the enemy's force, and many other particulars, which would swell this publication to too large a bulk; and, as the statement of the historian can convey no meaning applicable to the case to any military mind, I shall not trouble the reader with any further observations upon the subject.

Colonel Napier next proceeds to justify his statement of the number of the French army. He quotes as his authority the imperial French muster-rolls of the 1st of May, for the force under arms of the 5th corps. I am unacquainted with the exact mode of making up a French muster-roll, nor have I at present any opportunity of seeing one; but, were I to see the several heads under which those not under arms were accounted for, I might probably be able to shew that many of that class would be likely to join on such an occasion. But as I have no intelligence on the subject, I will not doubt the accuracy of Colonel Napier's calculation. He has taken a battalion of grenadiers as consisting of 500 men. He has given no authority for this estimate; I can only say that we, at the time, understood it to consist of 1,000. Two regiments from the 4th corps were rated at 4,000. This also appears to me as an arbitrary computation of their strength. Godinot's brigade is given at the same number, 4,000: and Colonel Napier then concludes by affirming, that

" he has thus worked out his estimate from authentic " documents." I will not question what I am not prepared with evidence to refute; but I would simply intimate, that, except as to the force of the 5th corps, he has not mentioned, or referred to any document, or authority of any description.

The historian then directs our attention to the French writers on these events for the confirmation of his account of the total. He cites five altogether: four of whom are all agreed in describing the French force as only 22,000; while the fifth, the author of a work entitled "*Victoires et Conquêtes Français*," has reduced them to a considerably lower number. Four of the five authors, cited on this occasion, are French. The fourth, Jomini, could only have copied the report of one of them; and from the account of the fifth, we only learn how little dependance can be placed on the representations of French authorities, whilst writing under the influence of national feeling, and a desire of vindicating the honour of their country. The error is an error on the side of patriotism; and, while we censure the injustice, we cannot help admiring the generous principle from which it sprung. Happily, or unhappily, some of our English historians have no such prepossessions attributable to them. In entertaining a suspicion of those representations of the enemy's force which Colonel Napier has quoted from the works of foreign authors, I may be censured for want of liberality; but I can give a sufficient reason for these suspicions. One of these authors is Colonel Lamarre. This

officer, while he limits the number of the French army to 22,000, raises that of the allies to 38,000. Another, M. Lapéne, from whom the others appear to have taken their estimate, so that he is in fact the sole authority, also represents the French force as 22,000; and yet it can be proved from his own work that, at the beginning of April, the 5th corps had 9,000 bayonets in the field. That author, describing the measures of Latour Maubourg, and his retreat with the army of Estremadura to Llerena about the 8th or 10th of April, says,—"This army (at Llerena) "was now only composed of a division of light "cavalry and of the 5th corps: this latter, which "had 12,000 *bayonets* at the opening of the campaign "of 1811, had lost at least 1,000 men in the pre-"ceding operations, and furnished a contingent of "2,000 soldiers for the garrisons of Olivença and "Badajoz, consequently it had no more, at the "period treated of, than an effective force of from "7 to 8,000 combatants." This is surely a strange consequence to draw from the premises. By subtracting three from twelve, do no more than seven remain? It may have been that others were, at the time spoken of in the above extract, detached from the 5th corps on other duties; but they would indubitably have rejoined on the occasion in question. As the passage stands, full 2,000 bayonets are left unaccounted for; as the last number of combatants given by Lapéne would not afford above 7,000 bayonets. Now, it is certain, if they were 12,000 at the commencement, and had only supplied 2,000

for the garrisons of Olivenza and Badajoz, and had lost no more than 1,000 from casualties, 9,000 bayonets must have remained. And in the interval between the 10th of April and the battle of Albuera, nothing could have occurred to reduce the number of this corps. It was almost in a state of repose.

Thus then we have.....	9,000
Colonel Napier says, that in the beginning of May this corps received....	3,500
Captain Lapéne further says, that Soult united at Seville between 9 and 10,000 infantry, which he formed into the brigades Werlé and Godinot, say	9,500
Infantry. ...	22,000

What does my despatch say?—

"The enemy's force was much more considerable "than we had been informed of, as I do not think he "displayed less than from 20 to 22,000 infantry." Such was, as I perfectly recollect, the general opinion at the time. I can adduce Colonel Napier himself, to support the calculation of the strength of the 5th corps at this period, as I have deduced it from Captain Lapéne's account. "Soult," says the historian, "had carried away six battalions, "and a regiment of cavalry, 400 men, were "thrown into Olivença; 3,000 into Badajoz: thus, "with the losses sustained during the operations, "Mortier's numbers were reduced to less than

"10,000 men." But if we allow 1,500 men for the light division of cavalry, there still remains nearly 8,500 infantry; and the historian had certainly taken every contingency that could diminish the number of this corps into consideration, for he has described it as supplying the whole garrisons of both Badajoz and Olivença; while Lapéne expressly states, that the greater part of the former, only, was taken from the 5th corps.

The last-mentioned corps, as we have seen, according to Lapéne's own shewing, ought to have consisted, at the time in question, of 9,000 bayonets; yet, without ascribing any reason whatever for its diminution, he, in the same paragraph, reduces it to 7,000.

Before that officer's book was written, the battle of Albuera had been fought. Its result may have had some effect, perhaps, in influencing the author's account of the gross numbers of the French army on that day. But Colonel Napier's statement proves, as far it can prove any thing, that the French army was in fact, independently of the superior skill of its commander, from its superior organization, discipline, &c., of greater intrinsic force than the allies. His History informs us, that "the French had fifty guns, "and above 4,000 veteran cavalry, but only 19,000 "chosen infantry; yet, being of one nation, obedient "to one discipline, and animated by one spirit, their "excellent composition amply compensated for the "inferiority of numbers."

There is, I must observe, a curious coincidence

between the numbers of the French infantry, as I have deduced them from the accounts of Lapéne and Napier, with the estimate made of it, on the ground, by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Sir Henry Hardinge, and myself, and every British officer present, whom I have heard speak upon the subject. But the reader will judge for himself: I am in no way interested in the amount of the enemy's force. If any blame can attach to any one, on this occasion, it would be to him who brought an inadequate force into the field. I gave my opinion of the numbers of the French army in my despatch; and, after all I have heard and read upon the question, I do not feel inclined to alter it.

The historian next considers his account of the loss experienced by the two armies.

He has asserted in his work, that "near 7,000 of "the allies," and "above 8,000 of the French were "struck down."

He now gives the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese	4,547
Of the Spaniards	2,200
Total	6,747

It cannot be denied that the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese was as great as is above represented; and the error of the "*Strictures*" appears merely accidental, and to have arisen from the author's having omitted to reckon the number of the officers and ser-

jeants with the rest of the killed and wounded; which being given in a separate return, was, perhaps, inadvertently overlooked. But even now, is not Colonel Napier guilty of a palpable mistake? After stating the above loss, he says, "It is also to be recollected "that the British official return does not include a "number of men, who, having been made prisoners, "escaped, and rejoined their regiment in a few days "after the action." Every military man is aware that the official return of casualties from head-quarters is formed from those transmitted by the respective divisions, brigades, or corps present; and no British officer will, I apprehend, suppose the officers respectively commanding would be guilty of any voluntary inaccuracy in their statements. That any incorrectness of this kind should occur at head-quarters would be impossible, as that return is published, and any error which it contained would be immediately detected by every general officer and commanding officer of a regiment. It appears to me quite marvellous that the historian, as a military man, should be so little acquainted with returns of that nature. He has given the loss of the Anglo-Portuguese, according to the official return, at 4,547. From this exact agreement of his statement with the numbers published in the returns, it is evident that he has seen and calculated upon them. But the above-mentioned number includes killed, wounded, and *missing*. The despatch and return from which this account is copied, were printed in the London

Gazette of June 3, 1811, and it will be there seen that the

Anglo-Portuguese killed were	984
wounded.....	2,993
Making a total of	3,977
Then the missing were....	570
	4,547

This is the precise amount, to a man, set down by Colonel Napier, and which he speaks of in such a manner as to intimate that the gross sum included only the killed and wounded, and omitted the men who had been made prisoners; while he has himself included those very men as *missing*, which, as long as there is any doubt respecting their fate, is the usual mode of returning them.

But one thing is obvious. If there were but 570 missing, there could not have been more than 570 prisoners. This is an incontrovertible fact; and, as Colonel Napier assures us, "the greater part," I believe nearly the whole, "rejoined the army a few days "after the return was made up." So far was the loss of the allies from being more severe than is described in the return, that it was, in fact, very considerably less.

With regard to the loss of the Spanish army, the historian tells us, that "he estimated their loss from "common report at the time, from the authority of "Colonel Jones's History, and from the Spanish "accounts of the day." As to common report, under

any circumstances, and more particularly under such circumstances, it cannot be considered otherwise than as a very extraordinary kind of evidence for the author of so grave a history to rely upon; and I shall, at once, set it aside as being of no value whatever. As to Colonel Jones, that officer, as far as I can discover, has no where estimated the Spanish loss at 2,200. In one place he reckons it at 2,000; and says in another place, that "it was above "that number." So that his calculation is nearly a medium between the statements of Colonel Napier and of the author of the "*Strictures*;" the former having, by a fraction, somewhat more of right to quote him in his favour than the latter. But, however, as Colonel Jones describes the whole Spanish force present at Albuera as amounting to 14,000, it is pretty manifest that his information on this subject could not have been of the very best description. Colonel Napier's last authority consists of the "Spa-"nish accounts of the day." By this author, no promise, statement, or document, of a Spanish origin, is to be relied upon, unless it relates to Albuera; and then it is to be received as an evidence of unquestionable weight and credit. This inconsistency is very strange. On the present occasion, it is impossible to guess what Spanish accounts he speaks of, as he has not cited them, nor afforded any clue to guide us in search of them.

I thus leave Colonel Napier and his three authorities. "Common report," which, according to an old adage, bears a very indifferent character for

truth; Colonel Jones, who does not agree with him, and his "Spanish accounts," which he has not thought proper to give any clue to the discovery of.

"There is," Captain Napier affirms, "in the text "of the author of the '*Strictures*,' proof of the "inaccuracy of his statement; for he says, that be-"fore the British came into action the Spaniards had "lost 1,500; and yet he would have us believe that, "in all the after-fight, though they were constantly "exposed to the fire, they only lost 200 more!"

It appears to me, that I shall be able to produce much stronger proof of the historian's inaccuracy on this head, than he has even imagined in the author of the "*Strictures*." Colonel Napier very seldom quotes the exact expressions of any document. He criticises, he paraphrases, or he gives the sense of a passage, according to his own understanding of it. In the course of these operations he very frequently, according to my view, mistakes the meaning of the authority that he is referring to. Such is the case in the present instance. He represents the author of the "*Strictures*" as saying, "Before the British "came into action the Spaniards had lost 1,500 "men." The reader may be surprised to learn, that there is actually no such sentence in the publication alluded to; nor, so far as I am able to catch the intention of its author, any passage that can be made to bear such a construction. It is said in the "*Fur-*"*ther Strictures**," with regard to the position occu-

* Page 158.

pied in first line by the Spaniards, and their exposure there to the enemy's fire,—"The loss of the Spa-"niards here was about 1,500 men;" but there is not a single word about the British to be found in the whole page. The author of the "*Strictures*" describes the loss of the Spaniards during the whole time they remained in this post; and, as he shews more than once, that both Colborne's brigade, and after him Houghton's, were engaged, while the Spaniards still remained on that part in the front line, he can never be understood by any, but the most careless reader, as having asserted, that the 1,500 men were there lost by the Spaniards, "before the "British had entered the action." The actual loss of the Spaniards can only be conjectured; no returns of its amount were transmitted to me; but the persons who were present at the time, and on the spot, were, at least, as likely to be accurate in their calculations as the historian. But I would observe, that if the Spaniards had only lost 1,500 upon the ground in question, their loss elsewhere could not have amounted to much above 200, as, after that period, they were never, to my knowledge, in action, nor exposed to any direct fire; and, if they subsequently suffered at all, it could only have been by the casual, or random fall of cannon balls.

"With respect to the *French* loss," the historian continues, "I found in General Gazan's intercepted "letter, that he had, a few days after the battle, more "than 4,000 wounded under his charge, and that

" some had died on the road. By Marshal Beres-
" ford's despatches I found that 350 wounded were
" discovered at Almendral; and that 3,000 were
" lying killed, or mortally wounded, on the field.
" This loose estimation, taken at the highest, ac-
" counts for about 8,000; taken at the lowest, about
" 7,000. This last number is what French writers
" admit, and I found a confirmation of it in the
" official abstract of Lord Wellington's analysis of
" the numbers opposed to him in July 1811. He
" there twice states the French loss at Albuera at
" 7,000 men; but with that liberality which is
" usually practised towards enemies on such occa-
" sions, Marshal Beresford added 2,000, Sir Ben-
" jamin D'Urban adds 3,000, and the author of the
" '*Strictures*' adds 4,000 to this number. How far
" future writers of this school will go, I cannot
" pretend to say."

The historian has here set down three precise numbers, 4,000, 350, and 3,000, and then calls the product a loose estimate; but, be it observed, that this is the very lowest estimate which Colonel Napier has been able to discover. My calculation, made upon the field of battle, and given in a letter dated the very day of the enemy's retreat, only comprehended those whom we found on the field, as far as we could prudently inspect it, and when I was altogether ignorant of the 4,000 wounded, under the charge of General Gazan, and of those who were afterwards found at Almendralejo, and other towns.

Now that considerable numbers of wounded sol-

diery, in addition to those found at Almendralejo, were discovered in the several other towns through which the enemy had retreated, had been told Colonel Napier by the author of the "*Strictures*," and was, indeed, to have been anticipated from the very nature of the case; and, besides this information, the historian had the testimony of Sir Benjamin D'Urban for 2,500 killed, and 1,000 prisoners, on the field; a statement which there can be no assignable reason for suspecting, and which is advanced on the very best evidence possible, for Sir Benjamin D'Urban had them actually counted.

As to the author of the "*Strictures*," fully aware that his calculation of the French loss is higher than any which had been previously given, he very fairly warns the reader of that fact, and details the reasons by which he has been led to deviate from the generally received accounts. This does not appear to me to indicate any want of candour, or the design of wilful exaggeration. The official abstract of the Duke of Wellington, which Colonel Napier mentions, I have never seen. He may, possibly, have misapprehended this, as he has so many other documents. Even, according to the brief reference which he has made to it, this paper would seem capable of bearing a very different construction from that which he has put on it. If, in July 1811, the Duke of Wellington estimated the reduction of the French army opposed to him at 7,000, in consequence of the battle of Albuera, this account would, at least, authenticate Sir Benjamin D'Urban's estimate of

those put *hors du combat* on that day, if it did not, indeed, fully confirm the representation of the author of the "*Strictures*." The Duke of Wellington's analysis may be understood, as shewing that, at least six weeks after the battle, when a large portion of the enemy's wounded must have recovered and rejoined their corps, the diminution of their strength was still estimated at 7,000. Colonel Napier's describing this document as a "statement of the numbers *opposed* to him in July," establishes the likelihood of the construction which I have put upon it; for it is clear, that the account of the numbers wounded on the 16th of May, but which had since been cured, and were actually present in the opposing army, could never have been taken into consideration, or have had any thing to do with an analysis of the force which the enemy opposed to Lord Wellington in July. The question is this:—Was the Duke of Wellington giving a statement of the number of the French army, who were put *hors du combat* on the 16th May; or, was he estimating the diminution of strength which the French army suffered, in the July following, from the battle fought upon that day?—I repeat, I have never seen the document alluded to; and how far my explanation of it may be correct, I leave to the consideration of the reader. But I would place this subject in yet another point of view. What, in a great battle, is the usual proportion of the wounded to the killed? What were the relative numbers of each, in the three great battles fought in the year 1811, by British com-

manders?—I will take the killed and wounded of the *British* at Barrosa, Fuentes D'Honor, and Albuera; and I find that, at Barrosa, the total killed were 203, and the wounded were 1,040, which make something more than 5 wounded to 1 killed; that at Fuentes D'Honor, the killed were 188, and the wounded were 1,030, which make 5½ wounded to 1 killed; and that at Albuera, the killed were 984, and the wounded were 2,993, which give a fraction more than 3 wounded to 1 killed. This small proportion, compared with the other two, may be accounted for from the enemy's vast superiority in artillery, and the nearness of its position to our troops during the whole of the fight. I will take this smallest proportion; and, as Sir Benjamin D'Urban counted 2,500 of the enemy dead on the field, that number, multiplied by three, would give 7,500 wounded, and a total of 10,000 *hors du combat.* If an average of the three battles were given, the amount would be greatly increased; and it is impossible, from the very circumstances of the engagement, the proportion of wounded to killed, on the side of the enemy, should have been inferior to that of the allies. It is to be observed, that I have in this calculation only taken the loss of the Portuguese and British, as that of the Spanish has never been ascertained. This method of forming a probable or approximate estimate of the loss of the French army, appears to me unobjectionable; and it pretty fully justifies all the accounts above alluded to, except that of Colonel Napier. With regard to the sarcasm which

concludes the paragraph now under my review, I must observe that, as Sir Benjamin D'Urban had better opportunities of estimating the enemy's loss than any other person, his statement always must be received, by every unprejudiced and candid person, as the most deserving of attention. But if Colonel Napier's present view of that loss be correct, there is another besides myself, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the author of the "*Strictures*," who is guilty of having exaggerated its amount. Is it already forgotten, that, in the "*History of the Peninsular War*," the loss of the French army in killed and wounded has been reckoned at *above* 8,000? Surely the author of that account might have allowed my 9,000 to pass, as no very material variation from his own.

But I turn to another subject:—"Already Blake's "arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority." Such is the assertion which Colonel Napier made in the third volume of his History, and which he now undertakes to justify against the contradiction of the author of the "*Strictures*." This account is "veri-"fied," he says, "by the facts of Blake's not ar-"riving in time on the 15th, and his having been "the occasion of much delay in posting his corps on "the morning of the 16th." Now, though these circumstances are quite true, as related by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, from whom they are quoted; they do not necessarily argue "*arrogance*," or any desire of "*shaking my authority*," on the part of Blake. Ignorance, negligence, or the want of energy, or

even of power to act otherwise, might have been the occasion of his slowness. No one can know better than Colonel Napier, that the Spanish armies were not precisely in the same state of discipline as the English, nor, like them, supplied at all times with every requisite, and ready to march at the tap of the drum. So far was I from perceiving any arrogance in General Blake, that I did not even observe any want of cordiality in that officer; and the delay which occurred may very easily be accounted for on any one of the grounds intimated above. With regard to my order for the change of front, as far as I am acquainted with it, all the circumstances are fairly stated in the "*Strictures.*" I delivered my first instructions to Blake himself, and he not only did not object to them, but he left me with the intention, as it appeared, of carrying them into effect. His doubts of the enemy's designs were afterwards brought me by his aide-de-camp, who simply reported that, as there was as yet no enemy to be seen on our right, and he "thought their principal attack was still "intended against the village and bridge, he would "suspend the execution of the orders I had given "him, until he received my further directions." I instantly despatched one of my own staff to him, desiring him to execute my original instructions; and, as I immediately proceeded to the threatened point, and there formed the Spanish line, with the assistance of Ballasteros and Zayas, whom I found upon the spot, I neither saw, nor heard any thing more of General Blake till after the conclusion of

the battle. Supposing the worst of the want of temper, or of the arrogance of General Blake, which I am far from doing, I do not comprehend in what manner any expressions which he might, at this critical moment, have used to the officer whom I sent to him, which no one but his own staff and one of mine were privy to, and which, as that was no time for gossiping communications, must necessarily have remained unknown till the end of the battle, could be construed into an attempt "*to shake* "*my authority.*" The thing itself is of no importance; or only important, as it bears upon Colonel Napier's general character for fidelity as an historian.

It is of little consequence whether it was the first or second line of the Spaniards which I desired Blake to form to the new front; and I only notice it to say that Colonel Napier is fully borne out, by the authorities adduced, in the account given in his History; although the reasoning with which he has in his "*Justification*" accompanied the defence of it, does not in any way bear upon the point, nor apply either to the position or the ground.—The original error, if it indeed was one, may be traced to my own despatch, from which it probably was recopied, both by Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Colonel Napier.

The next object to be considered is, what Colonel Napier calls, in his History, "the narrow ravine of "the Arroya." This term was objected to; but he argues in defence of it:—"If the rear of the posi- "tion was, as the author of the '*Strictures*' asserts,

'*practicable only for infantry*,' my expression is just; nevertheless, I have changed the word to valley, to which he cannot object, until he proves that two hills can be found without a valley between them." The historian's personal ignorance of the ground on which the battle was fought, and the very inaccurate information which he has received from others, have betrayed him into many mistakes, which his judgment would otherwise have avoided. The rear of the original position—as far at least as the Spanish line extended, and, unless I am much mistaken, a considerable portion of Stewart's division—consisted of a very steep descent. Whether it was absolutely impracticable for cavalry, I will not now be certain; but I am satisfied that a great part of it would have been difficult to that arm, acting in corps. But, however this may be, the expression of Colonel Napier, when he styled it "a narrow ravine," was wholly inapplicable to the subject. He has now changed his word, and called it a "valley, to which," he says, "the author of the "'*Strictures*' cannot object, until he proves that "two hills can be found without a valley between "them." In reply to which I should observe, that the author of the "*Strictures*" has nothing to prove, or disprove, on the subject, till Colonel Napier has established the fact, that *two* hills were actually there;—a supposition which I most distinctly protest against.

There was no hill opposite that which descended very abruptly from the rear of the first position,

At some distance from it, the ground began gradually to rise, less, I think, than the slope of a glacis, though not with its regularity or uniformity. If Colonel Napier chooses to designate the space between the hill and this gentle rise, "a valley," he certainly is at full liberty so to do. I should myself never have thought of designating it by such an appellation.

I shall introduce, at this place, my observations on Captain Gregory's statement respecting the battle of Albuera, as the events recounted by that officer, though inserted at the end of Colonel Napier's "*Justification*," are clearly to be referred to the beginning of the day. I shall be obliged to quote documents in discussing the details of this narrative, which relate to the time immediately antecedent to the battle, or to the very commencement of it; and it will be most convenient to submit them to the reader at once, before we enter upon the discussion of circumstances which subsequently occurred, and on several of which they may be brought to bear. Captain Gregory states*, that "a "deserter came in about one o'clock A.M. on the "16th; he said that an *order was issued for an at-* "*tack at eight* A.M.; *he was immediately sent in* "*to head-quarters*, and, I suppose, arrived. *Between* "*seven and eight, orders came for the cavalry, and,* "*I believe, for the horse artillery, to go to the rear* "*to forage, and make themselves comfortable.* As

* I give this narrative entire, with the *italics*, as printed in Colonel Napier's "*Justification*."

" there was a difficulty about watering, one regiment
" went down to the river at a time.—The first was
" the 4th Dragoons, *which, after watering, went to*
" *the rear; the 3d Dragoon Guards were going to*
" *water, and the horses, I believe, were taken off the*
" *guns of the horse-artillery for the same purpose,*
" *when an orderly of the 13th Dragoons came in from*
" *a piquet on the right with intelligence that the*
" *enemy was crossing the river!* General Long im-
" mediately galloped off, and *found half their army*
" *across*, under cover of a hollow, which had com-
" pletely masked the operation. *I was despatched to*
" *report it to the Marshal, whose head-quarters were*
" *in the village of Albuera; after being detained*
" *a few minutes at the door, he came out, and after*
" *questioning me sharply upon my intelligence, was*
" *going in, when* I took the liberty of mentioning
" that *the cavalry had been ordered to the rear, and*
" *that one regiment had already gone; and I asked*
" *him, if it should be brought up again, and to where?*
" His orders were, '*Let them go more to the right*
" *than they were before.*'—I galloped off to the spot
" where the cavalry had been ordered, and found *the*
" *4th Dragoons with their horses unbridled, and linked*
" *with the collar chains; the men had taken their*
" *accoutrements and jackets off, and were going in all*
" *directions to cut forage.* A few minutes brought
" them together. *Before I could get back, the can-*
" *nonade had begun. Had Soult delayed his attack*
" *half an hour, all the British cavalry would have been*
" *in the rear, dispersed over the country.* I do not

" know if the brigades of foot artillery had the same " orders."

In support of this statement, as far as relates to the order for forage, the testimony of two officers of undoubted honour is produced. The first is that of Lieutenant-Colonel Wildman. He was, at that time, only a Lieutenant in the 4th Dragoons. Though his evidence is positive, it is written after a lapse of two and twenty years, and I cannot consider it otherwise than the recollection of an imperfect memory. Colonel Wildman has not intimated by what means this order reached him. It was not, perhaps, requisite that, as a subaltern, he should be informed on that head, neither is this circumstance, *a very essential one*, mentioned by Captain Gregory himself. The next evidence is that of Colonel Leighton, then commanding the 4th Dragoons, a most unexceptionable witness in every point of view; but he only speaks to " the best of his recollection: " neither does he mention by whom the order was brought, though he, most certainly, ought to have known, as it would have been delivered to himself. This officer also gives his testimony after a lapse of twenty-two years; and just so long it is, that the existence of this marvellous order has remained a secret from all the world, and even escaped the investigations of Colonel Napier himself. I believe, however, that I shall be able to prove pretty distinctly that the recollections of these officers have deceived them; that no such thing ever occurred; or that, at all events, no such order was ever sent by

me, or was ever received by General Long. I could hardly, indeed, have believed it possible, that any officer in the army would seriously have entertained such a report.—It contradicts itself.—Who can suppose that Colonel Leighton, when retiring gradually before the enemy from the plentifully supplied country in front of Albuera, and knowing that the cavalry were marching towards a position, would have brought his regiment to its ground without twenty-four hours' provender for his horses?—an omission which, if my memory is correct, was contrary to the usual orders and arrangements of the army. One day's corn he could not have been without, which was all that could possibly have been required on the occasion. In fact, it would have afforded a singularly strong ground of censure against the General commanding the cavalry, if he had allowed it to come to the rear so unprovided; neither would it have been very creditable to the commanding officers of regiments. But I never before heard, that any deficiency on this occasion was experienced.

I will return to the statement of Captain Gregory, which, as I will undertake to shew, bears its refutation in itself, is opposed to every authenticated account, is inconsistent with the facts universally admitted to be true, and is even contradicted by Colonel Napier himself. Is it for a moment to be believed, even by the most credulous, that the commander of an army, after receiving, as Captain Gregory relates, positive information from a deserter, which every thing before his eyes confirmed, that he was to be attacked

at eight o'clock, should be so lost to reason as, at eight o'clock, to send away all his cavalry? The thing is incredible.—The tale refutes itself.—But, again, he states that the cavalry were sent to water only one regiment at a time, "as there was a difficulty." The nature of this difficulty he does not intimate; and, as no other can be supposed to have existed in watering at a river than such as originated in the proximity of the enemy, the sending them, by one regiment at a time, resolves itself into a precautionary measure, adopted to keep them together, and in hand on account of that proximity, though cavalry can water mounted, and when in every respect ready for action. Having, according to this gentleman's own report, taken this precautionary measure to keep the cavalry together, he pretends that I immediately after—at the very moment when an attack was to be expected—suddenly dispersed them "to make themselves comfortable, and to procure forage" over a country, in which there was not, for miles, a single blade of forage to be found!—a fact which is declared by the Quarter-Master-General, and of which he must have been perfectly aware, as, only a little month before, I had for three days had my head-quarters at the long deserted village of Albuera.

Can any thing be more ridiculous than the command which Captain Gregory describes the cavalry as having received. That corps was ordered "*to go "to the rear to forage, and make themselves com-"fortable!*" I had been on horseback from three

o'clock in the morning, long before light; I had sent, and had brought from Valverde, the Spanish guns which were in the action; I had shewn much anxiety and impatience to get Blake into his position; I had marched Cole's division during the night, with a view of having it with me early in the morning, and that my whole force might be up, and prepared for every contingency; and yet, after all these measures had been diligently and successfully completed, and when the enemy which I had come there to oppose was immediately before me, Captain Gregory asserts, and Colonel Napier believes, that I had the madness to send away my cavalry! I am satisfied that no other officer, or man, would allow that such an act of folly was within the range of things credible; but I shall proceed to shew, that the memory of Captain Gregory is treacherous, to a most extraordinary degree, by the evidence of contradictory facts, and that his whole story is an absolute illusion.

The reader may not be ignorant, should some recent publications have chanced to fall in his way, that I had in General Long a most bitter but secret enemy, who in his private letters maligned my conduct on every occasion, and did not fail to vent a proportionate share of his censures on my arrangements for the battle of Albuera. Now, if this officer, the general commanding this very cavalry at the time in question, is found to be altogether silent upon this strange mode of disposing of his force at so critical a moment; if he only speaks of my simply ordering it to the rear, in the most military manner possible;

if he does not offer, in his inimical criticisms on my conduct on that day, the slightest hint which might seem to support the narrative now under review, I should conceive, in common fairness, that such on omission on his part ought to be taken as a refutation in full of the illusions of Captain Gregory's memory. General Long mentions no such order. But his evidence against Captain Gregory is not that of *silence* only. He has given an account of all his own acts and movements, as well as of the proceedings of the cavalry, from early morning to the commencement of the action, which affords a direct contradiction to the statement now published by Colonel Napier. General Long's first act that morning, it appears, was to reconnoitre the ground beyond the right of our position. How long he was so engaged is not said; but he tells us that*, "on his return, he met Colonel D'Urban, "who gave him the orders to move the whole of "the cavalry to the rear of the British line; and "that Colonel D'Urban" (whose account will presently be given) "marched off himself with the "4th Dragoons." We find no intimation here of this corps having been sent "to forage, and make "*themselves comfortable;*" though he seems to have disapproved of the movement ordered, as, by the withdrawal of the 4th Dragoons, he thought the defence of the bridge had been abandoned. After this, General Long says "I assembled the rest of

* Mr. Long's Reply, p. 13.

" the cavalry, in order to fulfil my instructions; and " in half an hour afterwards we saw the enemy in " motion, pushing a strong corps of cavalry towards " the bridge, and crossing the greater part of their " force over the rivulet on the right of our position, " which evidently was to become the point of attack. " I placed the 3d Dragoon Guards on the ground " from whence the 4th Dragoons had been re- " moved" (I conclude near the bridge), " to oppose " the passage of the river, and distributed the rest " on the right. The moment the enemy's move- " ments were reported at head-quarters, the 4th " Dragoons were ordered back, and fresh disposi- " tions appeared to be making with the infantry."

This is, surely, an entirely different story from that of Captain Gregory. General Long had been to the right early in the morning; on his returning from it he saw Colonel D'Urban, who delivered him his orders, and who appears to have gone with the cavalry to place it on its ground. There is no mention of any orderly of the 13th Dragoons; none of his returning to the right; none of any " hollow, " under cover of which the enemy had passed;" neither is it mentioned, that the French had passed over any part of their army, to our right; on the contrary, General Long describes their force, when first seen, as marching towards the bridge; *i. e.* going against our left. It will be seen that such was the real fact; and he distinctly says, the enemy's move- ment was then reported to head-quarters, without the slightest allusion to any previous movement

having been observed, or any previous report been made. In all General Long's correspondence that we have seen, not one word is said of the cavalry having gone, or being ordered to go, "*to forage.*" I have referred to General Long's authority, without any consideration of his talents as a cavalry officer, or the propriety of the military movements he has described, or whether they were made or not, but merely to shew that, only a few days after the occurrences in question took place, he appears not only ignorant of what has been stated concerning himself, and his command, by Captain Gregory, but absolutely contradicts that officer's narrative:—and well indeed he might. The circumstances it details are at variance with all the universally-admitted facts of the time; with General Long's own personal position and movements; and with the orders which he describes himself as having received, and which he actually did receive, as will be shewn by the testimony of the officer who conveyed them.

It would quite puzzle Captain Gregory, I apprehend, to answer the few simple questions that might be addressed to him. He says, that "a dragoon "brought information from the right to the general "commanding the cavalry, that the enemy were "passing the river;" and he has asserted also, that "General Long was aware of one of his regiments "having been ordered away for forage." But, can Captain Gregory suppose it possible, that the General commanding that arm would not, on the receipt of such intelligence, have sent immediately to commu-

nicate it to the General commanding the army? But, still more, would he not instantly have sent to prevent the dispersion of the regiment of cavalry, when he saw that more than half the enemy's army had crossed the river? Was it not the bounden duty of General Long to have acted thus, supposing these curious facts to have occurred, as Captain Gregory has described them? Yet, notwithstanding the information received by the general in command of the cavalry, the Commander-in-Chief must have been left in ignorance of the enemy's movements till nearly the whole of the army had passed; for, it is stated, that *half* had passed when General Long first saw them, and the whole must nearly have passed before Captain Gregory was kind enough, some time after, to remind the Commander-in-Chief that this regiment had gone to the rear; though even then, it seems, he omitted to say any thing about "foraging." How, again, did it occur, that the Commander-in-Chief, with a very numerous staff of his own, entrusted his orders to the charge of an officer with whom he was totally unacquainted? How chanced he to do this without any reference to his Quarter-Master-General; and when, at the very time he was informed by Captain Gregory that this one regiment had been sent to the rear, he had reason to suppose that the whole of the cavalry off duty was to the rear also?—which, indeed, I believe to have been the case. How, I say, would Captain Gregory answer those questions?

Before giving Sir Benjamin D'Urban's statement

on these points, I will briefly give my own recollections respecting them. I perfectly well remember, that General Long and Colonel D'Urban came to me, early in the morning of the 16th, to intimate that the horses had been without water since the previous evening; and an arrangement was then made for sending them to the river, by regiments, at as little distance as possible from our ground. In like manner I desired the Quarter-Master-General, after placing Blake's corps in the position, to send the cavalry, which was now watered, behind the hill, to the rear of the British division; where they were directed to dismount and refresh, but to be ready to remount at the shortest notice. I had been, all the early part of the morning, with Blake's division, with which I remained till I saw it fairly in the alignment. I then proceeded, with the Quarter-Master-General, to reconnoitre on our right, up the Albuera, when we discovered masses of the enemy in the wood beyond the river, either on or very near the road from Santa Martha, beyond the Feria stream, and nearly opposite the hill between the two streams. Our piquets and videttes were still considerably higher up the stream than we had gone. I returned to the village; and D'Urban left me on the way, to look to the emplacement of the cavalry in the rear of our position. On my road I stopped with General Long, who was most properly placed a little to the left of Z. Z.; and, after informing him of what had been observed by D'Urban and myself, and desiring him to give me notice the

moment any movement was made by the enemy, I went on to Albuera. I had only reached the village a few minutes, when an officer from General Long reported to me, that the enemy's cavalry had shewn itself in force, on the opposite heights, out of the wood, as if intending to threaten our left. My horses were at the door, and I immediately mounted, and rode to General Long, from whom I could not have been away half an hour, and who was still on the spot where I had previously left him. When I came up to him, he informed me that the enemy had shewn a considerable body of cavalry on the heights opposite the village, but that they had countermarched, and re-entered the wood. Five minutes, however, had not elapsed, before we perceived their columns *débouche* from the wood, and advance, as it appeared, in the direction of the village. They proceeded along the flat and open space for some distance. A cannonading commenced from both sides; when one or more of the enemy's columns *halting*, soon began to file from their rear, so as to countermarch, pointing again up the stream. I then felt satisfied that the attack would be on our right; and determining on my movements accordingly, I gave my own orders to General Blake for his corps, as well as to General Long, for the disposition of the cavalry. It is not necessary for my present object, to pursue this narrative any further. Such were the circumstances which immediately preceded, and immediately followed the only message that I received from General Long throughout the whole of the day.

Who the officer was that brought the message, I have no remembrance.—It might have been Captain Gregory.

I now insert the statement Sir Benjamin D'Urban sent to me, when he was in England last year:—

"The statement of Sir Benjamin D'Urban, with re-
"ference to pages 34 and 35 of Colonel Napier's
"'*Justification*,' in which it is said that *the ca-*
"*valry and horse artillery were sent to the rear to*
"*forage, &c.*, and to Colonel D'Urban's having
"marched off with the 4th Dragoons, &c. as
"mentioned in '*Reply to Aspersions against Ge-*
"*neral Long*,' p. 113."

"A reference to my *Report*, pages 25 and 26, pub-
'lished in the *Appendix to* '*Further Strictures*,'
'and to the Plan prefixed to those '*Strictures*,' will
'sufficiently shew the object of this movement, viz.
'the sending the cavalry and horse-artillery to
'the rear,—the point to which, and no further, it
'reached, and the reasons for it. It will be seen
"that on the 15th May, awaiting the tardy arrival
"of General Blake, our cavalry and horse-artillery
'had provisionally covered the part of the position
'destined for his force to occupy; and that, as soon
'as the latter had been at length placed upon this
'alignment on the morning of the 16th, that cavalry
'and horse-artillery were withdrawn to rest and re-
'fresh in rear of the centre, upon the ground marked
'in the plan, as follows: 

" (leaving, of course, their piquets and posts upon the " points where they had been previously stationed); " and here they were not at all at a distance, or out " of reach, but within the position, although the re- " verse of it, centrically placed, and readily dis- " posable for any purpose which might require their " presence. To this ground, after they had been " watered by successive regiments, they were con- " ducted, and dismounted to dress and feed the " horses; but I never heard of any *order issued* " *to them to go to forage*, that is, *to go away from* " *the spot to collect forage*, if, indeed, there had " been, as to the best of my recollection there was " not, any forage to be found within reach. And " this measure, within the limits prescribed, was " assuredly necessary; since they had been out " for many hours, and stood in need of such im- " mediate refreshment as could be then afforded, " when a battle too was impending. Neither was " their continuance upon their former ground any " longer necessary, because it had been already " taken up by the Spanish infantry in two lines, with " two battalions in advance of its right (see *e*, *a*, *e*, " in the plan), and the bridge and village were de- " fended by the light infantry brigade of Count " Alten, strongly supported by other troops. It is " very possible, that I may have myself conducted the " 4th regiment to the ground above-described (in " order that the other regiments might follow), if " this be called 'marching off with them,' although " I do not now distinctly recollect it among the

"various directions which it was my duty on that "day to execute for the movements and distribution "of the troops."

The above statement requires no observations of mine, either to enforce or to explain it.

I will now point out the gross and palpable errors of Captain Gregory's "*Narrative:*"—He says, that, on receiving the intelligence from "an Orderly of "the 13th Dragoons, *who came in from a piquet* "*on the right with intelligence that the enemy was* "*crossing the river*, General Long galloped off," I conclude to the right—"and found half their army "across," and to the *right!* Why, every other authority has stated that the enemy's first movement was from the wood along the right bank of the Albuera, upon our left; and that we were not at all aware of their intention to cross above our right, and there make their attack, till after this first movement was considerably advanced, and the action had actually commenced with Godinot's corps on the opposite side of the river to our left.—It is quite surprising that Colonel Napier should have overlooked a blunder so gross, as to destroy the value of the whole of his friend's testimony. If Captain Gregory is correct, not only are the accounts of all the other officers who were present at Albuera decidedly false, but Colonel Napier's original calculation of the *time*, which divided the two armies in their respective positions, that is, before the French had even crossed the river, must be inaccurate in the extreme. He estimated it at ten minutes; and I

admit that, when once the Albuera was crossed, it would not have required more than fifteen minutes to advance from the bank of the stream to the foot of our position, as the distance was not more than a mile, and, although up hill, the ground is without any other natural impediment.

Every military man will feel that, if General Long had really received the information said to have been brought him by an orderly dragoon, he would not have left me a moment in ignorance of it. And though he might have gone to the right to ascertain its truth and extent; he would, at the same time, have dispatched some notice of so very important a matter to the Commander-in-Chief. By the time, however, of his arriving at the spot beyond our right, at which our piquets were stationed, "*one half* "*of the French army*," it is said, had crossed. Captain Gregory must have been at least two miles from Albuera, when he was sent back to me by General Long. After waiting some minutes at the door—not a very usual ceremony on such occasions—he has a conversation with me; he then rides another mile to the cavalry. On reaching them, he finds the "horses unbridled and linked with the collar-" chains; the men unaccoutred, without their jackets, " and going in all directions to cut forage."—Considering that these troops had taken off their accoutrements, and were without their jackets, and dispersed in all directions, Captain Gregory has re-assembled them in a manner that appears to me perfectly miraculous.—So be it, however. But what space of time

must have elapsed from the moment of this officer's quitting General Long beyond our right to his recalling, re-accoutring, clothing, and mounting the troops? What was Marshal Soult about with his column all this while? And, moreover, as he must have had all his troops across before I received any intelligence of his approach, how came I to have time, notwithstanding Blake's delay, to move the whole army and effect a change of front, on the point of my extreme right, and of a line extending two miles and a half to the left, before this French corps, so near my right, came up? All these questions are very difficult to answer; and I wish Colonel Napier had thought fit to reconcile the contradictions they involve.

According to Captain Gregory, the movement of the enemy to cross the Albuera river beyond our right was not only the first movement of which I was informed, but was actually the first movement which they had been observed to make; and consequently, if, when this officer left General Long, the half of the French army had crossed the stream, there could not have existed any doubt in my mind, or in the mind of any one, respecting their real point of attack. Captain Gregory, therefore, must have been the person who first elucidated this matter, and who gave me information respecting it, before the columns of the enemy had *débouched* from the road on the right bank of the river, directing themselves on our left, towards the village of Albuera. These are strong, clear, and prominent features; and, if it

can be shewn that Captain Gregory is absolutely in error on such material points, the whole of his evidence will, I apprehend, be regarded as totally invalidated.

That Marshal Soult neither did make, nor even intended to make, his first movement as asserted by Captain Gregory, shall be proved by unquestionable authority.

Captain Lapéne, in giving the plan decided on by the French Marshal for attacking the position of the allied army under my orders, on the 16th May, 1811, states,—" the General-in-Chief Soult, not being able " with his weak army to attack the enemy on all " points, determined to throw all his force upon one " only, and to overwhelm it. With that intention " he chose the extreme right of the allies. The " Marshal foresaw that, if that right was defeated, " it must fall back on the left of the position, and " uncover the road to Olivenca, the only one by " which it could retreat. This road once in our " possession, the allied army were in danger of being " entirely cut off, and thrown back upon Badajoz, at " the mercy of the garrison, which being freed by " the raising of the blockade, would necessarily fall " upon the rear of the enemy, and infallibly com- " plete his defeat. *The dispositions made to effect* " *this object were the following:* General Godinot, " on our right, received orders to march quickly upon " the village of Albuera, and to carry it, or, at least, " to oblige the enemy, by alarming him for the " safety of that point, to weaken his right in sending

" assistance to his left. The troops of the 5th " corps, united under the orders of General Gerard, " and directed by the Marshal in person, *were then* " to attack the right of the enemy so weakened, " and to overwhelm it. General Latour Maubourg, " seconding this attack with 3,500 horse, was to " precipitate himself also on the enemy's right, and " to complete its disorder, if General Gerard suc- " ceeded in making an opening in it. The brigade " of General Werlé, which was formed as it arrived " on the ground in rear of the 5th corps, facing " the point where the most interesting operations " were about to take place, and supported itself by " the battalion of Grenadiers under the orders " of Colonel Vâré, was also to second this attack, " and replace, if necessary, the troops engaged. " The artillery was all united, under the immediate " orders of General Ruty, to bring its whole fire to " bear on the wing of the enemy's army, which was " selected as the butt to all our efforts. Only one " battery, served by mounted artillerymen, remained " under the orders of General Godinot." Lapéne then proceeds to describe their *first* movement, which was that of Godinot on the village of Albuera; and, after censuring that officer's mode of proceeding, he continues :—" Scarcely was our right column, that of " Godinot, in readiness to cross the river, and then to " advance upon Albuera, before the opposite point of " our line, General Gerard, who had just arrived on " the ground, received the order to execute his " movement against the right of the enemy."

This passage presents us with the French Mar-

shal's plan for attacking the allies, and with the account of its execution as far as Captain Gregory's story is concerned. It was, we find, the enemy's intention to induce us to weaken our right by feigning a grand attack on our left, and to conceal their real design, till their first operation had taken effect. With this view, they did not shew their real attack, until Godinot had advanced a distance of more than a mile, and arrived opposite the bridge of Albuera; and yet, in contradiction to these facts, Captain Gregory has the boldness to assert that he saw, and that I was by him informed of that, which was the *second* movement of the French, somewhere between half-an-hour and an hour before their *first* movement had been commenced. His statement, in short, affirms that the enemy's operation against our right began nearly an hour—or in fact, must have been completed—before that against our left had been observed!!

So absurd an assertion ought, at once, to decide the degree of credit which this officer's testimony deserves. He has made himself the bearer of a message, which he could not by any possibility have been charged with. By such a message he would have been desired to communicate intelligence of an event which had not only never taken place, but which is actually contradicted by the published statements of General Long, the person from whom he describes himself as having received it.

I will now bring forward the evidence of Colonel Napier, himself against the statement of his own witness, and in refutation of "the new and curious

"facts," with which he has furnished him. The historian, in confirmation of Lapéne, says,—"the "light cavalry, the division of the 1st corps under "General Werlé, Godinot's brigade, and ten guns, "still remained at the French Marshal's disposal. "These he formed in the woods, extending along "the banks of the Feria towards its confluence "with the Albuera; and Godinot was ordered to "attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly "against the centre of the position, with *a view to* "*attract Beresford's attention, to separate his wings,* "*and to double up his right at the moment when* "*his principal attack should be developed.*" I do not pretend to understand how this attack of Godinot's was to "separate my wings, or double up my "right;" but the movements of the enemy are here clearly stated, and as they actually occured: and the passage instructs us, that the development of the attack upon our right was not to be made till after the demonstration on our left.—But how does this correspond with the tale related by Captain Gregory, who assures us that nearly an hour before he had seen half the enemy's army over on our right? The credit of his story is annihilated by the very person who has promulgated, applauded, and ostentatiously printed it in italics, as one of his "new and curious facts."

But this is not the only place in which Colonel Napier has anticipated the refutation of his friend. We find him saying in the subsequent page *,—

* Vol. iii. p. 534, of "History of the Peninsular War."

" during the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, " arrived with 16,000 men; but so defective was " the occupation of the ground, that Soult had no " change to make in his plan from this circumstance*; " and, a little before nine o'clock in the morning, " Godinot's division issued from the woods in one " heavy column of attack, preceded by ten guns. " He was flanked by the light cavalry, and followed " by Werlé's division of reserve, and, making straight " towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, " attempting to force the passage; at the same time " Briché, with two regiments of hussars, drew further " down the river to observe Colonel Otway's horse.

" The allies' guns on the rising ground above the " village answered the fire of the French, and " ploughed through their columns, which were " crowding without judgment towards the bridge, " although the stream was passable above and below.

* This is, I believe, as new and curious a fact as any military man ever gave credence to. A general reconnoitres his enemy on the evening of the 15th, and then decides upon his mode of attack for the next morning, under a supposition that 16,000 men of his opponent, who were then absent, would not join till the 17th. But on the morning of the 16th, it is discovered that the absent corps of 16,000 men, constituting more than half his enemy's force, has arrived during the night, and is actually in position; and yet the case remains the same!!! I will here observe, that though "*Further Strictures*" controverts, and, as I think, disproves Colonel Napier's opinion with regard to "the defec- " tiveness of the position," his "*Justification*" is silent as the grave upon the subject. The point was not altogether an immaterial one; and there is only one cause to which the silence of the historian can be referred.

"*But Beresford, observing that Werlé's division* "*did not follow closely, was soon convinced that the* "*principal effort would be on the right,* and, there- "fore, sent Blake orders to form, &c."

This extract, in the first place, confirms the former with regard to the first movement of the French against our left; on which point it is quite correct, and agrees with Lapéne. We have thus both friend and foe—or at least both English and French—uniting their testimony in contradiction of Captain Gregory's assertion, that, long before this period, the greater part of the enemy's army had crossed the Albuera above our right, and had been there seen by General Long and himself. And in the second place, it shews, by Colonel Napier's own account, that I did not discover till this second movement was going on—the first being by Godinot seconded by Werlé, and the one in question by the latter only—that the principal attack of the enemy would be against my right. It is, consequently, impossible that I should have been previously informed of the enemy's army having crossed the river above my right; as such a circumstance would have been a far stronger proof of their design than the mere lagging behind of Werlé's division, which the historian has most truly assigned as the reason of my having, at this time, ordered a change of front.

Thus Colonel Napier appears, a second time, as evidence against Captain Gregory, and in contradiction of his own "new and curious facts."—But I have still a third extract to produce from the "History of

" the Peninsular War," which confirms the refutation of Captain Gregory's statement beyond all further cavil or dispute. In the page following the one from which the last quotation was taken, after mentioning my detection of the enemy's design against our right, Colonel Napier relates that I gave Blake orders to change his front; that I likewise directed the whole movements to correspond with this new front; that, on Blake's having refused to obey my first order by Hardinge, I sent to him a second, which was equally fruitless; that I then went to him myself; and that after the lapse of time which all these arrangements and messages must have required, the whole of which, be it remembered, if they took place at all, must have happened after the attack by Godinot, when I joined Blake. " The " enemy's columns were," says Colonel Napier, " now " beginning to appear on the right; and Blake, yield- " ing to this evidence, proceeded to make the evolu- " tion, yet with such pedantic slowness that Beresford, " impatient of his folly, took the direction in person."

It was not, then, till a very considerable time after the action had commenced on our left that the enemy was "*beginning to appear,*" or could be seen, on our right*. Such is, or rather was, Colonel Napier's own account; though he now produces a

* That such was the case is also proved by the message sent to me by General Blake, who delayed executing my orders for the change of front, and still conceived that the false would turn out to be the real attack, because none of the enemy's force was for some time after visible above our right.

contrary story on the single and unsupported evidence of a subaltern officer, who, after two-and-twenty years' silence, scrapes his imperfect recollections together into the form of a statement, which disagrees, in the most important particulars, with every description of the battle of Albuera that has ever been considered as deserving the slightest degree of attention, and which disagrees with the account given in the "*History of the Peninsular War*," as decidedly as it does with every other.

General Long's evidence on this point is to the same purport. It might, perhaps, by a forced construction—though I am convinced it was not what he really meant to say—be understood from his narrative, that the two movements of the enemy's right and left were simultaneous; but, even allowing this interpretation of his words, they afford an equally strong contradiction of Captain Gregory's assertion, that General Long had *seen half the enemy's army across the river on his left*, before their right was put in motion. Sir Benjamin D'Urban's evidence is in perfect accordance on this point with the accounts of Lapène, Napier, Long, &c. I may now dismiss this part of the case.

Can any military man believe, that a general would, under the circumstances described, disperse or send away his cavalry? But I have engaged to shew that no order to that effect ever went from me. I now very briefly proceed to redeem that pledge.

If a commander delivers to the officer, who is the usual military channel of communication on such

occasions, an order of a precise and definite purport, and that officer acknowledges having received, understood, and communicated such an order, according to the purport stated by his commander, no person can believe that the commander is to be held responsible for the misapprehensions of those to whom the order was conveyed, or the mistakes they committed in the execution of them. Such are the grounds on which I consider Captain Gregory's account of the dispersion of the cavalry, whether it be correct or erroneous, as perfectly indifferent to me. I directed my Quarter-Master-General of the army, whom Colonel Napier will allow to have been the proper officer for such an object, to see the *whole of the cavalry* moved to the rear of the British line. The Quarter-Master-General received those orders, and understood them, according to the plain sense of my words, as is established, beyond dispute, by his own report of the proceedings of those times, with the plan of the battle of Albuera annexed to it, which he drew up and printed in 1817, and in which such a disposition of the cavalry, by my order, is described. The order, which was so received and understood by the Quarter-Master-General, he delivered to the General commanding the cavalry; by whom it was also understood in the same sense, as is manifest, beyond all dispute, from a letter of General Long to C. B. L., dated 30th May, 1811; and in which it is stated, that he received the order in the very words given by me to the Quarter-Master-General on the occasion. He says,—" I met Colonel D'Urban, who

" desired me to move off directly the whole of the " cavalry to the rear of the British line."

It cannot be necessary for me to add another word upon this subject. Thus, as far as I am concerned, three of Colonel Napier's four " new and curious facts" are disproved. I hope, presently, to be able to give an equally good account of the survivor; but, as it relates to events near the conclusion of the battle, I shall postpone the discussion of it to the proper place.

Colonel Napier next undertakes to vindicate the passage of his History, in which he has stated,— " That the right of the allies and the left of the " French were only divided by a wooded hill, about " cannon-shot distance from either. This height, " neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by " Soult." In defence of this account he says,—" If " the reader will look at the plan given by the '*Stric-* " *tures*,' he will there see that the hill in question is " precisely as I have described it, *about cannon-shot* " *from either army*."

This is ingenious, but not satisfactory. Colonel Napier, I conclude, in referring to the plan in question, takes the position in which the French army is placed in lines, marked B B; the spot where, as the margin informs him, " it was before, and at the " beginning of the action." Every military man will immediately perceive that, even supposing the enemy was so placed, it is not a position of either offence or defence; it might have been their *bivouac* in rear of their position, but that is the utmost it

could have been. Neither Napier nor Lapéne, however, who contradict each other on the subject, will permit us to think so much of it; and, considering the situation and employment of the latter, it is hardly possible to doubt the accuracy of his account, when he states, that "the French army did not "arrive at the skirts of this wood till day-break on "the 16th." It appears to me, that the position assigned to the enemy, on the plan attached to the "*Strictures*," was formed on the idea of their having arrived in the evening*, or during the night; and they were supposed to have bivouacked in the woods, and been stationed as marked in the plan. This mode of placing them seems to me altogether imaginary, as I am confident no individual of our army ever saw, or could have seen them, in that direction. But Colonel Napier says, that during the night "*Soult placed* 40 *guns, and* 15,000 *men*;" i. e. two-thirds of the French force, according to his own account of its numbers, behind this very hill. They could not, therefore, have been posted as marked in the plan published with the "*Further Strictures*;" and, as we know that the light cavalry, under Brichè, was along the banks of the river, the reserve and Godinot's brigade could alone have been thus situated. Thus, while Colonel Napier declares that two-thirds of the French army were not placed, as marked in the plan attached to the "*Strictures*," but on the rear slope of the hill in question, and at

* I am aware, Sir B. D'Urban states, that the enemy's infantry began to arrive in the evening.

little more than a hundred yards from its top, he nevertheless speaks of this very hill as being equidistant from the two positions, though that of the allies was a mile off; and the greater part of the French army, if they were really placed as the historian describes, may be said to have been upon it. He himself says,—"The whole mass of the "allied cavalry, closely followed by the French "light-horsemen, came in from Santa Martha in a "hurried manner, and passing the Albuera, aban-"doned all the wooded heights in front to the "enemy, whose dispositions being thus effectually "concealed at the distance of cannon-shot, the "strength of the position was already sapped." In this passage the enemy is represented as being in possession of the ground down to the Feria stream, and having their dispositions (for attack, I conclude) so far effectually concealed, to within cannon-shot distance; but, as the hill was about cannot-shot from our position and where the great mass of their troops was stationed, it was most clearly the left of their position, if they can be said to have been in position. I do not mean to dispute, that, previously to the attack, the French troops were massed behind this hill; but I will, nevertheless, shew that they were neither encamped in the wood, nor placed during the night, as Colonel Napier has described. Lapéne, an officer who served on the staff of the fifth corps, and who was present with it, "an eye-witness" of, and an actor in those events, relates,—"that the French army broke up from

" Santa Martha *during the night, and arrived, at* " *day-break*, on the wooded heights in front of Al- " buera." How troops could have been placed, during the night, in a position, at which they only arrived at day-break in the morning, I do not understand. Speaking of the guns which accompanied Godinot's brigade, Lapéne says,—" This artillery, " which, on the morning of the 16th, began the " action, was on the extreme right of the French " army, to second the movements of General Brichè. " This general, who had been placed the preceding " night, with his light cavalry, in front of the allies, " had, at day-break, harassed their advanced guard " established in front of Albuera stream. He had " even succeeded, after several partial charges, in all " of which he had the advantage, to force those posts " across the bridge." Now, although I do not produce Lapéne as good authority for events which occurred on the right of the French, where he was not personally present, yet he must have known whether the 5th corps, to which he belonged, was or was not opposite the allies during the night. It is also evident, from the above quotation, that Brichè was alone, during the night, in our front; and that he was acting alone, without infantry, and even without heavy cavalry, till after day-break. Again, in page 156, Lapéne confirms the above view of the time when the French army arrived in front of Albuera. He there says, speaking of the commencement of the battle,—" The right column was " scarcely in readiness to cross the river, and to

" advance upon Albuera, when, upon the opposite " flank, General Gerard, who had *just arrived upon* " *the ground*, received orders to execute his move- " ment against the enemy." Nothing then can be more clear than that, according to Lapéne, the 5th corps had not been placed any where during the night, nor had even arrived upon the ground. I have thus shewn, first, that according to Colonel Napier and Lapéne, the enemy could not have been in the position BB, as marked in the plan in the " *Strictures*." Secondly, that as Colonel Napier has placed two-thirds of the enemy's army to the rear of the hill in question, they could not have been a mile distant from the spot on which, or close to which, they were posted. And, thirdly, that though this point did eventually prove to be the enemy's left, still the French troops neither could, during the night, have occupied the position marked in the plan, nor that which has been assigned them by Colonel Napier.

Now, the centre of this height was nearly a mile from the left of the new position of the allies, and more than a mile from the right of the original position to which Colonel Napier alludes. We were, it is true, in possession of the ground to the Albuera; but it was a mile of open country, on which every man would be visible and exposed; while the ground held by the enemy was wooded, and, as Colonel Napier describes, " effectually concealed them." The centre of the hill in question is about three hundred and fifty yards from the Feria stream, and but little more than

a quarter of a mile from the road to Santa Martha, which runs through the wood. Of all this space the enemy was in possession down to the stream. If my memory is correct, the heights, on their side of the Feria, were higher than the hill in question. Had the allies, therefore, occupied this height, they could not have retained it ten minutes against an attack of the French; and they would, in all probability, have been driven from it, with a loss which would have been severe in proportion to the number of troops that held it. The army under my command—an army which Colonel Napier has so properly described—would have had to witness as an encouraging prelude to the ensuing battle, the sight of a considerable portion of their own body beaten and flying before the enemy. It is not, I think, necessary for me to discuss with Colonel Napier what I ought to have done, or left undone, at the battle of Albuera; but I cannot help taking a brief and cursory notice of his observations upon it. And I would first remark that, if I had even had any detachment upon the height in question, the driving them away would have afforded no indication of Soult's final intentions. Whether he had premeditated an attack on our left or centre, unless he meant to turn the former, such a measure would, for the sake of keeping his own flank and rear undisturbed, have been a necessary preliminary, as the reader will perceive to be the case, if he calls to mind that the high road to Albuera, from the south, runs nearly parallel to this hill at only about five

hundred yards distance. With the exception of some loss of life, and some little discouragement to the allies, the matter would have stood just as it did, and the event must convince every soldier that I was fully prepared for the attack made. When Colonel Napier says, that "the right of the army" (I suppose he means Colborne's brigade) "was surprised," he is well aware that, as I was not near the spot at the time, and did not witness the occurrence, I could have had nothing to do with it. Indeed, he has himself somewhat censured Sir William Stewart, and pleaded in excuse of the event, "that a heavy rain "prevented any object from being distinctly seen, "when four regiments of hussars and lancers, which "had passed the right flank in the obscurity, came "galloping in upon the rear of the line at the instant "of its development, and slew, or took, two-thirds "of the brigade." Every battle is subject to such untoward circumstances. They are, indeed, neither to be foreseen nor prevented, unless the general in command had the control of the elements. The surprise of Colborne's brigade is justly accounted for by the historian; and yet he would seem to impute the circumstance as a reproach against myself, who was in another part of the field, and had committed those troops to the charge of Sir W. Stewart, and, under him, to Colonel Colborne. Both those officers—to whom no blame can by any possibility attach—were on the spot, and did not, till it was too late, perceive the approach of the enemy. Colonel Napier would sometimes throw upon the Com-

mander-in-chief the responsibility of every error on every occasion, however occurring, or by whomsoever committed. He would, in the present instance, call on me to explain why patrols of cavalry and single-mounted officers were not sent out, in different directions, to inspect the movements of the enemy? How does Colonel Napier know that none were sent?—But an accusation on this point would not in fact lie against me. Such details do not exactly fall within the range of the Commander-in-chief's duties. In apparent ignorance of his subject, this great military censor is supposing, and complaining of, neglect on the part of the General in command of the cavalry, or of the Quarter-Master-General. I do not remember to have ever intimated that any blame attached to General Long on that point, and the Quarter-Master-General was not a person very likely to be found failing in any part of his duty. Moreover, it has been related in the very publication to which Colonel Napier's comments refer, that I had myself made the *reconnoissance* on our right; and that, from having observed the enemy assembling in the wood beyond the Feria, I had concluded they were preparing for an attack. The Quarter-Master-General was with me on the occasion, and I really cannot understand on what authority Colonel Napier assumes that I was in the dark upon this subject. But at what time were his "patrols and single-"mounted officers" to have undertaken their proposed *reconnoissances*. He would not, I presume, have had them go before day-break. But it appears

from General Long that he was there himself about that time; and I cannot guess why that officer should, without any evidence, be accused of neglecting the most ordinary duty of his situation, and omitting to establish the requisite out-posts. Besides, Colonel Napier has been expressly told, that, as soon after day-light as I had seen Blake's corps in its position, which, though it certainly occupied a good deal of time, was a primary object, I went, in person, and reconnoitred beyond our right up the Albuera stream, along which our pickets and videttes were posted; and was satisfied from what I saw, and from the information I received, that I knew as much of the enemy as, under the circumstances, could be known, and quite sufficient to guide me on an occasion where no intelligence whatever could have precluded the necessity of being prepared every moment for more than one point of attack.

I trust that the above charge which the Historian has made without any evidence—or, at least, any evidence that he has adduced—has been fully answered. But he has a still graver accusation to follow it. He reproaches me with having allowed the enemy to pass the hill, cross the Albuera, and ascend our height, without manifesting any resistance. In reply to all this very fine paper reasoning and manœuvring of Colonel Napier, I need only say, that I was perfectly aware of the composition of the army I commanded, and thoroughly acquainted with the ground. I had well studied both. I entertained a just respect for my enemy; and was not uncon-

scious of the many advantages he possessed over me. The line of conduct which I adopted, and persevered in to the end, was determined upon after much deliberation. And opposed as I was to the superior military talents and veteran troops of Marshal Soult, I was fortunate enough, through the intelligent and gallant conduct of the officers and soldiers under my command, to find myself successful at the conclusion of a very hard-fought field. Colonel Napier, in his History, when describing the contending armies, has pointed out the propriety of my not taking my troops out of position. This, however, he now blames me for not having done; though the forty pieces of cannon, which he has placed behind the hill, and which the French seem to have had no difficulty in raising to the summit of it, fully acquits me for not having sent my troops in any considerable numbers to the bottom of the descent; where, both advancing and retiring, for the distance of a mile, they would have been exposed to the salutes of so large a field of artillery, while the enemy would have lain completely under cover, and liable to very little injury. The historian demands "why were they, the French "army, not watched, and where was the allied ca-"valry?" The first of these questions has been already answered. Colonel Napier has himself shewn that picquets and videttes were placed for that purpose. He has read in General Long's "*Correspondence*," that that officer had been there; and he has learnt from the "*Strictures*," that I had myself reconnoitred at those points—and yet the question is

put, "Why was not the enemy watched?"—though, in fact, they could not move from their ground without being immediately perceived. In describing the very commencement of the action, when Godinot issued from the wood, followed by Werlé's division of reserve, and with the ten guns which commenced a cannonade, Colonel Napier has said, "The allies' "guns, on the rising ground above the village, an- "swered the fire of the French, and ploughed "through their columns, which were crowding "without judgment towards the bridge, although "the stream was passable above and below. But "Beresford observing that Werlé's division did not "follow closely, was soon convinced that the prin- "cipal effort would be on the right, and therefore "sent Blake orders to form a part of the first and "all the second line of the Spanish army, on the "broad part of the hills, at right angles to their "actual front."—The historian also asks, "Where "was the allied cavalry?" and has himself answered, "we shall see anon:" to which I am also content to echo for the present—we shall see anon! It is true that I did not expose my cavalry to the forty pieces of cannon mentioned by Colonel Napier. Neither did I consider it right to bring them in contact, and in an open field, with the superior and more veteran cavalry of the enemy. And I apprehend that, notwithstanding the disapprobation expressed by the historian, the result will be generally considered as a sufficient proof of the prudence of the measure.

I proceed to the next point. We read in the "History of the Peninsular War" of "the French cavalry out-flanking the front, and *charging here and there*," &c. In his defence of this passage, the author says, that "the idiomatic expression '*here and there*' shews, "that he never meant to say the French cavalry "charged home; but that they menaced the Spa-"niards' flank." I understand the military meaning of the word "charging;" but I do not understand how any sense of the phrase "*here and there*" can possibly alter the sense of the verb "to charge." The idiomatic expression "here and there" means, I believe, "dispersedly," "in several places apart;" and I should be very much surprised to hear from any officer, who told me his troops had been "charged "here and there by the enemy," that, when thus expressing himself, he meant to say the enemy had menaced his troops, but had never charged them at all. With every respect for the author of the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*," to whom Colonel Napier refers in his "*Justification*," I must differ from him, when he represents a charge of cavalry having been made on the Spanish troops. It occurred, he says, during "an endeavour to bring up the Spanish troops to the charge." This officer, being with his regiment, the 29th, most probably only writes upon this subject from report. I never heard of any endeavour to bring the Spanish troops to charge, except that which was made by myself, as described by Colonel Napier, and most certainly nothing of the kind then took place. I can, on the

direct evidence of the Honourable Sir William Lumley, who commanded the allied cavalry, and must have seen what occurred, assure the author of the "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*," that no such charge was ever attempted. Indeed, the Spanish infantry were never exposed to any such attack.

Colonel Napier now admits that, although the circumstance was related to him by a staff-officer of high rank, he was misinformed respecting the Spaniards firing upon the English. This instance of erroneous intelligence should lead him to be more suspicious of accounts received from such sources of information. He has, indeed, trusted to them too often and too much.

"At this critical moment General Stewart arrived "at the foot of the height with Colborne's bri-"gade." This passage from the "*History of the* "*Peninsular War*" has been objected to in the "*Further Strictures;*" and is now defended by Colonel Napier in a manner that shews him not to have understood the objection. The author of the "*Strictures*" seems to have meant, that the spot where Stewart is described as being with Colborne's brigade was on the unbroken declivity, which sloped gradually down from the height of our position to the Albuera stream, and that, consequently, there was no particularly-marked height for Stewart to be at the "*foot of;*" or if he had, according to the historian's expression, been "at the foot of the "height," he must have been on the bank of the Albuera stream; where he most certainly was not.

The historian would not, I imagine, describe a body of troops half-way up the slope of a glacis as being "at the foot of a height?"

Colonel Napier adds,—"Let me, however, shew "that there was a height, if there was not a hill." This really appears a work of supererogation; for the plan shews there was such a height, and no one has denied it. But the steep or abrupt side of that height was towards the enemy, while the ground, which was originally to our front, and on the change of position, to our rear, and rear of our left, had no such rapid descent. And our troops did not so much move up, as along, the very gradual slope of the latter ground; while the enemy faced the steep on the other side of the hill, and had their advance impeded by the necessity of surmounting it. There exists great difference of opinion on the question whether the enemy did, or did not, drive the Spaniards from the principal height or position, and there take post momentarily. I do not mean to censure Colonel Napier for having asserted that such a circumstance occurred; for I freely confess, that he has very good authority for such a representation. It is so reported in Sir Benjamin D'Urban's Memoir; and it appears to be confirmed by my own despatch. And yet, for the sake of truth, certainly not with any view of attaching blame to Colonel Napier on this point, I am satisfied that there exists a great misapprehension on the subject. I never meant in my despatch to be understood as stating, that the main heights, where

the Spaniards were posted had been, at any time, gained by the French, as I am quite convinced that they never were in their possession. I was with the Spaniards, about the centre of their right, nearly all the while that they remained in that position. While they were there, I had occasion, on account of a circumstance that has been mentioned, to speak to Sir William Inglis and the 57th regiment, which was in their rear. I saw this regiment afterwards relieve the Spanish line, and continued yet some time with the 57th; and I can therefore, on my own personal knowledge, positively affirm that this, our principal position, was never mounted by the enemy. I never, indeed, saw any one of their soldiers upon those heights, except the few lancers that straggled between the two lines. The lancers which charged Colborne's brigade had been momentarily there, but only on the extreme right of them. They never reached the Spaniards' right, nor even the 31st, which being on Colborne's left was, consequently, to the right of the Spaniards; and that these were the only French troops that ever penetrated so far is strongly corroborated by the accounts cited by Colonel Napier.

After having placed the 57th in the front line, and remained with them a short time, as above mentioned, I afterwards went to the right. There it was that I endeavoured, as related in the "*History of the Peninsular War*," to induce the Spaniards to turn the right of Houghton's brigade, and attack the left and flank of the French columns. Thence

I sent Colonel Arbuthnot for a brigade of Portuguese to effect the operation which I had failed in inducing the Spaniards to undertake. It was also at this period, and from this part of the field, that I despatched Sir Henry Hardinge, with instructions to Sir William Lumley, commanding the cavalry; after which, as is correctly stated in the "*Stric-*" *tures,*" he joined Sir Lowry Cole.

From this spot I saw part of Houghton's brigade fighting gallantly on the lower heights of the hill. These were the heights referred to in my despatch; and it is my opinion, that the enemy's having gained these gave rise to the belief that they had obtained a short possession of the principal heights of our position. According to the situation from which these transactions were witnessed, whether from the hill or the plain, a different impression would have been received by the spectator, and a different report disseminated. I have read with much attention Lapéne's account of the battle of Albuera. He sometimes describes what he saw, and sometimes writes from the report of others, but on this point he speaks from his own observation; and, though he represents our first position as having been carried by the French, and mentions the advantages which their cavalry met with on the right, he nevertheless most distinctly shews that their attack on the main heights was not successful, and that they never even attempted to mount them.

I will here transcribe Lapéne's account. After describing the movement of the right of the French

against the village of Albuera, which was made, he says, with a view of attracting our attention that way, he thus proceeds:—"General Gerard, after "having passed the rivulet at the head of the 5th "corps, in close column, and having forced the "allies, by the vigour of his attack, to abandon their "first position to him, continued his advance in the "same order, fully convinced that the manœuvres of "the enemy, from the right to the centre, were a "movement of retreat: General Gerard, therefore, "thought that he had only to precipitate his attack, "to complete the confusion and disorder in their "right. *This belief and treacherous confidence,* in "which the Commander-in-Chief partook with all "the army, determined General Gerard not to stop "to deploy his columns, when the enemy, driven "from his first position, threw back his right, ma-"nœuvring on his centre. In short, General Gerard "committed the fatal imprudence of advancing the "5th corps still in close column, and of attacking "the enemy in that order. Beresford, who, after "the check given to his right, for a moment thought "the battle lost, had nevertheless advanced his se-"cond line. At the time we are now speaking of, "three brigades of reserve were brought forward to "support that right in its new position, and nearly "all the enemy's army were now engaged. This "numerical superiority, and the false measures al-"ready taken by the French in their attack, insured "an incalculable advantage to the allies, which they "did not fail to seize. They began, with coolness,

" from two ranks, a continued and well-directed
" fire. No shot is lost on our close column, which
" can only oppose the insufficient and badly kept-up
" fire of its two front ranks. Of these, except in
" those ranks, our soldiers fall to the right and left
" without being able to defend themselves, and those
" who survive give themselves up to the most fatal
" discouragement. The officers in vain attempt to
" restore confidence to the troops, and animate them
" by their example. General Pepin falls, mortally
" wounded, the first victim of the fault committed;
" the Generals Maransin and Brayer, both belong-
" ing, as the former, to the 5th corps, are carried
" off dying; General Gazan, Chêf de l'état Major,
" is also wounded. General Gerard is in the midst
" of the danger; he attempts, in this critical posi-
" tion, to deploy his troops, and then to make a
" general movement from his left to his right; but
" the passage of lines (*deployment*), which requires
" space and coolness, cannot be effected under so
" violent a fire. Colonel Praefque, of the 28th
" Light, leading regiment of the column, is mortally
" wounded, as are all its superior officers. Discou-
" ragement is at its height; and the soldiers of this
" corps, which have already lost 600 men, consider
" themselves as victims led to the slaughter. In this
" situation, the most desperate that troops lately so
" confident were ever placed in, a most marked move-
" ment of fluctuation was perceptible, which soon be-
" came a disorderly retreat. The 103d of the line,
" the regiment immediately behind the 28th in the

" column, and, like all the regiments of Gerard's " corps, exposed successively to the same dangers " and to the same losses, *after useless efforts to gain* " *ground*, were obliged to yield to the numbers of " the enemy, and to the superiority of his fire. All " these troops, in a short time, form one confused " mass, and, retiring pell-mell, make no stop, until " they gain their first position of the morning, on the " other side of the rivulet. This rivulet, the banks " of which, from the passage of our troops and " artillery in the morning, had been rendered dank " and slippery, presented yet some obstacles, and " kept during the retreat our regiments exposed to " the enemy's fire."

Such is the relation of a staff-officer of the 5th corps of the enemy, whom Colonel Napier has cited as a good authority, and who was an intelligent observer of the events he has described: but how widely does his account of the battle differ from that of the English historian! The first position, which Lapéne speaks of as having been taken by the French, must, I apprehend, have been the height on which the artillery and reserve, or other troops of the enemy, were stationed during their attack on our first line in the second position, and from, or over which, perhaps, some of our advance-posts or pickets may have been driven. It is plainly stated, that on this supposed success the French army advanced against a new position, and that, on their reaching it, they were stopped. The description given by Lapéne of the spot where the French

halted, is too accurate to be mistaken; it evidently relates to the ground which lay immediately under us when on the heights, after our change of front on our right. If any corps, whether of a larger or a smaller number, retired from the hill opposite our position, and on which the French artillery was subsequently placed, it would have appeared to the French, as they advanced, like the throwing back of our right; although our real change of movement, on the contrary, was on the right, and consisted in the bringing forward our left. Lapéne has, moreover, spoken of the advantage obtained by the French cavalry on our real right, as subsequent to, and consequent upon this first success, which he represents as having occurred on the heights near the rivulet. He has also described the after-attack of the cavalry pretty correctly as it happened. I have brought these points into notice, with the view of shewing, that the success ascribed to Gerard could not have been gained against our main position, to which the 5th corps is afterwards brought by Lapéne. It is manifest, that the position which he describes as having been taken was not our main position, for he represents it as lying to the rear of the 5th corps, and of Werlé's, whilst they were engaged with us in front of the main position*. The French artillery, he tells us, was, after the retreat of the regiments, placed in the first line, where it redoubled its efforts to resist the advance of the enemy, which obstinately continued "its march to retake their lost ground."

* See the 165th page of Colonel Lapéne's work.

At the time here alluded to the French infantry had quitted the field, and their artillery is represented as still keeping their post upon the hill which they had all along occupied, and we were pressing forward to retake. This, therefore, I conclude to have been the position from which Lapéne supposes us to have been first driven. If this be not the ground, it must have been still more in the rear, though I do not recollect any other very marked height between us and the stream. It is, however, clear, that the French themselves do not pretend ever to have been in possession of our main position. Lapéne has established that point beyond all further dispute. His description of this part of the field of battle, where he was himself present, is extremely correct, and presents a happy contrast to that given by Colonel Napier in his "*History of the Peninsular War.*" I can fully corroborate every word that Lapéne has written with regard to the desperate situation of the French, their gallant conduct, and their ineffectual attempts to deploy at the bottom of our position; and, on comparing his account of these particulars with that given by the author of the "*Strictures,*" I find the most minute and positive agreement subsisting between them.

It appears to me that the note from Sir H. Hardinge's marginal observations in D'Urban's Memoir, most fully contradicts the statements which Colonel Napier has quoted it to prove. The note says,—"The "first brigade, when they had gained the crest of

" the hill, found it so hot, that Stewart ordered a " charge, which the Buffs and 48th alone made in " line against the enemy's column of at least 10,000 " men. Fortunately, the 31st being the left regiment, " had not time to deploy when the two other regi- " ments charged ; it therefore held the ground while " Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear and under " cover, and moved up to the support of *the* 31*st*, " *holding the position*, and keeping up a hot fire in " line against the close column of the enemy, which " attempted to advance and sometimes to deploy; " keeping, however, within musket-shot, both sides " firing grape ; the destruction being *infinitely greater* " in the dense order of the enemy than in our thin " order." This account does not materially differ from that of Lapéne.

If the first brigade was " on the crest of the hill" (I do not remember any crest on our side), and the enemy were musket-shot from it, the latter must clearly have been so much below the crest of the hill; and, as the position is said to have been held by the 31st, it most certainly could not, at that moment, have been lost. The attempt to deploy and advance corresponds with the accounts of Lapéne and the author of the " *Strictures*," and with my own observations at the time. It was subsequent to this period, and while accompanied by Sir Henry Hardinge, that I saw the 29th regiment engaged below me, as before mentioned, and endeavoured to induce the Spaniards, who were formed in close columns

on the top of the hill, to descend, turn the right of the 29th, and attack the left and flank of the enemy.

Whether the enemy gained this height or not would be to myself a matter of perfect indifference. There are few battles without their vicissitudes; there are very few in which errors of a greater or smaller magnitude have not been committed; and there are none whatever in which, by the exercise of a little ingenuity, they may not be imputed.

By every really liberal and candid mind an action will be surveyed as a whole; and where there has been a pretty just disposition of the forces, the disasters remedied as soon as they occurred, and the results successful, unless the judgment of the military critic is disturbed by prejudice, the General in command will never fail of receiving his just meed of commendation.

The statement of Major Elliott, of the 29th regiment, places me in the dilemma of either believing his memory defective, or of rejecting the testimony of every other officer—not excepting Colonel Napier himself—who has written upon those parts of the battle of Albuera to which his evidence refers.

First, Major Elliott is incorrect with regard to his own brigade. The whole of it did not move to the right. At the time of which he speaks, the 57th were in line in rear of the Spaniards; and I rather think the first battalion, 48th, to its left. This is, however, but a trivial error; and I only mention it as another instance to shew how very liable re-

gimental officers are to be mistaken, when speaking of those parts of an engagement with which they were not personally and immediately concerned.—Secondly, Major Elliott affirms, that the brigade moved to the right, in open column of companies, under a very heavy cannonade. On the contrary, it is said in the preceding note of Sir Henry Hardinge, that "the 31st regiment held the ground, while "Houghton's brigade deployed in the rear and under "cover:" and we have also been told by Colonel Napier, that "William Stewart, who had escaped "the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the "hill with General Houghton's brigade, which he "brought on with equal vehemence, but, instructed "by his previous misfortune, in a juster order of "battle."

What then was the previous order which Colonel Napier condemned? Stewart, he tells us, "had led "up in column of companies." He could not, therefore, have approved of this in Houghton's brigade. And, in saying that the latter went up "in a juster "order," he could never mean to corroborate Major Elliott's account, that the 29th moved in open columns of companies under a severe cannonade; for he has expressly quoted Sir Henry Hardinge to prove that the brigade formed under cover—a statement which is confirmed by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who says, "Houghton's brigade deployed very judi-"ciously and with admirable precision, under cover "of the lower falls of the heights, moved on in line "to the attack." So much for the accuracy of Major

Elliott's memory.—This officer further relates, that, after the disaster of Colborne's brigade, a body of Polish lancers appeared on the right of the 29th regiment, charged, and attempted an attack against it similar to that which proved so successful against the first brigade. Major Elliott here mentions only two attacks, and that upon the British; and I do not perceive how his evidence can in any way serve to support Colonel Napier's story of the "here and there" attacks upon the Spaniards. But Major Elliott must be in error either as to time or circumstance. It has been distinctly proved, that no more than one advance of the enemy's cavalry against the main body of our infantry ever took place. And the facts themselves, as stated by Colonel Napier, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and Lapéne, evince that the success of that attack was entirely owing to the sudden fog, which not only prevented the infantry from making a timely discovery of their danger, but also hindered Sir William Lumley from seeing what was going on till after the mischief was effected, and the mist that concealed the enemy had cleared away. It dispersed, however, before they reached a place of security, and Sir William Lumley had time enough to intercept and punish them. It is perfectly ascertained, that this dense state of the atmosphere did not again occur. Had any second body of the French therefore appeared, they must have been seen and encountered by our cavalry—an event which Sir William Lumley most positively declares never did take place. I have some idea, however,

that Major Elliott may be right as to the fact, though in error as to the time. The 29th regiment was in the rear of Colborne's brigade; and, if the left of the enemy's cavalry in their charge out-flanked the right of that brigade, the portion out-flanking might charge on, till they came on the right of the 29th, which was the right regiment of Houghton's brigade. If the event related by Major Elliott really occurred, the obscurity of the atmosphere would effectually have prevented the cavalry from perceiving what it was about, or where it was going. This, which is in a great degree confirmed by the authority of Lapéne, is the only solution of Major Elliott's statement that I can conceive. But it is indisputable that no body of the enemy's cavalry appeared on the heights of our main position, after the charge on Colborne's brigade; and I can adduce Colonel Napier to prove that they could not have been there without the knowledge of Sir William Lumley. "A shift of wind," says the historian, "blowing away the mist and smoke, the mischief "was perceived by General Lumley from the plains, "who sent four squadrons out upon the lancers, and "cut many of them off." Sir Benjamin D'Urban writes to the same effect.

Major Elliott is produced, as Colonel Napier's solitary witness, to prove that the ammunition of the army failed. Supposing this to have been the case with the 29th regiment, of which alone his informant can speak, it would not justify him in asserting, that such was the case with the whole of the

allied army. It would not have been extraordinary if, in such a battle, the ammunition of more than one corps had been exhausted; but as no such circumstance was ever heard of, either by myself, the Quarter-Master-General, or the officer commanding the artillery; and, as no supply was ever sent for from the reserve-ammunition for any regiment whatever, I am, except as regards the 29th, to which Major Elliott's testimony refers, compelled to discredit the account.

But the failure of the ammunition was not the only point which Colonel Napier was required to verify. There were objections to this part of his description of the battle of Albuera, alleged by the author of the "*Strictures*," on which he has not touched. I shall give the objectionable sentence as it stands in his History, and of which he has contented himself with defending the two first words:—"Ammunition failed; and, as the English fire "slackened, the enemy established a column in ad-"vance upon the right flank."—Now, while Major Elliott's testimony affords a very insufficient support to the first assertion, contained in the above extract, it supplies a full and complete refutation of the conclusion. That officer does not give the slightest intimation either that the 29th regiment fell back, or that the enemy advanced. It appears, on the contrary, from his report, that though the regiment had expended its ammunition, the fourth division came up at the very juncture, and compelled the enemy to retire.

The circumstance mentioned by Colonel Light respecting the Spanish cavalry, I never before heard of. His account differs from that given in Sir Benjamin D'Urban's Memoir. It seems extraordinary, that the latter should have sent an order to the cavalry, except through Sir William Lumley, the General commanding them, and who assures me that the circumstance is quite new to him.

Colonel Napier insinuates a charge against me for neglecting to report, in my despatch, that six of our guns had been captured by the enemy. My error was of a blacker dye than he has painted it: I not only omitted to relate the capture of the said guns, but also omitted mentioning that they were afterwards re-captured. The enumeration of such circumstances in a despatch, where the final result of an engagement is favourable, seems to me very unnecessary, and somewhat ostentatious. I stated what we had actually lost, which was one howitzer.

Colonel Napier allows that he was in the wrong respecting "the mutual firing between a British "and Spanish regiment" against each other, because there is incontrovertible evidence against it. But, although this evidence appeared so conclusive, as to induce him to cancel the incident from the pages of his History, he still maintains that such an event must have taken place at some period of the battle; and affirms, that "it is proved by the con-"tradictory evidence, as to which party fired upon "the other." I cannot imagine where this contra-

diction is to be found. I cannot discover it. Colonel Napier says, that "the circumstance was related to "him by a staff-officer of high rank." If so, his informant, I presume, related the whole transaction as it stands in his History, with the incident in which Colonel R. Arbuthnot is represented as so conspicuous an actor, and which that officer positively denies. This very material part of the story being proved to be erroneous, what dependence can be placed in the accuracy of the remainder? "But," rejoins Colonel Napier, "the reader must however "feel, that many circumstances may be satisfactorily "verified to an historian by conversation and by other "means, and yet he may not be able to detail the "chain of evidence in print." Extraordinary as this position is, I do not intend to dispute it; but Colonel Napier must admit, that an historian will obtain credit with the public in proportion to the accuracy of his statements; and if his own literary character were to be tried by the test of the circumstance in question, I do not believe it would be allowed to rank very high. He describes an event in which there are two prominent points:—*first*, the firing of two regiments upon each other; and, *secondly*, the most extraordinary intervention of an officer, whose name is given. Both parts of this story are distinctly contradicted. He is himself satisfied, by the clearest evidence, no such firing of two regiments upon each other took place at the time which he has intimated; and the officer whom he has introduced as playing so prominent a part, most

unequivocally declares, that he was never concerned in any affair of the kind. It would seem then, that this story was refuted, silenced, and put aside for ever; but, no, the historian still maintains that "at "one period of the battle such an event really did "take place." Why or wherefore this opinion is persisted in, he has not condescended to inform us. This is drawing deeply indeed upon that public confidence to which Colonel Napier maintains that he has a right, "on account of the general accuracy of "his statements, and his diligent inquiries after "truth."

How far his search after truth has been diligent or otherwise can only be known to Colonel Napier himself; but we may confidently affirm, from the authorities which he has cited, that his search has frequently been directed to very shallow and insufficient channels of intelligence. We have seen that his statements are almost universally made on the reports of subaltern and regimental officers; and that he has scarcely, in a single instance, had recourse to the information of a general officer, the commander of a brigade, or even the colonel of a regiment. We have seen that, when his representations are derived from documentary evidence, or the publications of others, his extracts are often partially made, and his inferences false and unmilitary. We have seen that, even with regard to facts of which he supposed himself "an eye-witness," from not taking the trouble of ascertaining what corps it was whose operations passed before his view, he has been led

into the greatest errors. We have seen, moreover, that while he describes his authorities, for "even "the most trifling points, as sound and numerous," statements of very material consequence are often made upon the unsupported evidence of one single witness, like Captain Squires; and that there are very few points on which his authorities are "*numerous*," and scarcely any on which they are "*sound*."

Colonel Napier describes the author of the "*Stric-* "*tures*" as saying, that "Soult took an hour to "execute his movement across the Albuera against "the right, and that the Spaniards resisted after- "wards for an hour and a half." From this account he most gratuitously concludes, that "the French Ge- "neral was permitted for two hours and a half to "act against a point of the position, on the posses- "sion of which depended the safety of the army. "They were," he says, "allowed to act there for "two hours and a half unopposed, save by a few "thousand Spaniards, who were confused and dis- "ordered by a sudden change of front, and by this "unexpected attack; and yet the 2d division was "within a mile of them, and the rest of the army "not two miles distant." This is, truly, a most extraordinary passage! The author persists in as- serting, that "the Spaniards were in disorder from "the beginning." It has been proved, that no such disorder existed as he has described. He was not present. His account is contradicted by notorious facts, and he has not advanced a tittle of evidence in support of it. I am unable to speak, with any

accuracy, of the time which elapsed between the different movements of the day, or which was occupied in effecting them; but, let it be granted that Soult was an hour—the author of the "*Strictures*" says, "about an hour,"—in passing the stream, and reaching our position, still it appears from Lapéne, an actor in the scene, that he did not make this advance, and spend this time, without encountering some opposition on the part of the allies. Lapéne may have exaggerated the resistance that the French met with, but still they must have met with some. The reader has already been informed why I was induced to take up a position, and to avoid, as far as possible, all general manœuvring, or bringing any considerable body of my men in contact with the enemy, out of position. So much for the first hour; and, with respect to the remaining hour and a half, Colonel Napier's account is not only contradicted by the "*Strictures*," but by his own History. It is on every hand admitted, that the misadventure to Colborne's brigade happened during this latter period. It was by one of the straggling lancers from that attack that I was myself encountered; and the author of the "*Strictures*" states, that at the time this event occurred, "the Spanish line was still un-
"broken, and most bravely encountering the enemy." It appears also to have been after, or about this time, that the Spanish line was fired into by the British second line; so that, at the least, the whole of Colborne's and part of Houghton's brigades must have been engaged. It is a most singular inference for

a military man to draw, that, because a particular corps is said to have kept its ground for an hour and a half, therefore, for that hour and a half, no other troops *were brought into action* against the enemy. This conclusion appears more strange, when it is remembered that Colonel Napier has himself expressly named the other troops which were at that very time engaged.

For what object, or on what authority, the historian has asserted that "the 2nd division was within "a mile of the Spaniards, and the rest of the army "not two miles," is to me incomprehensible. After General Blake had received his orders, all the other commanders of corps had received theirs, in as quick succession as the distances would permit. No one of them could have failed of having already received his instructions at the very beginning of the hour and a half in question; and they must all very soon after, if not before that time, have been in their respective positions, as indicated on the plan for the second order of battle; while a part of Stewart's division was actually in the rear of the Spaniards at the time, and somewhat nearer to them than was necessary. The author's idea of the enemy's being unopposed by the army in position, "except by a "few thousands of Spaniards, confused and dis-"ordered," will also, I should imagine, be considered as not a little singular. The Spaniards, as all allow, formed our first line on the main heights, Stewart's division formed our second line, and covered the right flank of the Spaniards. The allies were in position.

The enemy were the aggressors; and, at the period alluded to, I cannot see what more could have been expected of us, while acting on the defensive and resisting an attack, until the offensive party was seen to be so far weakened as to permit our attacking them in return. Such was the course of this battle; and such was also, I believe, the general course of the battle of Waterloo. I have proved, in contradiction of Colonel Napier, that the Spaniards were *not* in the state of confusion and disorder which the historian has described, and that the French did not mount the hill, on the testimony of Lapéne; but since I began my observations on this part of the historian's "*Justification*," an account has been transmitted me, which I shall here lay before the reader, as it not only confirms Lapéne upon the above-mentioned points, but affords a complete refutation of some other errors in the "*History of the Peninsular War*."

In reply to some inquiries which I addressed to Sir William Inglis, he sent me the following narrative by himself, which he published in the United Service Gazette of June, 1832; something more than a year before the appearance of Colonel Napier's "*Justification:*"—

"The 2d division of the British army engaged "at Albuera was under the command of Major-"General the Right Honourable Sir W. Stewart. "The 3d brigade in that division was the one that "was commanded by Major-General Houghton, and "was composed of the 29th, 1st battalion 57th, 1st

" battalion 48th. The whole division moved from " its ground in open column of companies, right in " front, about a mile, where the line was to be " formed on the leading company.

" At this period *the Spaniards were warmly en-* " *gaged with the enemy, and were behaving most* " *gallantly.* General Stewart's division was " brought up to support them and to form the " second line.

" After the 29th, and the right wing of the 57th " had formed, a body of French lancers got between " the two lines. The right platoon of the 29th " was ordered to disperse them. The fire from this " body flew rapidly to the left, and in consequence " was taken up by the 57th. Colonel Inglis, who " commanded the latter regiment, was, it so hap- " pened, at that moment wholly employed in the " act of correcting an error which had occurred in " the formation of the centre of his regiment, in " which, owing to the rain that fell, and the thickness " of the atmosphere which it occasioned, joined to " their having met with a piece of hollow ground, " the 5th company had lost its perpendicularity, and " doubled behind the 4th, whereby the centre of the " regiment became crowded; Colonel Inglis having " also at the same time his horse shot under him.

" It was at this moment, and whilst Colonel Inglis' " attention was thus unavoidably taken off, that the " firing which has been mentioned happened; but " almost instantly Colonel Inglis was again, though " dismounted, in front of his right wing, and gave

" the command to order arms, which was immedi-
" ately obeyed.

" Whilst speaking to his men on what had occur-
" red, General Houghton and a Spanish officer came
" up to him, and complained that the Spaniards had
" been fired upon. Colonel Inglis expressed his
" concern, of course, at such an occurrence; but it
" was a great satisfaction to him to perceive that
" the Spaniards themselves had happily not suffered—
" a circumstance which was attributable to their posi-
" tion with respect to the hill at the time of firing,
" which occasioned the balls to pass over their heads.

" Colonel Inglis then called the General's atten-
" tion to the steadiness evinced by his regiment,
" who were standing with ordered arms under so heavy
" a fire from the enemy. General Houghton di-
" rected Colonel Inglis not to engage till he should
" receive his orders so to do, and said, that he him-
" self was going to the right of his brigade, and
" would take off his hat to the Colonel, as a signal
" to him when he wished him to commence. When
" the signal was given (the Spaniards having retired)
" it was returned by the Colonel, who then ordered
" arms to be shouldered, and his regiment then threw
" in a very heavy well-directed fire, by files from the
" right of companies.

" From this period nothing more was heard of
" General Houghton by Colonel Inglis, until his
" Aid-de-camp, Captain Ramsden, acquainted Colo-
" nel Inglis that he was killed."

To the above conclusive article of Sir W. Inglis,

I shall add one paragraph from his letter to me which accompanied it:—"When your Lordship spoke "to me, the Spaniards retired very rapidly; and "when our front was clear, we were close to the "enemy, (perhaps) within one hundred paces. "*The French never did ascend the heights or at-*"*tempt it.*"

This, be it remembered, is really the report of an "eye-witness." It establishes, beyond the possibility of dispute, that some time after the attack on Colborne's brigade, nay, after the formation and arrival of Houghton's brigade, the Spaniards resolutely maintained their ground. The fact of the gallant 57th regiment having remained some time in second line, and so close to them with ordered arms, is a proof too strong to be controverted. The above statement evinces that Lapéne and the author of the "*Strictures*" were correct in saying that the enemy never mounted the hill. It also confirms, to the very letter, my reasoning on Major Elliot's account of the 29th regiment having been charged by the French cavalry. The time and the circumstances of the event are too clearly designated by Sir W. Inglis, to allow of any mistake respecting it. The charge occurred, he informs us, during the obscurity of the weather, the very time at which the attack was made on Colborne's brigade. We find, consequently, that there was only one charge made, and by one body of the enemy's cavalry; and that it was a small and confused part of the same, which appeared on the right of the 29th. That the number

of men was inconsiderable is evident, from its having required no more than one platoon to drive them off. Sir W. Inglis's narrative also settles the question with regard to the Spaniards firing on the English;—and in all these particulars verifies the account of the "*Further Strictures,*" and most decidedly contradicts the representations of Colonel Napier.

I must now call the reader's attention to the historian's observations on the movements of Sir Lowry Cole's division. By referring to the plan of the battle, and observing the disposition of the troops, it will be seen that the conical hill, under which the Valverde road ran, was nearly the centre of our first position; that our first line was close to and in its front, and that a strong force of artillery had been placed upon this eminence, not only on account of its general importance, but that it might secure to us the possession of the road, which was our only means of retreat, if the enemy should prove victorious. The troops at the village, and in advance nearer the Albuera stream, must first have been attacked and driven back, before the enemy could have reached this line. It consequently both supported the advanced position and afforded protection to those troops, which, if forced, had nothing to interrupt their retreat. The case, however, was totally altered with regard to the troops in and near Albuera, when, on the attempt being made upon our right, we changed our front, and left them at more than a mile distant, diagonally, to the rear of our left. They were,

however, still fully protected, and had their retreat secure, as long as the Portuguese division remained in reserve under the conical hill; but when the latter were moved by its commander, and took up an advanced position on the right of, and nearly in alignment with, the former, then the left became considerably thrown forward; and, consequently, had our right been broken or turned, not only would the enemy have been placed a mile or two in the rear, and on the road of retreat of those troops, but the whole army would have been taken in reverse, whilst they were also attacked in front.

That such was actually the state of the case, when we were in our first position, and expected that the enemy's attack would be against our then front, will appear clear to any one who looks at the placing of the troops, as described in the published plan of the battle.

The mass of our cavalry was stationed to the rear, near the centre, and Cole's division was in reserve to Stewart's; but immediately on the attempt against our right being perceived, the cavalry, supported by Cole, was placed, as shewn in the plan, to frustrate the object of our adversary, who was obviously bent on attacking and turning our right, with a view of gaining our rear, and seizing the line of our retreat. If we consider the several objects and the different points my reserve had to attend to, I think that, after our change of front, it will appear to have been happily placed under and to the rear of the conical

hill. It was in that situation *à portée* to our extreme right (Cole's division), to the new field of battle in our second position, and to the troops in the village and neighbourhood of Albuera. The correctness of the above simple exposition will not be doubted, I apprehend, by any military man.—Now, I will here advert to Colonel Napier's observations. The author of the "*Strictures,*" he observes, "would have it believed that Beresford did at the "time disapprove, and does still blame the advance "of the fusilier brigade, because the enemy's ca-"valry might, he says, have penetrated by the gap "thus made, and because he was in no danger of "being beaten, and never thought of retreating." It is not fair that expressions which he has never used, and meanings which he never could have entertained, should, as is the case in the above extract, be attributed by one writer to another. The author of the "*Further Strictures*" has simply confined himself to detailing facts, and declaring what he considers himself to have perceived or known of my views and intentions. And the preceding observations ought never to have proceeded from Colonel Napier, who was the first that attempted to deprive the commander of that division, of the credit due to his movement†. It was, as is stated in the "*Strictures,*" successful—it was commended, as the historian has mentioned, in my despatch. God forbid that I should ever look into all the petty details of a gallant ex-

† Ibid. vol. iii. p. 539.

ploit with a view of discovering its flaws—let Colonel Napier rest assured that I am no disciple of so illiberal a school. Besides, the commander, by adopting the suggestions and taking all the responsibility on himself, had made it his own; and the coolness, the extreme gallantry, and the military science which he displayed in its execution, deserved the utmost meed of praise. Under all the obstacles and hazards to which it was exposed, nothing less perhaps could have secured its success. But is all this, or more, to prevent the Commander-in-Chief, if he apprehend that a movement may give rise to disastrous consequences, from expressing his opinion and taking measures to counteract them? On this point I am quite willing to adopt every sentence uttered by the author of the "*Strictures.*" And there is one passage of his work relating to this subject so correct, and so convincing, that I cannot forbear laying it before the reader:—"It "may," he says, "be as well to indicate the objects "to be gained by retaining this post. It completely "covered the Valverde road on the line of retreat; "it covered effectually, with the assistance of our "small corps of cavalry, the right and rear of both "the original and the new position; and under its "support that cavalry became a valuable part of our "army, which could not otherwise have withstood "the superior cavalry of the enemy; besides, to its "rear and under its protection was placed all the "baggage and spare ammunition of the allied "troops. I refer the reader to the plan of the

" battle prefixed to this publication; and the posi-
" tion of that division is so singular, that, whether
" civilian or military, he cannot fail perceiving at a
" single glance, that it served all the purposes I have
" named, and which it frequently takes half an army
" to secure."

Has Colonel Napier attempted to refute any part of the above statement? He has not, and he could not. Indeed, not only has he himself borne witness to the necessity under which we lay of retaining that position, but Lapéne, our enemy, has still more strongly and decisively expressed himself to the same effect; and, I may add, that both have justified the correctness of my views respecting the object of Marshal Soult, which have been stated in a former page. I do not, by-the-bye, find in the "*Strictures*" the expression of "penetrating by the *gap*" made by Cole's advances. I may, perhaps, have overlooked it; but, if there, it certainly is not an appropriate word. The movement of Cole's division did not make a gap; but, by leaving the cavalry uncovered and unprotected, it destroyed the combination of cavalry and infantry mutually supporting each other, which I had formed for the protection of that most important position. Whether the combination was right or wrong, necessary or unnecessary, is not the present question. I had made it, because I conceived it of consequence; and every one will believe that, on seeing this post, which I regarded as so essential, weakened, I must naturally have felt alarmed, and endeavoured with all despatch to strengthen it. But

my anxiety was not caused, as Colonel Napier supposes, from any idea that the French cavalry would push through the *gap*, which was made by the advance of the Fusiliers, and which, if any such *gap* really existed, must have been between the left of the cavalry and the right of Stewart's division; but I was distressed by the consideration, that the fifteen squadrons of the allies, 1,500 men, under Lumley, of which not one-half were British, were left entirely unsupported against the twenty-six squadrons of the enemy, 3,500 men, under Latour Maubourg; and that if this latter should attack Lumley, and prove successful, as both his number and composition rendered only too probable, the most destructive results must have been inevitable. No military man, looking at the position, can for one instant doubt what the consequences must have been*. "Marshal Be-

* It is strange that Colonel Napier should not only doubt the fact, but appears to ridicule the idea of my feeling any anxiety on witnessing the movement of Cole's division; yet, if his History is correct, he has himself shewn how well-founded such apprehension would have been. He there represents the victory as being some time in doubt after the Fusiliers had come in contact with the enemy; and has clearly pointed out the fatal consequences which must have ensued from a defeat, if the enemy had broken our right, and penetrated round it. The same things appear to Colonel Napier under very different aspects when he wishes to censure me, or when he desires to defend the conduct of a French General. In accounting for Latour Maubourg's not having attacked our cavalry under Lumley during the day, he vindicates him on the ground of the support which the latter received from the union of the three arms, and consequently, and most especially, from the presence of Cole's divi-

" resford then," says Colonel Napier, ironically, " by " bringing up Collins's Portuguese and the Spanish " reserves to the aid of Houghton's brigade, and " joining them to Abercrombie's troops, expected to " have defeated the enemy, and, without the assist- " ance of the Fusiliers, to have won that battle " which was so hardly gained with their assistance. " Truly he expected much! the regiments of Hough- " ton's brigade, having lost two-thirds of their num- " bers, being without ammunition, and having a " French column already advanced upon their right " flank, were to have maintained the height until all " the troops above-mentioned could be brought into " line, and then Spaniards and Portuguese were to " do what the Fusiliers did!"

What Marshal Beresford expected can have

sion. On this occasion a high and just tribute of applause is yielded to Sir W. Lumley; and as Latour Maubourg is to be defended, I also come in for my share of commendation. But if the French General was only justified in not attacking Lumley by this combination, what excuse remained for his omission, after that combination was destroyed by the withdrawal of Cole's division? According to the historian's own shewing, I had ample cause of anxiety and alarm, lest Latour Maubourg should at that moment advance against Lumley, and when the consequences of his succeeding would have been to the full as disastrous as Colonel Napier has described, or I could, probably, have feared? I am not finding fault with the conduct of General Latour Maubourg: I am too well aware how easily, and how unjustly, an enemy may be censured by persons who criticise his movements without being acquainted with his orders, objects, or circumstances. I merely allude to the subject with a view of shewing the inconsistency of the historian's representations.

nothing to do with the question. His business was, to defeat the enemy if he could, and adopt the best measures for the protection of his own troops, if beaten. He might, however, very reasonably have supposed that the Spanish and Portuguese reserves of 10,000 men, aided by Abercrombie's brigade of British, might be able to effect as much as could be effected by the Fusiliers alone. Without detracting an atom from the credit due to the Fusiliers, I have no hesitation in saying, that the Portuguese reserve would have done as much as they did. Memories appear to be things of a very frail and singular construction; for it is recounted by Colonel Napier himself, who now disparages these troops, that on this very occasion one battalion of Portuguese Caçadores accompanied and protected the flank of the Fusiliers; whilst a brigade of the same nation acted under Colonel Harvey, with a gallantry not inferior to that of the Fusiliers.

The historian here repeats his account of the want of ammunition. It has been previously discussed, and I should suppose completely *refuted*. As to "maintaining the heights till the troops could be "brought into line arrived," I do not think that all the 10,000 or 12,000 men could have been required; but, be that as it may, it does not appear that bringing up the whole of them would have occasioned much delay, as a part, Colonel Collins's brigade, had actually arrived. "There was," says Colonel Napier, "no danger of the French cavalry pushing "through the gap made by the advance of the Fusi-

" liers, as Harvey's Portuguese brigade was placed " in the gap*, and that brigade did actually repulse " an attempt made by Latour Maubourg to push his " light cavalry through." Of this *gap* itself I shall take no farther notice. It was not on account of any gap, it was not about the infantry that I was concerned; but, as I have already stated, lest Latour Maubourg should have borne down upon Lumley, and swept him away. It must, at least, be clear that such was my opinion, or I should never have assigned to General Cole's division the post in which it was stationed. But, as far as I can comprehend the historian's meaning, I believe him to be mistaken in saying, that " Harvey's Portuguese brigade was " placed in the gap." I saw the division moved off altogether; and, by referring to Sir B. D'Urban's report†, it will be seen that, on the march, Harvey's brigade was attacked by and repulsed the enemy. To do this they must have halted temporarily, and, after beating off the French cavalry, continued their march, and proceeded finally to the attack, nearly at the same time as the Fusiliers. I myself saw nothing of this brigade after its first movement. If, by-the-bye, the conduct of these Portuguese troops equalled, or was so nearly on a par with that of the Fusiliers, why should it be supposed that 5,000 or or 6,000 men, of the same nation, and equal disci-

* I am glad to find, here, that the Portuguese troops have so soon recovered their value in the estimation of the historian. These are really, if not "new," very "curious facts."

† Appendix to "*Further Strictures*," page 31.

pline, would have been found unable to perform a service which was effected by 1,500 Fusiliers? These notions are, I think, contradictory; but still they are both maintained by Colonel Napier. Now, even leaving the Spaniards in the back-ground, 4,000 or 5,000 Portuguese troops might have been brought up; and, if I had not conceived such a number of that nation equal to 1,500 British, I should have been mad to have risked my army on the battle-ground of Albuera, in opposition to such an enemy as I there encountered. In confirmation of the reasonings and statements on this point, I have already referred the reader to Sir Benjamin D'Urban's report, and to the published plan of the battle. I now add the testimony of Lieutenant-General Sir W. Lumley, who, it will be seen, was an anxious eye-witness.

"Frequently, as time and circumstances would "permit, I scanned with no small anxiety the whole "line of infantry on those hotly and effectively con- "tested, and most important heights, the key of our "position; but, to the best of my recollection, was "not aware of the advance of the two brigades (the "Fusiliers and Harvey's), until they had passed my "left flank. They then came under my eye; and, "as D'Urban states, the rain and smoke having at "that time cleared away, I saw them, as one body, "moving to engage; and, although they had become "so oblique, relative to the point where I stood, "that I could not well speak to the actual distance "between the two, there did not appear any im-

" proper chasm or distance. Just about this period " also it was that D'Urban came up to me, and upon " my asking him how matters were going on upon " the left and elsewhere, and his giving me a hasty " detail of facts, he finished with saying, ' The " ' great object is to make that Portuguese brigade " ' cling well to the hill: I have just been with them " ' for that purpose.' And well and bravely, to my " mind, did they obey his instructions."

Sir William Lumley then proceeds to speak of the attempt of the French cavalry to charge the Portuguese brigade. But the above is sufficient to shew that the conduct and position of the brigade was as I have described them.

I now come to the consideration of the last of those " new and curious facts" relating to the battle of Albuera, which Colonel Napier's extensive researches have led to the discovery of. He asserts that I had contemplated a retreat; that I gave the order for it; and that the order was in part obeyed. This fact, the author says, " he had often heard of, " but has only recently ascertained." From documents now lying before me, I shall be enabled, I trust, to shew that the historian on this, as on many other particulars, has been most egregiously misinformed. I must, however, at once and most distinctly deny, that I ever gave such an order for retreat, or had any such measure in contemplation. Looking, indeed, to the circumstances of the moment, and the situation of the 2d and 4th divisions, which included the whole of the British infantry

and some Portuguese, it is clear that such an operation was scarcely practicable. Colonel Napier tells us, "*that the bridge and village of Albuera were* "*actually abandoned in obedience to my orders by* "*Alten's Germans, and by the artillery.*" I, on the other hand, assert that the bridge and village of Albuera never were abandoned; and, though Alten had orders to leave the village, I shall presently shew, first, that those instructions were not given with the design supposed by Colonel Napier; and, secondly, that troops enough for its defence would still have remained there, even though Alten and his Germans had actually left it; and that part of those troops were nearer to the bridge than even those of Alten in the village.

But first let me inquire what is Colonel Napier's evidence to prove, that this order for a retreat was given? It consists of a passage extracted from a publication by Sir Julius Hartman. The work I have never met with, but the quotation, as printed and probably translated by Colonel Napier in his "*Justification,*" is, I have no doubt, correct. For that, however, I am not answerable,—I take it as given by the historian. It is as follows:—

"The enemy made repeated and very serious "attacks on the bridge, which, however, were un- "successful, until the troops received an order to "assemble to cover the retreat upon Valverde. The "General-in-chief had given this order at a moment "when the result of the struggle for the possession "of the heights had appeared to him doubtful. In

" pursuance of this order, General Von Alten and " the commander of the Portuguese artillery, Major " Dickson, *abandoned the village and bridge, which* " *was immediately occupied by the enemy.* Directly " after, the retaking of this was most urgently or- " dered, which, by the valour of the troops, with " great sacrifice and spilling of blood, was accom- " plished; but, notwithstanding, the possession of " the bridge was never completely obtained.". This extract the historian considers as sufficient to establish his assertion, that a retreat was ordered. I think his evidence altogether valueless. Even if Sir Julius Hartman had said that such a command had been given, he would have said so without any authority. It is true that he was in the battle; but at such a distance from the bridge and village of Albuera as must have entirely prevented his being acquainted with the operations that were there going on. But Colonel Napier has drawn a forced and false inference from his statement. Hartman does not say that " a retreat was ordered," or that even any single corps was "ordered to retreat." No such conclusion can, according to my view of them, be, legitimately or militarily, deduced from his expressions. What does he say?—" That the troops"—*i. e.* one brigade of 1,100 strong—were " ordered " to *cover* the retreat upon Valverde."

I will not object to this statement, though it might be less equivocal; but he has mentioned in the following sentences what he conceived to be the reason of this command, and indicates that he had no

idea of the army, or even this small brigade, having received any order to retreat. "The General-in-"chief," he says, "had given this order at a moment "when the result of the struggle for the possession "of the heights had appeared to him doubtful."

This evidently shews that I had no intention of preventing the continuance of the struggle, and consequently was not thinking of voluntary retreat. If there had existed no reason for the precautions that I adopted, except that given by Sir Julius Hartman, I should have been sufficiently justified; but there was another in the unprotected state of the cavalry, as has been already mentioned: and besides, in every struggle of every battle, as in every battle itself, the success is always doubtful; and, even at the risk of differing with Colonel Napier, I must maintain that it is the commander's duty to provide against the occurrence of either probable or possible danger. Such, at that moment, was my case. Sir Julius Hartman, however, clearly intimates that my order to Alten's brigade was to provide against the forced retreat, or the defeat, of our line engaged, and not to order a retreat of the army, as Colonel Napier would infer. Every military man will be astonished at such a strange construction being put upon the passage. But had a retreat really been contemplated, would the orders for it have only been despatched to the commander of one brigade of 1,100 men? The very idea is absurd. Sir Julius Hartman himself commanded the British and Hanoverian artillery—no unimportant arm either in attack or

defence; and it does not appear that any notice of such a movement was communicated to him. Sir William Lumley, who, as commander of the cavalry, ought, according to my military ideas, to have been among the first to receive an intimation of it, was in equal ignorance. Sir Lowry Cole, Sir William Stewart, Sir John Hamilton, General Blake, the whole army in fact, with the exception of Sir A. Campbell, whose orders and position will soon be shewn, were all left without instructions on this momentous point;—that is, no such order was received or heard of during the battle by the officers commanding the several corps of the army. Thus, then, because a corps of 1,100 men is ordered to take up a position to cover the line of retreat for 28,000 in case of a reverse, it is insisted upon by an historian and great military critic that a retreat of the allies was not only contemplated but ordered!—I was extremely anxious to counteract all the attempts of the enemy towards our right and the Valverde road; because, as has been said, I clearly saw what his principal object was; and that no care to oppose him in that direction could be thrown away. With this view I strengthened that point originally, and sought to replace Cole's division as soon as I saw it moved. And that I was correct in my view of his object, two extracts, one from Lapéne and another from Colonel Napier, will, I think, suffice to prove.

"The General-in-chief, Soult," says Lapéne, "not "being able with his weak army to attack the enemy "on all points, determined to throw all his force upon

" one only, and to overwhelm it. With that inten-
" tion, he chose the extreme right of the allies.
" Marshal Soult foresaw that, if that right was de-
" feated, it must fall back on the left of the position,
" and uncover the road to Olivença, which passes
" through Valverde, the only one by which it could
" retreat. This road once in our possession, the
" allied army risked being entirely cut off, and
" thrown back upon Badajoz, at the mercy of the
" garrison, which, rendered free by raising the
" blockade, would necessarily fall upon the rear of
" the enemy, and infallibly complete its defeat.
" The dispositions to effect this object were as fol-
" lows," &c.

In confirmation of this account by Lapéne, it is stated by Colonel Napier himself, that " the hill in " the centre commanding the Valverde road, was " undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack " was made parallel to the front; but the heights on " the right presented a sort of table-land, trending " backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking " into the rear of the line of battle. Hence it was " evident that, if a mass of troops could be placed " there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the " allied army would be rolled up on the centre and " pushed into the narrow ravine of the Arroya; the " Valverde road would then be seized, the retreat " cut off, and the powerful cavalry of the French " would complete the victory."

These passages sufficiently account for my jealousy of the enemy's movements towards our right, and for

my keeping strong on that point. Captain Lapéne, of course, affords direct authority for the plan of Marshal Soult. The correctness of his account is evinced by every circumstance of the battle, and I am willing to admit it did not require, perhaps, any very great military skill to detect what the Marshal's object was, as soon as his attack on our right was perceived. The view which Colonel Napier has taken, of the results that must have ensued on the enemy's succeeding in his attack, is just; and, though there was no ravine, the disastrous consequences to our army would only have been more certain and fatal from the facility of action thus afforded the enemy's cavalry: yet Colonel Napier appears to censure the natural solicitude which I exhibited for the security of that point, at the very time the hill was in dispute, and would infer from my forming a reserve to retrieve or mitigate the evils of any adverse event which might occur, that I had determined on a retreat! With equal justice might the historian suppose, that when a second line is formed, a general always concludes that his first will be defeated.

But if a retreat was really in my contemplation, how does Colonel Napier account for my having despatched Colonel Collins's brigade, at the very time my orders were sent to Alten, to the most eventful part of the battle, with instructions to repair to the position which Cole had left, if his assistance there was not required? From these simultaneous instructions, two things may be inferred: first, from my supposing it possible that Collins's aid might not be

needed at the chief point of contest, that, though doubts might exist in my mind, I could not be very much alarmed, for the ultimate issue of the conflict there; and, secondly, from my sending him to strengthen the cavalry, that I was in some apprehension as to that point. I have thus far argued on the supposition that the words of my orders to Count Alten, as given by Sir Julius Hartman, were correctly reported,—which is not the case,—with a view of shewing that the conclusion drawn from them by Colonel Napier is untenable; but I can confirm all that has been stated above on the most unquestionable authority,—that of Count Alten himself. In a narrative of the events of the 16th May, as far as his brigade was concerned, he says,—"Meanwhile the "engagement on our right (the main battle) had "become very serious and doubtful for the allies; "and it was at this time of the day that I received "Marshal Beresford's orders to get loose of the "village with my brigade, with the ultimate view of "taking up a position in rear of it, covering the "Valverde road." That such was my precise message to Alten, I clearly recollect. It corresponds with all that I have stated. The words of my order, thus truly given, can bear but one construction. From the context of the passage quoted from Sir Julius Hartman, I believe that to have been the construction which he really put upon the order in question; and that the misapprehension has been altogether confined to Colonel Napier. Under the circumstances of the time, I conceive, that no better

arrangements could have been made; and that I should have been highly culpable if I had neglected to make them. It appears, as I have before stated, that the Portuguese brigade of Sir A. Campbell, which at the commencement of the action (on Godinot's movement towards the village) had been sent to support Alten, was still at the village of Albuera. He had full 2,000 men under his command, which, with Alten's corps, made 3,000 at that point. A Spanish force, moreover, had been ordered there. The number of the enemy opposite was not so great; and I might surely, therefore, draw off the 1,000 without any risk of endangering the safety of the post.

I here request the reader's attention to a letter of Sir A. Campbell, which he recently wrote to me from New Brunswick giving an account of the position of the troops under his command, and the orders which he received, respecting the *retreat* that is so obstinately insisted on by Colonel Napier.

" Statement of a few particulars relative to the " operations during the battle of Albuera, in which " the brigade I commanded was concerned.

" On the morning of the 16th May, as the British " army was moving to the right, and the Portuguese " brigade I commanded, consisting of the 10th and " 4th regiments, had arrived on the rising ground " immediately in the rear of the village of Albuera, " I received orders through Lieutenant-Colonel Har- " dinge, then Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the

" Portuguese army, to move down on the village to " support the light brigade of the German legion, " then in it, under the command of Major-General " Alten. I instantly did so, sending on an officer of " my staff to acquaint him (he being my senior " officer) with the directions I had received, and to " request his orders as to the disposal of the troops " I had brought to his support. On the return of " this officer, I was informed by him that the Gene- " ral did not wish that any of the troops under my " command should enter the village, but requested " that I would, by an equal division of them, occupy " the ground in its immediate flanks. This I did " by ordering the 10th regiment under Lieutenant- " Colonel the Count de Regende to the left, and the " 4th regiment to the right, posting the four bat- " talions as per accompanying sketch, and ordering the " banks of the river in front of each position to be " occupied with a strong line of skirmishers.

" In the course of the day I received an order to " be prepared in case of need—(as explained to me " at the time)—on the event of my seeing that " matters were not going on favourably to the right, " to fall back, and occupy the rising ground then " immediately in rear of the position of the 4th " regiment. This order being, as I have already " mentioned, only a precautionary one, I made no " movement whatever in consequence, and did not " even call in the skirmishers from the banks of the " river. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel " Arbuthnot came to say, that whatever orders I

" might have received to the purport stated, I was " on no account to quit the position I then held " near the village, as every thing was going on victo- " riously to the right along the whole line. I desired " him to inform Marshal Beresford that we had not " (as he himself saw) made any movement in con- " sequence of the first order, not having seen any " cause for so doing.

(Signed) " A. CAMPBELL,
" *Major-General.*"

I have here given the whole of Sir A. Campbell's statement, with the exception of one short paragraph, which will be presently cited.

It will be recollected that on the change of position, our left at the village became thrown forward a full eighth of a circle; and consequently, as the Portuguese division no longer occupied the reserve position in which I had placed it, should our right have been turned, or broken through, our left would have been unsupported, and the line of retreat unprotected. Neither, if the new right was broken, was there any support for them to fall back upon and rally under; while, at the same moment, by the advance of Cole's division, the cavalry were deprived of the protection provided originally for it. It was very evidently my intention that Alten should occupy a position from which he might be able to assist all these objects, and that Campbell's brigade, if our right was broken through, should retire upon and reinforce him, while it withdrew itself from the

peril of being cut off by a double fire. My discretionary orders were given him to secure despatch in the execution of his movements, and prevent any inconvenience that might arise, if, in the moment of peril, he had to wait for my instructions how to act. I repeat that, reviewing the circumstances of the time, and reconsidering the ground, I feel proud of the measures that were adopted on that day. It is, however, clear that not only was no retreat ordered, but that there is not the slightest ground for supposing it even entered into my contemplation. It may perhaps appear unnecessary, but I shall here add a final and positive evidence in refutation of this charge, from one who, had such an order been given, could not have been ignorant of the fact. The evidence is that of my then Quarter-Master-General, and is taken from a letter written the 29th of August, 1811, the year of the battle. It was written by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in reply to a friend in London, detailing the several idle rumours respecting the battle of Albuera, which had been transmitted to England in the gossiping communications of some of the officers of the army, and among which this story of a premeditated retreat was one. "It only remains for me to observe," writes Sir Benjamin D'Urban to his correspondent, "upon that part of your letter, by which I see that "some misinformation has led you to suppose it was "at one period of the day Sir William Beresford's "intention to retreat. I am clear and positive, and "I pledge myself that no such intention was ever

" formed, that no such order was ever given, or " meditated." It must here be added that in Sir Benjamin D'Urban's printed narrative of the operations of the allied army under my command,—a work which Colonel Napier has read and quoted from,—a note is given, at the twenty-first page, which presents the most distinct and unqualified contradiction of this reported retreat. Thus Colonel Napier had the evidence of the Quarter-Master-General of the army, in contradiction of the account of Sir Julius Hartman, who merely repeats a rumour which he had heard, and for which he has no direct testimony of his own, or anybody else, to produce. But I would inquire whether, in point of fact, the village of Albuera ever was abandoned by the allies, and occupied by the enemy; and what was that great " sacri- " fice and spilling of blood " which ensued in consequence, as asserted by Sir Julius Hartman, and so pompously maintained by Colonel Napier?

Immediately following the paragraph already quoted from Count Alten, and in continuation of it, he says,—" The brigade was withdrawn by detach- " ments from the village, in order to be formed out " of musket-shot, behind the same; but, before it " was actually formed, and just about the time that " the last detachments were in the act of quitting " the village, the battle had been decided in favour " of the allies; and the Marshal's countermand " arrived. Several companies of the 2d light " battalion, which were the nearest at hand, instantly " faced about and retook the village, cheering and

" advancing in double quick time, without meeting " with any serious opposition. The enemy was " found to have thrown only a *very few* straggling " Tirailleurs into the place; and even these were " not met with, till the church-yard, situated in the " centre of the village, had been passed."

The words " very few," which are given in italics, are underlined in the original MSS. of Count Alten. By a reference to the plan it will be seen that there are no houses between the church and the stream; and the distance between the two is from fifty to sixty yards. The sharp-shooters, therefore, might have assailed the advancing troops from beyond the river. The case is of no consequence. I only make the observation in consequence of what is stated by Sir Archibald Campbell, who can scarcely have been deceived; and my supposition reconciles the trifling discrepancy that appears in the two accounts. But the report of Alten is amply sufficient to shew that the evidence of Sir Julius Hartman, on which Colonel Napier so confidently relies, is singularly erroneous. I must also remark that the time, which elapsed between the two messages sent to Count Alten and Sir A. Campbell, was too short to have allowed the Count to get loose from the village: and I despatched Colonel Arbuthnot with orders to keep possession of Albuera, under a belief—and it was under my eye at the time—that the Germans had not yet quitted it; and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in a letter now lying before me, says,—

" The village was still in the occupation of the " German light battalion on my arrival, although

" Baron Alten was withdrawing them. But he " immediately reoccupied it; and I saw none of the " enemy there, nor did I hear any firing in it; though " I went afterwards to Sir Archibald Campbell who " was close to the place, and remained some time to " rest myself, as I was most excessively fatigued."

I shall here introduce the last paragraph of Sir A. Campbell's statement, which I previously omitted. " Being," he says, " thus in the position already " stated from nearly the very commencement of the " battle, till late in the evening, I can positively say, " that *not one French soldier* entered the village of " Albuera during that period."

So much for " the great sacrifice and spilling of " blood " in the village of Albuera. Colonel Napier indulges himself in a practice of printing any passages in italics to which he would particularly attract observation. This is frequently done in a manner that can scarcely be considered as fair. He very often seems to use it with a view of drawing the reader's attention to a particular sentence, or a few words of a paragraph, to the exclusion of its general drift and import. He has dealt in this manner with the passage quoted from Sir Julius Hartman. The words " to cover the retreat upon Valverde " are given in italics, to rivet the notion of a *retreat* strongly upon the mind; but when Sir Julius Hartman gives reasons to account for this order which do not favour the historian's representations, the reader is left to discover them for himself without any aid from the printer.

I have nothing more to observe on this part of

nel Napier's "*Justification*," except with re-
to the circumstance of Colonel Dickson's hav-
abandoned the village at the same moment with
unt Alten. As the reader has already seen that
e latter never had left it, he might perhaps ex-
ct to find that Major Dickson had been similarly
isrepresented; but he will, I conceive, be surprised
hear that the historian's mistake with regard to
this officer's movements is even greater than with
regard to those of Count Alten, and that he is de-
scribed as retiring from a position in which he had
never been. In a statement of Colonel Dickson,
which is now before me, he says, "*I was not posted*
"at the village of Albuera during the battle; nor
"were the guns under my immediate orders there;
"nor were they nearer the bridge than about seven
"hundred yards.

"My guns were posted on favourable ground
"about seven hundred and fifty, or eight hundred
"yards from the bridge, and at least seven hundred
"yards S.W. of the village. Their fire bore effec-
"tively on the bridge, and the road from it to the
"village. I received my orders from the Marshal
"himself for this object, when the enemy threatened
"a main attack on the bridge.

"The Portuguese artillery under my command
"was attached to General Hamilton's division. I
"believe I limbered up once or twice and moved a
"little, to improve my position, but never to retire."

I trust the reader will consider that I have fully and fairly met the several points of Colonel Napier's

"*Justification,*" in which I am personally interested, my authorities do not, be it observed, like those of the historian, consist of the accounts of regimental officers, few of whom, at the time the events under discussion took place, were above the rank of captain. On the contrary, I have confined myself, in this Refutation of his statements, to the testimony of such superior or general officers, as were present at the different transactions spoken of, and received the orders and directed the execution of them; of staff officers of the highest rank, who could not have been otherwise than intimately acquainted with every point to which their evidence refers; or of those who bore my instructions and saw them, in a greater or a less degree, carried into effect. It is with infinite reluctance that I have entered into this controversy. It is foreign to my habits and my disposition; but many of my friends agreed with me in opinion that to remain silent on this occasion, was to admit the truth of those unfair representations of my military views and conduct, which Colonel Napier has allowed himself to lay before the public, in a work which has acquired some degree of celebrity and circulation.

With regard to the last paragraph of the historian's "*Justification,*" I can assure him, that I neither did, nor do, "spurn the complimentary ex-"pressions of Dumouriez." The personal good opinion of so great a military authority can never be without its value. I did not, indeed, pay much regard to the traits of resemblance that he pointed out between the battle of Albuera and one of the

famous battles of antiquity. The coincidence was purely accidental. The having placed a part of the army under my command in a particular manner, was not to be approved, merely because another had adopted a similar method in classic times. Before any conclusion, either advantageous or disadvantageous to my dispositions for battle could be deduced from such a correspondence, it would be necessary to consider very minutely what agreement there was between the position and circumstances of the former commander and myself, and to possess an accurate knowledge of the reasons by which we were severally influenced. I might, very probably, lose by such an investigation; but, if the authority of Colonel Napier were of as high a value on military subjects as that of General Dumouriez, I should have cause to be proud of the position which I took up at Albuera, and which that great General eulogizes. The "*History of the Peninsular "War*" has passed on it the highest and most eloquent eulogy*; and, with that eulogy, I shall conclude my refutation of the author's criticisms, errors, partial representations, and "new and curious facts."

"It has been said," Colonel Napier states, "that "Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult "with sufficient vigour. The latter, certainly, did "not display any great energy; but the village was "maintained by Alten's Germans, who were good and "hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of "Portuguese. Latour Maubourg's movements seem

* Vide vol. iii. p. 155.

" to have been objected to without reason. He took
" six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew
" a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing
" to keep in check their cavalry. He was, un-
" doubtedly, greatly superior in numbers ; but Gene-
" ral Lumley handled the allied cavalry with skill
" and courage, drew all the advantage possible from
" his situation, and in the choice of that situation
" none can deny the ability of Marshal Beresford.
" The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed
" of the Arroya in their front, the aid of the horse
" artillery, the support of the 4th division, were
" all circumstances of strength so well combined,
" that nothing could be better, and they dictated
" Latour Maubourg's proceedings, which seem con-
" sonant to true principles. If he had charged in
" mass, under the fire of Lefebre's guns, he must
" have been thrown into confusion in passing the
" Arroya at the moment when the 4th division,
" advancing along the slopes, would have opened a
" musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then
" have charged or retired up the hill according to
" circumstances. In this case loss might have been
" sustained, and nothing very decisive could have
" accrued to the advantage of the French, because
" no number of cavalry, if unsustained by in-
" fantry and artillery, can make a serious impres-
" sion against the three arms united."

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
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